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Introduction: Clashes within Civilization
Th e most striking feature of contemporary moral utterance is 
that so much of it is used to express disagreements, and the most 
striking feature of the debates in which these disagreements are 
expressed is their interminable character. . . . Th ere seems to be no 
rational way of securing moral agreement in our culture.
—Alasdair MacIntyre, Aft er Virtue
In our times political controversy seems to follow Muslims wherever they go. Th is is no less true of Europe, where an estimated twenty million Mus-lims now reside mostly as a result of large-scale postwar immigration. 
Non-Muslim Europeans acrimoniously debate how best to handle these 
“new” Europeans of Muslim heritage. For their part, the Muslim Europe-
ans, comprising approximately 4 percent of the European Union’s (EU’s) 
population, hardly speak with one voice. Indeed, a central conclusion of this 
book is that European Muslims disagree vehemently but generally along the 
same ideological contours of discord that generate controversy among non-
Muslim Europeans. To wit, there exists no great, let alone unbridgeable, gulf 
in outlook or lifestyle forever separating “Islamic” from “Western” civiliza-
tion. We should be wary of the “clash of civilizations” thesis originated by 
Samuel Huntington (1996), popularized by the Western media, and applied 
on European soil as a microcosm of the global clash by an array of best-
selling authors (Sarrazin 2010; Fallaci 2006; Ye’or 2005).
I urge instead that we start from the premise of clashes within West-
ern civilization. I have in mind profound philosophical-turned-political 
fi ssures that have emerged in the modern era. Th ese rift s may have been 
briefl y smoothed over (or suppressed) during the generation immediately 
following World War II (WWII), during the so-called “end of ideology” 
(Bell 1960), which coincided with the original wave of postwar immigration 
to Western Europe (Messina 2007: 188–89). Mass immigration of Muslims 
to Europe presented a particularly salient (but hardly the lone) occasion for 
these strains to resurface and intensify beginning in the 1960s in Britain 
and on the Continent in the 1970s and 1980s. Heightened salience involved 
what Miller (2000) observed as the shift  of immigration issues from low to 
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high politics from little noticed or discussed to highly salient, appearing 
regularly in headlines, political speeches, international summits, and so on. 
One common way of reading this switch from low to high politics is to con-
tend that the newcomers caused the problems that merited the heightened 
attention. Th is is the reading I want to counter. Th e controversies swirling 
about immigration—“this cauldron of political and policy debates” (Hol-
lifi eld 1997: 40)—are better understood as deep-seated intra-European 
tensions rather than as clashes between a preexisting, presumably largely 
unifi ed Western Europe and a recently settling (invading) non-European 
“Other” (“Islam”).
Before I outline (and label) the outlooks generating the tensions, let 
us take a moment to look concretely at some of the political controversies 
surrounding European Muslims. Th is will allow the wider contours that I 
want to stress to come into visible relief, including why these intense con-
troversies are not likely to be resolved any time soon. Consider the heads-
carf fl ashpoint (O’Brien 2009). Th ose who support banning the veil (as the 
French government has done in public schools since 2004) contend that the 
sartorial religious practice not only exemplifi es but also proselytizes for 
the oppression of women. Others endorse the ban less out of an interest in 
women’s rights than because they see it as the most visible symbol of the 
dilution of their culture by immigration. Given higher fertility rates among 
Muslims, so goes the argument, immigration will purportedly culminate in 
making the majority (culture) a “minority in its own land.” Others see the 
right to cover as a litmus test for the sincerity of the much-touted freedom 
and tolerance of Western democracies. Many feel that Western European 
publics and governments fail the test miserably. Some critics don the veil as 
a sign of resistance to and condemnation of a long history (since the Cru-
sades) of the domination of “Orientals” by Europeans.
Consider additionally the issue of secularism. In contrast to the Unit-
ed States, with its legal separation of church and state, most European 
governments have long-standing formal or informal relationships with 
Christian and Jewish denominations. Th ese arrangements in one way or 
another channel state resources to promote recognized religious commu-
nities’ undertakings. For example, most European governments help fund 
private confessional schools and/or subsidize the provision of religious, 
denomination-specifi c education in the public schools. It is only natural 
that European Muslims would seek to gain similar state aid for Islam, and 
they have done just that in virtually every European land where they com-
prise a critical mass (Laurence 2012). Typically, Muslims have demanded 
that they alone should determine the form and content of publicly sub-
sidized Islamic instruction. Aft er all, must one be a devout, even erudite 
Muslim to know what is most important about Islam to impart to pupils? 
Introduction: Clashes within Civilization 3
Many critics of Islam (including convinced secularists of Muslim descent) 
severely doubt Islam’s democratic credentials and even go so far as to 
maintain that Islam and liberal democracy are fundamentally incompat-
ible. While some want offi  cials to spurn any relationship with Islam al-
together, others call on the state to monitor and regulate public Islamic 
education in order to ensure that its form and content do not transgress 
liberal democratic tenets (for instance, gender equality). Most European 
states have, in fact, opened up dialogues with Muslims aimed at gestat-
ing so-called “Euro-Islam,” an interpretation of the noble creed that is 
compatible with and conducive to liberal democratic mores and customs 
purportedly prized in Europe. Several Muslim organizations have taken 
umbrage at this paternalistic supervision, assailing it as thinly veiled cul-
tural imperialism of the most insidious variety. Indignantly they have 
established their own privately funded and operated Islamic schools. In-
deed, a few of these schools (and the organizations that oversee them) have 
been exposed as breeding grounds for vehemently and at times violently 
anti-Western thoughts, deeds, and actors.
Terrorism, needless to say, has become a salient issue, especially since 
the attacks of September 11 (9/11), as well as the Madrid, London, and Bos-
ton bombings and Paris attacks of 2015. Some scholars discern the “se-
curitization” of immigration policy, by which they mean the tendency of 
offi  cials, but also media, to view immigration primarily through the lens of 
its supposed threat to domestic security (Chebel d’Appollonia 2015; Kaya 
2012; Givens, Freeman, and Leal 2008). Yet nothing approaching consensus 
regarding the best way to guarantee security seems discernible. Some have 
interpreted the terrorist attacks as a wake-up call that Western govern-
ments have put their publics at undue risk by maintaining a policy of rela-
tively open and easy immigration and by granting extensive civil, political, 
and social rights to the newcomers. On this view, the state should depriori-
tize the rights and privileges of immigrants (by whom is putatively meant 
Muslims, oft en including naturalized Muslims) whenever they create even 
the suspicion of a threat to the security of “natives.” Arrest and deport fi rst! 
Ask questions and prove guilt later! One need only illustrate this stance as 
such to bring immediately to mind the counter-argument: human rights 
are sacrosanct and too important to permit their suspension or transgres-
sion for any individuals in the name of homeland security. A free society 
cannot be a 100-percent-secure society. Moreover, a demonstrable com-
mitment to liberty and equality represents, in the end, the most eff ective 
weapon against the terrorists and their would-be sympathizers, a position 
opponents consider to be the utmost (and perilous) expression of bleeding-
heart naiveté. Add to these arguments the viewpoint that the fi xation on 
Muslims as potential terrorists by the Western media (and unoffi  cially by 
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security offi  cials whose profi ling targets Muslims) represents not only an 
apocryphal distortion, not only an ire-raising aff ront to peace-loving Mus-
lims, but, because it is both, the single most eff ective recruiting tool for the 
very terrorists whom European governments wish to thwart. Why the pre-
occupation with immigration? Aft er all, most of the London Tube bombers 
and Paris shooters were British subjects and French citizens born in Britain 
and France, respectively. Europe has been spawning homegrown terrorism 
since at least the anarchists of the nineteenth century. Investigate the rea-
sons why rather than scapegoat Islam.
In this sampling of the controversies, we can detect three normative 
poles around which the vying stances cluster. Each pole represents some-
thing akin to a moral center of gravity that yields a moral compass one can 
use to chart an ethical way through any specifi c issue arising from immigra-
tion. Th e fi rst pole underscores equality and liberty for all. Whenever and 
wherever one detects the claim of (especially innate or unearned) superior-
ity and inferiority (for example, Muslim lives and limbs are dispensable); 
whenever and wherever one detects the forcing of an innocent, adult human 
being to act against his or her will (for instance, compulsion to don the veil), 
one’s moral compass should point to potential immorality, a deep intuition 
that “this can’t be right.” Th e second pole concentrates moral awareness 
around the we-group, that wider collectivity beyond the obvious circles of 
immediate friends and family with whom one identifi es or feels a sense of 
we-ness even when one does not personally know the members (for exam-
ple, nation, ethnicity, religion). Th is second moral compass points to immo-
rality whenever the well-being and continued fl ourishing of that we-ness, 
however understood, seems imperiled. Th e moral inclination is to defend 
the we-group, most oft en against an allegedly threatening they-group (thus, 
Muslims take “our” jobs or insult “our” customs). Th e third pole is actu-
ally an amoral pole. Its pointer signals trouble whenever it detects a claim 
to possess the moral high ground. Its center of gravity is a fully politicized 
sensibility that behind any claim to moral superiority lurks an ulterior, self-
serving, political motive (say, the persistent domination of Muslims in the 
name of “emancipating” or “enlightening” them).
Each pole just limned represents something like the pithiest expression 
of a major normative outlook, or what I will call “public philosophy.” I dub 
these “liberalism” (pole 1), “nationalism” (pole 2), and “postmodernism” 
(pole 3). Th is book contends that these three broadly understood philosoph-
ical traditions (schools of thought) represent the most infl uential norma-
tive forces in the politics of immigration in Europe today. Other isms, such 
as Protestantism, Catholicism, communism, fascism, and (explicit) racism, 
have drift ed to the margins; others clearly more centrally visible, such as 
democratic socialism, feminism, multiculturalism, (implicit) racism, and 
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Islamism, can be (and are in this book) interpreted as variants (subcatego-
ries) of the broader three public philosophies.
Liberalism, Nationalism, and Postmodernism
I strongly wish to avoid misunderstanding in regard to labels. I devote a 
few paragraphs at this juncture to explaining (in broad and loose terms) my 
understanding of the labels “liberalism,” “nationalism,” and “postmodern-
ism.” My hope is that even if readers might prefer slightly diff erent labels, 
we would all nonetheless (roughly speaking, of course) be considering the 
same three seismic developments in Western thought and society that I de-
scribe below. Labels inevitably involve generalization. I concur with Peter 
Gay (2002: 5), who sagely observes that “while it may be hard to live with 
generalizations, it is inconceivable to live without them.”
Liberalism originated as a product and project of the Enlightenment. It 
emerged among brave, forward-looking men and women of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries who sought to liberate humankind from the twin 
forces of darkness: ignorance and tyranny. Pioneering minds, such as John 
Locke, Baron de Montesquieu, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, and 
Adam Smith, employed their prodigious reasoning powers to discern and 
articulate universal moral principles that the thinkers believed not only 
were comprehensible to all persons but also demonstrated the rectitude of 
man’s yearning to be free. Liberalism insists on the inherent equality of all 
persons regardless of where and when they exist. From this fundamental 
equality derives the self-evident, inviolable right of each person to think, 
worship, work, and live as he or she wishes so long as he or she does not 
impede another’s right to do the same. Furthermore, each individual must 
have an equal and voluntary say in determining the laws that govern him or 
her. Democracy, on this view, also represents the surest way to foster impar-
tial government—that is, a government of laws based on rational, universal 
principles rather than of individuals moved by whimsical desire. Initially 
enunciated in philosophical treatises, these ideas eventually became an-
chored (never perfectly) in law fi rst in countries such as Great Britain, the 
Netherlands, the United States of America, and France and eventually in the 
rest of Europe and beyond in what we today generally recognize as liberal 
democratic governments. Liberal laws established rights of property and 
person against arbitrary seizure, led to the abolition of serfdom and slav-
ery, and gradually whittled away at forms of legal discrimination. Over time 
liberal democratic laws extended the franchise to more and more persons. 
Liberal laws established not only the free market but also, in time, the regu-
lation of that market with an eye to redistributing its rewards more equita-
bly throughout society. Liberalism, as I conceive it, deserves the lion’s share 
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of normative credit for inspiring and legitimizing the long and hard-fought 
process in (Western) Europe of securing for all citizens fundamental civil, 
political, and social rights (culminating in the postwar liberal democratic 
comprehensive welfare state) that T. H. Marshall so famously traced in Citi-
zenship and Social Class (1950). Th e mention of social rights—“from the 
right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to 
the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according 
to the standards prevailing in the society” (Marshall 1950: 8)—should un-
mistakably signal that, in my conception of liberalism, (democratic) social-
ism represents a corollary of the broader moral theory and social movement 
demanding the equality and freedom of all. I gloss over the sniping from the 
left  charging conventional liberalism with possessive individualism as well 
as the scare tactics from the right equating social democracy with creeping 
communist totalitarianism. Th e two generally agree on the same loft y goal 
of emancipating individuals; they diff er only on the means to achieve it—an 
honest, consequential, but ultimately intramural debate.
Wherever humans feel humiliated, dehumanized, or forced to act 
against their will, they can turn to liberal values for moral support. Th ey 
have done so and they continue to do so. Liberalism remains vital in our 
times thanks to the boost it has received from compelling intellectuals such 
as John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas and from courageous activists such 
as Martin Luther King, Jr., Nelson Mandela, Lech Walesa, Václav Havel, 
Aung San Suu Kyi, and Malala Yousafzai. It has been—in fi ts and starts no 
doubt—transforming our world from one oriented around corporate iden-
tities and entrenched stratifi cations to one centered on the individual un-
leashed to smash (in time) hierarchies of all sorts in favor of human rights 
and democratic governance.
Nationalism emerged in protest against liberal universalism. Coined 
by Johann Herder in 1774, “nationalism” fi rst became common in politi-
cal parlance in the middle of the nineteenth century. But well before that, 
sharp minds and tongues, such as Herder, Edmund Burke, Johann Fichte, 
Joseph de Maistre, and Guiseppe Mazzini, who abhorred the French Revo-
lution and the Napoleonic expansionism that sought to impose its political 
order outside France, rejected the Enlightenment’s pivotal notion of a single, 
universal human nature. Th ey maintained instead that people were funda-
mentally diff erent and that these inerasable diff erences stemmed from being 
members of diff erent nations. Each nation was said to possess a particu-
lar character—Herder called it a “soul” (Volksgeist)—that organically takes 
shape by virtue of the fact that members of a given nation share a common 
history, language, and homeland, and common customs, mores, and tastes. 
Moreover, they share as well a common expectation and hope that their na-
tion will survive and thrive into the future so that their progeny will be able 
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to inherit, honor, and contribute to their culture and its collective achieve-
ments. Th ey form a “community of destiny.” Nationalism teaches that be-
cause each nation is particular, an idiosyncratic organic whole, it alone 
can know wherein consists the nation’s well-being. It deductively follows 
that each nation (or people) must govern its own aff airs, must have its own 
state. Th e nation-state, understood as the best possible congruence between 
nation and state, represents the moral and political ideal of nationalism. 
Despite a comparatively brief discrediting by its association with fascism, 
nationalism has been revived as a normative public philosophy in the work 
of prominent postwar scholars such as David Miller, Dominique Schnapper, 
Alain de Benoist, Marco Tarchi, Samuel Huntington, and Ernst-Wolfgang 
Bökenförde. A moral off spring of nationalism’s particularism that stresses 
relative political autonomy for any bona fi de cultural community has also 
found expression through communitarian philosophers such as Charles 
Taylor, Michael Walzer, and Hans-Georg Gadamer.
Peoples’ endeavors to create and keep their own states have massively 
altered the modern world in successive waves of independence movements 
and nation-state formations. Th e fi rst fl owed forth over the course of the 
nineteenth century and transformed Europe (and the Americas) from a 
continent of absolutist empires and smaller kingdoms into one of nation-
states. A second wave washed across Africa and Asia as new nations-states 
(oft en fl edgling and cobbled-together) sought independence from European 
colonial empires. A third wave drowned the Soviet Bloc starting in 1989 and 
formed the independent nation-states of Central Europe and Central Asia.
Th e fi rst wave culminated in World War I, the fragmentation of the 
Habsburg and Ottoman Empires into nation-states, and the founding of the 
League of Nations in 1919, when 44 states signed the League’s covenant. 
Today the League’s successor, the United Nations, consists of 193 member 
states. Because 97 percent of people live in their birth country (Hampshire 
2013: 4), practically everyone on the planet has a national political identity 
(represented by the individual passport). All one need do to discover the 
importance of passports (all of which, save Vatican City, are at this point 
national) is to set out on international travel. It is hard to imagine a norma-
tive political vision that has had a greater concrete impact on the modern 
era than nationalism.
Postmodernism too entails a critique of Enlightenment liberalism. But 
its critique reaches far beyond liberalism to a rejection of any and all claims 
to absolute certainty, including the sense of wholeness and purpose that the 
members of a nation can purportedly enjoy when securely ensconced in a 
national polity. An instructive metaphor here is anti-foundationalism. Post-
modernism represents an experiment to approach life precariously (even 
precipitously) without a metaphysical foundation that anchors us in some 
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self-serving illusion that our existence fi ts neatly into a greater order or 
serves some ultimate end. It was Friedrich Nietzsche, with his philosophical 
“hammer,” who shattered the foundation of Western thought: that monist 
presupposition widely held in the West since Plato that cosmos rather than 
chaos ultimately reigns, that we inhabit a universe whose inherent order we 
can comprehend. Nietzsche averred that what we take for absolute truth is 
but a lie that we have conveniently forgotten is a lie. Alleged truths are noth-
ing more than linguistic metaphors rather than facts that correspond to an 
objective reality that confi rms their validity. Our existence is ultimately one 
of infi nite metaphors or contingent perspectives with no fi nal arbiter to de-
termine which of them is objectively true. Furthermore, what drives each 
perspective is a cloaked, deeply rooted will to power, a largely unconscious 
psychological urge to dominate others by forcing them to conform to our 
preferred interpretation of how the world ought to be.
Nietzsche’s perspectivism has been profoundly explored and augment-
ed in, for example, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s theory of “language games,” 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s notion of “prerefl ective consciousness,” or Mar-
tin Heidegger’s idea of “Enframing.” Each theorizes perspectives that stand 
in for—quite literally re-present—rather than actually coincide with any 
objective reality. Th ese postmodern musings have reached perhaps their 
richest expression in Jacques Derrida’s idea of diff érance, a ceaseless string 
of referrals between signifi ed and signifi er that can be deconstructed to 
show the absence of any fi xed starting point. Sigmund Freud, of course, 
pioneered our exploration of the unconscious and how its sublimated urges 
aff ect our conscious lives. His work has been broadened and deepened by 
the likes of Erich Fromm, Herbert Marcuse, Jacques Lacan, Luce Irigaray, 
and Julia Kristeva. A number of major thinkers have enriched our under-
standing of the intersection of power and knowledge. Max Weber, for one, 
discerned in the modern rational outlook a totalizing force that would cul-
minate in the disenchantment of the world—that is, in the total domina-
tion by bureaucratic rationality and administration, despite the fact that 
this bureaucratic outlook was just one of a wide range of world-organizing 
perspectives, none better than the other in some irrefutably demonstra-
ble way. Max Horkheimer and Th eodor Adorno (and other members of 
the Frankfurt School) developed the argument that the Enlightenment 
spawned a dialectic of not just increasing knowledge of the world but also 
increasing domination of those things known, including human beings 
with the advent of the human sciences. Th is strand of thinking has argu-
ably attained its most trenchant exploration in Michel Foucault’s hugely 
infl uential reconceptualization of power as a “power-knowledge nexus” in 
which the normalizing power of knowledge replaces older forms of brute 
physical force in the governing of human beings and societies.
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Because postmodernism is the youngest of the three public philoso-
phies, its concrete impact on our lives is perhaps not yet as readily recog-
nizable as liberalism’s generation of a world of individuals or nationalism’s 
production of an international fi eld of allying and vying nation-states. Th e 
sway of postmodernism manifests itself wherever we fi nd challenges to ac-
cepted canons. Th ese come forth in the academy with the criticism, say, of 
“dead white man’s history.” We encounter it too in the arts with the blur-
ring of High Art and pop culture in the work of an Andy Warhol or the 
collapsing of the distinction between artist and viewer by Joseph Beuys. 
Works inspired by such postmodern pioneers now overfl ow modern art 
museums and galleries across Europe. Th e postmodern spirit permeates, 
however, well beyond purely “intellectual” venues. Th ink, for instance, of 
the growing interest in non-Western medicine that has spawned a multi-
billion-dollar industry peddling alternative healing techniques on practi-
cally every corner and computer. We experience a postmodern world also 
wherever we witness the proliferation, fragmentation, and combination 
of identities, especially identities conventionally not associated with one 
another. Th us, we increasingly fi nd hyphenated persons who insist that 
they are Turkish Dutchmen or French Muslims, or Pakistani-Anglican-
homosexual-vegan Britons for that matter. On the rise are hybrid families 
forged through the growing number of mixed marriages whose off spring 
go by names such as Muhammad Smith or Dominique Khaldun. Europe’s 
large cities especially brim with such hybrid persons who conspicuously 
defy stereotypes and undermine conventional expectations regarding 
identity. Th eir stories are dramatized in multiple books, like Zadie Smith’s 
White Teeth (2000, TV serial in 2002), or popular fi lms, including Olivier 
Nakache’s and Éric Toledano’s Intouchables (2011), Fatih Akin’s Soul Kitch-
en (2009), Buket Alakus’s Einmal Hans mit scharfer Sosse (2013), Phillippe 
de Chauveron’s Qu’est-ce qu’on a fait au Bon Dieu (2014), which reach into 
every home. Th ey are the nation’s soccer stars, such as France’s Zinedine 
Zidane or Germany’s Mesut Özil. Finally, the postmodern sensibility turns 
up in increasingly widespread political cynicism. Th e expanding distrust 
of political institutions and personalities coupled with the mounting alien-
ation from politics documented by numerous pollsters in Europe refl ect a 
withering expectation that politics is or can be about serving the common 
good (Dalton 2006; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). For ever-larger numbers 
of Europeans, the self-serving, ruthlessly calculating politician willing to 
do and say anything to gain or maintain power represents the norm rather 
than the exception. To the extent that European publics have come to ex-
pect bias, distortion, manipulation, and corruption in politics rather than 
being astounded and appalled, they are crossing over, whether knowingly 
or not, to the postmodern viewpoint expressed in Nietzsche’s notion of the 
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will to power. Similarly, when viewers and readers take biased, partisan re-
porting and analysis of politics to be normal and consider the expectation 
and aspiration for objectivity passé and Pollyanna-ish, they have essentially 
adopted Nietzsche’s (1968: 267) perspectivism, whereby there are “no facts, 
only interpretations.”
Kulturkampf
My simplifi ed sketch of the course of modern political thought is the story 
of unfulfi lled hopes and unintended consequences. We have not arrived at 
the intended destination of modernity’s founders. Th e ultimate hope inau-
gurating and driving the modern era (since René Descartes) has lain in the 
anticipated discovery of secular certainty to replace the (perceived) onto-
theological certainty of the past that was deemed immature and indefen-
sible by modern minds (Toulmin 1990). In terms of morality, the aim was to 
deduce moral laws to correspond to the physical laws of nature discovered 
by the likes of Isaac Newton and other natural scientists.
But such ethical certainty and consensus have proven elusive. Th e heat-
ed controversies surrounding just such an issue as the Muslim question re-
mind us daily of the conspicuous “battle over discourse” (Hampshire 2013: 
32) that prevails in the West. Th e controversies would appear to be irrec-
oncilable and mounting. “It is hard to fi nd a democratic or democratizing 
society these days that is not the site of some signifi cant controversy over 
whether and how its public institutions should better recognize the identi-
ties of cultural and disadvantaged minorities” (Gutmann 1994: 3). Europe 
lacks a political ideology possessing enough moral authority to unite all. On 
the contrary, Europe appears well on its way toward a value pluralism tee-
tering on relativism, as well as to a nasty politics of bitter discord in which 
each party relentlessly if not ruthlessly seeks to impose its specifi c agenda 
on its detractors. Such is the portrait of our political universe painted by 
Alasdair MacIntyre (1984) in Aft er Virtue. Th e lack of commonly held stan-
dards is the regrettable culmination of Western modernity across the entire 
spectrum of cultural life according to Jacques Barzun’s (2001) From Dawn 
to Decadence: 500 Years of Western Cultural Life.
I generally see eye to eye with these deservedly esteemed scholars but 
prefer a more positive interpretation. My reading builds off  the work of Isa-
iah Berlin. Whereas MacIntyre and Barzun mainly animadverted on the 
emergence of profound value pluralism, Berlin discerned in it the prospect 
for profound philosophical maturation. Maturation to greater philosophi-
cal (and presumably political) sophistication could transpire if value plu-
ralism were to result in the abandonment of monism. In Th e Crooked Tim-
ber of Humanity, Berlin argued that monism represented the underlying 
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presupposition of Western thought from Plato to his own time. Monism, he 
claimed, reposed on three presuppositions:
Th e fi rst position is this: to all genuine questions there can only be 
one correct answer, all the other answers being incorrect.  .  .  . Th e 
second assumption is that a method exists for the discovery of these 
correct answers.  .  .  . Th e third assumption, and perhaps the most 
important in this context, is that all the correct answers must, at the 
very least, be compatible with one another. (Berlin 1991: 23–24)
Th e Oxford don broke the spell that monism held over him via his in-
vestigation of Romantic nationalism. In his probing exploration into the 
thought of its seminal thinkers, in particular Giovanni Vico and Herder, 
Berlin determined it impossible to conclude that the ideology resulted from 
faulty reasoning. Rather, it started from diff erent axioms from, and there-
fore reasoned through to incompatible conclusions with, his own preferred 
liberalism. But the axioms were unassailably reasonable and the reasoning 
compellingly sound. Hence, a rational way to dismiss nationalism as error 
eluded the committed liberal. Berlin was left  no responsible option but to 
conclude that rationality was plural, that there could be more than one right 
answer to a given query and that there could be multiple upstanding visions 
of the good life that nonetheless contradicted one another. “Some among 
the Great Goods cannot live together. Th at is a conceptual truth” (Berlin 
1991: 13).
I augment Berlin’s analysis by adding postmodernism as a third public 
philosophy with its own internally convincing reasoning. I read these three 
public philosophies as the currently predominant players in an enduring 
Kulturkampf, or struggle for ideological hegemony in modern European 
politics. Ongoing arguably since the outbreak of the Reformation in 1517, 
the Kulturkampf has seen some public philosophies come and go, gain and 
then lose their competitive edge against rivals (for instance, Marxism). Lib-
eralism, nationalism, and postmodernism stand today in competition but 
unable to defeat one another decisively. Each provides compelling reasons 
for believing its tenets. Each has been articulated by great seminal savants 
and is defended by persuasive contemporary apologists. Each has accumu-
lated scores of theses and mountains of corroborating evidence to validate 
its conclusions. Each stands stoutly armed with arguments to fend off  at-
tacks and criticisms from rivals.
Th e metaphor of Kulturkampf, though useful, has its shortcomings. Th e 
image draws desired attention to the unavoidable ideological clashes of the 
three outlooks that I want to underscore. Th is emphasis on intermural dis-
agreement automatically entails accentuating the intramural commonalities 
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binding each of the three. Th at said, none of the three represents a monolith. 
Within each school there exist vying theories and theorists, diff erent points 
of emphasis, and varieties of strategies. I will treat these fi ner distinctions 
within liberalism, nationalism, and postmodernism in Chapter 2. However, 
my underlying theme stresses that the diff erences within each school of 
thought resemble family quarrels—that is, diff ering outlooks that, in the 
end, concur when it comes to the most important values that should govern 
the public sphere. Liberalism stakes its lot with individual autonomy, na-
tionalism with communal homogeneity, and postmodernism with insuper-
able heterogeneity and discord.
Messiness
Such attention to nuance within the three camps still leaves us with an all 
too orderly impression of the infl uence of these normative outlooks on poli-
tics. In treating the basic theoretical principles of each public philosophy, 
Chapter 2 might leave the impression that the concrete political world is 
fi lled with easily identifi able liberals, nationalists, and postmodernists. Real 
politics, of course, is fuzzier. Political actors do not march forth onto the po-
litical battlefi eld like footballers sporting jerseys clearly demarcated with an 
“L,” “N,” or “P” so that the analyst can clearly spot them. In this book philo-
sophically consistent political actors represent the exception rather than the 
norm. Legislation itself—in democracies typically the result of complicat-
ed manipulations, compromises, negotiations, and concessions—is all the 
more inconsistent and contradictory.
Gary Freeman describes immigration policy as “an extremely messy re-
ality,” with “ramshackle, multifaceted, loosely connected sets of regulatory 
rules, institutions and practices” (2004: 946). Virginie Guiraudon (2003) has 
applied James March and Johan Olsen’s (1989) “garbage can” theory of or-
ganized chaos to immigration policy making. James Hampshire (2013: 2) 
maintains that “the intractable nature of immigration policy is not a failure 
of governance but rather a refl ection of contradictory imperatives of the lib-
eral state.” We wind up, then, with “a mixed bag not fully assimilationist, 
pluralist, or multicultural” (Freeman 2004: 960). Freeman sagely cautions 
social scientists against excessive optimism with regard to coherently fi tting 
this policy mess into neat explanatory typologies.
In these pages I explore the hypothesis that the policy messiness that 
Freeman and others uncover stems, in part at least, from normative messi-
ness. Normative messiness diff ers from mere discord between distinct 
normative camps. Messiness arises through imprecise and incomplete ap-
plication of normative theories that obfuscates their critical diff erences. 
In the repartee of daily politicking, we rarely if ever encounter the public 
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philosophies trotted out in full form—that is, as the intricate, comprehen-
sive theories that I sketch in Chapter 2. Rather, we more oft en come across 
mere fragments of these larger normative outlooks that have become un-
moored, so to speak, from their theoretical home. Few political actors have 
the time, inclination, or capability to trace a deployed fragment back to 
its mother theory, let alone explain the grand theory in its entirety. Few 
political activists are what Martin Carstensen (2011: 148) calls “paradigm 
man”; most work rather like the improvising “bricoleur” pragmatically and 
strategically using philosophical fragments like tools in a toolkit (see also 
Mehta 2011: 38–39). Hampshire (2013: 25) observes that politicians tend to 
want to “fudge” the immigration issue by sending “diff erent messages to 
diff erent audiences.”
Th e resulting ideological “bricolage” generates normative muddle 
that in turn fosters policy messiness. When political actors employ nor-
mative fragments as “performative utterances” (Hampshire 2013: 152) or 
“schemas” (Bowen et al. 2014b: 14) in specifi c contexts separated from 
their mother theories, they make themselves less aware of, or at least less 
intolerant of, philosophical inconsistency and contradiction. Below the 
reader will encounter repeated examples of quite glaring philosophical 
inconsistency in the normative arguments of political personalities, par-
ties, and organizations. Such contradictions irk theorists, but they do not 
appear to trouble political agents much. Make no mistake. Slogans like 
“France for the French” and “No human being is illegal” do philosophi-
cally contradict one another, but the contradiction goes less noticed in 
politics or, if discerned, is not given much import. Tolerated and perhaps 
deliberate inconsistencies fi nd their way into immigration policy and 
contribute to its becoming “an awesome accumulation of contradictions” 
(Schierup, Hansen, and Castles 2006: 77) and “a messy state of aff airs” 
(Boswell 2009: 251). As Margaret Levi (2013: 187) observes, “Bad policies 
are oft en good politics.”
Mutual Fragilization
Another normative dimension in understanding policy messiness is “mutu-
al fragilization.” I borrow the concept from Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age. 
Th ere Taylor (2007: 303–4) interprets mutual fragilization as “certainly one 
of the main features of the world of 2000, in contrast to that of 1500.” Th e 
Canadian philosopher has in mind a heightened awareness, in our times, 
of views opposing our own. Increasingly, however, these are construed not 
as the palpably false, immoral humbug of deranged or debased adversaries, 
but rather as the plausibly correct and prudent convictions of sensible fellow 
humans who happen to disagree with us.
14 Chapter 1
We live in a condition where we cannot help but be aware that there are 
a number of diff erent construals, views which intelligent, reasonably 
undeluded people, of good will, can and do disagree on. We cannot 
help looking over our shoulder from time to time, looking sideways, 
living our faith also in condition and uncertainty. (Taylor 2007: 11)
Richard Rorty (1989: 73) discerns something similar with the proliferation 
of “ironists”—that is, persons so atuned to inescapable contingency that 
they cannot take their own convictions fully seriously. Zygmunt Bauman 
(1993: 11) speaks of “endemic inconclusivity.”
We might think of political antagonisms accompanied by diffi  dence 
and ambivalence as soft er or gentler diff erences of opinion. To be sure, 
seemingly confi dent, uncompromising voices sound forth, like an Ayaan 
Hirsi Ali (2006) fully convinced that Islam tramples women’s rights plain 
and simple. Th ere can be little doubt that one consequence of the ongoing 
Kulturkampf is a hardening of positions among some adversaries. Jagged 
clashes between opposing parties would seem to close off  the kind of em-
pathy toward others’ viewpoints that can open the door to the unifying 
“fusion of horizons” so nobly yearned for by Hans-Georg Gadamer (2007). 
I applaud the German hermeneutist’s compelling urgings. But in the pages 
that follow, I am more interested, following Taylor, in exploring the emer-
gence of a phenomenon that falls short of consensus. I have in mind a 
spreading disposition characterized by heightened awareness of discord 
that breeds increased expectation and acceptance of diff erence, diffi  dence, 
and ambivalence. Perhaps years of accumulated collective experience with 
an ongoing Kulturkampf have
opened a space in which people can wander between and around 
all these options without having to land clearly and defi nitively in 
any one. In the wars between belief and unbelief [in this book public 
philosophies], this can be seen as a kind of no-man’s-land; except 
that it has got wide enough to take on the character rather of a neu-
tral zone, where one can escape the war altogether. Indeed, this is 
part of the reason why the war is constantly running out of steam 
in modern civilization, in spite of the eff orts of zealous minorities. 
(Taylor 2007: 351)
Martin Schain, like Freeman, underscores the messiness of immigration 
policies. In his transatlantic comparative study, he fi nds a “contradiction of 
policies in diff erent arenas” that governments regularly and quite knowing-
ly, if tacitly, tolerate (Schain 2008: 276, 283). Such glaring inconsistencies, he 
avers, “refl ect the complexities of the democratic political process” (Schain 
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2008: 275; see also Hampshire 2013; Bertossi and Duyvendak 2012). Nor-
mative fragmentation and fragilization, as I aim to show, is an important 
but underexplored example of these complexities. Normative fragmentation 
and fragilization need not persist. Some person or party might very well 
reconfi gure fragments in a new way that would seem so compelling to most 
involved that they would embrace it and establish an overarching consen-
sus. Rogers Brubaker (2001: 531) discerns something like this in the “return 
of assimilation.” Christian Joppke (2009: 120) contends that “diversity” has 
become the “master rhetoric in all Western states.” Jonathan Laurence (2012: 
xix) observes “a new political consensus” to integrate Muslims into existing 
institutional arrangements in numerous European lands. I do contend that 
European states and publics fi nd themselves in a single, international (even 
global) discourse regarding immigration, but it remains a constantly fl uc-
tuating discourse shaped by abiding discord, principally among liberalism, 
nationalism, and postmodernism.
Methodology
My analysis employs a mainly constructivist methodology. Constructivism 
reposes on the premise that ideas matter. Th ey form the expectations that we 
bring to the world and thereby shape the way we experience it (Béland and 
Cox 2011). Ideas are not, then, separate from or secondary to an indepen-
dent social reality; they are constitutive of it (Berger and Luckmann 1967). 
Specifi cally, I work with the notion of public philosophy (Mehta 2011; Favell 
1998; Lowi 1969). Of a kind with what other constructivists label “world-
views” (Weber 1949), “frames” (Bleich 2003), “political discourses” (Con-
nolly 1993), “repertoires of evaluation” (Bowen 2010: 6), “policy paradigms” 
(Hall 1993), or simply “political ideologies” (Freeden 1996), a public philos-
ophy is a loosely integrated, internally varied vision of how the public sphere 
ought to appear and function. A public philosophy determines for a political 
actor under its sway what stands out as signifi cant as opposed to insignifi -
cant in the political arena. It shapes what comes forth as a problem in need 
of being addressed and prescribes what passes for a desirable solution. It is 
that set of expectations, ultimately normative, that inclines a political actor 
toward one position but away from another, to be perturbed by large-scale 
immigration rather than pleased, to view the newcomers as a threat rather 
than a benefi t to one’s life and land.
Most importantly, a public philosophy is an organic entity, a living tradi-
tion of related ideas that constantly morphs (Berman 2011; Freeden 1996). 
A public philosophy has a birth, an unfurling life, and presumably some-
day a death (a passing into political oblivion like, say, royalism, fascism, or 
Stalinist socialism). Needless to say, the latter fate has yet to befall liberalism, 
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nationalism, or postmodernism. A public philosophy forms around a core 
set of tenets, fundamental and interconnected presuppositions, theories, and 
principles, typically enunciated by seminal thinkers acknowledged as such 
inside and outside the tradition. However, because a public philosophy is a 
protean tradition, off shoots and variations of the core ideas inevitably spring 
forth. Th ese are typically developed by subsequent thinkers working self-
consciously with the tenets of the masters in an eff ort to explore, expand, and 
improve them. Th ere is a mutually dependent relationship between seminal 
and subsequent thinkers. Th ough the latter would have nothing to inspire 
them without the pioneering intervention of the former, the pioneers’ ideas 
would, without their expositors’ eff orts, fade into oblivion—that is, turn into 
largely ignored ideational relics seriously considered by none but a few spe-
cialists in the history of ideas. A public philosophy, then, resembles an ex-
tended family rooted in a common (philosophical) ancestry but expanding 
to include many related yet still distinct individual members (dead and alive).
I off er family portraits, as it were, of liberalism, nationalism, and post-
modernism. Perhaps it is better to think of them as caricatures—sophisti-
cated caricatures, I hope, but caricatures nonetheless. I do not pretend to 
off er anything like a comprehensive history of liberalism, nationalism, or 
postmodernism of the kind one would expect to fi nd in a volume such as 
Nationalism: Its Meaning and History (Kohn 1955). Again, such an eff ort 
exceeds the scope of this study and remains only tangentially related to its 
purpose: making sense of normative infl uences on contemporary immigra-
tion policy. My approach is informed more by what Michel Foucault (1979a: 
30–31) calls the “history of the present.” I assemble the caricatures with an 
eye to how each public philosophy is understood (and deployed) today in 
the politics of immigration. Aspects that do not fi gure much or at all in cur-
rent debates (for instance, the kind of unabashed Aryanism/Anti-Semitism 
that played such a critical role in the nationalist thinking of the fi rst half of 
the twentieth century) will receive only passing mention in the caricatures. 
Th e same holds for dimensions of the three isms that do not pertain much 
to politics proper (for instance, the Romantic art associated with national-
ism or the mark of postmodernism on contemporary literary criticism or 
architecture). Th e sources on which I draw to create the caricatures are the 
primary works of the thinkers treated as well as prominent secondary inter-
pretations of those works.
I treat the public philosophies as political ideologies. I thus structure 
the caricatures in a way that facilitates analyzing them as performative dis-
courses that do political work by legitimizing and advancing some concrete 
agendas as opposed to others (Schain 2012: 370–71; Schmidt 2010: 15–20). 
Th is interest in examining public philosophies not merely as theories but as 
real forces in the day-to-day politics of immigration—the ultimate aim of 
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the book—has a number of important consequences for the organization of 
the study.
In the fi rst place, Chapter 2 is a service chapter, preparing the ground 
for the main analysis that takes place through four case studies carried out 
in subsequent chapters. Th ese examine the following policy areas and the 
debates surrounding them: (1) citizenship (especially naturalization poli-
cy), (2) the so-called “headscarf controversy” (l’aff aire du foulard), which 
has mushroomed beyond France to all corners of Europe, (3) secularism 
(mosque-state relations), and (4) domestic security (especially as it pertains 
to immigrants and refugees). Th e rationale for the choice of these four is 
explained further below. I can say at this juncture that each of the four stud-
ies focuses on persons of Muslim heritage residing (or seeking to reside) in 
Europe. Whether fairly or unfairly, they are the group around which the 
most controversy exists (Dancygier 2010: 286). As Anne Norton (2013: 2) 
observes, “Th e fi gure of the Muslim has become the axis where questions of 
political philosophy and political theology, politics and ethics meet.”
Second, I intend the caricatures to operate in a way analogous to Max 
Weber’s ideal type. Th ey exist nowhere in real politics in the form in which 
they are represented in Chapter 2. However, formulating the public philos-
ophies as pure theory (ideal types) generates heuristic devices that enable 
us to identify liberal, nationalist, and postmodern arguments or rationales 
when they are being deployed in politics. I must warn, however, that there 
is a limit to how much neat ordering the serious student of politics can do. 
Politics, especially democratic politics, tends to be messy. It is the nature, 
and perhaps even the beauty, of the beast (Blyth 2011). As intimated, many 
if not most political actors’ stances do not square neatly with the theories 
of liberalism, nationalism, or postmodernism. Most people’s beliefs are in-
determinate, inconsistent, and mutable (Carstensen 2011; Geuss 2008: 2–6). 
Typically we encounter but fragments of the theories, and oft en fragments 
from two or more theories employed by a single actor or articulated in a 
single policy. It might irk some readers with a proclivity for consistency 
when I associate, say, Nicolas Sarkozy with a liberal position on one page 
and a nationalist one on another page. Inconsistent or not, the truth is that 
the former French president, like scores of other political actors, espouses 
normatively inconsistent or slippery positions.
Michael Freeden (1996: 37–41) maintains that just such inconsistency 
prompts many political theorists to shy away from the study of politics 
proper. Th eorists scoff  at the dumbing down and pandering by politicians. 
As a result, the conventional approach to the study of political philosophy 
has been to limit inquiry to the works of other political philosophers—
essentially what I do in Chapter 2. I concur with Freeden that this con-
vention regrettably relinquishes analysis at arguably the most important 
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point—namely, where political ideas become forces in real politics as op-
posed to mere ideas in thinkers’ minds. Pure theorizing about normative 
issues that pertain to immigration is far more advanced than the empiri-
cal investigation of how normative ideas aff ect politics (Schain 2012: 370; 
Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008: 155; Koopmans et al. 2005: 150). 
Empiricists tend to steer clear of normative factors because they resist exact 
measurement and quantifi cation. Th e impact of normative ideas on politics 
winds up in a no-man’s land neglected by both theorists and empiricists 
alike. “For too long,” complains Seyla Benhabib (2004: 143), “normative po-
litical theory and the political sociology of the modern state have gone their 
separate ways” (see also Bader 2007: 22). Several studies have pointed to the 
infl uence of normative factors on immigration policy, although accompa-
nied by the claim that their impact demands deeper exploration (Sains-
bury 2012: 277; Triandafyllidou 2010b: 2; Gest 2010: 65; Messina 2007: 76; 
Koopmans et al. 2005: 182–209; Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004; 
Lamont 2000: 9).
Th is study aspires to be a constructive piece in building the bridge 
across the normative-empirical divide. Doing so entails tracing what 
Freeden (1996: 37) calls the “morphology” of political ideologies from their 
inception in seminal minds to their development and further exposition by 
subsequent theorists to their application in politics by political actors. All 
three aspects of “how ideas go from individual thought to collective action” 
(Schmidt 2010: 15) are necessary to come to grips with how normative ideas 
weigh upon politics. Th is is a formidable challenge that prevents me from 
pursuing other intriguing and important avenues of inquiry. For one, I pay 
little attention to how agents acquire normative ideas. My accentuation of 
normative fragments would seem to suggest an instrumentalist approach 
that reads actors as rational agents who choose normative fragments with 
an eye to advancing perceived interests. But I do not exclude from possi-
bility structuralist accounts whereby social structures, for instance, class, 
ethnicity, religion, gender, or geography, lead actors to adopt certain views 
rather than others. Institutionalist approaches, which hold that a major in-
stitution can in eff ect transfer a prevailing ideology to those who come into 
contact with it, are plausible as are other theories of socialization, such as 
the impact of family (see Bleich 2003: 188). Th e point to underline here is 
that I do not take a position in this study. I examine how ideas are deployed 
rather than acquired by political actors.
Needless to say, normative theories, fragmented or whole, are hardly 
the only forces at work in politics. Indeed, policy analysts have identifi ed 
a range of nonnormative factors that color immigration policy. Th ese in-
clude demographics (Koopmans, Michalowski, and Waibel 2012), health of 
the economy (Anderson 1996), political opportunity structures (Koopmans 
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et al. 2005), international crises (Tichenor 2002), interstate politics (Betts 
2011), media salience (Givens and Luedtke 2005), type of party in power 
(Goodman 2014), strength of radical right parties (Koopmans, Michalows-
ki, and Waibel 2012), policy venues (Guiraudon 1998), level of government 
(Schmidtke and Zaslove 2014; Dancygier 2010; Money 1999), courts (Kawar 
2015; Joppke and Torpey 2013), institutional and legal heritage (Goodman 
2014; Brubaker 1992), history of colonialism (Howard 2009), political access 
(Dancygier 2010; Freeman 1995; Kriese et al. 1995), asymmetry of avail-
able resources (Smith 1999; Mann 1987; Castells 1975), ethnic origin (Rex 
1996), type of political actor, such as (opportunistic, ideological) elected of-
fi cials versus (pragmatic, problem-solving) administrators (Howard 2009; 
Ellermann 2009; Schain 2008), cross-national learning (Goodman 2014: 
219; Astor 2014: 1728–29; Laurence 2012: 19), institutional habitus, such as 
school as opposed to hospital as opposed to military (Bowen et al. 2014a), 
and administrative rationality or “governmentality” (Cohen 2009: 116–25). 
I will allude to such factors as they seem relevant to a particular normative 
stance under examination. I want to make clear, however, that I undertake 
in these pages no systematic weighing of the various factors to determine 
precisely where normative infl uences fi t into the overall equation. Th at obvi-
ously important eff ort exceeds the scope of this book (see Hampshire 2013: 
51–54; Schain 2008; Tichenor 2002). My study deliberately spotlights but 
one dimension of the politics of immigration. I do not purport, then, to 
provide a full explanation of how a given policy becomes law or why a given 
political actor espouses the view(s) he or she does. I aim rather to show that 
fragmentation and fragilization in the normative sphere contribute to the 
“dizzying” complexity (Hampshire 2013: 132) and “the bewildering diver-
sity” of immigration policies (Bader 2007: 26).
Plan of the Book
As discussed, Chapter 2 treats liberalism, nationalism, and postmodernism 
as vying public philosophies locked in a protracted Kulturkampf. In addi-
tion to outlining tenets and reviewing seminal and contemporary thinkers 
of each public philosophy, I also stress variants within each philosophy as 
well as how they relate to issues of immigration. For example, I highlight 
two long unfurling strands of liberal theorizing that diff er on how best to 
achieve the shared goal of individual autonomy for all. Th e fi rst, which I 
dub “liberal voluntarism,” stresses negative liberty or freedom from undue 
state intervention in the lives of its citizens, who are presumed to be able 
to achieve self-improvement on their own. Much warier of the formidable 
enemies of freedom, what I call “liberal perfectionism” emphasizes positive 
liberty and calls on the state to mold citizens into reliable practitioners and 
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defenders of freedom. Th e fi rst seeks a liberal society, the second a society of 
liberals. Th e fi rst seeks freedom from the state, the second freedom through 
the state. Th ese strands evince themselves in the work of contemporary nor-
mative theorists who deal with issues of diversity caused by immigration. 
Liberal multiculturalism morally bars the state from favoring any particu-
lar ethnic, religious, or other cultural group (including that of the major-
ity), while liberal assimilationism exhorts the state to resocialize newcom-
ers to the purportedly predominant liberal values of the receiving country 
through such measures as mandatory civics courses. However, we should 
take care neither to exaggerate the diff erences nor to understand these cate-
gorizations as fi rm and exact. Voluntarism and perfectionism represent two 
poles between which liberal thinkers and stances swing.
Th eir philosophical kinship comes clearly to the fore when liberalism 
is contrasted with nationalism and its stress on cultural particularism and 
communal solidarity. Again I underscore two diverging tendencies that, 
however, share the overriding normative goal of collective political auton-
omy for the culturally homogenous nation. “Egalitarian nationalism” em-
braces this goal for every nation and envisages independent nations living in 
peace with one another precisely because their national self-determination 
is honored. By contrast, what I term “antagonistic nationalism” sees “our” 
nation in a zero-sum game of competition with other nations and stresses 
national solidarity in response to real or imagined threats to national inde-
pendence. Succinctly, egalitarian nationalism strives for the fl ourishing of 
all nations, antagonistic nationalism for the fl ourishing of our nation. As 
far as immigration is concerned, the fi rst tendency has morphed into com-
munitarianism, emphasizing the right of transnational immigrant minority 
communities to enjoy collective cultural autonomy and security analogous 
to that of the majority culture. Th e second manifests itself in xenohostile 
nativism that deems immigration and immigrants divisive, even irredentist 
forces that subvert national unity and well-being.
Postmodern perspectives too tend to range along a continuum between 
two poles. “Hobbesian postmodernism” perceives no alternative to a harsh 
struggle or turf war among persons and groups espousing incompatible 
values. However, in the postmodern reading the battle has no overpower-
ing state to keep the peace, as famously theorized by Th omas Hobbes in 
Leviathan. A second, let us say gentler, inclination that I term “hospitable 
postmodernism” urges us to embrace unsettling alterity and hybridity and 
explore in our unexpected encounters still unimagined solutions to cultural 
confl ict. Th e fi rst variety turns up in normative refl ection on immigration 
in the claim that the best we can hope for is, in the end, an always tenuous 
modus vivendi among confl icting cultural groups. Th e second fi nds expres-
sion in the interest in and celebration of “everyday multiculturalism” (Wise 
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and Velayutham 2009)—that is, the pragmatic, context-specifi c, and always 
provisionary ways in which common folks confronted with cultural confl ict 
manage to negotiate and accommodate their diff erences.
Chapter 3 examines the issue of citizenship. Requirements for natural-
ization as well as legal residence establish the most immediately relevant 
conditions under which immigrants live. By setting the bar of legality, they 
also directly and dramatically aff ect the untold numbers of “illegal” immi-
grants in destination countries in addition to aspiring immigrants in send-
ing countries. In an “age of migration” (Castles and Miller 2009) framed by 
a stratifi ed global economy of the affl  uent North and impoverished South, 
implementing the requirements of legal immigration becomes one of the 
most important and daunting tasks facing governments (Cornelius et al. 
2002). At a deeper level beyond mere border control, stipulating naturaliza-
tion requirements represents for a demos what Joppke (2009) calls a “mirror 
of identity.” Defi ning what it takes to become a citizen—to become “one 
of us”—forces a citizenry to contemplate who “we” are. What should and 
what does constitute the integral traits of our political identity? To this fun-
damental political question, we will see, there exist myriad confl icting an-
swers that, however, generally fall within the normative contours formed 
by liberalism, nationalism, and postmodernism. Th e varying normative 
stances fi nd their way into complex citizenship policies across Europe and 
cast doubt on the putative comparative claim that there exist distinctive na-
tional understandings of citizenship, such as French republican, German 
ethnonationalist, and British or Dutch multicultural (Goodman 2014; How-
ard 2009; Koopmans et al. 2005; Brubaker 1992).
Chapter 4 investigates the veiling controversy. Th e extraordinary sa-
lience of this debate over a mere article of clothing stands as compelling 
testimony to the power of normative ideas to shape politics. Keep in mind 
that veiling is practiced by a minority of members of a minority religious 
sect in Europe. Th e policy of banning or permitting covering cannot, then, 
except in the wildest of imaginations, have serious material (or nonnorma-
tive) consequences (and thus motivations) in the same way that, say, an open 
immigration policy can aff ect rates of unemployment or the de facto mini-
mum wage. And yet the headscarf controversy has oft en come to stand as a 
metaphor for the broader immigration debate as a whole, an extremely com-
plicated and intricate subject matter that gets simplifi ed down to whether 
one approves or disapproves of covering hair. On the face of it, the policy 
itself would appear straightforward: permit or proscribe veils. Th is is largely 
true, though the exact conditions under which veiling is permitted or pro-
scribed vary widely. Normative fragmentation shows up markedly in the 
arguments for and against banning. Put diff erently, liberal, nationalist, and 
postmodern fragments turn up coexisting and allying with one another, so 
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to speak, on the side of banning the veil despite the fact that the broader 
theories from which they stem are philosophically incompatible. Th e same 
turns out to be true with the case against banning. Th e veiling controversy, 
then, off ers a telling example of normative fragmentation and fragilization 
that make it possible for positions fundamentally at odds to combine in the 
messy business of politicking.
Chapter 5 addresses secularism. Once considered a fait accompli that 
unequivocally positioned Europe in the vanguard of history and progress, 
secularism today is being revisited by Europeans, Muslim and non-Muslim 
alike (Habermas 2006; Casanova 1994). Muslim fundamentalists and Is-
lamists, estimated at four or fi ve million strong in Europe, tend to resist 
secularization, oft en highly conspicuously and controversially. Th ey con-
tend that European-style secularism unjustly requires the pious to relegate 
their religious beliefs and practices to the private sphere, degrading them 
to a level of superfi ciality on par with a pastime. Muslim resistance has led 
some Christians to reevaluate the deal that they struck with the secular state 
and to press for a larger, even leading place for Christian heritage and be-
lief in the public sphere. Liberal voices contend that the modern state can 
and must maintain its neutrality while incorporating a modernized “Euro-
Islam” into the European secular order. Postmodernists see in the reopen-
ing of the secularism question a perfect example of why it is immature folly 
to consider any normative order so self-evidently superior that it can remain 
immune to politicization. Secularism is anything but cut-and-dried in Eu-
rope, and rapidly changing policies toward Islam, Christianity, and other 
creeds are moving in many diff erent directions.
Chapter 6 analyzes the issue of domestic security. Security concerns 
have, since 9/11, fully infi ltrated the politics of immigration. Indeed, they 
bleed into every dimension of immigration, including the three case studies 
of Chapters 3, 4, and 5. Th us, is she hiding a bomb beneath that burqa? Are 
they harboring a terrorist cell in that mosque? Should we be more suspicious 
of our Muslim citizens and residents than the rest? Such questions evoke 
the specter of a dark European past. Is Europe in the process of recreat-
ing a category of second-class citizens analogous to the Jews of yesteryear? 
Are Europeans resurrecting on their own soil the kind of apartheid regimes 
they once imposed in their colonies? In arguing that such a grim process is 
well under way if not completed, postmodern and postcolonial voices have 
given some of the stigmatized Muslims reason to think that they must take 
their defense into their own hands. Even rumor and innuendo of such rebel-
lious undertakings have stirred nationalist calls to unshackle the state and 
fully enable it to protect the nation by whatever means necessary. What has 
changed regarding security is that what were once considered extraordinary 
means, such as torturing and terrorizing, the mere mention of which raised 
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automatic moral indignation, have been de-tabooed and are now being dis-
cussed as arguably appropriate responses to perceived insecurity.
Chapter 7 concludes the book by suggesting ways in which its approach 
contributes to the broader corpus of literature studying immigration. Th e 
case study chapters demonstrate Taylor’s mutual fragilization, a matured 
normative milieu characterized by widespread diffi  dence and ambivalence 
toward competing public philosophies. Keenly aware that fragilized voters 
can be persuaded by a broad, almost kaleidoscopic mélange of normative 
stances, political actors in diff erent contexts opportunistically invoke well-
sounding fragments of philosophically incompatible normative world-
views with little or no concern for consistency. Viewing them as impro-
vising bricoleurs who deploy fragments of the three public philosophies 
like tools in a tool kit enables us to better expose and comprehend policy 
messiness. Th e approach of normative bricolage provides a more nuanced 
way of understanding the impact of moral arguments on the politics of im-
migration than the conventional Left -Right dichotomy employed in many 
studies (Sainsbury 2012; Howard 2009; Lahav 2004). By interpreting the 
normative discourse as a Kulturkampf that has ensued for centuries across 
the whole of Europe (and beyond), this book furthermore aims to off er a 
refreshing and revealing alternative to the conventional nation-state com-
parisons that stress path dependency and distinct national styles (Good-
man 2014; Koopmans et al. 2005; Fetzer and Soper 2005; Favell 1998; Jop-
pke 1996; Brubaker 1992).
2
Kulturkampf
Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-incurred 
immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one’s own 
understanding without the guidance of another. . . . Th e motto of 
Enlightenment is therefore: Sapere aude! Have courage to use your 
own understanding.
—Immanuel Kant, Political Writings
Next to love of parents for their children, the strongest instinct 
both national and moral which exists in man is love of his country.
— Edmund Burke, Th e Works of the Right 
Honourable Edmund Burke
Perhaps nobody yet has been truthful enough about what 
“truthfulness” is.
—Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil
I employ the German notion of Kulturkampf (literally, “culture struggle”) to connote an ideological battle among liberalism, nationalism, and post-modernism. As intimated in the preceding chapter, I contend that none of 
the three public philosophies has been able decisively to discredit or defeat 
its rivals philosophically or politically. Each public philosophy has distilled 
such compelling arguments for its integral tenets that it has proven able to 
defend itself against philosophical or political marginalization. Th e endur-
ing normative stalemate produces fertile ground for the emergence of mutu-
al fragilization. Although each public philosophy doubtless has its share of 
staunchly committed proponents, a great number of political activists and 
citizens develop normative ambivalence. Th e latter results from a combina-
tion of budding diffi  dence regarding moral stances with which one closely 
identifi es and creeping sympathy toward positions with which one does not 
closely identify. Mutual fragilization intensifi es with fragmentation—that 
is, when normative slogans become detached from the systematic mother 
philosophy and deployed as performative utterances designed to sway po-
litical actors. Empirical demonstration of both mutual fragilization and 
fragmentation will have to await the case study chapters.
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Th e current chapter aims to familiarize readers with liberalism, nation-
alism, and postmodernism as public philosophies. I want to create enough 
familiarity that readers can easily identify liberal, nationalist, or postmod-
ern fragments as such when they come forth in the discourse on the Muslim 
question treated in subsequent chapters. I also aim to prepare readers for 
mutual fragilization. Th is I do by deliberately presenting generous inter-
pretations of liberalism, nationalism, and postmodernism. I portray each 
public philosophy in its own terms and best light. I lay special stress on the 
reasoning buttressing arguments that fi gure prominently in the politics of 
immigration in Europe. Rather than side with a particular public philoso-
phy, I wish to impress upon readers the plurality of persuasive normative 
outlooks that deal with European Muslims.
Liberalism
Th e intellectual origins of liberalism lie in the European Enlightenment of 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Pioneering thinkers of that era, 
such as Locke, Rousseau, Kant, and many others, argued that liberty, equali-
ty, reason, and progress represent righteous ends befi tting all human beings. 
Regardless of liberalism’s complex evolution over time, the philosophy’s 
central aspiration remains to this day a society of free and equal human be-
ings exercising their individual and collective reason to improve their lives.
For the philosophes of the Enlightenment the most redoubtable obstacles 
standing in the way of this loft y ideal were ignorance and tyranny taught 
and imposed by the unholy alliance of altar and crown. Th e (for the most 
part Roman Catholic) church was accused of preaching not only error and 
superstition but also, worse, blind obedience to authority. For instance, Ba-
ruch Spinoza, whose Tractacus Th eologico-Politicus [1670] represented one 
of the earliest and most scathing critiques, charged: “Philosophy has no end 
in view save truth; faith . . . looks for nothing but obedience and piety” (1951: 
189). Of the many human tragedies and follies that resulted from rampant 
credulity none came in for more scorn than the religious wars all too fre-
quently endorsed by priests and waged by princes. In Le Bon sens (Common 
Sense), published in 1772, Baron d’Holbach lamented:
In all parts of our globe, intoxicated fanatics have been seen cut-
ting each other’s throats, lighting funeral piles, committing, without 
scruple and even as a duty, the greatest crimes and shedding torrents 
of blood. . . . For what? . . . On behalf of a being, who exists only in 
their imagination, and who has made himself known only by the 
ravages, disputes, and follies, he has caused upon the earth. (Quoted 
in Bronner 2004: 165)
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David Hume derided the Crusades as “the most signal and most durable 
monument of human folly that has yet appeared in any age or nation” (quot-
ed in Tyerman 2006: xiv). With his characteristic wit, Voltaire (1969: 295) 
caustically quipped in 1769: “Th e Church must surely be divine, since seven-
teen centuries of roguery and imbecility were not capable of destroying it.” 
Th e church was also said to be implicated in political tyranny by way of its 
support for the notion of the divine-right king whose absolute mundane au-
thority was purportedly authorized by God. Locke (1980: 48), for example, 
in Two Treatises of Government [1689], excoriated the doctrine as nothing 
more than a continuation of the state of war of every man against every man 
wherein, however, the monarch has an overwhelming advantage. Across the 
English Channel, the Dutch republican Eric Walten (1689: 6) condemned 
monarchy as a euphemism for “slavery.”
For the lumières, French and non-French alike, the cure for this sorry 
state of aff airs was a strong dose of reason—that is, enlightenment. Th is 
did not necessarily have to mean an antipathy for religion per se. Th e pref-
erence rather was, to quote Kant’s famous title from 1793, Religion within 
the Bounds of Mere Reason. Whether atheist, deist, or otherwise, Enlight-
enment thinkers generally shared the belief that reason rather than scrip-
ture, human rather than divine authority, ought to be the fi nal arbiter (on 
earth) of what was true or false (Spragens 1981: 53). Moral philosophers 
enviously sought to emulate natural philosophers like Newton, whose 
great discoveries of the physical laws of nature were widely disseminated, 
for example, in the popular Encyclopedia of Denis Diderot and Jean Le 
Rond d’Alembert (Israel 2006: 201–3). Th e moral philosophers postulated 
the existence of a rationally ordered metaphysical universe whose eter-
nally valid moral laws, like natural physical laws, were comprehensible 
through reason. In 1770, d’Holbach maintained that “morals is the science 
of the relations that subsist between the minds, the wills, and the actions 
of men, in the same manner that geometry is the science of the relations 
that are found between bodies” (Holbach 1970: 98). Kant (1996: xi) de-
clared reason supreme in all matters:
Our age is the genuine age of criticism, to which everything must 
submit. Religion through its holiness and legislation through its 
majesty seek to exempt themselves from it. But in this way they in-
cite a just suspicion against themselves, and cannot lay claim to that 
unfeigned respect that reason grants only to that which has been 
able to withstand its free and public examination.
Th e great appeal of reason lay in its presumed universal accessibility. 
All humans were postulated to have the capacity to think rationally, one 
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reason debate should be free and public. In his Discourse on Methods [1637], 
Descartes (1971: 7) maintained that “the power of judging well and of dis-
tinguishing truth from falsehood, which is what we properly mean by good 
sense or reason, is naturally equal in all men.” Similarly, Kant (1949: 228) 
declared reason to be “clear, irrepressible, and distinctly audible even to the 
most ordinary man.” Humanity’s universal capacity to reason meant that 
the moral laws could not only be discovered but also verifi ed and internal-
ized by all human beings. A universal and knowable morality for all of hu-
mankind made possible the realization of Friedrich Schiller’s noble vision of 
“all men becoming brothers” that Ludwig van Beethoven unforgettably put 
to music in the fi nal movement of the Ninth Symphony.
Th e universality of human reason confi rmed the moral validity of 
equality and liberty for all. For centuries elites of various stripes had 
sought to legitimize their superior power by proclaiming their superior 
wisdom. But if all humans possess the equal ability to reason and reason 
is the fi nal arbiter of right and wrong, it followed that all persons must be 
naturally and fundamentally equal. “Being furnished with like faculties,” 
wrote Locke in the Second Treatise, “there cannot be supposed any .  .  . 
subordination among us.” Furthermore, if all individuals can think ratio-
nally, they should be free to lead their lives as they see fi t rather than being 
made to follow the imposed direction of self-appointed superiors—“a lib-
erty to follow my own will in all things where the rule prescribes not; and 
not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will 
of another man.” By “rule” Locke meant “no other legislative power, but 
that established, by consent, in the common-wealth” (Locke 1980: 17). Be-
ing subject to the laws of a government formed by the rational consent of 
the governed (or social contract) was not seen as a violation of individual 
liberty. Th e rational consent of the governed meant that democratic law 
amounted to self-legislated morality rather than heteronomy. Of course, 
if all persons were equal, then one’s rightful liberty had to end where it 
impinged on another’s. Th us Kant (1949: 128), in Th e Idea for a Universal 
History with Cosmopolitan Intent [1784], wrote that each citizen should be 
allowed to seek “his welfare in any way he chooses, as long as (his way) can 
coexist with the freedom of the others.” In Ancient and Modern Liberty 
[1819], Benjamin Constant nicely expressed the centrality of individual 
autonomy for liberalism:
Liberty is everyman’s right to be subject to the law alone, the right 
of not being arrested, tried, put to death or in any way molested, 
by the caprice of one or more individuals. It is every one’s right to 
express his own opinion, to attend to his own art, to come and go, 
to associate with others. It is, lastly, every one’s right to infl uence the 
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administration of the state either by nominating all or some of its of-
fi cers, or by his advice, demands and petitions, which the authorities 
are in a greater or less degree obliged to take into account. (Quoted 
in Ruggerio 1927: 167–68)
Rational, free, and equal persons could be expected to improve their 
lot both individually and collectively. Th e Enlightenment bequeathed to 
posterity an extraordinary enthusiasm for progress. “Th e course of human 
aff airs as a whole,” wrote Kant (1991: 234), “does not begin with good and 
then proceed to evil, but develops gradually from the worse to the better, 
and each individual is for his own part called upon by nature to contribute 
towards this progress to the best of his ability.” Th ough the obstacles were 
doubtless great, Enlightenment thinkers believed that one day all persons 
could be liberated and educated to take control over their lives and steer 
them toward betterment. No one deserved to be deemed so destitute, be-
nighted, or subjugated that the liberating rays of enlightenment could not 
shine upon him. “Th e perfectibility of the person,” declared Marquis de 
Condorcet (1804: 371), “is indefi nite.”
Liberal Voluntarism and Perfectionism
Liberalism not only champions but also depends on liberty, equality, ra-
tionality, and progress for its legitimization. Because it claims to be a self-
legislated morality, liberalism requires persons who are granted liberty and 
equality to act rationally and progressively. Essentially, it needs persons nei-
ther to prevent nor to endanger their own freedom or that of anyone else. If 
they do either, they cast doubt on the very universality of human reason on 
which liberalism morally rests.
Th ere has long been a debate within liberalism regarding how much 
government intervention, if any, is needed to achieve liberal ends. Isaiah 
Berlin (2002) famously analyzed the debate as one between negative and 
positive freedom. Th e former emphasizes freedom from government in-
tervention into one’s private aff airs and the latter the freedom to develop 
with government assistance into a better person capable of genuine self-
mastery. Others label the two outlooks “classical” and “modern” liberal-
ism (Ryan 2012: 24). I prefer the labels “liberal voluntarism” and “liberal 
perfectionism” but I have in mind a distinction similar to Berlin’s. Liberal 
voluntarism wants persons to have free choice, while liberal perfectionism 
wants them to make the right choice. It deserves underscoring that the 
two represent poles between which liberal philosophers and philosophies 
gravitate rather than enclosed camps with fi rm delineations of members 
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and nonmembers. Th ere prevails an unavoidable “slipperiness” between 
them (Ryan 2012: 22).
Liberal voluntarism worries more about governments that make mis-
takes than individuals who do so. Individuals should be free to err because 
error can represent an important dimension of the benefi cial learning 
process leading into maturity. By contrast, when the state errs, its errors 
ramify widely. With this in mind, John Stuart Mill (1975: 15), in On Lib-
erty [1859], laid out the harm principle, whereby “the only purpose for 
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized 
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, 
either physical or moral, is not a suffi  cient warrant.” Th e English utilitar-
ian provocatively articulated his opprobrium for social engineering, in-
deed for any kind of pressure to conform, when he wrote: “If mankind 
minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary 
opinion, mankind would be no more justifi ed in silencing that one person, 
than he, if he had the power, would be justifi ed in silencing mankind” 
(Mill 1975: 23). A few years earlier, Alexis de Tocqueville (1952: 62–63), in 
L’Ancien Régime et la Révolution [1856], had averred that “each man, being 
presumed to have received from nature the enlightenment necessary to 
conduct himself, has from birth an equal and inviolable right to live inde-
pendently of others in all that concerns him alone, and to forge his own 
destiny as he wishes.” Compelling citizens to do the right thing amounted 
to nothing more than the illusion of progress, a cure that was worse than 
the disease: “A State which dwarfs its men, in order that they may be more 
docile instruments in its hands even for benefi cial purposes, will fi nd that 
with small men no great thing can really be accomplished” (Mill 1975: 
141). Kant (1998: 107) too had denounced a government that would police 
or legislate morality: “Woe to the legislator who would want to bring about 
through coercion a polity directed to ethical ends! For he would thereby 
not only achieve the very opposite of ethical ends, but also undermine his 
political ends and render them insecure.”
In the twentieth century, the critical distinction between the right and 
the good emerged within liberal discourse. As experience with (relatively) 
freer societies accumulated, it became obvious that free persons would not, 
as many Enlightenment thinkers had hoped, converge on a unifi ed vision of 
the good life. As mentioned, Berlin argued that there were equally rational 
and compelling reasons for embracing liberalism as there were for espousing 
nationalism, even though the two philosophies were incompatible and in-
commensurable. “Th e necessity of choosing between absolute claims is then 
an inescapable characteristic of the human condition” (Berlin 1969: 169). 
Similarly, Rawls (2001: 3) developed the notion of “reasonable pluralism”:
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I believe a democratic society is not and cannot be a community, 
where by a community I mean a body of persons united in affi  rm-
ing the same comprehensive, or partially comprehensive, doctrine. 
Th e fact of reasonable pluralism which characterizes a society with 
free institutions makes this impossible. Th is is the fact of profound 
and irreconcilable diff erences in citizens’ reasonable comprehensive 
religious and philosophical conceptions of the world, and in their 
views of the moral and aesthetic values to be sought in human life.
From the perspective of liberal voluntarism, the fact of reasonable plu-
ralism should not alarm the state. Th e liberal state should focus its atten-
tion on guaranteeing rights rather than supporting a particular vision of 
the good life. It should concern itself with “procedural consensus” rather 
than substantive ethics (Habermas 1998: 226). It should stipulate and reg-
ulate the (fair) rules but not the results of the political game. It should 
act as umpire rather than coach. Government should ensure coercion-free 
public discourse in which all have an equal say in the making of laws that 
pertain to them (Habermas 1984; 1987a). Another metaphor is that of the 
“night watchman” (Nozick 1974: 26–27). Th e state should guard against 
the violation of its citizens’ rights but refrain from instructing citizens 
what to do with their rights. Th e emphasis on rights rather than the good 
should include above all guaranteeing individual liberty and equality be-
fore the law and maintaining the rule of law. In this vein, Brian Barry 
(1996: 538) asserts that “the basic idea of liberalism is to create a set of 
rights under which people are treated equal in certain respects, and then 
leave them to deploy these rights (alone or in association with others) in 
pursuit of their own ends.”
By contrast, liberal perfectionism fears bad choice. Many Enlighten-
ment thinkers harbored doubts about the liberation of the masses. Kant 
(1838: 264) observed that the “Volk consists of idiots”; Hume (1754: 250) re-
gretted that the “bulk of mankind” are “governed by authority, not reason.” 
No one more famously voiced the concern than Rousseau (1967: 7), who 
in the opening line to the fi rst chapter of Du contrat social [1762], penned 
the unforgettable observation: “Man is born free, and everywhere he is in 
chains.” Th e chains were centuries of subjection to repression, ignorance, 
and poverty that the Geneva native had detailed in the Discourse on the Ori-
gin and Basis of Inequality among Men [1754]. Rousseau (1967: 22) further 
maintained that it, therefore, is oft en necessary that men should be “forced 
to be free.” Th is represented no contradiction for the Genevan polymath, 
as he explained in his beloved novel Émile [1762], so long as the mandated 
instruction led to self-mastery in the end. As for politics, Rousseau (1967: 
41) contended that “the people always desire what is good, but do not always 
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discern it.” Rousseau (1967: 42, 43, 45) theorized the need for a “great leg-
islator” who “by his genius” would possess a prophet-like combination of 
wisdom, prudence, and charisma that would enable him to “compel with-
out violence and persuade without convincing.” His noble and indispens-
able task was to guide individual citizens to transcend their petty, parochial 
interests, come together as a body politic and generate the “general will” 
(volenté générale) in the public interest. Additionally, the legislator was to 
establish and preach a “civil religion” (religion civile) whose basic tenets were 
to inspire harmony and loyalty to the state (Rousseau 1967: 145–47).
He who dares undertake to give institutions to a nation ought to 
feel himself capable .  .  . of altering man’s constitution in order to 
strengthen it; of substituting a social and moral existence for the 
independent and physical existence which we have all received from 
nature. (Rousseau 1967: 43)
Although the French (Rousseau to be sure but also Henri de St. Simon 
and Auguste Comte) are oft en loathed or lauded for social engineering, oth-
ers too discerned the need for a guiding hand of the state. Kant (1991: 134), 
for one, wrote:
If a certain use to which freedom is put is itself a hindrance to free-
dom in accordance with universal laws (i.e. if it is contrary to right), 
any coercion which is used against it will be a hindrance to a hin-
drance of freedom, and will thus be consonant with freedom in ac-
cordance with universal laws—that is, it will be right.
Similarly, Mill (1975: 16), who worked for the East India Company, believed 
that “despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbar-
ians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justifi ed by 
actually eff ecting that end.”
Arguably the most consequential thrust for positive liberty has come, 
since the mid-nineteenth century roughly, with the insistence on and 
struggle for social in addition to civil and political rights for all (Marshall 
1950). Whether called “New Liberalism” in Britain or “Social Democracy” 
on the Continent, the principal aim of this progressive movement turned 
out to be to provide working-class individuals the same basic opportuni-
ties that upper- and middle-class persons presumably can give themselves 
independently (Habermas 1962). Th e tradition reproached laissez-faire 
capitalism for generating and tolerating miserable living conditions for 
the masses that not only impoverished them but also eff ectively blocked 
them from developing self-respect and self-mastery (Ryan 2012: 33–34). 
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In his wartime report Social Insurance and Allied Service [1942], William 
Beveridge argued that a comprehensive social welfare state was necessary 
to free Britons from the “Five Great Evils of Want, Disease, Idleness, Igno-
rance and Squalor” (quoted in Hemerijck 2013: 122). In fact, welfare states 
that provided social security “from cradle to grave” were eventually real-
ized across northwestern Europe in the generation following World War 
II (Hemerijck 2013: 121–25).
Other theories of positive liberty look beyond social rights to fostering 
civic-mindedness. Republicanism, for example, has long insisted that only 
through civic engagement with fellow citizens can individuals realize their 
full potential. Even when free, a life lived exclusively in the private sphere 
remains parochial and impoverished—that is, less than it should be (Viroli 
1997; Pocock 1975; Arendt 1958: 22–78). Quentin Skinner (1990: 304) argues 
that “if we wish to enjoy as much freedom as we can hope to attain within 
political society, there is good reason for us to act in the fi rst instance as 
virtuous citizens, placing the common good above the pursuit of any indi-
vidual or factional ends.” What Cécile Laborde (2002: 611) dubs “civic pa-
triotism” requires
of citizens . . . that they be willing to engage in the [public] conversa-
tion, that they see it as their own, and that they learn the skills which 
allow them to participate in it. So, while requiring that all citizens 
be socialized into the same political culture, it does not take this 
culture as a fi xed legacy but as a “lived” experience.
Republicanism contends that citizens ultimately learn civic virtue only by 
doing citizenship—that is, by actively engaging in self-government. Th ey 
therefore need to be encouraged and in some cases enabled by the state to 
participate in public life and dialogue. Such support, according to Laborde 
(2008: 24), necessitates “not only the just distribution of goods and resources 
but also the expansion of basic powers, virtues, and capabilities, including 
those of personal autonomy, civic skills, and self-respect.” Persons who lack 
these qualities should not be left  alone by the state, as liberal voluntarism 
posits, but rather helped to help themselves.
Deliberative democracy represents a turn in democratic theory from 
mere choice to informed choice. It represents an attempt to go beyond guar-
anteeing mere access to decision-making to guaranteeing the quality of 
decision-making (Keenan 2003; Richardson 2002; Fung and Wright 2001; 
Drysek 2000; Benhabib 1996; Buchstein 1995; Barber 1984). According to 
deliberative democracy, good decisions only emerge through and at the 
conclusion of rational collective deliberation. All impediments to rational 
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discussion need to be eliminated. Th ese include not only external obstacles, 
such as coercion, intimidation, and deception, but also internal obstruc-
tions, such as adherence to superstition or the inability to refl ect critically. 
Habermas (1998: 44) stipulates the necessary conditions for the domination-
free communication at the core of deliberative democracy as
(i) that nobody who could make a relevant contribution may be ex-
cluded; (ii) that all participants are granted an equal opportunity to 
make contributions; (iii) that all participants must mean what they 
say; and (iv) their communication must be freed from external and 
internal coercion so that ‘yes’ or ‘no’ stances that participants adopt 
on criticizable validity claims are motivated solely by the rational 
force of the better reasons.
Deliberative democracy is functioning as it should when citizens can pro-
vide a reasonable account of the arguments for and against a specifi c policy 
that was adopted, including an appreciation of, not necessarily however 
agreement with, why one line of reasoning prevailed over the others.
Th e liberal democratic state should enable all its citizens to deliberate 
rationally, off ering assistance to those not able to do so independently.
Because most citizens live most of their lives in civil society out-
side of conventional politics, deliberative theories seek to structure 
civil society so as to better equip citizens to deliberate in politics. . . . 
As democratic theorists have long recognized, democracy cannot 
thrive without a well-educated citizenry. An important part of dem-
ocratic education is learning how to deliberate well enough to be 
able to hold representatives accountable. Without a civil society that 
provides rehearsal space for political deliberation, citizens are less 
likely to be politically eff ective. (Gutmann and Th ompson 2004: 35)
It follows that the liberal state should foster those organizations that en-
courage rational deliberation and not shrink from proscribing those that 
discourage or threaten it (Gutmann and Th ompson 2004: 61). Critics who 
object to government overreach must keep in mind that democracies, be-
cause they are governed by the people and not by some enlightened despot 
or cadre, have an existential interest in well-educated citizens. Tolerating 
widespread civic apathy invites poor governance at best and political suicide 
at worst. Aft er all, “we cannot simply assume that people are good liberal 
democrats.” In some circumstances, “liberalism with a spine” is called for 
(Macedo 2000: 5).
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Cosmopolitanism and Liberal Multiculturalism
Both liberal voluntarism and liberal perfectionism have profound implica-
tions for the politics of immigration. To address the former fi rst, it prescribes a 
thin conception of citizenship that translates into advocacy for cosmopolitan-
ism and liberal multiculturalism. According to cosmopolitanism, citizenship 
should not require any thick or profound attachment to or identifi cation with 
a larger group. In order to guarantee individual autonomy, the rights of dem-
ocratic citizenship should never be contingent on one’s creed, race, gender, 
ethnicity, or, most importantly for immigration, one’s nationality. Citizen-
ship should be de-territorialized and de-ethnicized and attached to person-
hood rather than peoplehood (Delanty 2009: 131). Residence itself (in some 
accounts legal or even long-term) should suffi  ce to make immigrants eligible 
for rights fully equal to those of native citizens (Ellermann 2014; Carens 2013; 
Tonkiss 2013; Abizadeh 2012; Beck and Grande 2007; Benhabib 2004; Haber-
mas 2003; Rubio-Marin 2000). Rainer Bauböck (2007: 2423), for example, en-
dorses “stakeholder citizenship” for all “individuals whose circumstances of 
life link their future well-being to the fl ourishing of a particular polity.”
Cosmopolitanism implies a commitment to liberal multiculturalism. If 
the liberal state welcomes all, then it should not concern itself with telling 
citizens which language(s) to speak, god(s) to worship, lifestyle(s) to lead, 
group(s) to embrace. Th eir affi  liations are their own private aff air. Indeed, 
liberal multiculturalism reconceptualizes robust affi  liation with a particu-
lar culture from a vice that threatens to undermine liberal universalism to a 
virtue that enhances personal autonomy. Vigorous affi  liation with a chosen 
tradition can enrich and strengthen one’s personal beliefs. Moreover, just 
such a sense of secure belonging and connectedness can fortify an individ-
ual to resist the fearsome pressures of conformity in mass consumer society 
(Bielefeldt 2007; Kymlicka 1995).
Liberal multiculturalism [as] a normative principle that affi  rms . . . a 
political attitude of fostering and encouraging the prosperity, cultural 
and material, of cultural groups within a society, and respecting their 
identity, is justifi ed by considerations of freedom and human digni-
ty. . . . Th e preservation of their culture is justifi ed only in terms of its 
contribution to the well-being of people. (Raz 1994a: 189, 186)
If cultural identity and pride are integral to personal autonomy, as is for exam-
ple private property, then the liberal state should protect them as well. In Will 
Kymlicka’s (1995: 113) words, the state “should aim at insuring that all nation-
al groups have the opportunity to maintain themselves as a distinct culture.” 
Th e state should adopt a neutral position that refrains from privileging any 
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particular cultural expression or group over others. In Joseph Raz’s (1994a: 
174) “liberal multiculturalism,” the state “consists . . . of diverse communities 
and belongs to none of them.” Exclusivist notions—“Italy is for the Italians,” 
“French is the language of France,” “Britain is a Christian country”—should 
enjoy no normative sway in truly cosmopolitan and multicultural societies 
that treat all human beings with equal respect and dignity.
Th e neutrality of the law vis-à-vis internal ethical diff erentiations 
stems from the fact that in complex societies the citizenry as a whole 
can no longer be held together by a substantive consensus on values 
but only by a consensus on the procedures for the legitimate enact-
ment of laws and the legitimate exercise of power. . . . Hence the ethi-
cal integration of groups and subcultures with their own collective 
identities must be uncoupled from the abstract political integration 
that includes all citizens equally. (Habermas 1998: 225)
Liberal Assimilationism
As far as immigration is concerned, liberal perfectionism translates into 
preference for liberal assimilationism. Th e latter urges the state to encour-
age, demand, and even test the assimilation of immigrants to liberal values, 
usually generally understood as the moral principles anchored in the receiv-
ing country’s (liberal democratic) constitution. Habermas (1998: 229), for 
instance, claims that “constitutional patriotism” must be mandatory:
A democratic constitutional state . . . can require of immigrants only 
the political socialization described in (1) [“Assent to the principles 
of the constitution”] (and practically speaking can expect to see it 
only in the second generation). Th is enables it to preserve the iden-
tity of the political community, which nothing, including immigra-
tion, is permitted to encroach upon, since that identity is founded 
on the constitutional principles anchored in the political culture and 
not on the basic ethical orientations of the cultural form of life pre-
dominant in that country.
By requiring identifi cation with the liberal values of the constitution, liberal 
assimilationism prescribes a thicker form of citizenship that entails in some 
important respects becoming liberal-minded. Although Habermas (1998: 
227) has said that “loyalty [to the constitution] .  .  . cannot be legally en-
forced,” if one wants to require it, then disloyalty must either be penalized or 
corrected through mandatory instruction. It is not surprising that Haber-
mas (2008a: 27) in his refl ections on “post-secular society” writes:
36 Chapter 2
Th e constitutional state confronts its citizens with the demanding 
expectations of an ethics of citizenship that reaches beyond mere 
obedience to the law. Religious citizens and communities must not 
only superfi cially adjust to the constitutional order. Th ey are expect-
ed to appropriate the secular legitimisation of constitutional prin-
ciples under the very premises of their own faith.
Th is refl ects a political identity so thick as to aff ect the way persons worship. 
Laborde (2002: 609) too advocates a thick requirement for immigrants that 
“includes familiarity with collective institutions, political rituals and rhet-
oric, types of discourses, and accumulated habits and expectations stem-
ming from previous conversations.” Her “critical republicanism” mandates 
“autonomy-promoting education” for those unable or unwilling to embrace 
individual autonomy for all persons: “Vulnerable individuals—in particular 
female members of minority groups—must be equipped to resist the mul-
tiple forms of domination they are potentially subjected to: public and pri-
vate, secular and religious, ethnocentric and patriarchal” (Laborde 2008: 
168–69; see also Scheff er 2011: 309–10).
Like liberal voluntarism and liberal perfectionism, liberal multicultur-
alism and assimilationism represent normative poles between which liberal 
theories tend to gravitate. I thus deliberately quoted Habermas under both 
rubrics to underscore just this point. Other theorists too demonstrate “slip-
periness” between thin and thick notions of liberal citizenship. Although 
Raz (1994a: 174) endorses “liberal multiculturalism,” for example, he also 
notes the necessity of a common political culture:
Members of all cultural groups . . . will have to acquire a common 
political language and conventions of conduct to be able to partici-
pate eff ectively in the competition for resources and the protection 
of group as well as individual interests in a shared political arena. 
(Raz 1994b: 77)
Because it champions liberty but does so with absolute moral certitude, lib-
eralism will always harbor a built-in tension between voluntarism and per-
fectionism, what Spragens (1981) calls the “irony of liberal reason” (see also 
Gray 1996: 21–22).
Nationalism
Th e origins of nationalism are contested. Some consider it a purely modern 
phenomenon, accompanying, for example, industrialization (Gellner 1983) 
or the expansion of the print medium (Anderson 1991). Others stress older 
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roots. Th e book of Genesis, of course, associates the creation of diff erent 
nations of peoples speaking diff erent languages with God’s destruction of 
the Tower of Babel. Patriotism has its etymological roots in the Latin word 
patria. Originating in Roman times and surviving throughout the Middle 
Ages, patria connoted loyalty to one’s community, but community under-
stood in a much more parochial sense than the modern nation. Th ere existed 
too the notion of natio closely associated with lingua. Students at medieval 
universities were, for instance, enrolled according to their natio, typical-
ly determined by their mother tongue. Caricatures of whole peoples—the 
“niggardly English,” “stern Germans,” “passionate Italians,” “lazy Irish,” 
and so forth—have been bantered to and fro in Europe for ages. In a more 
systematic, scholarly manner, John Armstrong (1982) uncovered “nations 
before nationalism,” something like identifi able ethnic tribes bearing com-
mon, persistent characteristics that distinguished them from other tribes 
and who in modern times would gain or seek a nation-state. Anthony Smith 
(1986) calls roughly similar groupings ethnies, each of which was conscious 
of itself as a people with a history and without which modern European 
leaders could not have built nation-states as we know them today. Th ere 
were also states and territories, such as France, England, the Netherlands, 
and arguably Sweden, assembled and governed by absolutist monarchs that 
appeared identifi ably national—that is, French, English, Dutch, Swedish—
in contrast to multiethnic empires such as the Habsburg and Ottoman dy-
nasties, well before the nation actually governed in the modern democratic 
sense of a sovereign people in control of a state came into being (Marx 2003).
Particularism
Th at modern democratic nation-state was fi rst proclaimed (in Europe) by 
the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen in 1789. Article III reads: 
“Th e nation is essentially the source of all sovereignty.” Th is is why Rous-
seau, the celebrated philosopher of the Revolution, is sometimes called the 
intellectual father of modern nationalism (Smith 1991: 88), though in truth 
he championed republicanism modeled on the ancient polis. It was actually 
Johann Gottfried Herder who coined the term “nationalism.” Th e Lutheran 
pastor of Bückeburg and one-time student of Kant insisted that the Revolu-
tion was distinctively French. Against its proponents, especially Napoleon 
I, who conquered far and wide across Europe in the name of defending and 
spreading the purportedly universal values of the Revolution, Herder retort-
ed that the Revolution was particularistic. He argued that the principles of 
the Declaration could not have the same meaning for Germans (or any non-
Frenchmen for that matter) because they were written in the French, not the 
German, language; that the Revolution could never inspire the Germans in 
38 Chapter 2
the same way because it was launched and lived by Frenchmen and not by 
Germans; that the republic founded by Frenchmen in 1789 could never feel 
like the right model for Germans because they did not found it. Every phe-
nomenon, Herder averred, is inescapably a product of the ultimately unique 
context—language, culture, time, place—in which it comes to life and re-
mains only truly appreciable by those who share that context. “Not a coun-
try, not a people, not a natural history, not a state, are like one another,” he 
wrote in Another Philosophy of History for the Education of Mankind [1774]. 
“Hence the True, the Good, the Beautiful in them are not similar either. If 
one does not search for this, if one blindly takes another nation as a model, 
everything is extinguished” (Herder 1877–1913: 4:472).
Th e alleged sources of national particularism vary. Herder stressed lan-
guage. To be sure, he acknowledged other factors: “Th e original character of 
a nation is derived from its family traits, its climate, its type of life, its educa-
tion, its fi rst eff orts and its habitual occupations” (quoted in Sternhell 2010: 
201). But among these specifi cally interconnected factors none was more 
important than language: “Has a nation anything more precious than the 
language of its fathers? In it dwell its entire world of tradition, history, reli-
gion, principles of existence; its whole heart and soul” (Herder 1877–1913: 
17:58). Language formed the core of what Herder (1877–1913: 8:392) termed 
the Volksgeist, literally a “people’s soul,” its “inner character,” its particular 
“genius” (Herder 1877–1913: 25:10). Th e Volksgeist represented a people’s 
“center of gravity” (Herder 1877–1913: 5:509), the ultimately inscrutable and 
even ineff able something that made one person Italian, another German, 
and, moreover, enabled both of them automatically to recognize the dif-
ference. Herder deemed it tragic to lose or, worse, to abandon one’s mother 
tongue, the “dictionary of the soul” (quoted in Gillies 1945: 37). For exam-
ple, he heaped scorn on the pronounced Francophilia of the court of Fred-
erick the Great, where only French was spoken. Germans, he believed, could 
never amount to more than second-class Frenchmen and therefore should 
not endeavor to emulate them no matter how great they seemed. “Nations 
evolve in accordance with the place, the time, and their inner character. 
Each one bears within itself the harmony of its perfection, not comparable 
to any others” (Herder 1984: 3:759).
Montesquieu underscored climate. In the Spirit of the Laws [1748], he 
maintained that laws
should be so adapted to the people for which they are created, that 
it should be a great coincidence if the laws of one nation suit anoth-
er. . . . Th ey ought to be fi tted to the physical conditions of a country, 
to its climate, whether cold, hot or temperate; to the nature of its 
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soil, to its situation and extent, and to the way of life of its people 
whether it is agricultural or pastoral or that of hunters. (Montes-
quieu 1950–1955: 1:8–9)
It should be noted, however, that the French baron, like other philosophes, 
did believe in natural law, knowable through reason and whose moral prin-
ciples needed to be customized to fi t particular national settings.
Religion represented the critical bonding agent for the French patriot 
(of the France of Louis XIV rather than 1789) Joseph de Maistre. In Consi-
dérations sur la France [1796], he pilloried the Revolution for its seculariz-
ing tendencies. Acts such as the Constitution of the Clergy, he contended, 
dangerously diluted Roman Catholicism, whose unadulterated version he 
took to be an integral part of French identity. “A man must have lost his 
senses to believe that God has commissioned academies to tell us what He 
is and what is our duty to Him. . . . Th ose who speak or write in such a way 
as to rob a people of its natural dogma should be hanged like burglars” 
(Maistre 1884–1887: 5:108). Th e comte cast aspersions on the idea of a civic 
religion whose universal secular principles could apply to all mankind. 
He dismissed the Enlightenment axiom of a single human nature with 
a notorious quip: “I have seen in my life French, Italians, Russians, etc. 
I even know, thanks to Montesquieu, that one can be Persian; but as for 
man, I declare I have never met him in my life” (Maistre 1989: 145). He 
insisted that “nations, like individuals, have their character and even their 
mission. . . . Each of them reveals to the observer an unalterable character” 
(Maistre 1989: 71).
For Edmund Burke, it was the incremental unfolding of a shared history 
that stamped a people. He viewed a nation as inhering in a kind of quasi-
sacred pact or “partnership . . . obtained in many generations . . . between 
those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born” to 
honor the nation’s achievements of the past, cherish those of the present, 
and make possible those of the future (Burke 1973: 110). Th e Irish-born rep-
resentative to the British House of Commons abhorred the French Revolu-
tion for trying to invent a polity and people from scratch.
A nation is not an idea only of a local extent, an individual momen-
tary aggression, but it is an idea of continuity, which extends in time 
as well as in numbers, and in space. And it is not the choice of one 
day, or one set of people, not a tumultuary or giddy choice; it is a 
deliberate election of ages and generation, it is a Constitution made 




It takes no clairvoyant to discern a proclivity for national homogeneity 
among nationalist thinkers. Th ey tend to fear foreign elements as a dilution 
of the national character. For instance, Fichte (1968: 215), in his famous Ad-
dresses to the German Nation in French-occupied Berlin during the winter 
of 1807/1808, maintained:
Th ose who speak the same language are joined to each other by a 
multitude of invisible bonds by nature herself.  .  .  . Th ey belong to-
gether and are by nature one and an inseparable whole. Such a whole, 
if it wishes to absorb and mingle with itself any other people of dif-
ferent descent and language, cannot do so without itself becoming 
confused, in the beginning at any rate, and violently disturbing the 
even progress of its culture.
Similarly, de Maistre (Maistre 1989: 270) warned that “the excessive intro-
duction of foreign words . . . is one of the surest signs of a people’s degrada-
tion.” Montesquieu (1989: 310) advised readers to be “careful not to change 
the general spirit of the nation.” “If the character is generally good, what 
diff erence do a few faults make?”
Th e faults might be prejudices against nonnatives. Th e founding fathers 
of particularism not only defended national prejudice; they lionized it. In 
prejudices lay embedded the collected and bequeathed wisdom of a peo-
ple—not wisdom in an erudite, bookish form but in the form of “common 
sense” palatable to ordinary folks, what Vico (1948: para. 142) described 
as “judgment without refl ection felt in common by the whole of a people, 
order, nation, or the whole human race.” In a thought that is oft en echoed 
with regard to Islam in Europe today, Herder noted that “the introduction 
of any foreign religion is very dangerous. It always destroys the national 
character and honorable prejudices” (quoted in Sternhell 2010: 309). Burke 
too celebrated prejudice: “Instead of casting away all our old prejudices, we 
cherish them to a very considerable degree, and . . . we cherish them because 
they are prejudices; and the longer they have lasted and the more generally 
they have prevailed, the more we cherish them” (Burke 1973: 100).
Nation-state
Prejudice constituted an important element of the collective but unique 
wisdom of a people that made it imperative that each nation have its own 
state. In a slogan oft en uttered by European nationalists striving throughout 
the nineteenth century for national self-determination against empires like 
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the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian, the Italian nation-builder 
Giuseppe Mazzini proclaimed “every nation a state, only one state for the 
entire nation” (quoted in Glover 1997: 12). If each nation is truly unique, has 
its own “soul,” then it follows (in nationalist logic) that only it can govern 
itself aright. “Wherever a separate language is found, there a separate nation 
exists, which has the right to take independent charge of its aff airs and to 
govern itself” (Fichte 1968: 184). Only natives can understand the singular 
needs of their nation; foreign rulers or rules will ultimately destroy a nation. 
Nationalism further postulates that the individual can experience the fullest 
richness and felicity of human life only as part of a national community—
that is, as a communal “We” as opposed to an isolated “I” (Hegel 1953: 110). 
Th e nation binds its individual members to a reassuring community beyond 
the immediate family and grants them a kind of immortality by antedating 
and outlasting their own physical existence. Liberalism’s freedom for the 
individual alone is incomplete at best and chimerical at worst. True free-
dom can, from the nationalist perspective, be enjoyed only collectively as 
a member of a nation living with co-nationals in sovereign control of “our” 
nation-state. No one developed this idea of collective national freedom more 
thoroughly and systematically than Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, who 
called its realization “the divine Idea as it exists on earth.”
What counts in a state is the practice of acting according to a com-
mon will. . . . Th is spiritual content then constitutes the essence of 
the individual as well as that of the people. It is one life in all, a grand 
object, a great purpose and content on which depend all individual 
happiness and all private decisions. Th e state does not exist for the 
citizens; on the contrary, one could say that the state is the end and 
they are its means. But the means-end relation is not fi tting here. For 
the state is not the abstract confronting the citizens; they are parts 
of it, like members of an organic body, where no member is end and 
none is means. (Hegel 1953: 50–52)
Egalitarian Nationalism
Hegel’s vision represents the core aspiration of egalitarian nationalism. 
Th ough they did not all articulate as intricate, systematic, and dialectical a 
philosophy as the great savant of Jena, most important nationalist thinkers 
and activists of the late eighteenth and fi rst half of the nineteenth centuries 
subscribed to some version of this ideal in which each nation gains genu-
ine independence over its own aff airs. Th ey were optimistic that peoples 
aff orded self-determination would be content and therefore live together in 
international harmony. Herder painted the vision of a grand international 
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garden of humanity, with each independent nation symbolizing one of the 
beautifully blossoming fl owers. Egalitarian nationalists tended to denounce 
all forms of cultural or political chauvinism, chief among them imperial-
ism. Burke, to his credit, deplored his own beloved Britain’s empire, and not 
only for its mistreatment of his Irish brethren but also the peoples of Asia 
and Africa whom it subjugated. Herder poured vitriol not only on French 
expansionism but also on the European colonies around the world that 
wrongly quashed diff erent peoples’ right to self-determination. Egalitarian 
nationalism arguably reached its political highpoint (in Europe) during the 
revolutions of 1848, the “springtime of the peoples,” when many Kultur-
nationen (nations without a state) sought to form democratic nation-states 
independent of various empires and kingdoms, the so-called “prisons of the 
peoples” (see Alter 1994: 39–65).
Antagonistic Nationalism
Many students of nationalism note a transformation to a more chauvinistic 
variety of nationalism aft er 1848, ultimately culminating in the two world 
wars (Kohn 1955: 50–80; Hayes 1931: 164–231). Variously labeled as “integral 
nationalism” (Hayes 1931: 164), “primordialism” (Sutherland 2012: 132), “jin-
goism” (Heywood 2012: 188), “biological nationalism” (Kohn 1955: 73), “eth-
nic nationalism” (Smith 1991: 82), or simply (proto)“fascism” (Kohn 1955: 78), 
I prefer “antagonistic nationalism” to describe the view of “our nation” as in a 
kind of Darwinian survival-of-the-fi ttest competition with all other nations 
(Darwin’s Origin of the Species appeared in 1859). It lays equal if not greater 
stress on identifying, neutralizing, and even eliminating perceived external 
and internal enemies of the nation rather than merely nourishing and cel-
ebrating the national character. While some claim that antagonistic national-
ism was more prominent in central and eastern Europe (Smith 1991: 81–82; 
Kohn 1946: 329–454; also see Marx 2003 against this thesis), I read egalitar-
ian and antagonistic nationalism as poles between which nationalists across 
Europe move. Both poles belong to a single ideological orbit philosophically 
rooted in metaphysical particularism. Both variants share the particularistic 
notions that the world is divided into unique nations, that the nations rep-
resent for their members their most meaningful association or community 
(beyond the family) without which their lives are less than complete, and that 
for this reason it is critical to protect and nurture the national culture or char-
acter—to wit, maintain homogeneity. Th e antagonistic variant injects into an 
otherwise naively idealistic nationalism a dose of sober realism by maintain-
ing that in a world populated by distinct peoples, nations and nation-states 
will inevitably collide and confl ict. It adds the sociopolitical insight that such 
enmity tends to reinforce national solidarity.
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Antagonistic nationalism arguably received its most philosophically 
profound and sociopolitically incisive articulation by Carl Schmitt (1976), 
especially in Der Begriff  des Politischen (Th e Concept of the Political) from 
1927. Schmitt did not originate the outlook, however. Hints of it turn up 
in numerous conservative and nationalist thinkers and activists, such as 
Fichte, Ernest Renan, Hippolyte Taine, Charles Maurras, Giovanni Gentile, 
Paul de Man, Ezra Pound, W. B. Yeats, Robert Brasillach, Pierre Drieu La 
Rochelle, Maurice Barrés, Ernst Jünger, Otto and Gregor Strasser, Georges 
Valois, Oswald Mosley, and Oswald Spengler. Long discredited aft er World 
War II due to the author’s membership in the Nazi Party, Schmitt’s work has 
experienced a deserved reassessment in recent decades (Tralau 2010; Agam-
ben 2005; Mouff e 2000). Not only are his interpretations based on rigorous 
philosophizing about the shortcomings and contradictions of liberalism 
and democracy but are also now validated by a virtual mountain of social 
scientifi c research into how persons view and treat those whom they deem 
diff erent from themselves (Kosic and Phalet 2006; Stolz 2000; Taguieff  1988; 
Lévi-Straus 1985; Horowitz 1985; Tajfel 1982).
Schmitt rejected the Enlightenment notion of a common ethics that 
could unite all peoples. He referred to the political world as a “pluriverse 
rather than a universe,” in which war between nations was likely if not 
inevitable (Schmitt 1996: 53). In fact, for the Berlin professor politics ul-
timately boiled down to a relationship between friend and enemy (Freund 
und Feind): “Th e specifi c political distinction to which political actions and 
motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy” and “Were this 
distinction to vanish then political life would vanish altogether” (Schmitt 
1996: 26). In order to prevail against the enemy and avoid annihilation, a 
people had to be homogeneous and its members loyal to the state (ultimately 
to the point of dying for it). Schmitt abhorred the divisive politics of par-
liamentary democracy and postulated that only the threat (real or imag-
ined) of an enemy (external and internal) could overcome the divisiveness 
of interest-group politics:
Th e endeavour of a normal state consists above all in assuring total 
peace within the state and its territory. . . . As long as the state is a 
political entity the requirement for internal peace compels it in criti-
cal situations to decide also upon the domestic enemy. Every state 
provides, therefore, some kind of formula for the declaration of an 
internal enemy. (Schmitt 1996: 46)
Indeed, Schmitt believed that denying or appeasing the enemy amounted 
to treason, such that “if a part of the population declares that it no longer 
recognizes enemies, then, depending on the circumstance, it joins their side 
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and aids them. Such a declaration does not abolish the reality of the friend-
and-enemy distinction” (Schmitt 1996: 51). A nation that tolerated internal 
diversity and discord was doomed to extinction: “If a people no longer pos-
sesses the energy or the will to maintain itself in the sphere of politics, the 
latter will not thereby vanish from the world. Only a weak people will disap-
pear” (Schmitt 1996: 53).
Nativism
Th e ideological progeny of antagonistic nationalism, what I term “nativism,” 
lay largely dormant in Western Europe and marginalized to the political 
fringe for a generation following World War II due to its association with 
fascism and the Holocaust. It was in opposition to large-scale postwar im-
migration that nativism revived (in the domestic politics of Western Eu-
ropean polities) and began its gradual but steady rise into the legitimate, 
mainstream public philosophy it represents today. Th e earliest nativist ar-
guments to reach the political limelight aft er World War II likely fell from 
the lips of British Conservative MP Enoch Powell. On 20 April 1968 in Bir-
mingham, he delivered his “River of Blood” speech in which he presaged 
massive civil unrest in Britain “of American proportions” if immigration 
was not curbed. Supported (according to Gallup) by 74 percent of Britons, 
many of whom marched in protest against his immediate sacking as shadow 
defense secretary by Edward Heath, the address by the intellectual-turned-
politician was built on classic particularist presuppositions: “Th e West In-
dian or Asian does not, by being born in England become an Englishman. 
In law he becomes a United Kingdom citizen by birth; in fact he is a West 
Indian or an Asian still” (quoted in Hansen 2000: 188). Across the Eng-
lish Channel, it was Jean-Marie Le Pen who brought the argument against 
“unassimilated” immigrants into mainstream French politics: “As a general 
rule, we believe populations should live in their own territories, within their 
own historical borders. When cultural and ethnic identities are mixed, it 
makes for an explosive combination” (quoted in Holmes 2000: 67, 70). In 
Germany, it was the fi ft een German professors who in 1982 published the 
Heidelberg Manifesto, which warned:
Peoples are .  .  . living systems of a high order, each with its own 
systematic characteristics which are transmitted genetically and 
through tradition. For this reason the integration of large masses of 
non-German foreigners is impossible for the simultaneous preserva-
tion of our people, and leads to the well-known ethnic catastrophes 
of multicultural societies. (Quoted in Chin 2007: 148)
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Analysts choose diff erent labels for this outlook, such as “integralism” 
(Holmes 2000: 6), “cultural racism” (Wieviorka 2002: 141), or the “new rac-
ism” (Barker 1981), but they all tend to discern a transformation from an older 
form of racial discrimination based on biological diff erences and claims of 
racial inferiority and superiority to a newer diff erentialist form emphasizing 
allegedly unbridgeable cultural diff erences that purportedly necessitate the 
separation of ethnic cultural communities (Wieviorka 2002: 143).
We err, however, if we associate nativism exclusively with the Far Right. 
A large number of reputable contemporary scholars voice concern that 
cultural heterogeneity and multiculturalism erode national well-being. Al-
though Alain de Benoist has been accused of supporting the radical Right, 
he has openly rejected Le Pen and the National Front. Nevertheless, the 
director of the infl uential Nouvelle Droite think-tank Groupement de re-
cherche et d’études pour la civilisation européenne (GRECE) opposes im-
migration on grounds that it threatens to transform France into the United 
States, a “mere agglomeration of men and women from all countries” that 
as a result has no culture, only a “lack of culture” (Benoist 1979: 398). He 
prefers “the affi  rmation of collective singularities, the spiritual reappropria-
tion of heritages, the clear awareness of roots and specifi c cultures” (Benoist 
1977: 19; see also Champetier and de Benoist 1999). Dominique Schnapper 
(1998: 112, 80) too dislikes “multiculturalism,” because it can degenerate 
into “Lebanon.” Th e daughter of Raymond Aron contends that only a ho-
mogenous national culture can transcend the divisive confl icts of local and 
regional identifi cations (“ethnies”). Moreover, she rejects as insuffi  ciently 
binding the abstract universalism of Kant’s cosmopolitanism or Haber-
mas’s constitutional patriotism in favor of a “cultural homogeneity” forged 
through commonly lived experiences, such as serving in the same military 
force, speaking the same language, practicing the same religion, and living 
according to the same customs and mores (Schnapper 1998: 30, 116).
Historical experience has demonstrated that the minimization of 
cultural and historical diff erence has been the most economical, and 
probably the most eff ective means of transcending ethnic identities. 
Objective homogeneity of population is not enough to create a na-
tion, but it is true that it favors the interaction of social life and of 
political society. Th at is why the formation of the nation was always 
accompanied by policies aimed at reducing particularisms, not only 
political but cultural. (Schnapper 1998: 116)
Although Schnapper insists on labeling her variety “civic nationalism” in 
contradistinction to “ethno-nationalism” (76), it is nigh impossible to read 
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Community of Citizens: On the Modern Idea of Nationality and escape the 
impression that the author believes her beloved France was much better 
off  before the onslaught of large-scale postwar immigration (see, for in-
stance, 155–69).
Likewise, the eminent German legal philosopher Ernst-Wolfgang 
Börkenförde sides with cultural homogeneity over abstract universalism:
A relative homogenization in a shared culture is needed . . . if the so-
ciety which tends to become atomized is to be reunited into a unity 
capable of concerted action, in spite of being diff erentiated into a 
multiplicity of parts. Th is task is performed by the nation and its 
attendant national consciousness along with, and in succession to, 
religion. . . . Th us the ultimate goal cannot be to overtake national 
identity and replace it with something else, not even with a univer-
salism of human rights. (Börkenförde 1995)
British political philosopher David Miller worries about the negative 
impact of cultural diversity on social solidarity. Social justice, he postulates, 
has a real chance of emerging and persisting only in societies “whose mem-
bers acknowledge ties of solidarity” (Miller 1995: 93). Furthermore, “with-
out a common national identity, there is nothing to hold citizens together” 
(Miller 1992: 94). “National character,” he explains,
will include political principles such as belief in democracy and the 
rule of law . . . [including] social norms such as fi lling in your income 
tax return or queuing as a way of deciding who gets on the bus fi rst. 
It may also embrace certain cultural ideals, for instance religious 
beliefs or a commitment to preserve the purity of the national lan-
guage. (Miller 1995: 25–26)
Indeed, empirical studies have shown a strong correlation between social 
homogeneity and generous redistributive welfare policies (Alesina and 
Glaeser 2006; Putnam 2007). For Miller (2000: 27), this is how things should 
be, for “nations are ethical communities. . . . Th e duties we owe to our fellow-
nationals are diff erent from, and more extensive than, the duties we owe to 
humans as such.”
Th ough hardly as chauvinistic as Schmitt, or Far Right politicians like 
Le Pen for that matter, these more respectable scholars nevertheless view 
unassimilated immigrants as detrimental to the receiving society. Th ey are, 
therefore, in some fashion enemies simply by virtue of not conforming to 
the national character of the majority. It should come as no surprise, then, 
that Schmitt’s “friend-enemy” realism turns up in their scholarship. Th us, 
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Schnapper (1994: 183) underscores that “collective attachments are always 
affi  rmed in opposition to others,” while Miller (1989: 67–68) contends 
“that communities just are particularistic. In seeing myself as a member 
of a community, I see myself as participating in a particular way of life 
marked off  from other communities by its distinctive characteristics.” Th e 
consequences for Muslim immigrants (examined in detail in subsequent 
chapters) are unmistakable: assimilate, depart, or remain as unwelcome, 
marginalized residents.
Communitarianism
As far as immigration is concerned, communitarianism represents the ideo-
logical progeny of egalitarian nationalism. Contemporary communitarian-
ism maintains, however, that each bona fi de community ought to be able 
to preserve and practice the norms and values that make it distinct regard-
less of where the physical frontiers of nation-states fall (Walzer 1983: 314). 
Communities of immigrants should be neither expected nor compelled to 
forsake their language, religion, manners, or anything else integral to their 
distinct identity as a result of having immigrated to a new homeland. While 
what I term “communitarianism” is oft en dubbed “multiculturalism,” by 
detractors and proponents alike, I prefer the former label because there are 
liberal and postmodern varieties of multiculturalism that are philosophi-
cally distinct from communitarianism. Th e latter prizes the good over the 
right—not, however, the universal good postulated in liberal perfectionism, 
but rather the particular good envisaged diff erently by distinct communi-
ties (MacIntyre 1984: 220). Contemporary communitarianism reimagines 
Herder’s particularistic claim (quoted previously) that “the True, the Good, 
the Beautiful in them [nations] are not similar” to fi t a transnational age of 
migration in which it is not possible or even perhaps desirable for an entire 
nation to inhabit the same territory that it calls its own.
Before his death at the age of 102 in 2002, Hans-Georg Gadamer articu-
lated the arguably most philosophically sophisticated version of modern-day 
Herderism. Richly and creatively borrowing from philosophical traditions 
such as Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology, Friedrich Schleiermacher’s and 
Wilhelm Dilthey’s hermeneutics, and Ferdinand de Sassure’s semiotics, Ga-
damer developed his infl uential notion of distinct “horizons of experience.” 
Each signifi cant community lives within its own horizon of understand-
ing that defi nes its world, or how the members collectively experience it. 
A common language constitutes an important, to be sure, but not the sole 
ingredient of the horizon. “All human knowledge of the world is linguisti-
cally mediated. Our fi rst orientation to the world fulfi lls itself in the learn-
ing of language. But not only this. Th e linguistic nature [Sprachlichkeit] of 
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our being-in-the-world articulates in the end the whole realm of our expe-
rience” (Gadamer 2007: 65). A horizon is, furthermore, not something we 
choose. Rather, it represents a collection of shared experiences and outlooks 
that we inherit and share as part of a persisting community.
For we live in what has been handed down to us, and this is not 
just a specifi c region of our experience of the world that we call the 
“cultural tradition,” which only consists of texts and monuments 
and which are able to pass on to us a linguistically constituted and 
historically documented sense. No, it is the world itself which is com-
municatively experienced and continuously entrusted to us as an in-
fi nitely open task to pass on. It is never the world as it was on its fi rst 
day but the world as it has come down to us. (Gadamer 2007: 26)
Th e author of Truth and Method [1960] and public debating opponent 
of liberal icon Habermas, Gadamer readily admitted that horizons amount-
ed to prejudices, but like many metaphysical particularists before him, he 
adjudged these as neither avoidable nor deplorable: “It is not so much our 
judgments as it is our prejudices that constitute our being.” Th ese “pre-
understandings,” as he preferred to label them, “constitute the initial direct-
edness of our whole ability to experience .  .  . whereby what we encounter 
says something to us” (Gadamer 2007: 74, 9). Prejudice and other aspects of 
our horizon, if properly valued, held out for the German hermeneutist the 
promise to make possible fi rmer bonds of solidarity among members of a 
community than are possible through instrumental consent. Gadamer un-
derstood himself to be rehabilitating and modernizing Aristotle’s notion of 
ethos—political solidarity and unity of purpose built on philia (friendship) 
as opposed to facturm (arrived at via reason).
“Friendship” in a philosophical refl ection is a term for solidarity. 
But solidarity is a form of experiencing the world and social reality 
which one cannot bring about and make possible through objectiv-
istic plans to overcome this solidarity through artifi cial institutions. 
On the contrary, solidarity exists before all possible overt acceptance 
and before the working of institutions, economic orders, legal or-
ders, or social customs. It carries them and makes them possible. 
(Gadamer 2007: 271)
Like Herder, Gadamer deemed a world of profound, even ultimately 
insurmountable diversity richer and healthier for the human soul than a 
world standardized through and through according to the dictates of pure 
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reason. Like Herder, he refused to ditch the vision of diverse communities 
living in harmony with one another, appreciating and embracing rather 
than deprecating and loathing their diff erences. He urged his admirers to 
work toward a “fusion of horizons” (1975: 289–90) by opening their minds 
to the perspectives of other horizons in ways that could broaden their own. 
Gadamer warned that a fi nal, absolute fusion would forever elude us, but 
seeking it nonetheless would provide a much more intriguing philosophical 
journey than rationalist monism. Gadamer’s was a deeply humane message 
admonishing his fellow humans to cherish that which made their specifi c 
community invaluable to them, to appreciate that other communities cher-
ished their common values equally as strongly, and to embrace that diversity 
rather than recoil from it.
For Charles Taylor (1995: 256), an avid admirer of Gadamer, the only 
way to encourage human diversity, rather than asphyxiate it through the 
imposition of an artifi cial universalism, is to organize diverse societies ac-
cording to the principle of “the presumption of equal worth.” “As a pre-
sumption, the claim is that all human cultures that have animated whole 
societies over some considerable stretch of time have something important 
to say to all human beings . . . so all should enjoy the presumption that their 
traditional culture has value” (Taylor 1995: 252–53). Th e principle trans-
lates into what the Canadian philosopher calls the “politics of recognition,” 
which is distinct from and not infrequently in confl ict with “the politics of 
equal dignity.” Th e latter, founded on liberalism, presumes that all humans 
are fundamentally the same (in the abstract) and therefore prizes equal or 
identical treatment regardless of diff erences in race, creed, nationality, gen-
der, and so on. By contrast, the politics of recognition foregrounds com-
munities’ particularities and therefore prizes recognizing and encouraging 
them. As Taylor (1994: 43) explains,
Th e reproach the fi rst makes to the second is just that it violates the 
principle of nondiscrimination. Th e reproach the second makes to 
the fi rst is that it negates identity by forcing people into a homoge-
neous mold that is untrue to them. Th is would be bad enough if the 
mold were itself neutral—nobody’s mold in particular. But the com-
plaint generally goes further. Th e claim is that the supposedly neu-
tral set of diff erence-blind principles of the politics of equal dignity 
is in fact a refl ection of one hegemonic culture. As it turns out, then, 
only the minority or suppressed cultures are being forced to take 
alien form. Consequently, the supposedly fair and diff erence-blind 
society is not only inhuman (because suppressing identities) but 
also, in a subtle and unconscious way, itself highly discriminatory.
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No community should have to live according to standards alien to it. For 
Walzer (1983: 314), “justice is rooted in the distinct understandings of plac-
es, honors, jobs, things of all sorts that constitute a shared way of life. To 
override those understandings is (always) to act unjustly.”
Postmodernism
Like nationalism, postmodernism rejects liberalism’s universalism. How-
ever, whereas nationalism has been in many ways antirational, for instance 
in its celebration of prejudice, postmodernism has tended to be hyperratio-
nal. Postmodernism employs the Enlightenment’s sharpest tool, reason, but 
utilizes it to interrogate rationalism itself. In this way, postmodernism rep-
resents less an anti-Enlightenment movement, like nationalism, and more 
an extension, or better, even a culmination of the Enlightenment tradition. 
For postmodernism maintains that the human intellect has developed to a 
state of such penetrating perspicacity in late modernity as to render belief 
in universal truths and values intellectually unsophisticated (Vattimo 2006: 
165). Th e truth about truthfulness, to invoke Nietzsche’s remark at the head 
of the chapter, is that apodictic or Absolute Truth does not exist. Rather, 
“truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions” (Nietzsche 1954: 
47). In place of illusory timeless truth, postmodernism discerns infi nite in-
terpretations—that is, competing truth claims none of which can indubita-
bly demonstrate its validity over and above rivals. Th e irreducible multiplic-
ity of perspectives—perspectivism—ultimately undermines all attempts to 
form a metaphysical bedrock on which fi rmly to build our lives individually 
or collectively—nihilism.
Postmodern perspectivism and nihilism thus diff er markedly from na-
tionalism’s particularism. Th e latter posits a particular but single culture 
or character for each nation (or community) that provides its members a 
mostly taken-for-granted, inscrutable-but-secure, lasting, holistic sense of 
who they are and what they stand for. By contrast, postmodernism reads 
our societies and ourselves as sites of a hurly burly, even schizophrenic and 
constantly morphing patchwork of meanings that generate hybrid and fl uid 
identities and values that make fi nal closure or certainty elusive. Th e result-
ing impermanence, furthermore, renders overarching political consensus, 
whether liberal or national, chimerical and impossible.
Perspectivism
Nietzsche (1968: 267), arguably the intellectual father of postmodernism, 
originated the notion of “perspectivism.” He rejected positivism’s postulate 
of unequivocal facts with a now famous aphorism: “No, facts is precisely 
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what there is not, only interpretations” (1968: 267)—to wit, “Th ere are many 
kinds of eyes . . . and consequently there are many kinds of ‘truths,’ and con-
sequently there is no truth” (Nietzsche 1968: 291). Nietzsche averred that 
the epistemological notion of truthfulness was philosophically indefensible 
despite millennia of presupposing it in the Western tradition, whether in 
ancient Greek thought, monotheism, or modern science, all of which, for 
Nietzsche, were of a piece in their inveterate monism. Th e formally trained 
philologist interpreted language as the starting point of the yearning for 
apodictic truth. Language depicts a world that we quite understandably 
want to believe is “true” or actually “out there” in a way that corresponds to 
how our language describes it. But wishing something to be true does not 
make it so. Indeed, Nietzsche contended that serious scrutiny eventually 
exposes every truth claim, including the belief in God, to be a self-soothing 
illusion (1968: 45). “Th e ‘apparent’ world,” he scribbled in Twilight of the 
Idols, “is the only one: the ‘true’ world is merely added by a lie” (Nietzsche 
1967–1977: 4:481). Th e “fi rst perfect nihilist of Europe” (Nietzsche 1968: 3) 
chastised his readers’ immature yearning for truth and implored them to 
confront both the constructed and contested nature of knowledge:
But I should think that today we are at least far from the ridiculous 
immodesty that would be involved in decreeing from our corner 
that perspectives are permitted only from this corner. Rather has 
the world become “infi nite” for us all over again, inasmuch as we 
cannot reject the possibility that it may include infi nite interpreta-
tions. (Nietzsche 1974: para. 374)
Subsequent thinkers in the postmodern tradition have augmented Ni-
etzsche’s seminal insights. (Late) Wittgenstein, for instance, argued that 
language, rather than representing more or less accurately the independent 
essence of objective things, actually assigns meaning to things. Moreover, 
“the meaning of a word is its use in the language” (Wittgenstein 1958: sec. 
43). Needless to say, usage varies from one linguistic context to the next 
depending on the specifi c rules and understandings of the language appli-
cation (understood loosely as “grammar”). “Essence is expressed by gram-
mar.  .  .  . Grammar tells what object anything is. (Th eology as grammar)” 
(Wittgenstein 1958: sec. 371, 373). Diff erent grammars or “language games” 
can therefore impart very diff erent meanings to the “same” object. Compet-
ing interpretations are neither valid nor invalid, merely diff erent.
Was Augustine in error, then, when he called upon God on every 
page of the Confessions? But—one might say—if he was not in error, 
surely the Buddhist holy man was—or anyone else—whose religion 
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gives expression to completely new views. But none of them was in 
error, except when he set forth a theory. (Wittgenstein 1993: 119)
Th e Austrian school teacher turned Cambridge don conceded that most 
humans do not perceive the ongoing subtle changes to their language 
game that to them appears stable (Wittgenstein 1958: sec. 18; 1969: sec. 
99). Nonetheless, the illusion of stability cannot ultimately shield one 
from potentially upsetting alterations in the language game or from com-
ing into contact with diff erent language games altogether. Despite origi-
nally setting out to provide perfect philosophical certainty in Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus (1922), Wittgenstein wound up asserting that phi-
losophy can off er no comfortable escape from “the groundlessness of our 
believing” (Wittgenstein 1969: sec 166), “cannot give it any foundation” 
(Wittgenstein 1958: sec. 124).
Wittgenstein’s contemporaries were drawing equally arresting conclu-
sions, albeit from diff erent angles. Max Weber (1922: 154), for example, ar-
gued that our enhanced ability to reason led us further from rather than 
closer to certainty:
It is the destiny of a cultural epoch which has tasted of the tree of 
knowledge to know that we cannot decipher the meaning of world 
events, regardless of how completely we may study them. We must, 
rather, be prepared to create them ourselves and to know that world-
views can never be the product of factual knowledge. Th us the high-
est ideals, those which move us most powerfully, can become valid 
only by being in combat with the ideals of other men, which are as 
sacred to them as ours are to us.
His compatriot Martin Heidegger maintained that what persons take as re-
ality (“being in the world” or Dasein) is a product of “Enframing” (Ge-stell). 
Th e latter is more of an occlusion of than an opening to the fullness of being 
(Sein) that enframed persons forget has happened (Seinsvergessenheit).
World picture, when understood essentially, does not mean a pic-
ture of the world but the world conceived and grasped as picture. 
What is, in its entirety, is now taken in such a way that it fi rst is in 
being and only is in being to the extent that it is set up by man, who 
represents and sets forth. (Heidegger 1977: 129–30)
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who was deeply infl uenced by Heidegger, pre-
ferred to see the body as the most important frame of reference. All expe-
rience, he argued, must needs take place through and in the body. “Our 
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constant aim,” he explained in the Phenomenology of Perception, “is to elu-
cidate the primary function whereby we bring into existence, for ourselves, 
or take hold upon a space, the object or the instrument, and to describe the 
body as the place where this appropriation occurs” (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 
154). Th e French philosopher thus rejected the Cartesian distinction be-
tween mind and body (“I think, therefore, I am”) and with it the quest for 
a purely abstract perception of the world that, because it was thought to be 
disembodied, was reputed to be objective. Nor did Merleau-Ponty advance 
a version of biological determinism whereby the body as the identical physi-
ological confi guration in all humans generates identical experience for all. 
On the contrary, he interpreted the body as the complex and indeterminate 
site not only of physiological and psychological structures but also of accu-
mulated experiences that, all taken together, made possible an infi nite array 
of lived meanings even within a single embodied person.
A generation later, Jacques Derrida (1991) further enriched perspectiv-
ism with his infl uential notion of diff érance. Untranslatable due its intended 
double meaning (in French) of deferral and diff erence, the neologism con-
veys the claim that any word (and by extension any concept) only acquires 
meaning in relation to other words, words that are not only anterior to and 
concurrent with it, but also words that will emerge in the future. Th us, for 
any word there can be no fi xed or permanent meaning (fi nal or correct in-
terpretation); it is infi nitely deferred and therefore potentially diff erent from 
one moment to the next. “Th ere is nothing outside the text” with which 
to (in)validate the text’s meaning (Derrida 1976: 158). Th e ineluctable and 
interminable intertextuality of language is tantamount for Derrida to “the 
deconstruction of the transcendental signifi ed, which at one time or an-
other, would place a reassuring end to the reference from sign to sign” (Der-
rida 1976: 49). Because we can comprehend and experience the world only 
through language, our understandings of it have to be forever indetermi-
nate, mutable, and plural (Derrida 1992). Ours is a world of “infi nite vari-
abilities” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 201).
Will to Power
Postmodernist insistence on the constructed nature of truth begs the ul-
timately political question of how some representations of truth come to 
prevail (even if temporarily) over others. Needless to say, Nietzsche had an 
answer. In Th e Will to Power, he asked:
By which means does a virtue come to power? By exactly the same 
means as a political party: the slandering, inculpation, undermin-
ing of virtues that oppose it and are already in power, by rebaptizing 
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them, by systematic persecution and mockery. Th erefore: through 
sheer “immorality.” (Nietzsche 1968: 172)
Nietzsche discerned an intrinsic and mutually reinforcing relationship be-
tween knowledge and power. At the root of every truth claim, he argued, lay 
an oft en unconscious drive to dominate others, to force them to live by one’s 
own interpretation of the world. “It is our needs that interpret the world; 
our drives and the For and Against. Every drive is a kind of lust to rule; each 
one has its perspective that it would like to compel all the other drives to 
accept as the norm” (1968: 267). For example, the self-declared anti-Christ 
contended that Christianity was a perspective that was motivated by the 
mediocre masses to constrain the brilliant and gift ed few. Th e critical in-
sight bequeathed to postmodernism was that knowledge and power cannot 
be decoupled. Th e former is always implicated in ultimately political rela-
tions of power.
Michel Foucault has arguably done more than any other postmodern 
analyst to deepen the understanding of the interconnected relationship be-
tween power and knowledge.
“Truth” is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for 
the production, regulation, distribution, circulation, and operation 
of statements. . . . It is linked in a circular relation with systems of 
power which produce and sustain it, and to eff ects of power which it 
induces and which extend it. (1984: 74)
Th e crux of the Frenchman’s exploration of the “microphysics of power” 
is that knowledge is constructed by an interlocking, mutually reinforcing 
nexus of resources, institutions, administrators, and experts that becomes 
strategically positioned in such a way as to establish its representation of 
reality (both normative and empirical) as “objective.” Th is form of “govern-
mentality” operates through normalization. Th e dominant discourse and 
the institutions and actors that produce and administer it form a defi nition 
of “normal” and therewith simultaneously establish, diagnose, sequester, 
and discipline the “abnormal.” Furthermore, the “normalizing gaze” not 
only defi nes and spotlights the negative Other but also conveniently proj-
ects back a positive and reinforcing image of the “normal ones” who live the 
dominant discourse’s representation as objective truth.
Besides Foucault’s (1978; 1979; 1988) own case studies into sexual, crim-
inal, and psychological deviance, Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978) right-
fully stands as one of the most celebrated Foucauldian analyses of how a 
power-knowledge discourse actually functions in all its complexity. Th e 
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discourse of Orientalism, according to Said, enables and legitimizes Euro-
pean domination of the “Orient.”
Taking the late eighteenth century as a very roughly defi ned starting 
point Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate 
institution for dealing with the Orient—dealing with it by making 
statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, teaching 
it, selling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style 
for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient. 
(Said 1978: 3)
Th e Palestinian American scholar contended that “European culture gained 
in strength and identity by setting itself off  against the Orient as a sort of 
surrogate and even underground self” (Said 1978: 3). Furthermore, follow-
ing both Nietzsche’s and Foucault’s insistence on the constructed and im-
posed nature of knowledge, Said (1978: 6) cautioned:
One ought never to assume that the structure of Orientalism is noth-
ing more than a structure of lies or of myths which, were the truth 
about them to be told, would simply blow away. . . . What we must re-
spect and try to grasp is the sheer knitted-together strength of Ori-
entalist discourse, its very close ties to the enabling socio-economic 
and political institutions, and its redoubtable durability.
Said’s work profoundly contributed to Postcolonial Studies, which inter-
rogates Eurocentrism past and present and, as we shall see in subsequent 
chapters, has had a considerable impact on the politics of immigration in 
Europe.
Hobbesian Postmodernism
Both Foucault and Said have come under criticism for exaggerating the pow-
er of a single discourse to dominate over all others. Jean-François Lyotard 
(1984), for example, maintains that the “postmodern condition” is such that 
no “meta-narrative” can remain beyond suspicion and contestation. Simi-
larly, Giorgio Agamben (2005: 83) observes that “contemporary politics . . . 
all over the planet unhinges and empties traditions and beliefs, ideologies 
and religions, identities and communities.” Th e erstwhile liberal turned 
postmodernist John Gray (1995: 85) has something similar in mind when 
expressing grave doubt about the prospects for a political consensus rooted 
in liberalism, noting “the intellectual foundations of the Enlightenment 
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project have fallen away; but liberal theory, for the most part, proceeds as 
if nothing has happened.” Likewise, Bhikhu Parekh (2000: 13) argues that
liberalism is a substantive doctrine advocating a specifi c view of 
man, society and the world and embedded in and giving rise to a 
distinct way of life. As such it represents a particular cultural per-
spective and cannot provide a broad and impartial enough frame-
work to conceptualise other cultures or their relations with it.
Truth claims of all sorts are regularly recognized as and challenged for 
being implicated in political power relations. “Today,” observes Gianni Vat-
timo (2006: 128),
we all know that television lies and that the media do not in the 
least supply disinterested and objective representations of the world, 
and . . . even what we call “nature” is only accessible to us through 
scientifi c paradigms fraught with historicity and loaded with theory, 
hence with “prejudice.”
Alluding to Hobbes’s notorious “Leviathan,” a state so awesomely powerful 
that it alone can keep the peace among otherwise warring factions whose 
worldviews know no common ground, Etienne Balibar (2004: 201) insists:
Th ere can be no new “Leviathan” that would regulate belief and of-
fi cialize knowledge (“institute the truth,” as the modern state has 
done through its schools and universities), and there is even less pos-
sibility for a new “civic religion” that would relativize “traditional” 
or “revealed” religions and relegate them to private choice.
“Hobbesian postmodernism” (meaning, like Balibar, sans Leviathan) is 
the shorthand label I give to this outlook, according to which overlapping 
political consensus, ethical or procedural, is impossible, and bald political 
contestation remains the fi nal arbiter among vying adherents of competing 
worldviews. Stanley Fish (1999: 14, 12), for instance, dismisses the eff orts of 
prominent contemporary liberal philosophers like Rawls and Habermas to 
anchor consensual politics in universally reasonable and fair procedures: 
there can be “no hope of a procedural republic from which divisive issues 
have been banished and in which we can all just get along. . . . Confl ict is al-
ways just around the corner (Hobbes was right).” Th is is because competing 
groups enter politics today informed by fi rmly held worldviews that are not 
only incompatible but incommensurable, each representing “an orthodoxy 
to itself, fully equipped with dogma, criteria for evidence, founding texts, 
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exemplary achievements, heroes, villains, goals, agenda, and all the rest” 
(Fish 1999: 218). In the absence of commonly recognized standards or prin-
ciples by which to evaluate competing outlooks, political struggle becomes 
the fi nal arbiter. “Everything is politics,” declares Fish (1999: 9). Th ere is no 
escaping “the political game.” “Play it (the lesson is superfl uous; what else 
could you do?) and play it to win” (Fish 1999: 7, 240). One does this by taking 
whatever political and rhetorical steps are deemed necessary to make one’s 
preferred outlook the “prestige discourse” and one’s opponents’ the stigma-
tized discourse. Gray (1995: 90) likewise recommends abandoning idealistic 
quests for harmony and settling for a postmodern “modus vivendi.” Such 
an arrangement does not even constitute the proverbial “agreeing to dis-
agree.” Rather, confl icting, though perhaps parleying parties come to the 
realization that it is more convenient, less disruptive, to permit one another 
variously constructed and understood zones of discretion in which their 
particular mores predominate. Th e borders of such zones will inevitably be 
contested, and opposing parties will from time to time vehemently and even 
violently clash. Th ough perhaps unsettling, this is simply the Hobbesean 
reality of postmodern life and society.
Although both advocate a separatism of sorts, Hobbesian postmodern-
ism and communitarianism should not be confounded. Th e latter reposes 
on ethical consensus—namely, on the principle of the presumption of equal 
worth. Diff erent communities recognize and respect the borders separating 
them. Th e better metaphor for grasping Hobbesian postmodernism is the 
turf war where the borders themselves are contested and fl uid. To be sure, 
vying parties might reach a stalemate or even a truce, but neither represents 
an agreement regarding overall principles or procedures of mutual gover-
nance. Th e parties never fully relinquish the eff ort to expand their sphere 
of infl uence because they view politics as a zero-sum game in which one 
either dominates or is dominated. Chantal Mouff e (2000: 45) claims that 
“no fi nal resolution or equilibrium . . . is ever possible, and there can be only 
temporary, pragmatic, unstable and precarious negotiations of the tension.” 
What is necessary is a “constant process of negotiation and renegotiation—
through diff erent hegemonic articulations.”
As far as immigration is concerned, Hobbesian postmodernism casts 
doubt and suspicion on the notion, let alone actual achievement, of genu-
ine community held together by common norms and values respected by 
all or most members. Th e only real community, claims Jean-Luc Nancy 
(1991), is “the inoperative community.” Gray (1995: 911–92), for example, 
pours cold water over the smug confi dence that immigrants will eventu-
ally adopt Western individualism on account of its allegedly unequivocal 
superiority, arguing that “the evidence of recent Asian immigrant groups, 
who do as well or better on all measures of well being in the absence of any 
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commitment to an idea of autonomy, and perhaps because they have no 
such commitment, are compelling counter examples.” Similarly, Parekh 
(1999: 71) points to many “adult, sane, and educated women” who “freely” 
undergo clitoridectomy or engage in polygamy because in their worldview 
these practices make perfectly good sense. Th e confi dence of decidedly 
anti-Western Islamists to resist Westernization both outside and inside 
Europe has been mounting since the Iranian Revolution of 1979 (Göle 
2011). Germany’s foremost expert on German Islamism, Werner Schiff au-
er (2007: 79), contends that Islamists are so fi rmly entrenched and well or-
ganized that relations between them and their opponents “must almost by 
necessity lead to an agonising confl ict-oriented fi ght for recognition.” With 
similar Hobbesian postmodern candor did Tariq Modood (1990: 144) re-
fer to Britain’s Muslims as “the group that British society is currently be-
ing forced to adjust to or defeat.” Parekh (2000: 238) mirthlessly notes that 
diverse “political communities are exceedingly diffi  cult to hold together 
and, as history shows, there is no means of knowing what might precipi-
tate their break up.” If a multicultural society’s eff ort to cohere “proves 
inadequate, it should avoid repressive violence and accept its misfortune 
as part of the inescapable frailty of all human institutions.”
Hospitable Postmodernism
Hobbesian postmodernism can seem frightfully grim. One thinks of Fou-
cault’s (1980: 90) oft -cited inversion of Carl von Clausewitz’s famous dic-
tum: politics is the continuation of war by other means. But postmodern 
politics does not necessarily have to degenerate into rampant “mixophobia”; 
there are opportunities for “mixophilia” as well (Bauman 2003: 27). Cer-
tainly in the global cities of today, “groups of diff erent backgrounds, eth-
nic and otherwise, cannot help but enter into relations with each other, no 
matter how great the desire for separateness and the attempt to maintain 
cultural purity” (Ang 2001: 89–90). What I dub “hospitable postmodern-
ism” seeks to conceptualize such relations in ways that can prove coopera-
tive and mutually benefi cial to actors taking radically diff erent positions—a 
“modus covivendi” rather than a mere modus vivendi (Bauman 2003: 32). 
What is necessary for constructive as opposed to destructive relations to 
have a chance of emerging is, according to Derrida (2001: 22–23), “uncondi-
tional hospitality, off ered a priori to every other, to all newcomers, whoever 
they may be.” Similarly, in his analysis of what ought to be done When Faiths 
Collide, Martin Marty invokes the metaphor of “risky hospitality,” inviting 
“strangers” to one’s table without the guarantee that the encounter will turn 
out to be agreeable. Th e best one can hope for is a
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thickening of the discourse. It will not produce anything so near 
as a straight-arrow secular rational approach. It will eventuate in a 
thicket, a bramble, of entangled and sometimes not completely un-
entangleable strands, mixed with branches or other growths. But is 
it likely to refl ect not only the messiness of a pluralist society but also 
repositories of options that would not have been contemplated in the 
world of the Rawlsians. (Marty 2005: 121)
Marty succinctly enunciates the essential spirit of hospitable postmod-
ernism. It neither promises nor even aspires to anything remotely as har-
monious or as stable as nationalist homogeneity, or liberal consensus for 
that matter. Th ough hospitable postmodernism does not foreclose coopera-
tion, it nonetheless acknowledges that the unexampled and interminable di-
versity of postmodernity makes fi rm certainty and lasting accord unlikely, 
if not impossible. We do well, therefore, not to exaggerate the diff erences 
between Hobbesian and hospitable postmodernism. Th ey represent poles 
between which postmodern theorists gravitate. Oft en the same thinker 
expresses elements of both, hospitable postmodernism typically emerg-
ing in gentler moments when the writer is trying to reassure readers that 
embracing postmodernism does not have to entail a headlong leap off  the 
precipice of moral absolutism into a relativistic abyss of anarchic turmoil. 
Take Mouff e, for instance. Although she invokes Schmitt to underscore the 
inescapably antagonistic dimension of politics, in the end she articulates 
her own theory of “agonistic pluralism.” Hers is a vision in which diff ering 
parties come to see themselves not as Schmitt’s enemies, but as “adversaries, 
adversaries being defi ned in a paradoxical way as ‘friendly enemies,’ that is, 
persons who are friends because they share a common symbolic space but 
also enemies because they want to organize this common symbolic space 
in a diff erent way” (Mouff e 2000: 9). Fish (1999: 15) claims “that confl ict is 
manageable only in the short run and that structures of conciliation and 
harmony are forever fragile and must always be shored up, with uncertain 
success.” For his part, Parekh (2008: 2) outlines a “new politics of identity” 
rooted in the “spirit of human solidarity.” But by his lights such solidarity 
can only emerge through recognizing and embracing the infi nite diff erent-
ness of fellow humans and not through ignoring or suppressing particu-
larities through abstract universalism. “Particularity or diff erence is valued, 
but not particularism, which absolutizes it. Th e universal is valued, but not 
universalism, at least not of the kind that sets itself in opposition to and 
despises the particular” (Parekh 2008: 3). Modood (2007: 150) goes so far 
as to maintain that a common “national identity” is “necessary to make a 
success of a multicultural society.” However, he immediately qualifi es: “Not 
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assimilation into an undiff erentiated national identity; that is unrealistic 
and oppressive as a policy. An inclusive national identity is respectful of 
and builds upon the identities that people value and does not trample upon 
them.” Furthermore, it “should be woven in debate and discussion, not re-
duced to a list” (Modood 2007: 153).
Hospitable postmodernism seeks to transform strangeness into some-
thing to welcome rather than fear, “from a threat to an opportunity” (Mavelli 
2012: 137). Kristeva (1991), for instance, argues that deep down we are each 
of us strangers to ourselves—an unavoidable state of the human condition 
that, however, can be tapped to ease and encourage openness vis-à-vis for-
eigners. Similarly, Bonnie Honig (2001: 4) urges reframing the conventional 
question of “What problems do foreigners pose for us?” to “What problems 
does foreignness solve for us?” Foreigners oft en transgress convention in 
ways that annoy natives. Honig (2001: 99) recommends reconceptualizing 
such disturbances as invigorating reminders that democracy itself originat-
ed in challenges to convention. Th ese authors do not preach engaging oth-
erness in order to emulate adversaries, but rather as a vehicle for expanded 
self-understanding. Th is is what Agamben (1993: 68) means when he writes: 
“Th e outside is not another space that resides beyond a determinate space, 
but rather, it is the passage, the exteriority that gives it access.”
Hospitable postmodernism especially prizes hybridity. Exploring rather 
than avoiding alterity, it is argued, yields hybrid perspectives, experiences, 
and identities that, even when initially uncomfortable, can prove to be sal-
utary. Salman Rushdie, for instance, encourages readers to celebrate “hy-
bridity, impurity, intermingling, the transformation that comes from new 
and unexpected combinations of human beings, cultures, ideas, politics, 
movies, songs” (quoted in Joppke 1996: 488). Parekh (2008: 28) contends 
that hybridity enhances tolerance, for persons exposed to hybridity are less 
likely to fi xate on a single identity and demand its defense or imposition 
on others. Homi Bhabha (1994: 226, 37) likewise welcomes the “hybridity 
as heresy” that surfaces in what he calls the “third space of enunciation.” 
Th e latter is “the ‘inter’—the cutting edge of translation and negotiation, the 
in-between space”—that can generate hitherto unimagined and unexperi-
enced outlooks and perhaps even solutions to intractable confl icts. “And by 
exploring this Th ird Space,” he adds, “we may elude the politics of polarity 
and emerge as others of ourselves” (Bhabha 1994: 38). Balibar (2004: 178) 
also champions the experience of “translation.” Building off  the ideas of 
Umberto Eco, the French philosopher reminds readers that Europe, due to 
its enduring multilingual experience, has traditionally excelled in the art of 
translation, repeatedly making comprehensible to nonnative speakers ideas 
originally craft ed in alien tongues. Th is noble tradition should be tapped 
and expanded to welcome non-European newcomers rather than jettisoned 
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in favor of a fortress Europe attitude. Similarly, Derrida (1992: 29) urges his 
fellow Europeans to be “the guardians of an idea of Europe . . . but of a Eu-
rope that consists precisely in not closing itself off  in its own identity and in 
advancing itself in an exemplary way toward what it is not.” Th is would also 
seem to be the tenet of a brand of postmodern cosmopolitanism advocated 
by thinkers such as Ulrich Beck (2000), who want to untie cosmopolitanism 
from its tight moorings to Kantian universalism and make it a looser public 
philosophy that welcomes and celebrates diff erence while at the same time 
seeking to forge “political dialogs that cut across boundaries” (Radtke 2011).
Such dialogues should be totally open-ended and free of strict taboos. 
Th e conditions and conclusions should never be preordained. Claude Lefort 
(1988: 39), for example, favors “a regime founded upon the legitimacy of a 
debate as to what is legitimate and what is illegitimate—a debate which is 
necessarily without any guarantor and without any end.” Stuart Hall (2000: 
235) adds:
A process of fi nal political adjudication between rival defi nitions 
of ‘the good’ would be inimical to the whole multi-cultural proj-
ect, since its eff ect would be to constitute every political space as a 
“war of manoeuvre” between entrenched and absolutized particular 
diff erences.
Open-endedness necessitates the relaxation of fi rm principle in favor of 
fl exible, context-specifi c pragmatism. Solutions to confl icts that work will 
likely be local and last only temporarily before they need to be renegotiated. 
Modood (2007: 134), for example, warns that “there is no general remedy.” 
He recommends instead of a general principle to follow a “pragmatic, case-
by-case, negotiated approach to dealing with controversy and confl ict: not 
an ideological, ‘drawing a line in the sand’ mentality” (Modood 2009: 180).
It is worth reiterating that hospitable postmodernism “comes without 
guarantees” of success (Amin 2002: 973). Th is “means constant exposure to 
ambivalence—that is, to a situation with no decidable solution, with no fool-
proof choice, no unrefl ective knowledge of ‘how to go on’” (Bauman 1993: 
245–46). It is more akin to an experiment, even a venture or gamble, that 
engaging diff erence will yield more agreeable results than limiting or sup-
pressing it. Th us, Honig (2009: 38) encourages “an embrace of the perpetu-
ity of political contestation.” Doing so can facilitate a
self-overcoming [that] may take the form of civic commitments to 
practices of agonistic respect and to an ethos of pluralization that 
acknowledges the remainders of all forms of life by actively but not 
uncritically supporting the eff orts of new identities to come into 
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being without prior guarantees about the rightness or justice of 
their claims.
Hospitable postmodernism is motivated by a sense that alternatives to it 
have proven themselves unable to manage the postmodern condition of un-
precedented and unending diff erence.
Th e point of the dialogue is to deepen mutual understanding, ex-
pand sympathy and imagination, exchange not only arguments but 
also sensibilities, to get both parties to take a critical look at them-
selves, build up mutual trust, and to arrive at a more just and bal-
anced view of both the contentious issues and their wider context. 
It must be robust, frank and critical, telling the truth as each party 
sees it, but always in the knowledge that it cannot be allowed to fail, 
because the only alternative to it is the vicious cycle of hatred and 
violence. (Parekh 2008: 170)
Conclusion
I have so far treated liberalism, nationalism, and postmodernism as separate 
public philosophies. I did note slipperiness between poles within each public 
philosophy. It remains in this conclusion to adumbrate ways in which borrow-
ing and blending between public philosophies transpires. Such intermingling 
is symptomatic of the mutual fragilization spawned from a spreading aware-
ness of the plurality of normative persuasiveness. Many thinkers fuse ele-
ments from more than one public philosophy because they seem compelling.
Take liberal nationalism, for example. Its expositors contend that lib-
eral democracy functions best in a homogeneous national culture such as 
the putative European nation-state (before mass immigration). In this vein, 
Margaret Canovan (1996: 80) calls nationalism the “battery that makes lib-
eral democracy run.” Yael Tamir (1993: 139) goes so far as to claim that 
“most liberals are liberal nationalists” because they typically conceive of 
liberalism as functioning within nation-states. Th us, although Laborde’s 
(2002: 610) “civic patriotism” is mainly rooted in shared liberal values, she 
concedes that within any given national setting
a variety of “ethnic” practices will be maintained, because they are 
deemed innocuous (e.g., most street names), convenient (e.g., Chris-
tian calendar), or open to re-interpretation and deconstruction (e.g., 
aspects of national history). Civic patriotism .  . . demands . . . that 
they [immigrants] feel “at home” with what must be a genuinely 
shared national identity.
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Gravitating in the other direction, there can be no gainsaying that Miller 
(1995) or Schnapper (1998) both want to press their prized national homo-
geneity into service toward liberal democratic ends among nationals. Simi-
larly, Taylor (1985: 187–210) hopes and believes that communitarianism can 
enhance rather than restrict personal autonomy.
As appealing or even as natural as liberal nationalism might seem, it 
cannot in the end avoid contradiction when confronted with large-scale im-
migration. If the goal of homogeneity is pursued in earnest, illiberal policies 
will have to be enacted that penalize or marginalize those who refuse or fail 
to conform. Inversely, if liberal equality is taken seriously, the equal treat-
ment of nonconforming citizens is bound to erode national homogeneity 
(Tonkiss 2013: 22; Müller 2007: 9).
Border crossings with postmodernism are also discernible. We already 
saw, for example, that Mouff e’s (2000) postmodern theory of “agonistic plu-
ralism” borrows heavily from Schmitt’s (1996) reading of the ineluctable 
friend-enemy relations among nation-states. Or listen to Bauman (1997: 57) 
laud liberalism’s moral centerpiece of individual autonomy:
Th ere is a true emancipatory chance in postmodernity . . . through 
revealing conditions of individual freedom which transcend both 
national and ethnic/tribal limitations; through focusing on the right 
to choose as the sole human universality; on the ultimate, inalien-
able individual responsibility for that choice, and on the complex 
State- or tribe-managed mechanisms aimed at depriving the indi-
vidual of the freedom of choice and that responsibility.
Liberal theories of deliberative democracy take a page from hospitable post-
modernism when they call for open-ended dialogue. Jan Werner Müller’s 
(2007: 69) version of constitutional patriotism, for example, is “one that does 
not see constitutional cultures as fully ‘achieved’ and closed to self-critical 
learning, but rather views them as an ongoing project of realizing certain 
norms and values in an ‘ever more perfect’ way.” He furthermore takes 
inspiration from postmodernism’s idea of fl uid, hybrid, negotiated identi-
ties when he envisages the “integration [of immigrants] not as something 
done to ‘them,’ but something accomplished in common through mutual 
deliberative engagement . . . in such a way that a reconstituted ‘we’ emerges” 
(Müller 2007: 89). Likewise, Gadamer’s (1975: 289–90) striving for a “fusion 
of horizons,” which, however, can never be fully realized, would seem to 
embrace both hybridity and open-endedness.
Again, however, borrowing and blending cannot fully avoid normative 
trouble spots. If liberalism declares equality and liberty for all inviolable, 
then the deliberative dialogue is not truly open-ended and free of foregone 
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conclusions. Relatedly, if postmodernism insists that the values by which 
humans live are ultimately the result of political struggle, it cannot guaran-
tee that liberty and equality for all will prevail.
Th ere is furthermore an unmistakable normative affi  nity among liberal, 
communitarian, and (hospitable) postmodern endorsements of multicul-
turalism. All three prefer a thin conception of citizenship that does not de-
mand that immigrants identify so strongly with the receiving country that 
they wind up fully relinquishing the affi  liations and values with which they 
emigrated. Additionally, all three wish to see diff erent cultural communities 
cohabitate in mutually benefi cial relations. However, normatively speaking, 
liberal multiculturalism cannot tolerate communities that violate the liber-
ty and equality of members—a criticism, as we shall see, that is oft en leveled 
against some Islamic organizations, particularly regarding their attitudes 
toward women. For its part, communitarianism, because of its central tenet 
of the presumption of equal worth, is normatively obligated to tolerate com-
munities whose long-standing traditions and teachings prize other values 
(for example, obedience to God or to parents) over individual liberty. And 
not even the hospitable variety of postmodernism can guarantee a given 
cultural community that it will survive intact and not succumb to the cor-
rosive forces of proliferating and intersecting worldviews.
We can also discern normative alliance among liberal assimilationism, 
nativism, and Hobbesian postmodernism. If one insists that immigrants 
should be required to assimilate to the national culture of the receiving soci-
ety, but additionally maintains that the national culture is a liberal one, then 
liberal perfectionism and nativism obviously overlap. Indeed, we will fre-
quently encounter just this argument in the case study chapters to follow. If 
one prefers a more preemptive, exclusionary, and aggressive strategy based 
on the claim that “our” liberal culture fi nds itself in an existential battle 
with “their” illiberal culture that can only be won in “our” favor by neutral-
izing and dominating “them,” then the potential alliance between nativ-
ism and Hobbesian postmodernism comes into sharp relief. Indeed, this is 
the essential logic of the popular “clash of civilizations” thesis (Huntington 
1996), which, as we shall see, has found considerable purchase in Europe. 
But it should be and will be noted that such aggression toward Muslims 
casts grave doubt on the liberal credentials of its supporters. Furthermore, 
relentless aggression toward Islam can prompt a backlash from (some) Mus-




No single question is more likely to test the capacity of European 
nations to address the issue of multiple “belongings,” exclusive or 
incompatible “loyalties,” the growing uncertainty of boundaries 
between “insiders” and “outsiders” (or, rather, the increasing number 
of “citizens” who are neither simply inside nor simply outside), than 
the status and the importance of Islam within the European space.
— Etienne Balibar, European Anti-discrimination and the 
Politics of Citizenship
It is hard to think of an issue that has shift ed more decidedly from low to high politics than citizenship for immigrants. “No issue,” writes Marc Howard (2006: 450) in his comparative survey, “has been more sensitive, 
explosive, or politically eff ective than immigration and citizenship.” Ben-
habib (2004: 150) describes them as “time bombs . . . ready to explode at very 
short notice.” While the issue fi gured prominently in European politics in 
the second quarter of the twentieth century through the creation of state-
less peoples or what amounted to the denaturalization (including disenfran-
chisement, expropriation, sequestration, and elimination) of Jews and other 
“undesirables” in fascist regimes as well as mistreatment of “former fascists” 
by vengeful anti-fascist states following victory in World War II (Arendt 
1966), during the third quarter the issue faded from center stage as most 
Europeans came to take for granted the idea that each person should be a 
citizen of one country in the traditional sense of possessing a single passport 
(the express goal actually of the 1930 Hague Convention that “every person 
should have a nationality and should have one nationality only” as well as 
the Council of Europe’s 1963 Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Mul-
tiple Nationality). Because most economically burgeoning West European 
states recruited foreign workers to alleviate labor shortages in the 1950s and 
1960s, there existed a growing number of migrants, but their naturaliza-
tion—easier in some places and harder in others—garnered very little po-
litical attention.
Th is low profi le for immigration began to alter in the 1970s when in 
response to persistent recession West European governments halted the 
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recruitment of foreign laborers. Th e cessation spawned a profound unin-
tended consequence. Fearing that by leaving they could never return to jobs 
more lucrative than ones available in their homelands, the migrants re-
mained (some legally, some illegally). Moreover, with a long-term stay now 
anticipated, the mostly young men brought their families to their side (some 
legally, some illegally). Th ese family unifi cations drastically expanded both 
the number and diversity of the migrant population in West Europe, creat-
ing permanent immigrant communities with the full range of demographic 
complexity and accompanying needs from infancy to old age. Already in 
1971, the Swiss author Max Frisch (1983: 416) had characterized the extraor-
dinary transformation with his terse observation that “we called for workers 
and human beings showed up.”
With the steadily growing number and permanent settlement of immi-
grant families and entire transnational communities, the questions of how 
many of these alien residents to naturalize and under what conditions have 
gained since the 1980s ever greater political salience. Virtually every na-
tional government has revisited and revamped its immigration and natural-
ization laws—some toward greater exclusivity (such as France’s Loi Pasqua-
Méhaignerie of 1993 or Loi Besson/Guéant of 2011), others toward greater 
inclusivity (such as Germany’s Nationality Law of 2000). In fact, most govern-
ments have moved in both directions, as will become clear below. Furthermore, 
signifi cant change is also transpiring at the international, supranational, and 
subnational levels as well. Benhabib (2005: 676) discerns “epochal change” 
stemming from the “disaggregation of citizenship and the disaggregation of 
sovereignty.” Indeed, it no longer makes sense to employ the concept of citi-
zenship without a modifying adjective such as “ancillary” (Goodman 2014: 
66), “plastic” (Konsta and Lazaridis 2010), “fl exible” (Ong 1999), “incipient” 
(Isin and Nyers 2014: 9), “post-territorial” (Ragazzi 2014: 490), “multi-layered” 
(Yuval-Davis 1999: 120), or “multilevel” (Maas 2013b). Th e fact is that in all 
countries of Europe we now fi nd many diff erent, coexisting kinds or degrees 
of citizenship. Th is “graduated sovereignty” (Ong 1999: 21) ranges from plural 
citizenship (multiple passports) to conventional citizenship (single passport), 
to various permanent and temporary visas for resident aliens (that oft en entail 
considerable civil, social, and political rights of conventional citizenship), to 
accepted and pending refugees, to the undocumented (Ataç and Rosenberger 
2013; Maas 2013b; Sainsbury 2012; Boswell and Geddes 2011, Joppke 2010; 
Bohman 2007; Schierup, Hansen, and Castles 2006).
Th e current chapter explores how normative discord contributes to the 
“deep policy contradictions” observable in European immigration and natu-
ralization policies (Triandafyllidou 2010d: 2). From the liberal tradition come 
contentions that rampant immigration and other forces of unbuttoned glo-
balization have ushered in a peerless postnational era in which international 
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cosmopolitan norms should apply for all persons and in all nation-states 
(Carens 2013; Tonkiss 2013; Delanty 2009; Beck and Grande 2007; Benhabib 
2004; Habermas 2003; Rubio-Marin 2000; Held 1995; Soysal 1994). Defend-
ers of the nation-state retort that a national state governing a homogeneous 
nation remains the most infl uential, eff ectual, and ethical way of organizing 
citizens within a polity (Villiers 2006; Huntington 2004; Th aa 2001; Schnabel 
1999; Schnapper 1998; Jacobson 1996; Miller 1995; Börkenförde 1995). Th e 
postmodern perspective discerns such thoroughgoing alterity and hybridity 
that living according to commonly observed norms, whether international, 
national, or local, becomes neither possible nor desirable (Isin and Nyers 2014; 
Cohen 2009; Ang 2001; Nancy 2000; Hall 1992; Kristeva 1991). As Will Kym-
licka and Wayne Norman (2000: 41) conclude, no perspective has managed 
to gain normative supremacy when it comes to citizenship (see also Bertossi 
2012: 262). Once we appreciate the high degree of fragmentation and mu-
tual fragilization in this discordant normative atmosphere, the “bewildering 
complexity of rules and regulation” (Bauböck et al. 2006: 20), “contradictory 
trends” (Sainsbury 2012: 282), “paradoxical picture” (Hansen and Hager 2010: 
11), and “messy and muddling practices” (Bertossi and Duyvendak 2012: 238) 
become less surprising, if not necessarily less unsettling.
Liberal Cosmopolitanism
Hope springs eternal that Europe will one day acknowledge and embrace 
itself as a continent of and for immigrants. To do so, European states must 
work to realize the cosmopolitan norm that all (long-term) residents should 
enjoy full rights of citizenship regardless of their race, ethnicity, national-
ity, language, culture, and religion. In the fi rst place, European states are 
signatories to several international declarations, including the UN Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights (1950), the UN Convention on the Elimination 
of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965), the UN Declaration on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Reli-
gion and Belief (1981), the UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights 
of Migrant Workers (1990), and the UN Declaration of the Rights of Persons 
Belonging to Minorities (1992). All declare some version of the loft y liberal 
ideal that rights should be attached to personhood alone. Article 2 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights stipulates:
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status.
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To the extent that European states honor such international norms, they 
establish what Hollifi eld (1992: 26–28) termed “embedded liberalism.”
Th e European Union (EU) has pressed its burgeoning political clout 
into the service of cosmopolitanism. Since its founding in 1951 (as the Eu-
ropean Coal and Steel Community), the EU has placed itself on a steady, 
if slow, course of realizing equal civil, political, and social rights for citi-
zens of member states regardless of where they reside within the EU (Bo-
swell and Geddes 2011: 177–78; Joppke 2010: 161–72; Maas 2007). As far 
as migrants from nonmember states, so-called “third-country nationals” 
(TCNs), were concerned, however, appeals to cosmopolitan openness re-
mained largely symbolic until 1999 (Besson and Etzinger 2007: 574). Ar-
ticle 13 of the Amsterdam Treaty of that year bestowed on the EU the 
prerogative to pass binding legislation to counter discrimination. Th e 
Tampere European Council of 1999 swift ly demonstrated that it would 
not shy away from the enhanced power. Th e council proclaimed that “a 
more vigorous integration policy” should work toward securing for TCNs 
“rights and obligations comparable to those of EU citizens.” In 2000, the 
council issued the Racial Equality Directive dedicated to “Implementing 
the Principle of Equal Treatment between Persons Irrespective of Racial 
or Ethnic Origin” (Council of the EU 2000a). Among other things, the 
directive mandated the establishment of an anti-discrimination agency 
in each member country, such as the United Kingdom’s Commission for 
Equality and Human Rights (2004), France’s Haute Authorité de Lutte 
contre la Discriminations et pour l’Egalité (2005, renamed Défenseur 
des Droits in 2011), or Germany’s Antidiskriminierungsstelle des Bundes 
(2006). Th e directive was followed up in 2000 with the council’s highly 
detailed six-year Community Action Programme to Combat Discrimina-
tion (Council of the EU 2000b). Realizing it had its hands full, the com-
mission announced that successful implementation of the new initiative 
would “require strong political leadership to help shape public opinion” 
and to “avoid language which could incite racism or aggravate tensions be-
tween communities” (Commission of the European Communities 2000: 
22). Th ese eff orts led to adoption of the Common Basic Principles for Im-
migration and Integration Policy in the European Union in the Hague 
Program of 2004. Th e principles, meant to guide immigration policy in all 
member states, include the following:
Access for immigrants to institutions, as well as to public and private 
goods and services, on a basis equal to national citizens and in a non-
discriminatory way, is a critical foundation for better integration.
Th e participation of immigrants in the democratic process and 
in the formulation of integration policies and measures, especially at 
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the local level, supports their integration. (Council of the EU, Justice 
and Home Aff airs 2004: 19–24)
In 2011, the EU issued the Single Permit Directive, aiming to harmonize 
and simplify residency and work visas into one process that accords holders 
of the permits equal rights to EU nationals in work and education. Th e EU 
also established in 1997 the European Monitoring Centre for Racism and 
Xenophobia (in 2007 renamed the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights) and 
charged it with documenting and denouncing racism throughout the EU. 
Andrew Geddes (2000) rightly draws attention to a “thin Europeanisation” 
of rights for TCNs in that they are guaranteed at the EU level irrespective 
of whether or not the individual country in which they reside grants those 
rights in its domestic laws. Joppke (2011: 226) discerns decided movement 
toward “a kind of quasi-European citizenship for immigrants, without the 
need for acquiring a member state nationality fi rst.” What seems obvious is 
that “any consideration of state-level trends must fi rst draw the EU frame-
work that constrains, triggers or gives shape to state-level trends” (Joppke 
2011: 225; see also Faist and Ette 2007).
Furthermore, nation-states face a constantly accumulating corpus of in-
ternational jurisprudence generated by benches such as the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECHR) and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) that 
enforce these laws “beyond the state” (Slaughter 2004; see also Besson and 
Etzinger 2007). As far back as 1985, for instance, the ECHR ruled in Abdu-
laziz, Cabales and Balkandali vs. UK that Britain’s practice of barring for-
eign husbands from joining their immigrant wives in the United Kingdom 
violated Articles 8 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
In 2008 in the groundbreaking Metock case, the ECJ ruled that every EU 
citizen has the unconditional right to bring his or her spouse to any mem-
ber country in the EU even if the spouse is not an EU citizen or even a legal 
resident of a member state. Such rulings and the cosmopolitan conventions 
and treaties that they interpret and enforce have been gradually establishing 
a “postnational” form of citizenship that “confers upon every person the 
right and duty of participation in the authority structures and public life 
of a polity, regardless of their historical or cultural ties to that community” 
(Soysal 1994: 3). States that violate this international regime of human rights 
increasingly fi nd themselves as losing defendants hauled before internation-
al tribunals by nonstate individuals and organizations (Benhabib 2007: 33). 
In order to avoid the same fate, many other states have preemptively altered 
practices and amended statutes to bring them into conformity with inter-
national law (Boswell and Geddes 2011: 228). Th ough, for reasons detailed 
below, it seems an exaggeration to maintain that the nation-state “is in the 
process of becoming a territorial administrative unit of a supranational legal 
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and political order based on human rights” (Jacobson 1996: 133), there can 
be no gainsaying the liberalizing impact of international law on citizenship 
in Europe (Sassen 1996).
Many European governments needed little or no nudging on behalf of 
cosmopolitanism. Well before the EU Race Directive of 2000, for instance, 
Sweden (1986), Belgium (1993), the Netherlands (1994), and Denmark (1994) 
each instituted anti-discrimination laws and/or commissions. Similarly, 
well before the Tampere Council of 1999, many European states made citi-
zenship automatic or easy for nonnatives. As early as 1947, France conferred 
full French citizenship on Arab men from Algeria, a status those born be-
fore independence in 1962 retained thereaft er. In the British Nationality Act 
of 1948, the United Kingdom guaranteed fully equal rights of citizenship to 
all members of the Commonwealth. Home Secretary James Ede defended 
the bill by saying it would “give the coloured races of the Empire the idea 
that . . . they are the equals of the people in this country” (quoted in Schain 
2008: 164). Th e Netherlands emulated the British example in 1954 for the 
inhabitants of Surinam and the Dutch Antilles.
Furthermore, many governments granted aliens partial if not full rights 
of citizenship. For example, Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, 
Norway, Finland, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the 
Swiss cantons of Neuchatel and Jura permit all or some TCNs to vote in at 
least local elections. Of course, all European Community (EC) citizens may 
(according to Article 17 of the Maastricht Treaty of 1992) cast ballots in 
local elections as well as elections for the European Parliament. Moreover, 
since Tampere the EU has urged member states to fully enfranchise both 
EC citizens and TCNs. Local voting rights for TCNs have been introduced 
in some cities in France, Austria, Italy, and Germany but have been either 
rescinded or ruled unconstitutional. As early as 1975, France’s secretary of 
state for immigration, Paul Dijoud, enunciated his “government’s dedica-
tion to assuring the equality of social rights between foreign and French 
workers” (quoted in Schain 2008: 51). Th ree years later the Conseil d’État 
issued a decision endorsing the position (Schain 2008: 110). Likewise, Italy’s 
Turco-Napolitano Law of 1998 gave long-term resident aliens equal access 
to the Italian welfare state, though some aspects of the law were eff ectively 
repealed by the subsequent Bossi-Fini Law of 2002 (Schierup, Hansen, and 
Castles 2006: 189–91). Across Europe, legal (and in some cases illegal) aliens 
have gained broad if not fully equal access to the welfare state (Sainsbury 
2012; Boswell and Geddes 2011: 173, 178; Ferrera 2005: 144; Ireland 2004; 
Bommes and Geddes 2000; Bauböck 1994; Hollifi eld 1992: 222–23). Indeed, 
the extent and speed with which immigrants have acquired social rights in 
Europe led Guiraudon (2000) incisively to contend that, as far as aliens are 
concerned, social rights tend to be granted before rather than aft er political 
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rights, as was famously theorized in T. H. Marshall’s Citizenship and Social 
Class of 1950. As far as civil liberties are concerned, most European con-
stitutions can be and have been interpreted by courts to guarantee them 
to all persons rather than exclusively to citizens. To cite but one example, 
in 1973 when the German government still obstinately insisted that “Ger-
many is not a land of immigration” (kein Einwanderungsland), the Federal 
Constitutional Court ruled that the “free development of one’s personality” 
guaranteed in Article 2 of the Basic Law applied to both citizens and aliens 
(O’Brien 1996: 54). Freedom from extradition, needless to say, represents a 
gravely consequential exception to protected civil rights (Joppke 2010: 84), 
although even here the courts have oft en blocked deportations (for example 
in keeping with the non-refoulement clause in Article 33 of the 1951 UN 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees) or governments have proven 
unwilling or unable to deport (Hollifi eld 2014: 181; Hampshire 2013: 49–50; 
Rosenberger and Winkler 2013; Freedman 2011; Boswell and Geddes 2011: 
171–72; Ellermann 2008). Generally speaking, courts have tended to de-
fend immigrants’ rights when legislative and executive branches have tried 
to curtail or transgress them (Hollifi eld 2014: 180–81; Kneip 2008; Joppke 
2001; Guiraudon 1998). Aliens enjoy so many, if not all the rights of citizens 
that it is not outlandish to posit the seemingly contradictory notion of “alien 
citizenship” (Bosniak 2006). Call it “alien” or “postnational” citizenship or 
“citizenship light” (Joppke 2010: 145) or even “self-limited sovereignty” 
(Hampshire 2013: 47), Europe has taken signifi cant strides in the direction 
of the universal hospitality and world citizenship envisaged by Kant in To-
ward Perpetual Peace.
Th ough traditionally associated with “classic lands of immigration” such 
as the United States, Canada, and Australia, the principle of jus soli (citizen-
ship for all born in country) is hardly foreign to Europe. France enacted it 
into law in 1889. Britain formally codifi ed jus soli in 1914 (Janoski 2010: 
69–71). Denmark adopted jus soli in the 1983 Aliens Law but rescinded it 
in 2004 for children born of non-Nordic parents (Vink and de Groot 2010: 
719). Belgium not only adopted jus soli in the Code of Belgian National-
ity of 1984 but also considerably reduced naturalization requirements for 
those born outside Belgium in the so-called “quickly Belgian law” of 2000 
(Foblets and Loones 2006: 71). In defending the latter the Belgian Justice 
Ministry contended “a foreigner wishing to acquire Belgian nationality is 
seen as a citizen of the world, with a positive attitude to a variety of cultures 
and ready to co-invest in the future of the multicultural society” (quoted 
in Foblets and Loones 2006: 78). Article 2 of Ireland’s Constitution was 
amended in 1998 to read: “It is the entitlement and birthright of every per-
son born in the island of Ireland . . . to be part of the Irish nation.” Double 
jus soli (citizenship for those born in the country with at least one parent 
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also born there) was adopted by the Netherlands in 1953 and by Spain in 
1982. Although Germany did not adopt conditional jus soli (for children of 
aliens resident eight or more years) until 2000 under the government of So-
cial Democratic chancellor Gerhard Schröder, Helmut Kohl’s conservative 
regime had introduced a right of naturalization for second-generation im-
migrants born in Germany in the Aliens Law of 1990 and had signifi cantly 
restricted jus sanguinis (citizenship based on ethnic ancestry) in 1992 for 
ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union (O’Brien 1996: 89–95, 113). 
Schröder captured the general cosmopolitan spirit in 1998:
For far too long those who have come to work here, who pay their 
taxes and abide by our laws have been told they are just “guests.” 
But in truth they have for years been part of German society. . . . We 
will reach out a hand to those who live and work here and pay their 
taxes so they may be encouraged to participate fully in the life of our 
democracy. Th is is responding positively to the realities of Europe. 
(Quoted in Howard 2009: 133)
Indeed, a host of countries—Sweden (2001), Finland (2003), Portugal 
(2006), Luxembourg (2009), Czech Republic (2012)—have recently adopted 
some form of jus soli such as facilitated naturalization for aliens born in the 
settlement country or double jus soli (Vink and de Groot 2010: 718–19: Jop-
pke 2010: 43–50; Howard 2009: 73–93). Italy’s Prodi government introduced 
jus soli legislation in 2006 but could not push it through parliament before 
Berlusconi’s coalition (including the xenophobic Lega Nord) replaced it, 
and in 2013 Greece’s high court overturned the jus soli law of 2010. In sum, 
nineteen European governments (Honohan 2010: 9) have long ago or more 
recently moved their citizenship laws closer to the normative ideal that per-
sons who spend all or most of their lives in a country ought to be citizens of 
that country regardless of their parents’ nationality. Th ough it seems over-
stated to announce a “convergence toward more liberal citizenship laws and 
policies in Europe” (Joppke 2010: 50), “within the EU-15 as a whole, recent 
liberalization of citizenship policies is undeniable” (Howard 2009: 30; see 
also Koopmans, Michalowski, and Waibel 2012: 1233).
I would be remiss, of course, not to add that despite these trends to-
ward greater equality, Muslim immigrants in particular tend to experience 
higher levels of exclusivist discrimination when applying for citizenship or 
visas (Hainmueller and Hangartner 2013; Weil 2004: 377–87; Hagedorn 
2007). Furthermore, Muslims in the aggregate tend to register rates of un-
employment, poverty, high-school dropout, incarceration, and other un-
desirable social indicators twice that of non-Muslim natives across Europe 
(Alba and Holdaway 2013; Sainsbury 2012: 113–34; Algan and Aleksynska 
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2012: 322–26; Dancygier 2010: 282–83; Open Society Institute 2010; Hellyer 
2009: 154–55; Karich 2007; Heath, Rothon, and Kilpi 2007). To take one 
dramatic example of persistent underprivilege, 18 percent of all people in 
France, compared to 50 percent of North African and 36 percent of Turkish 
immigrants, reside in squalid HLM projects (habitations à loyer modéré or 
cités) of the kind that garnered so much attention in the notorious riots of 
2005 and 2007 in Paris’s banlieues (Bowen 2010: 19).
Th e struggle for full equality for Europe’s immigrants will doubtless 
persist, for they have numerous political advocates. What Benhabib (2007: 
33) calls an “interlocking network of local and global activists” working for 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as Amnesty International, 
Human Rights Watch, the European Network against Racism, France Plus, 
Proasyl (Germany), the German Institute for Human Rights, the Human 
Rights League in Belgium, the Catholic charity Caritas, the UK Forum 
against Islamophobia and Racism (FAIR), No One Is Illegal (U.K.), Sin-
Papeles (Spain), Zivilcourage und Anti-Rassismus-Arbeit (ZARA) in Aus-
tria, tirelessly keeps highly focused pressure on governments to improve 
migrants’ rights. Let us take as typical of such political strivings the 2010 
report of the Open Society Institute, with offi  ces in London, Budapest, and 
New York. Aft er laying out its empirical fi ndings of widespread discrimina-
tion against Muslims, Muslims in Europe: A Report on 11 EU Cities recom-
mends the ethnic and religious integration of boroughs; the elimination of 
housing discrimination against Muslims; the enhanced integration of Mus-
lim and ethnic organizations in schools, workplaces, and other public asso-
ciations; the development of municipal campaigns that “promote a common 
and integrative identity of the city in order eff ectively to strengthen unity 
and solidarity”; the liberalization of naturalization requirements for TCNs; 
the allowance of dual citizenship; and the right to vote for resident aliens at 
all levels, not just municipal (Open Society Institute 2010). Th rough repeat-
ed web posts, pamphlets, demonstrations, editorials, and sponsored events 
they channel into the public arena a steady stream of cosmopolitan slogans 
(what I call “philosophical fragments”), such as “same ground, same right, 
same voice” (from Mouvement contre le racism et l’amitie des peoples) or 
“fairness and equality for all” (from the U.K.’s Antiracist Alliance). Even 
the Fédération Internationale de Football Association sponsors its annual 
FIFA Day against Discrimination, which features prominent soccer stars 
condemning ethnic and racial prejudice. Moreover, soccer fans around the 
world could read the slogan “Say No to Racism” during World Cup 2014 
games in Brazil.
It is the undeniably far-reaching normative sway of such liberal univer-
salism that in part moves governments at various levels regularly to issue 
conspicuous public service announcements propagating cosmopolitanism 
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(Berg and Sigona 2013: 352). To cite but three examples, the German gov-
ernment’s Du bist Deutschland (You are Germany), Oslo’s OXLO (Oslo 
Extra Large), or media blitzes like London’s campaign to win the Summer 
Olympics deliberately spotlighted persons of easily recognizable ethnic, 
racial, and religious diff erence from the majority culture to celebrate mul-
ticulturalism as a plus for the city and country. In 1998, Jacques Chirac 
awarded the multicultural (so-called Black-Blanc-Beur) French World 
Cup champion team (with its Algerian French captain Zinedine Zidane) 
the Legion d’honneur. Tony Blair captured the essence of the Europe-wide 
movement to eliminate discrimination with his much quoted phrase “rac-
ists are the only minority” (quoted in Koopmans et al. 2005: 243). With 
equally eff ective pith, Angela Merkel, while defending her government’s 
policy of hosting increasing numbers of refugees in 2015, retorted: “If we 
had not shown a friendly face, that’s not my country” (Guardian 15 Sep-
tember 2015).
Many scholars interpret the increasing legalization or toleration of 
dual citizenship as an important dimension of the broader liberalization 
of citizenship laws (Joppke 2010: 47–49; Howard 2009: 24–26). A large and 
expanding number of European states, including the United Kingdom, 
France, Belgium, Ireland, Sweden, Finland, Luxembourg, Greece, Bulgaria, 
Germany, Denmark, and Hungary, have legalized dual citizenship for im-
migrants. In its European Convention on Nationality of 1997, the Council 
of Europe ended its strict prohibition (from 1963) of dual nationality. Fur-
thermore, states that have resisted formal legalization of dual nationality, 
such as Spain, the Netherlands, and Austria, increasingly tolerate it (Sains-
bury 2012: 109; Vink and de Groot 2010: 721–25; Faist 2009: 184–85; Kezjar 
2009: 137–38; Hansen 2003: 95; Joppke and Morawska 2003: 18–19; Free-
man and Ögelman 1998: 777). For example, four-fi ft hs of the naturaliza-
tions in the Netherlands make exceptions for dual nationality on grounds 
(in accordance with Article 16 of the European Nationality Convention) 
that renunciation of the original nationality would produce undue hard-
ship for the applicant (MiGAZIN 25 April 2012; Faist and Ette 2007: 927; 
see also Dumbrava 2014: 37; Joppke 2010: 47–50). In that both de jure and 
de facto acceptance of dual nationality make easier the naturalization of 
immigrants, the practices serve the cosmopolitan ideal of facilitating the 
acquisition of full rights of citizenship wherever one resides.
Communitarianism
But dual nationality also serves the normative ideal of nationalism, par-
ticularly its communitarian variant. Dual nationality can be interpreted 
as Herderian egalitarian nationalism adapted to fi t the age of migration. 
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Th e German philosopher theorized a people (Volk or Kulturnation) whose 
cultural homogeneity justifi ed its acquisition of a sovereign state. In the age 
of migration, the integrity of nations that possess nation-states is threat-
ened by the myriad push and pull factors that motivate or compel many 
members of the nation to reside outside the territorial boundaries of their 
nation’s state. Dual nationality facilitates the maintenance of a variety of 
integral ties to the nation (as well as nation-state) even though millions of 
its members have been dispersed into distant diasporas. It aids the nation 
in transnationally cohering as a Kulturnation across borders by promot-
ing the notion that one can “take the migrant out of his homeland but not 
the homeland out of the migrant.” In Herderian language, dual national-
ity helps to defend the “soul” of a people against the fi ssiparous forces of a 
relentlessly globalizing world.
In this light, it should come as no surprise that origin states turn out 
to be among the most assiduous proponents of dual nationality and other 
communitarian privileges for “their” emigrants. In the fi rst place, there is a 
long tradition stretching back to colonial times of European powers insist-
ing on the creation and preservation of ethnic enclaves replete with separate 
churches, schools, hospitals, neighborhoods, and so on for their expatri-
ates. Most of these enclaves survived colonialism and continue to thrive in 
some form for expatriate communities around the world. Indeed, in what 
Joppke (2010: 63) terms “re-ethnicizing citizenship,” increasing numbers of 
European states—twenty, including seven of the EU-15 and all of the later 
succession states in Eastern Europe (Boswell and Geddes 2011: 197)—off er 
automatic or privileged access to citizenship for their emigrants and their 
progeny (jus sanguinis).
But our focus is Muslim migrants. Th eir homeland states have lobbied 
long and hard for dual nationality as well as other communitarian rights. 
Governments like Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, Pakistan, and Bangla-
desh exert formidable diplomatic pressure to facilitate all manner of links—
familial, recreational, burial, commercial, fi nancial, political, and cultural—
between their respective countries and their emigrant diasporas in Europe. 
In visits to Germany in 2008 and 2010, for instance, Turkish prime minister 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan came under sharp criticism, including from his Ger-
man counterpart, for allegedly undermining the goal of integration when he 
urged Turkish emigrants to preserve their Turkish identity by founding and 
sending their children to Turkish schools. In a very public example of what I 
theorize as “fragilization” (acknowledging the partial validity of one’s oppo-
nent’s view), Merkel was moved to soft en her criticism when Erdoğan stole 
her thunder with a remonstrating communitarian fragment: “If we have 
German high schools in Turkey why shouldn’t there be Turkish high schools 
in Germany?” (quoted in Migration und Bevölkerung April 2010). In another 
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fi ne example of fragilization, Morocco’s minister for the Moroccan diaspora 
in France sought to juggle the ideals of liberal integration and nationalist 
communitarianism: “Integration is an objective, but it must not constitute a 
rupture with the mother country” (quoted in Laurence 2012: 219).
Sending-country governments have many compelling reasons for pre-
venting rupture, not all of which are normative. Remittances, valued in the 
billions of dollars annually, typically constitute the second or third largest 
single contributor to GDP in sending countries, amounting to 2–3 percent 
of GDP in Algeria and Turkey and 8–10 percent in Morocco (Laurence 2012: 
33; Ahmed 2012; Sassen 2003; Freeman and Ögelman 1998). Furthermore, 
for the economies of these countries their emigrants in Europe, oft en num-
bering in the millions, represent sizable, lucrative markets for products 
peculiar to and produced in the sending countries (travel packages, enter-
tainment and news in the native language, specialty foods, Islamic services 
and accessories, etc.). Arabic, for instance, is the second most transmitted 
language in the world aft er English (Allievi and Nielsen 2003; Faist 2000). 
Offi  cials believe, rightly or wrongly, that this steady economic fi llip from 
Europe contributes to regime durability (Ahmed 2012). Relatedly, sending 
governments endeavor to monitor and mold the political opinions and ac-
tivities of their expatriates. Ruling and opposition parties endeavor to sway 
the votes (and donations) of the many absentee voters that can in tight elec-
tions make the diff erence. For instance, it seems unlikely that Turkey’s Wel-
fare (Refah) Party, the predecessor to the currently ruling Justice and De-
velopment (Adelet ve Kalkınma) Party, would have risen to electoral victory 
in 1995 without the votes and funds raised in Germany by its leader, Nec-
mettin Erbakan, himself an erstwhile migrant to Germany (Kaya 2012: 53). 
Dual citizenship keeps this critical political support accessible even when 
émigrés naturalize in receiving countries.
It is important to underscore, however, that, despite their rhetoric and 
measures promoting integration, the governments of destination coun-
tries have for decades encouraged communitarian separatism. Moreover, 
this holds true for all major destination lands in Europe, not exclusively for 
those with offi  cial policies of “multiculturalism” such as Sweden, Belgium, 
the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Policies promoting physi-
cal and cultural separatism were common in receiving countries from 
the start of postwar immigration in the 1950s and 1960s. Most recruit-
ing countries offi  cially declared that the laborers were temporary workers 
summoned to fi ll labor shortages, who would “rotate” back to their home-
lands within a few years. Th e foreign workers were typically employed in 
national or ethnic teams at the workplace, boarded in segregated housing 
units, and generally encouraged to remain among themselves. Aft er all, 
they were supposed to return home (Fredette 2014: 128–30; Duyvendek 
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and Scholten 2012: 272; Abadan-Unat 2011: 9–13; Castles and Miller 2009: 
97–103; Schain 2008: 46–48, 128–33; Ceylan 2006: 246–48; O’Brien 1996: 
44–46; Castles and Kosack 1973).
When their families started arriving in the 1970s, the segregation tend-
ed to persist in the form of ethnic neighborhoods (ghettos). Various offi  cials 
in the destination countries who had to deal with migrants—social workers, 
healthcare providers, educators, police—faced the dilemma of how to serve 
clients whose language and cultural ways they did not know (well). Th e of-
fi cials typically turned to the embassies of the sending countries that, for 
reasons suggested above, eagerly provided materials, programs, and person-
nel. Eventually, governments at various levels, particularly municipal ones 
facing dense concentrations of migrants, also commissioned and funded 
ethnic and religious organizations independent of the embassies to provide 
mother-tongue classes, non-Christian and non-Jewish religious services, 
and other ethnically specifi c programs and activities. Whether through 
embassies or NGOs, the point to stress is that European governments have 
played a signifi cant role in encouraging transnational connections and 
identities among separate immigrant communities (O’Brien 2013a: 75–77; 
Laurence 2012: 30–104; Kaya 2012: 40–44, 63–67, 103–4, 120–29; Schain 
2010: 140–41; Gest 2010: 87–92; Mohr 2006: 268; Fadil 2006: 57).
In 1977, the European Community issued a directive that member states 
should off er to migrant pupils mother-tongue classes sponsored by sending 
governments (Laurence 2012: 39). Already in 1969, a report commissioned 
for the Economic and Social Council in France had recommended “repa-
triation” for “inassimilable islands” of migrants (quoted in Schain 2008: 
92). Th e French adopted a two-pronged policy of “adaptation [to France] 
or return” and negotiated agreements with Maghrebi embassies to admin-
ister the second prong to the étrangers, as migrants were labeled (Laurence 
2012: 39). In 1981, the Mitterand government abolished a wartime law that 
prohibited equal funding for French and non-French associations. Francs 
from the Social Action Funds (Fonds d’Action Sociale) were channeled 
to ethnically distinct cultural and religious organizations whose number 
proliferated to 4,000 by the end of the decade (Withol de Wenden 1992; 
see also Schain 2008: 107–9; Guiraudon 2006: 137–40). As Jocelyn Cesari 
(1994: 250–51) observed, this communitarian pattern of funding that tar-
geted ethnically specifi c associations actually discouraged eff orts to orga-
nize interethnic and interreligious associations and programs. Th e 2005 Loi 
Sarkozy also encouraged return migration (Castles and Miller 2009: 257). 
Until the Minorities Law of 1983, the Dutch stressed reintegration alone, 
but thereaft er adopted a “dual policy” (tweesporenbeleid) that sought to 
“simultaneously create opportunities for a successful reintegration of im-
migrants who decided to return, and to equip those who decided to stay 
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with a strong and positive sense of identity” (Maussen 2009: 127; see also 
Kaya 2012: 129–33; Vink 2007: 340, 345). Likewise in Germany, where im-
migrants were tellingly referred to as “guestworkers” (Gastarbeiter), the fed-
eral government published its fi rst report calling for integration in 1972 and 
appointed a commissioner for integration in 1978 (O’Brien 1996: 53–57). 
But these liberal measures added to rather than replaced preexisting com-
munitarian policies such as the “Bavarian Model” of segregating pupils ac-
cording to ethnicity into mother-tongue classes (Joppke 1996: 469; Radtke 
1997). “Reintegration” became the offi  cially recognized goal of the federal 
government (again alongside rather than in place of integration) in 1983 
with passage of the Law to Promote the Willingness of Foreigners to Return 
Home, which earmarked millions of marks to subsidize programs helping 
foreigners maintain their homeland culture in Germany (O’Brien 1996: 81, 
99–101). Th e British adapted their customary policy of “indirect rule” in the 
empire to deal with the immigrants streaming into the British Isles from the 
former colonies. Prominent elders were identifi ed for distinct ethnic groups 
and then given the discretion and resources to care for their co-ethnics in 
exchange for promoting their docility (Bowen 2012b: 159; Gest 2010: 87–92; 
Rex 1996: 58; Joppke 1996: 480).
Whether offi  cial or “de facto multiculturalism” (Joppke and Morawska 
2003: 19), communitarian policies have persisted. Indeed, its welcoming, 
cosmopolitan rhetoric notwithstanding, the European Commission (2000: 
8, 10) has breathed new life into the communitarian dimension of dual 
nationality by calling for a “reintegration framework” “to assist returning 
migrants to re-settle in their countries of origin.” Lest we consign them 
to some bygone era before Europe “woke up” to the permanent nature of 
postwar immigration, research at Queens University (“Multiculturalism 
Policy Index” 2012) found that multiculturalist policies increased not only 
from 1980 to 2000 but also from 2000 to 2010 across Europe and “more 
than off set” the high-profi le rescinding of such policies in places such as 
the Netherlands since 9/11. Indeed, numerous studies spanning several de-
cades and countries have repeatedly demonstrated (and typically derided) 
the separatist and segregationist impact of government-sponsored policies 
of multiculturalism (Ranstorp and Dos Santos 2009; Ateş 2008; Sniderman 
and Hagendoorn 2007; Rogstad 2007; Koopmans et al. 2005; Bundesamt für 
Verfassungsschutz 2005; Brenner 2002; Cantle Report 2001; Spinner-Halev 
1999; Haut Conseil à l’Intégration 1997; 1995; Wetenschappelijke Raad 1989; 
also see Wright and Bloemraad 2012 for counter-argument). Th e complex or 
messy truth is that in most European countries multicultural policies co-




From the postmodern perspective, dual nationality represents but one of 
multiple alternatives to single citizenship. Th e same holds for the binary dis-
tinction between citizen and noncitizen stressed by both liberalism and na-
tionalism. Th e latter seeks to preserve the distinction in ways that privilege 
citizens. Liberalism ultimately aims to abolish noncitizenship by making all 
persons citizens of the world in some fundamentally equal sense. Postmod-
ernism, by contrast, reads citizenship as a constructed legal and political 
status that is protean, plural, and contested (Maas 2013a; Sassen 2002).
De Jure and De Facto Citizenship
Once one begins to analyze citizenship as numerous legal political statuses 
that confer rights and entitlements on some and deny them to others, the 
many diff ering degrees of what amounts to one’s de facto citizenship in 
Europe become readily apparent. As intimated in the introductory section, 
the variety and gradation of statuses are vast and appear to be expanding 
rather than contracting. We can distinguish four categories, noting consid-
erable variety within each: (1) conventional citizen, (2) legal resident alien, 
(3) “illegal” resident, and (4) denied or deported nonresident.
Conventional citizens are citizens in the sense of possessing a passport. 
We must immediately add the qualifi cation, however, that many citizens 
have multiple passports. Possession of multiple passports typically brings 
with it considerable advantages (for example, in entering or residing in the 
countries that issued the passports) but can in countries that forbid multiple 
citizenship force the abandonment of all but one passport (Heisler 1998: 577–
78). However, not all citizens are equal. For example, when seeking to live 
together as a family unit, citizens with family members who are nonnation-
als oft en face greater obstacles (for instance, maximum age requirements for 
children or proof of authentic marriage for spouses) and obligations (such as 
assuming fi nancial responsibility for dependents denied access to the wel-
fare state) (Ruff er 2011; Howard 2009: 152). Some stigmatized groups, es-
pecially Muslims, even aft er naturalizing suff er informal discrimination in 
many walks of life to such an extent that they experience citizenship diff er-
ently from unstigmatized “co-citizens” (Chebel d’Apollonnia 2015: 43–44; 
Midtbøen 2014; Fredette 2014: 42–46; Bertossi 2014; Organisation for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development 2013: 191–230; Cesari 2013: 80–138; 
Antidiskriminierungsstelle des Bundes 2013; Amnesty International 2012; 
Ansari and Hafez 2012; Zick, Küpper, and Hövermann 2011; Open Society 
Institute 2010; 2002; European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2009; 
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Peucker 2010; European Union Monitoring Centre 2006; Runnymede Trust 
1997; see also Islamophobia Watch at www.islamophobia-watch.com). Th ere 
also exists an undeniable hierarchy of passports, at least as far as Europe 
is concerned. Th ose holding passports from other EU countries may enter, 
reside, and work anywhere in the EU without a visa. Passports from favored 
countries such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and Japan generally 
entitle holders to visa-free entry into Europe but only as a tourist for a short 
period (typically ninety days). Holders of passports from most other (less 
affl  uent) countries require a visa to enter Europe. Moreover, long-term work 
and residence visas are typically much harder to come by for persons from 
these nations than for those from the favored countries (Hampshire 2013: 
66; Castles 2012: 69–70).
Th e mention of visas brings us to the category of legal resident alien, 
which is enormously complex and ranges from the highly privileged to 
the highly precarious. We have already noted the privileged status of resi-
dent aliens from EU member states. Persons possessing certain high skills 
deemed in great demand (in, say, information technology or engineering) 
or plentiful funds for investment typically receive expedited visa processing 
through various “blue” (EU since 2009) or “green” card schemes (Germa-
ny since 2000) or “investor visas” (in Austria, the United Kingdom, Swit-
zerland, and Germany) designed to attract the best, brightest, and richest 
(Dzankic 2012). Th ough they may have waited long and paid much to ac-
quire permanent visas, those who hold them typically have very secure sta-
tuses that can be revoked only as a result of being convicted of a crime. Th ey 
can, however, have less equal access to the welfare state than citizens enjoy 
and in most places have neither full voting rights nor freedom from extradi-
tion (Sainsbury 2012: 113–31; Joppke 2010: 89–91). Furthermore, some visas 
permit gainful employment while others forbid it (Sainsbury 2012: 281; Si-
gona 2012; Wilpert and Laacher 1999: 53). Temporary visas can range from 
several years (for instance, in the process of applying for the permanent 
visa) or several weeks (in the case of seasonal workers). Temporary visas too 
can come with severe restrictions. Spouses allowed entry are oft en denied 
work permits either permanently or temporarily during a period of pro-
bation (Afonso 2013: 30–32; Staver 2013: 61–79; Ruff er 2011). Student visas 
usually prohibit working in paid jobs and expire upon completion or ter-
mination of study (frequently with a brief grace period). Seasonal and other 
short-term workers’ visas are oft en limited to a specifi c branch of industry 
(for example, health services, tourism, agriculture) and sometimes even to 
a specifi c employer (for instance, with au pairs). Refugees typically not only 
have restricted access to social welfare but are usually forbidden to work 
or else permitted to seek employment only in narrowly stipulated types of 
work. Furthermore, refugees are oft en compelled to reside in specifi ed areas 
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and thus do not enjoy freedom of movement (Sainsbury 2012: 281; Sigona 
2012). Asylum seekers inhabit a veritable no-man’s land between legality 
and illegality. Th ey are neither fully legal nor fully illegal pending a defi ni-
tive ruling on their application. While waiting (oft en for years) they are typ-
ically denied the right to work and to move freely (Hampshire 2013: 69–76; 
Craig 2013; Sigona 2012; Hatton 2009).
Th e category of “illegal” alien might seem unambiguous at fi rst thought. 
In fact, it too is varied and complex (Cross 2012; Triandafyllidou 2010e; 
Schierup, Hansen, and Castles 2006). Accurate accounts of undocumented 
migrants in Europe, needless to say, elude us. Th e European Commission 
(2008: 6) estimates eight million. Anna Triandafyllidou and Dita Vogel 
(2010: 298) estimate four million. Others claim one in ten migrants resides 
illegally (Bloemraad et al. 2008: 166). Despite the sensational media’s spot-
light on undocumented migrants who cross the border clandestinely with 
or without the help of traffi  ckers, this stereotypical illegal alien represents 
a small proportion of total “irregular” migration. According to Franck 
Düvell (2011), 80 percent of irregular migrants enter with a valid visa of 
some sort and only later become illegal by remaining beyond the expira-
tion date (see also Sigona and Hughes 2012: viii; Triandafyllidou 2010d: 4–5; 
Engbersen 2001: 222). As Bridget Anderson (2013: 124) perceptively stresses, 
large numbers of illegals are actually semi-illegal because they are in semi-
compliance rather than full noncompliance with the law (most commonly 
by residing legally but working illegally). Th eir statuses can and do change 
frequently. Consider that in 2011 the countless East Europeans of the so-
called EU-8 (states that acceded in 2004) who were residing or working il-
legally in the EU-15 states became legal overnight. Th e frequent declara-
tions of amnesty, especially common in southern Europe in Spain (1985, 
1986, 1991, 1996, and 2005), Italy (1986, 1990, 1995, 1998, and 2002), Greece 
(1998, 2001, 2005, and 2011), and Portugal (2001, 2004, and 2005) have not 
only legalized “illegals” (typically only temporarily) but also unoffi  cially 
encouraged irregular migrants to come or stay in the hope of one day be-
ing regularized (Gest 2010: 135; Fasani 2010; Triandafyllidou 2010c: 203–5; 
Castles and Miller 2009: 113). France permits sans papiers to acquire legal 
papers aft er ten years of demonstrated residence (Schain 2008: 70). Needless 
to say, there exists a critical diff erence both in quantity and consequence 
between undocumented residents in the custody of the state and those at 
large. However, not all apprehended “illegal” aliens are deported. Many re-
main for long periods in detention centers, while others who are notifi ed of 
an impending deportation abscond before it is carried out (Anderson 2013: 
131–35; Boswell and Geddes 2011: 171–72).
Th e overwhelming number of undocumented migrants comprise those 
who never set foot in Europe (Cross 2012). European governments devote 
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considerable resources and energy to denying would-be migrants entry to 
“Fortress Europe.” For example, many governments, including the Neth-
erlands (2006), Germany (2007), France (2007), Britain (2010), Denmark 
(2010), and Austria (2011), have not only increased the level of language 
profi ciency required for family reunifi cation but have transplanted the site 
of taking the language classes and exams from the receiving country to 
sending countries (Goodman 2014: 205). Th ose who fail to meet the re-
quirements are never allowed to reach the destination country, thus avoid-
ing altogether the oft en unpleasant and expensive deportations. Following 
the example of the United Kingdom and Germany in 1987, most European 
states exact steep fi nes on private passenger carriers (for instance, airlines 
or cruise ships) that bring inadequately documented persons onto their na-
tional territory (Hampshire 2013: 67). Th e EU annually budgets over €100 
million for Frontex “to reduce the number of irregular migrants entering 
the EU undetected” (http://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/mission-and-
tasks/). Frontex, of course, coordinates but does not replace the member 
states’ own extensive border-control actions, agencies, and agents. Migrants 
who make it to Europe “illegally” come under the Schengen Convention. 
Originally signed in 1985 in Schengen, Luxembourg, by fi ve countries (Bel-
gium, France, the Netherlands, West Germany, and Luxembourg), the con-
vention now has twenty-six mostly contiguous signatory countries (exclud-
ing Ireland and the United Kingdom) and stipulates that travelers denied 
entry into the territory of any signatory country are thereby automatically 
denied entry into the other twenty-fi ve territories (the so-called “Schengen 
area,” spanning 4.3 million square kilometers). All too frequent tragedies, 
such as the shipwrecks in 2013 and 2015 between the coast of North Af-
rica and the Italian island of Lampedusa that cost hundreds of lives, or the 
abandoned lorry found full of corpses outside Vienna in 2015, dreadfully 
remind us of the thousands of migrants who perish or suff er severe injury 
endeavoring to reach Europe. Of course, this is not to mention the un-
fathomable number of human beings who have eff ectively lost what Ayelet 
Shachar (2009) calls the “birthright lottery” by being born in countries of 
the impoverished global South and who wish to migrate to Europe but do 
not because they deem the obstacles insurmountable.
Th e multidimensional and polymorphous quality of de facto citizen-
ship reveals fragilization toward and fragmentation from postmodernism. 
Citizenship is increasingly viewed instrumentally by migrants, citizens, 
and offi  cials alike. Instrumentalization, furthermore, refl ects relaxed com-
mitment to the normative goals of solidarity, either inclusively with all hu-
mans (liberalism) or exclusively with native nationals (nationalism). Less 
insistence on realizing normative ideals facilitates expanding acceptance of 
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nonuniform and inconsistent citizenship policies that result from the va-
garies of political contestation rather than from an unambiguous ethical 
doctrine (Isin and Nyers 2014: 8).
Instrumental Citizenship
Many analysts observe the instrumentalization of citizenship (Vink and de 
Groot 2010: 714; Joppke 2010: 157–61; Gest 2010: 175). Th is can mean in-
dividuals who apply for, acquire, and utilize their citizenship status(es) as 
a way of addressing largely pragmatic challenges of securing genial living 
conditions. Th ey might neither seek nor feel a “thick” identifi cation with or 
deep loyalty to the nation-state of which they are citizens. At this juncture, 
however, and employing the less conventional understanding of plural de 
facto citizenship developed above, I want to underscore instrumentalism on 
the part of the state. Here I have in mind the tendency on the part of offi  -
cials publicly and unashamedly to describe migration and migrants as mere 
means for enhancing the domestic economy. George Menz (2009: 29–30) 
writes of the “European competition state, which perceives of migration . . . 
as a valuable opportunity to avail oneself of attractive human resources with 
desirable skill portfolios.” Austria actually sells citizenship for $300,000 to 
anyone who invests more than $2.5 million in its economy. Since 2013, Ger-
many’s Ministry of Labor and Social Aff airs maintains Jobmonitor, which 
systematically identifi es sectors sorely in need of foreign workers (Organisa-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development 2013: 45). Justifying in 
2005 his government’s “green card” program (since 2000) for certain highly 
skilled migrants, Schröder crassly opined “there are people we need and 
there are people who need us,” the implication being that Germany should 
attract the former and repel the latter (quoted in O’Brien 2013b: 143). A year 
later, Sarkozy contrasted preferred immigration choisie with unwanted im-
migration subie (a proposal actually fi rst put forth by Socialists in 1998). Th e 
French introduced the Carte de Competences et Talents for skilled foreign 
workers in 2006. In that same year, the Swiss enabled expedited visas for 
skilled TCNs. Britain has had a Highly Skilled Migrant Programme since 
2002 (Corvalho 2013). It uses a “point-based system” (PBS) introduced by 
the Labour government to rank migrants’ skills so as to sift  out those Britain 
wants (offi  cially) from those it does not want (Anderson 2013: 59). Th e Neth-
erlands, Denmark, and Austria subsequently introduced PBS (Hampshire 
2013: 61), though Denmark abolished its program in 2012 aft er ten months 
in force (Goodman 2014: 113). In 2011, David Cameron explained that Brit-
ain seeks “good immigration, not mass immigration” (New Statesman 14 
April 2011), while his Home Offi  ce (2011: 12) offi  cially strives to “allow . . . 
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only the brightest and the best to stay permanently.” In 2008, EU Commis-
sion president José Manuel Barosso announced that “with the [newly intro-
duced] European blue card, we send a clear signal. Highly skilled workers 
are welcome in the EU” (quoted in Rudolph 2010: 51). Th e EU’s Stockholm 
Programme of 2009, which set the EU’s migration agenda until 2014, called 
for “a fl exible admission system . . . to adapt to increased mobility and the 
needs of national labour markets” (quoted in Boswell and Geddes 2011: 76).
Readers should keep in mind that West European governments initiated 
postwar immigration in the 1950s and 1960s primarily in an eff ort to fi ll 
labor shortages, at that time mostly in unskilled jobs (Castles and Kosack 
1973). Moreover, Anthony Messina (2007) demonstrates that, all the clam-
or regarding unchecked immigration notwithstanding, European nation-
states have continued into the twenty-fi rst century their adept control of 
migration to serve perceived economic interests. Th is includes turning a 
blind eye to much illegal immigration that supplies the labor market with 
cheap workers desired by many industries (Anderson 2013; van den Anke 
and van Liempt 2012; Boswell and Geddes 2011: 135–36; Schierup, Hansen, 
and Castles 2006; Verstraete 2003; Engbersen 2001).
On initial consideration, instrumental use and abuse of alien workers 
would seem to accord with nationalism’s favoritism for nationals. How-
ever, this is only partially true, for migrants (legal and illegal) can under-
mine nationals’ interests. Programs designed to recruit highly skilled aliens 
channel them into typically well-paid, desirable jobs. Th e European Cen-
tre for the Development of Vocational Training estimates a need for six-
teen million highly skilled workers by 2020 (http://www.cedefop.europa.
eu/en/news-and-press/newsletters/cedefop-newsletter-no-14-julyaugust-
2011?view=full). It is true that such positions may not be fi lled by TCNs 
if EU citizens are available. However, businesses that are keen to swift ly 
fi ll indispensable positions rarely look very far or long for nationals or EU 
members (Hampshire 2013: 41–44; Anderson 2013: 71). More importantly, 
recruitment of foreigners alleviates pressure on governments to commit the 
resources needed to attract nationals to and train them in the highly skilled 
professions where shortages abound. Similarly, both regular and especially 
irregular migrants oft en take low-paying, undesirable, so-called 3-D (dirty, 
diffi  cult, dangerous) or 3-C (cooking, caring, cleaning) jobs that nationals 
tend to spurn. Moreover, the steady supply of cheap labor eases pressure on 
employers and regulators to improve the wages and conditions of such posi-
tions to levels that would attract nationals (Castles and Miller 2009: 222). 
Meanwhile, large numbers of nationals remain indefi nitely unemployed 
across Europe. To quote ultranationalist Jean Marie Le Pen, “We have six 
million migrants in France, and six million unemployed” (quoted in Koop-
mans et al. 2005: 213).
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Instrumentalism can contravene liberalism’s ethical ideal of equal 
treatment for all. Undocumented aliens in particular are vulnerable to ex-
ploitation by employers, landlords, and even family members who threat-
en to expose the migrants’ illegality if they protest iniquitous conditions 
(Mantouvalou 2014: 52–58; Anderson 2013: 159–76; Sainsbury 2012: 13–31; 
Schierup, Hansen, and Castles 2006: 209–10; Calavita 2005; Andall 2003; 
Anderson 2000; Rubery, Smith, and Fagan 1999). For fear of exposure and 
deportation, many irregulars forego welfare assistance to which they or their 
dependents are entitled (Sainsbury 2012; Triandafyllidou 2010e). Needless 
to say, governments denounce both “illegal” migration and the exploita-
tion of “illegals” and announce high-profi le campaigns to eliminate both 
repugnant phenomena (Afonso 2013: 32; Boswell and Geddes 2011: 135–36; 
Triandafyllidou 2010d: 11). Th us, François Hollande, while campaigning for 
president in 2012, pledged: “I shall lead a merciless struggle against illegal 
immigration and the clandestine work networks” (quoted in Daguzan 2013: 
107). But both phenomena persist across Europe. Moreover, they not only 
persist but also fl ourish to such an extent that they cannot be explained as 
rare exceptions to an otherwise uniform and prevailing regularity (Boswell 
and Geddes 2011: 131–32; Koser 2008; Schierup, Hansen, and Castles 2006: 
30; Düvell 2006). “Th e danger with tough enforcement is that it can never 
be tough enough. Th e tougher the enforcement, the bigger the ‘problem’ it 
uncovers” (Anderson 2013: 136).
Indeed, we can discern the regularization of irregularity, or what Agam-
ben (1998: 7) calls “inclusive exclusion.” I have in mind offi  cial and unoffi  cial 
government actions that encourage or enable the normalization of irregular 
migration, contributing to its emergence or persistence as an integral as op-
posed to aberrational feature of receiving societies. In the fi rst place, the 
state creates the category of illegal alien. We most oft en think of the state as 
conferring citizenship. But it also confers illegality. Illegal migrants would 
neither exist without the state’s laws that illegalize them nor be as readily 
exploitable without the state’s threat to deport them (Hampshire 2013: 63–
64; Anderson 2013: 86–90; Khosravi 2012: 62; Vivar 2012: 116; Karakayali 
2008; Bauder 2006). Moreover, Europe’s economies depend on a constant 
pipeline of undocumented workers that the state not only creates but tol-
erates. Neoliberal trends have been transforming European societies into 
“post-Fordist” economies that function with an increasing number of pre-
carious (“fl exible”) forms of employment (especially in the expanding ser-
vice industries) that provide neither living wages nor benefi ts for jobholders 
(Munck, Schierup, and Wise 2012; Schierup, Hansen, and Castles 2006; Sas-
sen 1998; Wacquant 1996; Harvey 1989). Concurrently with the emergence 
of the dual labor market, “post-social” welfare states trim entitlements and 
increasingly foist the responsibility for one’s socioeconomic security onto 
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the individual (Rosanvallon 2013: 209–54; Sainsbury 2012: 113–31; Castles 
2012; O’Malley 1996; Rose 1996). Both trends combine to spawn a growing 
minority underclass—a “precariat” (Munck, Schierup, and Wise 2012: 9) or 
“shadow side” (Castles and Miller 2009: 310)—that is forced permanently to 
endure “new social risks” or, in other words, living and working conditions 
systematically and signifi cantly inferior to those of the middle-class ma-
jority (Bauman 2011; Esping-Anderson et al. 2002; Balibar and Wallerstein 
1991). Migrants, legal and illegal, so disproportionately fi ll the ranks of this 
underclass of “the new poverty in the European Community” (Room, Law-
son, and Laczko 1989) that some authors speak of “an incipient ethno-racial 
stratifi cation” (Schierup, Hansen, and Castles 2006: 81) or even a “Euro-
pean apartheid” (Balibar 2004: 121). Just as lawmakers know perfectly well 
from demographers (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment 2013; 2011; Eurostat 2008; United Nations 2000) that Europe depends 
on immigrants to replace its aging and dwindling population with its low 
birthrate, they know equally well from political economists and sociologists 
that their economies, if they are to remain globally competitive, depend on 
an underclass of modern day “helots” (Cohen 2006: 152) comprising mi-
grants with varying degrees of (il)legal status.
It is a well-established fact that southern European economies function 
through systematic reliance on large numbers of illegal and semi-legal mi-
grants to fi ll informal but critical niches in secondary labor markets such as 
construction, domestic service, hotels, restaurants, agriculture, and retail 
trade. Because the workers are typically paid in cash and have no written 
contracts, employers can intimidate them into accepting salaries and condi-
tions below legal minimums. Th ese practices are so extensive in southern 
Europe that analysts argue that illegal laborers should be understood as a 
cause rather than eff ect of large-scale migration. Th e frequent amnesties at-
test to the integral and regular nature of this labor force, for they not only 
legalize (oft en only temporarily) undocumented workers, but, as already 
mentioned, attract additional undocumented migrants (Maroukis 2010; 
Fasani 2010; Gonzalez-Enriquez 2010; Sciortini 2004; Reyneri 2003; King 
2000; Anthias and Lazaridis 1999; Baldwin-Edwards and Arango 1999). In 
2009, Italy’s public service and innovation minister Renato Brunetta can-
didly admitted that the underground economy “plays an important role, 
especially during an economic crisis” (quoted in Fasani 2010: 183).
In what might be termed a process of the “southernization” of the 
North, illegal and semi-legal work is expanding in northern Europe (Ander-
son 2013: 159–76; Sigona and Hughes 2012; Withol de Wenden 2010; Cyrus 
and Kovacheva 2010; Castles and Miller 2009: 238; Schierup, Hansen, and 
Castles, 2006: 23; Düvell 2006; Anderson 2000; Rubery, Smith, and Fagan 
1999). Lest one think, however, that illegal migration is a completely new 
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phenomenon in northern Europe, consider that as early as 1966 the French 
Minister of Aff airs, Jean Marie Jeanney, remarked that “illegal immigration 
has its uses. [Without it] we would perhaps be short of labour (quoted in 
Geddes 2003: 53). Th ough the French amnesty in response to the sans pa-
pier movement of 1997 was ostensibly designed to legalize illegal migrants, 
Schain (2008: 54) insists that offi  cials deliberately made the mandatory peri-
od of documented residency in France prohibitively long (ten years) so as to 
guarantee that the vast majority of the undocumented would remain so. In 
2003, the Swedish government estimated that a surprisingly high percentage 
(8–9 percent) of youths between the ages of sixteen to twenty-four resided 
in Sweden without proper papers and had no legal employment or course of 
study (Statens-off entliga-utredningar 2003). Similarly, a British report on 
irregular migration warns “of producing a generation of disenfranchised 
youth” (Sigona and Hughes 2012: vii). Christian Joppke (2011: 230) observes 
that increasing numbers of TCNs are coming to the realization that it is 
easier to migrate to the EU illegally and avoid or contest deportation than it 
is to acquire legal visas. Germany has become envied and emulated across 
Europe for cleverly legalizing what normally would be considered illegal 
work. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, lawmakers and employers devised 
highly fl exible laws and practices that made it legal for German fi rms to pay 
foreign subcontractors to supply laborers to work at sites in Germany but 
under terms of employment established in the country in which the subcon-
tracting company is incorporated (Schierup, Hansen, and Castles 2006: 34, 
152). In the 2000 decision to jettison its zero-immigration policy for TCNs, 
the European Commission (2000: 17–18) had given the green light to such 
“special arrangements” for “certain types of workers, e.g. seasonal workers, 
transfrontier workers, and intra-corporate transferees” that facilitate “the 
effi  cient management of migration fl ows.”
Such proclivity for fl exibility refl ects fragilization toward a postmodern 
interpretation of citizenship, which reads citizenship as a political construct 
that is mutable and plural rather than fi rm and unitary. Moreover, types of 
citizenships are constantly being worked out by vying and allying political 
actors who wield asymmetrical political power (Isin and Nyers 2014: 8–9; 
Maas 2013a: 3; Neveu 2013: 205; Ataç and Rosenberger 2013; Cohen 2009: 
14; Sassen 2002). Th is is precisely the point that many scholars seek to under-
score with their oft en clever but still unconventional-sounding neologisms 
such as “alien citizens” (Bosniak 2006), “digital citizens” (Isin and Nyers 
2014: 9), “hybrid citizens” (Stasiulis 2004), “fragmented” citizens (Wiener 
and Della Sala 1997), “semi-citizens” (Cohen 2009), “denizens” (Hammar 
1990), or “margizens” (Castles and Davidson 2000). Such examples manifest 
a willingness on the part of many offi  cials to experiment with the plasticity 
of citizenship to address pragmatically the varied political situations that 
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confront them. Th us, for privileged and powerful noncitizens, conditions 
and conveniences similar or even superior to those enjoyed by the formal 
citizen can be swift ly made possible without forcing the welcomed “super 
citizens” (Chimienti and Solomos 2012: 96) to wade through the thicket of 
red tape characteristic of the formal naturalization process (Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development 2013: 48–49). By contrast, 
powerless and politically vulnerable migrants can be eff ectively made to 
endure miserable living and working conditions that are unacceptable or 
illegal for the conventional citizen. Such exploitation occurs not only in-
directly through the unacknowledged toleration by offi  cials of illegal em-
ployers, traffi  ckers, and landlords, but directly through the denial of rights 
and benefi ts to migrants to which they are legally entitled—a practice well 
documented across Europe and particularly pronounced in regard to Mus-
lims (Hebling 2013; Anderson 2013: 122–25; van den Anke and van Liempt 
2012; Sainsbury 2012: 251; Alonso 2012: 485; Cyrus and Kovacheva 2010: 
133; Verkaaik 2010; Human Rights Watch 2008; Hagedorn 2007; Mourit-
sen 2006; Triandafyllidou 2006; Green 2005: 921; Klausen 2005: 21; Weil 
2004: 377–87; Guiraudon 2003; Koopmans 1999: 630). Christina Boswell 
and Andrew Geddes (2011: 137) speak of the “deliberate malintegration” 
of foreigners on the part of offi  cials. Such practices refl ect an openness to 
tolerating or facilitating third-world conditions in Europe, including strati-
fi ed statuses of legal membership that resemble those of former European 
colonies. We can also conceptualize these plural modes of citizenship as 
a kind of re-medievalization of the modern European state and society in 
which a quasi-legal hierarchy of ranks is allowed to erode the normative 
ideal of equality before the law for all citizens that is intrinsic to the West-
phalian model of the unifi ed nation-state. Countless European citizens 
daily interact with migrants who have precarious legal statuses. Th e former 
work with or alongside semi-legals and illegals in their places of employ-
ment. Th ey hire irregular migrants to clean their homes or care for their 
children or elderly parents. Th ey dine in restaurants or sleep in hotels staff ed 
by persons with substantially inferior legal statuses, not to mention living 
conditions (Mantouvalou 2014; van den Anke and van Liempt 2012; Sassen 
1998). A study of domestic workers in the U.K., for example, found that 67 
percent of those surveyed in 2010 worked seven days per week and 48 per-
cent worked no less than sixteen hours per day, 56 percent earned £50 or less 
per week, 60 percent were not allowed in public unaccompanied, 65 percent 
had their passport withheld, and 49 percent did not have their own room 
(Lalani 2011). Indeed, lest they lose a politically advantageous issue, the very 
politicians who rail against illegal immigration both enable and rely on its 
continuation (Maas 2013c: 14; Schierup, Hansen, and Castles 2006: 79). Just 
as in colonial and medieval times, inequalities and asymmetries occasion 
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varying degrees of political identifi cation and loyalty among subjects (more 
in this regard in subsequent chapters). Th ey also spark resistance and protest 
on the part of the underprivileged and their advocates of the kind already 
noted above. Citizenship (actually a montage of citizenships) is, thus, very 
much in fl ux in Europe (Hansen and Hager 2010).
Contra Immigration
Most of the same countries that have encouraged immigration and natu-
ralization have also adopted policies to discourage them as well. All of 
the Western European countries that actively recruited foreign laborers 
in the 1950s and 1960s have ceased doing so since the recession of the 
1970s, with some limited exceptions regarding seasonal and highly skilled 
workers (Castles and Miller 2009: 108). A number of countries with open 
naturalization laws tightened them. In 1962, under a Conservative gov-
ernment, Britain targeted “coloureds” by revoking the unconditional right 
to reside in Britain for citizens of the United Kingdom whose passports 
were issued in the colonies, including those already residing in the U.K. 
In 1964, a Labour-controlled Parliament targeted white settlers in the col-
onies by passing the Nationality Act, which gave unconditional right of 
entry and residence to the U.K. to those with colonial passports who had 
a parent or grandparent born in the U.K. (“the Natal Formula”). Th e Im-
migration Act of 1971 and the British Nationality Act of 1981 refi ned these 
legal distinctions between those with ancestral connections to the British 
nation (“patrials”) and those without, the overall eff ect being to introduce 
a strong jus sanguinis dimension into what had been a cosmopolitan jus 
soli policy for the entire Commonwealth (Schain 2008: 130–35). Likewise, 
in the Loi Pasqua-Méhaignerie of 1993, France shrewdly dismantled auto-
matic jus soli for Maghrebians by devising cumbersome bureaucratic re-
quirements for naturalization that could only be fulfi lled between the ages 
of sixteen and twenty-one. Th e Debré Law of 1997 further tightened re-
strictions. Although some of the restrictions were rescinded in 1998 under 
the premiership of Socialist Lionel Jospin (Goodman 2014: 190), the 1999 
census recorded roughly 500,000 eligible Maghrebians who failed to natu-
ralize (Schain 2008: 75–78). Soon-to-be interior minister Charles Pasqua 
bluntly averred that “France has been an immigration country, but she 
wants to be one no longer” (quoted in Hollifi eld 2014: 171). In 2004, Den-
mark abolished jus soli for children born of non-Nordic parents (Vink and 
de Groot 2010: 719). Spain denies dual citizenship to Moroccans, whence 
the lion’s share of its approximately one million Muslims originate, while 
permitting it for naturalizing immigrants from former colonial states in 
Latin America (Janoski 2010: 83). As mentioned, all the Eastern European 
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countries adopted strict jus sanguinis naturalization regimes aft er aban-
doning the Soviet Bloc (Dumbrava 2014: 56–58; Bauböck, Perching, and 
Wiebke 2007; Howard 2009: 169–92), thereby emulating Austria, Switzer-
land, Greece, Italy, Finland, and Luxembourg in Western Europe (How-
ard 2009: 21). Although Germany dismantled (most of) its jus sanguinis 
citizenship law from 1913 with the introduction of conditional jus soli in 
the Nationality Law of 2000, the same law nonetheless simultaneously dis-
couraged naturalization by making dual nationality verboten. Th e Bund-
estag further deliberately diluted jus soli in 2004 by raising residency re-
quirements for TCN parents with children born in Germany (Vink and 
de Groot 2010: 719). In Ireland 80 percent of voters supported a national 
referendum in 2004 to deny jus soli to children born of parents who had 
not resided in the British Isles for at least three years. Several countries 
have made it more diffi  cult for foreigners applying for citizenship aft er 
birth (that is, without jus soli entitlements) by lengthening residency re-
quirements or raising the language profi ciency bar (Italy in 1992, Greece 
in 1993, Denmark in 2002, France in 2003, Finland in 2003, Britain in 
2009, and Belgium in 2012) (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development 2013: 103; Vink and de Groot 2010: 725–26; Howard 2009: 
94–168). Following the lead of the Netherlands in 1998 (Civic Integration 
for Newcomers Act) and formally encouraged by the European Council 
Tampere Conclusions of October 1999, Denmark (2004), Austria (2004), 
Germany (2007), France (2007), the United Kingdom (2007), and Spain 
(2012) have introduced mandatory civics classes and exams for naturaliza-
tion (Klekowski von Koppenfels 2013; Mourão Permoser 2013; Goodman 
2010; Groot, Kuipers, and Weber 2009; Michalowski 2009). It should be 
noted, however, that in light of the exemptions made for EU citizens as 
well as other “Westerners” (via bilateral agreements), the courses and ex-
ams clearly target non-Westerners, in particular applicants from Muslim-
majority countries (Goodman 2014: 214–20; Michalowski 2014; Cesari 
2013: 88; Ersbøll, Kostakopoulou, and Van Oers 2011; Ruff er 2011: 947; 
Joppke 2010: 1137–42; Saharso 2007). We should also not overlook the dis-
couraging impact of naturalization fees that can run in the hundreds and 
sometimes thousands of euros for applicants who typically possess limited 
means (Vink and de Groot 2010: 727).
Numerous countries have, especially since 9/11, made it harder for aliens 
to reside legally. Commonly implemented measures include lengthening the 
number of years of legal residency required for permanent visas or citizen-
ship, raising language profi ciency requirements, increasing the duration of 
marriage for spousal reunifi cation as well as decreasing the maximum age 
for off spring reunifi cation, introducing or increasing the minimum income 
(allegedly to prevent reliance on noncontributory welfare benefi ts), and 
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making it easier to deport foreigners convicted of a crime. Some or all of 
these measures have been adopted by, among others, Austria (2002, 2005, 
2011), Denmark (1992, 2002, 2005, 2012), France (2003, 2006, 2011), Ger-
many (2004, 2007), Switzerland (2006), Italy (2002, 2009), Spain (2012), the 
Netherlands (1998, 2002, 2004, 2012), and the United Kingdom (2004, 2009, 
2012) (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 2013: 
56–57; Hampshire 2013: 76–80; Koopmans, Michalowski, and Waibel 2012: 
1223; Sainsbury 2012; Janoski 2010: 153, 179; Vink and de Groot 2010; Kral-
er 2010; Howard 2009: 101–3; Schain 2008; Messina 2007; Schierup, Han-
sen, and Castles 2006; Aleinikoff  and Klusmeyer 2002). Moreover, most of 
the obligatory courses and exams apply to visa applicants as well. Once an 
important ideological weapon in the Cold War, lenient asylum laws have 
been tightened virtually everywhere in Europe. An “architecture of exclu-
sion” (Gibney 2004: 3) has been erected, especially since the civil wars in the 
former Yugoslavia sent hundreds of thousands of refugees fl eeing to West-
ern Europe (Hampshire 2013: 69–76; Boswell 2005: 28–30). In particular, 
the Schengen Agreements, combined with the Dublin Convention (1990) 
and Dublin Regulation (2003 and 2014), have propelled something of a race 
among European states to restrict asylum. In 2015, Hungary announced 
plans to build a fence along its entire border with Serbia (Th e Telegraph 17 
June 2015). Most of the signatory countries want to gain a reputation as the 
most lenient, lest they, like Germany, attract untold numbers of asylum seek-
ers who have only “one shot” at applying in the entire Schengen area (Hamp-
shire 2013: 101–5; Hatton 2009; Schierup, Hansen, and Castles 2006: 65–80). 
Tony Blair’s comment from 2003 is typical of this “get-tough” posture:
We have cut asylum applications by half. But we must go further. 
We should cut back the ludicrously complicated appeal process, de-
rail the gravy train of legal aid, fast track those from democratic 
countries, and remove those who fail in their claims without further 
judicial interference. (Guardian 30 September 2003)
David Cameron was curter, calling refugees a “swarm” trying to enter Brit-
ain (Telegraph 15 August 2015). In response to Silvio Berlusconi’s threat 
to legalize and send packing northward the “human tsunami” of refugees 
reaching Italy’s shores as a result of the Arab Spring, the Danish government 
enraged the European Commission in 2011 by reinstating passport control 
for travelers from other Schengen lands. Germany followed suit in 2015 as 
tens of thousands of asylum-seekers were being “released” northward by 
Macedonia, Greece, Hungary, and Italy in blatant violation of the Dublin 
Regulation. In the same year Slovakia said it would accept Christian but 
not Muslim refugees. Swiss citizens went even further, voting in 2014 with 
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a razor-thin majority in favor of a referendum placed on the ballot by the 
radical Right Swiss People’s Party to impose quotas on the number of for-
eigners entering the land, including EU citizens. In the face of lost votes to 
the surging United Kingdom Independence Party, David Cameron too has 
said that limiting the number of EU foreigners into Britain might be neces-
sary (Die Zeit 15 May 2014).
Despite its rhetoric and action in favor of equal rights for TCNs alluded 
to above, the EU hardly qualifi es as an unequivocal voice in favor of cos-
mopolitan openness. Until 2000, the European Commission endorsed a 
zero-immigration policy and thereaft er open borders only for highly skilled 
TCNs. Th e European Commission (1994: 32) all but offi  cially supported xe-
noskeptic concerns that migrants pose a threat when it stated: “Society’s 
willingness to accept the infl ow of new migrant groups depends on how it 
perceives government to be in control of the phenomenon.” Furthermore, 
one has to wonder just how far the EU can go in supporting multicultur-
alism for TCNs when Article 6.3 of the Treaty of European Union (1992) 
states: “Th e Union shall respect the national identities of its Member states.” 
Small wonder, then, that the EU’s Family Directive of 2003 authorizes mem-
ber states to deny family reunifi cation to immigrants who are not well inte-
grated (Goodman 2014: 208).
Backlash against Multiculturalism
Behind much anti-immigrant policy making lies a harsh critique of multi-
culturalism. Although we should not discount the postmodern instrumen-
talism that justifi es exploiting migrants for no other reason than that they 
are vulnerable, there can be no denying the emergence of a “multicultural 
backlash” (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010) or “retreat of multiculturalism” 
(Joppke 2004) across Europe (also Boswell and Geddes 2011: 202; Bukow et 
al. 2007: 13; Brubaker 2001). Th e strongest purveyors and greatest benefi cia-
ries of this “backlash against diversity” (Grillo 2005: 38) have been radical 
Right political parties and politicians, the marked improvement in whose 
political fortunes arguably represents the most signifi cant novel develop-
ment in European politics over the past three decades. No European pol-
ity has remained immune from sporadic spikes in the electoral success of 
extreme Right parties; they represent formidable fi xtures on the political 
spectrum in many countries where they regularly garner between 10 and 15 
percent of the popular vote; they have negotiated their way into ruling co-
alitions in Austria, Denmark, Switzerland, Norway, the Netherlands, Italy, 
Estonia, Romania, Poland, and Slovakia. Th ey shrewdly deploy xenophobic 
slogans that directly appeal to many voters: “Keep Sweden Swedish” (Swe-
den Democrats), “Give us Denmark back” (Danish People’s Party), “Shake 
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off  the creeping tyranny of Islamization” (Dutch Party for Freedom), “Is-
lam out of Britain” (British National Party), “Stop the Foreigners” (Austrian 
Freedom Party), “Rescue Hungarians” (Jobbik), “Masters in our own house” 
(Northern League in Italy), “Greece belongs to Greeks” (Golden Dawn). 
Th ese clever rallying cries of the “politics of closure” (Hampshire 2013: 16) 
represent ideological fragments of Schmitt’s sophisticated friend-enemy 
philosophy of nationalism: “A nationally homogeneous state then appears 
normal; a state that lacks this homogeneity is abnormal, a threat to peace” 
(Schmitt 1983: 231).
Only at their peril can mainstream political parties ignore or dismiss 
this “resurgence of nationalist thinking” (Bukow et al. 2007: 13). Many 
have registered it and endorsed or adopted aspects of the Far Right’s plat-
form, generating an unmistakable “restrictive turn” in immigration policy 
making (Koopmans, Michalowski, and Waibel 2012: 1234; also see Hamp-
shire 2013: 16–35; Art 2011; Howard 2009: 11–12; Berezin 2009; Givens 
and Luedtke 2005; Norris 2005). For example, a study by the European 
Commission against Racism and Intolerance (2011: 7) bemoaned “the in-
creasing use of xenophobic and anti-Muslim arguments by mainstream 
political leaders.” In a much discussed article from 2000, the prominent 
Labor Party member and publicist Paul Scheff er bemoaned the “ethnic 
underclass” in the Netherlands that does not identify with Dutch culture 
as irrefutable evidence of the “multicultural disaster” (NRC Handelsblad 
29 January 2000). In 2004, Pope Benedict XVI denounced multicultur-
alism as a Western pathology born of self-loathing (Pera and Ratzinger 
2004). In 2010, Angela Merkel maintained that “multiculturalism has 
failed, and failed utterly” (Das Bild 17 October 2010). Sarkozy echoed her 
in the same year, deriding multiculturalism as a “failed concept” (quoted 
in Kaya 2012: 216). Both Gordon Brown and David Cameron disavowed 
multiculturalism as an explicit goal of their respective governments. Th e 
Tory leader complained in 2011 that “under the doctrine of state multi-
culturalism we have encouraged diff erent cultures to live separate lives 
apart from each other and the mainstream” (quoted in Mavelli 2012: 139). 
Governments at various levels around Europe have commissioned stud-
ies that document and denounce the desultory impact of multiculturalist 
policies and lifestyles. Typical of their conclusions is Britain’s Cantle Re-
port, whose compilers were
particularly struck by the depth of polarization of our towns and 
cities. . . . Separate educational arrangements, community and vol-
untary bodies, places of worship, language, social and cultural net-
works, means that many communities operate on the basis of a se-
ries of parallel lives. Th ese lives do not seem to touch at any point, 
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let alone overlap and promote any meaningful interchanges. (Cantle 
Report 2001: 9)
Indeed, the notion of the “parallel society” has throughout Europe taken on 
the pejorative connotation of a society so thoroughly divided into separate 
cultural communities that it lacks the common bonds required for social 
cohesion (Ranstorp and Dos Santos 2009; Netherlands Ministry of the In-
terior 2007; Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz 2005; Cantle Report 2001; 
Haut Conseil à l’Intégration 1997, 1995; Wetenschappelijke Raad 1989; but 
also see Wright and Bloemraad 2012 for counter-argument).
Earned Citizenship
One prominently prescribed remedy for the allegedly disintegrative eff ects 
of the multicultural society is the reinvigoration of citizenship. On this 
view, citizenship should refl ect common values that bind citizens together 
in a profound manner. Th e defenders of a more robust, thicker citizenship 
insist that it must be earned rather than merely granted, prized rather than 
merely possessed. Th e U.K. Home Offi  ce (2008: 11), for instance, stipulates 
that “citizenship must be earned.” Blair and other “Th ird Way” Social Dem-
ocrats were wont to speak of “no rights without responsibilities” (quoted in 
Kuisma 2013: 101). In 2006 during an interview on prime-time television, 
Sarkozy averred that would-be citizens must master French and “learn to 
respect the country [and accept] French laws, even if they don’t understand 
them,” because “it is up to them to adapt, not France” (quoted in Cesari 
2013: 7). His presidential rival, Jean Marie Le Pen, stated simply: Etre Fran-
çais, cela se mérite (You must deserve to be French) (quoted in Kaya 2012: 
71). Th is same sense of deservedness is cleverly captured in the German 
government’s catchy slogan Fördern und Fordern (promote and require) to 
characterize its immigration and naturalization strategy (quoted in Bahn-
ers 2011: 36). On this view, successful applicants for citizenship (as well as 
permanent residency) ought to be expected to demonstrate an earnest iden-
tifi cation with and commitment to the host society—that they have made it 
their “home” as opposed to their current place of residence. Th ey ought, that 
is, to have assimilated to some signifi cant degree.
But what exactly are migrants expected to assimilate in this widespread 
“return of assimilation” (Brubaker 2001)? When we analyze what political 
actors pressing for assimilation include and propose to include as require-
ments for naturalization, we discover fragments of both nativist national-
ism and liberal perfectionism. Th e resulting mixture manifests mutual 
fragilization between the two. Philosophically, the diff ering demands of 
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nativist nationalism and liberal perfectionism exclude one another but po-
litically they can make quite comfortable bedfellows.
Nativist Nationalism
Demands for ethnonational assimilation can be heard around Europe. In 
a direct rebuff  to Habermas’s liberal alternative to ethnonationalism, In-
terior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble averred that “constitutional patriotism, 
as a matter of reason (and not of emotion), is not suffi  cient. . . . If we want 
to feel part of a collectivity, then there must be something that connects us 
at a deeper level, at the level of religion and culture, values and identity” 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 27 September 2006). In 2006, he called on 
Muslims to identify with the “German value community” (deutsche Wertge-
meinschaft ) (quoted in Amir-Moazami 2009: 203). In 2014, the Christian 
Social Union went so far as to propose mandating that German be spoken 
in immigrants’ homes (Die Tagesschau 7 December 2014). Several promi-
nent German politicians have used the term Leitkultur (leading culture) in 
the same assimilative vein (Green 2005: 942). Christian Democratic Union 
(CDU) general secretary Laurence Meyer, for example, claimed “there 
should be no doubt who has the rights of a house owner and who is the 
guest” (quoted in Leiken 2012: 248). For its part, the German government 
has long demanded as a requirement for naturalization a “voluntary and 
lasting orientation toward Germany” (quoted in Hansen 2003: 91) and was 
wont to deny citizenship to applicants who joined immigrant ethnic or re-
ligious associations (Koopmans 1999: 630). Th ough the 2000 Citizenship 
Law amended the language to “suffi  cient oral and written German language 
skills” (quoted in Goodman 2014: 127), Green (2005: 944–48) argues that 
through bureaucratic discretion and clever political stonewalling by Chris-
tian Democrats ethnonationalist bias persisted nevertheless. Th e civics 
exam required since 2007 requires extensive knowledge of German history 
(Klekowski von Koppenfels 2013: 149).
In Italy, successful applicants for naturalization must demonstrate not 
only knowledge of the “Italian language,” but also of “the essential ele-
ments of the national history and culture” (quoted in Spena 2010: 175). In 
order to pass Austria’s citizenship test, applicants must correctly answer 
culturally specifi c questions such as “In which Upper Austrian town are 
there two famous winged altars?” (quoted in Jenkins 2007: 274). In 2012, 
Mariano Rajoy’s government introduced a “Spanish identity” test as a re-
quirement for naturalization, while Catalonia’s integration contract re-
quires immigrants to prove “an adequate knowledge of Catalan civil life” 
(quoted in Hazán 2014: 384).
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According to the national models paradigm, such ethnonationalist in-
fl ection should be expected in these countries based on their long-standing 
ethnonationalist traditions (Koopmans, Michalowski, and Waibel 2012; 
Koopmans et al. 2005; Brochmann and Hammar 1999; Favell 1998; Joppke 
1996; Brubaker 1992). But similar “neo-assimilationist” (Hansen and Hager 
2010: 169) pressure turns up in countries that the paradigm does not cat-
egorize as ethnonationalist. British law, for instance, requires unmistakable 
attributes of “Britishness” (quoted in Ryan 2009: 290–91) and “a clear pri-
mary loyalty to this Nation” (Home Offi  ce 2001: 20). Home Secretary David 
Blunkett explained in 2001 that “we have norms of acceptability and those 
who come into our home—for that is what it is—should accept those norms” 
(quoted in Joppke 2004: 250). In unmistakably Burkean language, Minister 
of Education Michel Grove said of the citizenship test in 2013: “If we can 
develop a better understanding of our past—how institutions have evolved 
and changed—then we’ll have a better understanding . . . of how institutions 
can give expression to our shared sense of identity” (quoted in Goodman 
2014: 154). Th e Netherlands requires “feeling Dutch” (quoted in Van Oers 
2009: 128), one reason why Integration Minister Rita Verdonk argued in 
2006 that the mandatory naturalization ceremonies should celebrate “our 
history that has formed our identity” (quoted in Verkaaik 2010: 73). She 
also endorsed the idea that migrants should be required to speak Dutch in 
public, a suggestion that the city of Rotterdam wrote into law (Kaya 2012: 
134). Similarly, Amsterdam launched a major campaign in 2006 to teach 
the city’s history so that immigrants could be helped to “feel themselves 
Amsterdammers” (quoted in Duyvendak 2011: 102). Indeed, the very Min-
derhedennota of 1983, which established the Netherlands’ offi  cial policy of 
multiculturalism, plainly stressed the dominance of Dutch culture: “It [in-
tegration] is a confrontation between unequal partners. Th e majority cul-
ture is aft er all anchored in Dutch society” (quoted in Vink 2007: 345). In 
neighboring Belgium, Filip Dewinter (2000: 10), leader of the nationalist 
Flemish movement Vlaams Belang, says immigrants should have a simple 
choice: “Assimilation or return.” In 2006, Sarkozy rephrased Jean Marie 
Le Pen’s favorite patriotic exclamation—La France, aimez-la ou quittez-la 
(France, Love it or leave it): “If there are people who are not comfortable 
in France, they should feel free to leave a country which they do not love” 
(quoted in Kaya 2012: 70). Showing that nationalism is not limited to the 
political Right, Socialist interior minister Manuel Valls claimed that “you 
have to be proud to be a Frenchman to be part of this nation” (Spiegelonline 
29 October 2013). At least since François Mitterand introduced the cam-
paign for “the right to be diff erent” (droit à la diff érence) in 1981, promi-
nent opponents of multiculturalism proudly dubbing themselves “national 
republicans,” such as Philippe de Villiers (2006), Dominique Schnapper 
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(1998), Jacqueline Costa-Lascoux (1989), Emmanuel Todd (1994), Pierre-
André Taguieff  (1987), and Michèle Tribalat (1996), among others (Laborde 
2008: 196), have urged a policy of deliberate francofi cation.
Th e French, of course, purport that their requirement of assimilation 
à la communauté française is based on the universal republican principles 
of the French Revolution and not on ethnic origins. Yet the web page of 
the Ministry of Justice instructs prospective applicants that they need to 
be “well assimilated to the French customs and manners.” As early as 1988, 
France’s Nationality Commission stipulated that immigrants worthy of 
French citizenship should manifest “clear adhesion to the essential common 
values of French society,” which entails “speaking the same language, shar-
ing the same culture and patriotic values, participating in the national life 
like the others” (quoted in Laborde 2008: 196, 191). Th e current civics course 
underscores that “French and Frenchmen are attached to a history, a culture 
and fundamental values. . . . It is necessary to know them, understand them 
and respect them” (quoted in Michalowski 2014: 182). Small wonder, then, 
that in practice French offi  cials are known automatically to deny natural-
ization to Muslims who observe the pious duty to pray fi ve times daily at 
prescribed moments (Klausen 2005: 21) or who wear Islamic garb (Good-
man 2014: 198), a practice documented elsewhere (for Denmark, see Mou-
ritsen 2006; for Italy, Triandafyllidou 2006). In 2011, France went so far as 
to prohibit Muslims from praying on the street, while permitting Catholic 
religious processions through the same streets (Vakulenko 2012: 22).
Even the EU has lent support to this “renationalization of citizenship” 
(Modood and Meer 2012: 34). Its Hague Program of 2004 claims that mi-
grants should be expected to “acquire” the “culture of the host society,” 
including “basic knowledge of the host society’s language, history and in-
stitutions” (quoted in Hansen and Hager 2010: 166). Finally, we should not 
overlook the eff ect of what Michael Billig (1995) terms “banal national-
ism.” He means the saturation of everyday life by myriad signs, symbols, 
and meanings, which taken together strongly reinforce the idea that iden-
tifying with the majority culture is “normal” while resisting such identifi -
cation is “abnormal.”
Such policies and attitudes discriminate against migrants for not belong-
ing to the nation. Th ey are deemed undeserving of equal citizenship rights 
and privileges because they purportedly do not command the national lan-
guage, respect the national history, or observe the national norms in the 
same degree as nationals. Following Schmitt’s friend-enemy logic (if only in 
fragmentary rather than comprehensive fashion), the diff erences manifested 
by unassimilated migrants are made to render them potential or real threats 
to the well-being of the citizenry. Th e citizenship courses, exams, and oaths, 
of course, ostensibly seek to encourage assimilation. However, in light of the 
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fact that practically everywhere they have been introduced naturalization 
rates have declined (Anderson 2013; MiGAZIN 25 April 2012, http://www.
migazin.de/2012/04/25/amnesty-international-kritisiert-diskriminierung-
von-muslimen/; Löwenheim and Gazit 2009: 160), the courses, exams, and 
oaths wind up functioning as exclusionary measures that deny full citizenship 
to far more ethnic minorities than they certify for naturalization. Whether 
on the actual or symbolic level, they work to accentuate and perpetuate rather 
than eliminate diff erence and diff erential treatment (Mourão Permoser 2013; 
Hampshire 2013: 127; Boswell and Geddes 2011: 120; Verkaaik 2010: 77).
Liberal Perfectionism
Th e courses, exams, and oaths also reveal what one author labels “Schmit-
tian liberalism” (Triadafi lopolous 2011: 863). On this view, the defect that 
disqualifi es applicants for citizenship (renders them potential foes) is their 
alleged unfamiliarity with or even disrespect for the liberal values that 
purportedly undergird democracy. Consider the decision of France’s high 
court (Conseil d’Etat) in 2008 to uphold the denial of French citizenship 
to a burqa-wearing Moroccan woman married to a French national on 
grounds that she exhibited an “assimilation defect” (défaut d’assimilation). 
However, according to the court, the defect lay in her “adoption of a radi-
cal practice of her religion, incompatible with the essential values of the 
French community, especially the principle of the equality of the sexes” 
(quoted in Joppke 2010: 139). Likewise, in 2010 a Moroccan man was de-
nied citizenship because, in the words of Immigration Minister Eric Bes-
son, he “forced his wife to wear the full veil . . . and rejected the principles 
of secularism and the equality between men and women” (Guardian 2 
February 2010). Both Moroccans were not denied citizenship simply for 
being Muslim in the sense of not being Roman Catholic like the majority 
of the French nation. Rather, their (admittedly Muslim) practice allegedly 
violated the liberal universal principle of gender equality. Some might ob-
ject that they nevertheless were discriminated against based on their reli-
gion. I in no way discount the possibility that religious (or for that matter 
racial or gender) prejudice was covertly or even subconsciously at play in 
these decisions. However, it is not insignifi cant that the offi  cial justifi ca-
tion is ultimately rooted in liberal universalism rather than nationalist 
particularism, for a strict application of the latter would rule out the idea 
of French Muslims altogether. France, of course, is home to millions of 
French citizens who practice Islam.
Yet we should not overlook the court’s particularist allusion to the “French 
community.” It exemplifi es the fragmentation and fragilization common in 
political practice in contrast to pure theory. Th us, a fragment of nationalist 
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thinking (“the French community”) detached from the broader theory of 
nationalism (which would theorize that French values are unique rather 
than universal) becomes married with a liberal fragment (“equality of the 
sexes”) detached from the philosophy of liberalism (which would reject the 
idea that gender equality can be “French” precisely because it is a universal 
principle). Such practical overlaying of theoretically incompatible fragments 
makes good political sense because both nationalism and liberalism resonate 
positively with fragilized European publics for whom the philosophical in-
consistency is irrelevant. Th us, when asked in 2004 to defi ne “Britishness,” 
Gordon Brown replied a “passion for liberty anchored in a sense of duty and 
an intrinsic commitment to tolerance and fair play” (quoted in Joppke 2009: 
84). Tony Blair (2006) mentioned “belief in democracy, the rule of law, tol-
erance, and equal treatment for all, respect for this country and its shared 
heritage.” Rita Verdonk said that to qualify as Dutch one must respect the 
“fundamental constitutional rights” of the Netherlands, especially gender 
equality and freedom of religion (quoted in Verkaaik 2010: 73). Retired Dutch 
Labor Party leader Wouter Bos (2005) averred that all Dutch citizens must 
“accept civil liberties—including freedom of expression, the equal treatment 
of men, women, heterosexuals and homosexuals, the separation of church 
and state, the principle of democratic government and the rule of law.” Since 
2011, France requires for citizenship “adherence to the principles and essen-
tial values of the Republic” (quoted in Goodman 2014: 187).
Th e national models paradigm, again, predicts such statements from 
countries with a multicultural tradition. But listen to former Danish prime 
minister Anders Rasmussen: “Danish society has been built on some fun-
damental values, which must be accepted, if you are to live here. In Den-
mark, politics and religion are separated. In Denmark, there is inviolable 
respect for human life. In Denmark . . . women are equal to men” (quoted 
in Mouritsen 2006: 82). Austria’s integration contract requires knowledge 
of “European values and core democratic values” (quoted in Mourrão Per-
moser 2013: 165). In Germany, Bundestag president Norbet Lammert urged 
his fellow Christian Democrats to replace the notion of deutsche Leitkultur 
with a Leitkultur für Deutschland. Th e latter revolves around the “inviolabil-
ity of human dignity, the free development of the personality, the equality of 
men and women, the freedom of science, art and culture, as well as the free 
religious expression” (Süddeutsche Zeitung 20 December 2007). With this 
suggestion Lammert escaped nationalist particularism but not a (slightly) 
wider civilizational or Eurocentric particularism, for in the same article he 
made the common assertion that such principles form the “Western com-
munity of values.”
Such statements purport to defend universal values but they em-
ploy a particularistic logic and strategy. Nationals (and Westerners) are 
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presumed to respect liberal values, while nonnationals (more precisely, 
non-Westerners) are presumed not to respect them and to need mandatory 
training to learn to internalize them. Th us, the British handbook for inte-
gration courses simply states that “the fundamental principles of British life 
include: democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, tolerance of those 
with diff erent faiths and beliefs, participation in community life” (Home 
Offi  ce 2013: 7–8). Joppke (2010: 137) labels this line of thinking “particular 
universalism” and “the main form in which Western states practice exclu-
sion today.” As Per Mouritsen (2009: 29) observes, “An identitarian civic-
liberalism-as-national culture is politicized and essentialized against Islam.” 
Or more broadly, “our” Western culture purportedly based on liberalism 
is juxtaposed against “their” presumably illiberal and therefore threaten-
ing Islamic culture (Cesari 2013: 142). Mouritsen, Cesari, and many others 
are right to stress Islam (O’Brien 2013b 133–34; Hampshire 2013: 150–54; 
Kaya 2012: 211; Göle 2011: 155; Amiraux 2010: 145; Sayyid 2009: 198–99; 
Ewing 2008: 28; Schiff auer 2006: 111; Muñoz 1994: 219). As mentioned, the 
courses, exams, and oaths are for all intents and purposes designed for Mus-
lims (and some other non-Westerners). Exemptions are typically made for 
Westerners. No one in Europe is seriously suggesting that, say, non-Muslim 
Germans residing in France should be trained and tested in respect for gen-
der equality. Likewise, no one is suggesting that, say, non-Muslim French 
nationals in Denmark should be compelled to prove their commitment to 
the freedom of religion. Rather, the courses and requirements teach and test 
the “correct” liberal answers to questions regarding the kind of topics, such 
as polygamy, gender equality, homosexuality, and apostasy, toward which 
Muslims are presumed to have illiberal attitudes (Michalowski 2014; Ers-
bøll, Kostakopoulou, and Van Oers 2011) . Th e Dutch test goes so far as to 
ask test-takers how they react to scenes of kissing men and topless women 
shown during the exam (Jenkins 2007: 274–75).
Th ere is, then, an unmistakable liberal perfectionist element that en-
deavors to mold Muslims into trustworthy liberals. Th us did Minister for 
Immigration Maria Böhmer defend the tests as an eff ective way to “shape 
politically mature subjects” (Süddeutsche Zeitung 9 July 2008). Th e lib-
eral perfectionist goal, however, augments rather than replaces the nativ-
ist dimension. Th e French exam, for example, is designed as “an evalua-
tion of language goals and the values of the Republic” (quoted in Schain 
2008: 57). Likewise, the Integration Policy New Style of 2002 demands 
“that people speak Dutch, and that one abides to [sic] basic Dutch norms” 
(quoted in Duyvendak and Scholten 2012: 274). Th e U.K.’s Home Offi  ce 
(2008: 5) stipulates that “all who live here should learn our language, play 
by the rules, obey the law and contribute to the community.” In addition 
to recommending that the courses impart “basic knowledge of the host 
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society’s language, history and institutions,” the European Council’s 2004 
Hague Programme recommendations additionally stipulate that newcom-
ers should be made to “understand [and] respect . . . the full scope of values, 
rights, responsibilities, and privileges established by the EU and member 
state laws” (Council of the EU, Justice and Home Aff airs 2004: CBP 4.2 and 
CBP 2). Home Secretary Charles Clark called in 2006 for a legally binding 
integration contract to ensure that “new immigrants live up to the values 
of our society” (quoted in Schain 2008: 158). In 2010, David Cameron re-
ferred to such insistence on liberal rectitude as “muscular liberalism” that 
is “unambiguous and hard-nosed about the defence of our liberty” (quoted 
in Joppke and Torpey 2013: 153).
Critics of liberal perfectionism claim the courses and requirements 
are too intrusive. Timothy Garton Ash (2006), for instance, anathematizes 
them as “enlightenment fundamentalism,” while Bauböck (2002: 176) re-
jects them as overbearing “liberal assimilationism” and Liav Orgad (2010: 
53) as “illiberal liberalism.” Labeling the courses, exams, and oaths “repres-
sive liberalism,” Joppke derides them as “the imposition of virtuous citizen-
ship” and likens them to overbearing eff orts at social engineering in the 
Soviet Bloc (Joppke 2010: 62, 141–42). Bridget Anderson (2013: 109) speaks 
of “super-citizenship” that holds immigrants to much higher standards 
than natives. Indeed, with the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act of 
2009 the United Kingdom introduced a probationary year of citizenship in 
which the newly naturalized must demonstrate “active citizenship” through 
“civic activities” that “benefi t the local community”—a kind of compulsory 
civic activism (Home Offi  ce 2008: 50). Imagine how many native Britons 
would have their citizenships revoked if held to this standard? It deserves 
mention that the Cameron government decided to cease implementation 
of the measure (Goodman 2014: 151–52). Since 2007, the French govern-
ment reserves the right to withdraw welfare benefi ts from immigrant par-
ents who fail to fulfi ll the obligation to integrate their children into French 
society (Sainsbury 2012: 191). Th e Land government of Baden-Württemberg 
requires its naturalization offi  cials to employ specifi ed interview guidelines 
(Gesprächsleitfaden) to test whether the applicants’ required oath to uphold 
the German constitution is sincere. Th e questions are designed to certify a 
genuine “inner disposition” to honor the constitution as opposed to a mere 
outward pledge, and this despite the fact that the Constitutional Court had 
ruled in 2000 that citizens are “legally not required personally to share the 
values of the Constitution” (quoted in Joppke 2010: 140–42).
As these examples suggest, the defense of liberalism can exclude im-
migrants as much or more than it includes them. Th eir alleged illiberalism 
marks them with a kind of scarlet letter that ostracizes them from partaking 
equally of the privileges of mainstream society. Liberal exclusion, however, 
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operates alongside or in combination with nativist exclusion. It is wide-
spread normative fragilization that, in part at least, makes simultaneously 
appearing to defend the nation and to embrace liberal values politically pru-
dent, even if philosophically inconsistent.
Conclusion
Comparative scholars of citizenship and immigration policy painstakingly 
search for patterns. One group of analysts seeks order in the convergence 
of policy across Europe, typically, though not always (Hollifi eld, Martin, 
and Orreneus 2014b), in a more liberal, open direction (Joppke 2010: 143; 
Hansen and Weil 2001; Beck 1998; Jacobson 1996; Held 1995; Soysal 1994). 
A competing school of researchers, as mentioned, discerns distinct and 
persistent national styles anchored in past tradition and path dependency 
(Goodman 2014; Koopmans, Michalowski, and Waibel 2012; Koopmans et 
al. 2005; Brochmann and Hammar 1999; Favell 1998; Joppke 1996; Brubak-
er 1992). Th ese otherwise laudable studies tend to exaggerate the order and 
coherence of citizenship and immigration policies. In reality, the latter are 
“contradictory and polyvalent” (Joppke 2010: 67), “fragmented” (Wiener 
and Della Sala 1997: 605), “multilayered and complex” (Maas 2013b: vii), 
with “new policies added on top of previous ones” (Garbaye 2010: 166) in 
a “blended approach” (Banting and Kymlicka 2013: 577) or “dizzyingly” 
“complex assemblage” (Hampshire 2013: 132, 54) that is “incoherent” and 
riddled with “inconsistencies and double standards” (Fasani 2010: 178), not 
to mention constantly “in fl ux” (Boswell 2003: 1). Likewise, while some op-
timistic ethicists such as Habermas (1987b: 170) would like to believe that 
“all alternatives to a universalistic broadening of moral consciousness are 
being decimated,” analysis of the normative discussion of citizenship and 
immigration does not fi nd imminent consensus, but rather a “multiplicity 
of frames” (Duyvendak and Scholten 2012: 276) and “a variety of oft en con-
tradictory sets of public ideas and theories about citizenship” in a “discur-
sive and normative fi eld of struggles for legitimacy .  .  . [that] vary all the 
time” (Bertossi 2012: 249, 262). As Hampshire (2013: 12) incisively observes, 
“Few studies have sought to examine how these factors interact to produce 
confl icting policy outputs.”
Th is chapter has advanced normative fragmentation and fragilization as 
a partial explanation of policy incoherence or messiness. In the statements 
of policy makers and other political activists I have highlighted abundant 
normative fragments employed trying to legitimize policies and policy rec-
ommendations. Th ese selected philosophical tidbits can be traced back to 
the more comprehensive public philosophies of liberalism, nationalism, and 
postmodernism that I outlined in the previous chapter, although political 
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actors exhibit little concern for philosophical consistency. Rather, like bri-
coleurs (Carstensen 2011: 148), they pragmatically deploy and even clump 
together multiple fragments from the three public philosophies (and their 
variants) in an eff ort to legitimize a broad variety of policies to a broad 
variety of audiences. Th is opportunistic political strategy makes sense or 
“works” due in part at least to the mutual fragilization or interpenetration 
among the three public philosophies. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
because none of the three has been able defi nitively to discredit its two ri-
vals, fragments emanating from all three can and oft en do sound convinc-
ing to philosophical laypersons. Th us, to put it in lay terms, standing up for 
equal rights (liberalism), defending the integrity of the nation (nationalism), 
or eschewing solidarity in favor of instrumental selfi sh gain (postmodern-
ism) can each seem like compelling causes in certain contexts despite their 
ethical incompatibility. While the resulting moral pluralism and laxity may 
prove unsettling to philosophers reared on monism and exactitude, they 
turn out to be an enabling opportunity for political actors who need not 
confi ne either their rhetoric or their policies to a normative straitjacket. 
Rather, fragilization and fragmentation enable political fl exibility and op-
portunity that few politicians can aff ord not to exploit. Th e result, I have 
underscored, are immigration and citizenship policies that across Europe 
tend to lack coherence and defy neat classifi cation.
4
Veil
Wives . . . submit yourselves to your own husbands so that, if any 
of them do not believe the word, they may be won over without 
words by the behavior of their wives, when they see the purity 
and reverence of your lives. Your beauty should not come from 
outward adornment, such as elaborate hairstyles and the wearing 
of gold jewelry or fi ne clothes. Rather, it should be that of your 
inner self, the unfading beauty of a gentle and quiet spirit, which 
is of great worth in God’s sight. For this is the way the holy women 
of the past who put their hope in God used to adorn themselves. 
Th ey submitted themselves to their own husbands, like Sarah, who 
obeyed Abraham and called him her lord.
—I Peter 3:1–5
Men are the maintainers of women. . . . So the good women are 
obedient, guarding the unseen as Allah has guarded. . . . And say 
to the believing women that they lower their gaze and restrain 
their sexual passions and do not display their adornment except 
what appears thereof. And let them wear their head-coverings over 
their bosoms. And they should not display their adornment except 
to their husbands or their fathers, or the fathers of their husbands, 
or their sons, or the sons of their husbands, or their brothers, or 
their brothers’ sons, or their sisters’ sons, or their women, or those 
whom their right hands possess, or guileless male servants, or the 
children who know not women’s nakedness.
—Qur’an, 4:34, 24:31
Scholarship on policies regulating Islamic veiling in Europe exhibits the propensity to impose order on what is actually a messy reality. Christian Joppke (2009: vii), for instance, points to distinct national approaches 
in “Republican France,” “Christian-Occidental Germany,” and “Multicul-
tural Britain.” Similarly, Schirin Amir-Moazami (2007: 35–38) insists on the 
critical diff erences between a discourse based on “abstract universalism” in 
France compared to an “ethnic-cultural” idiom in Germany. Sawitri Sahar-
so (2007: 527) diff erentiates between the Netherlands’ “multicultural” and 
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Germany’s “ethno-cultural” model (also see Collet 2004). Anna Korteweg 
and Gökçe Yurdakul (2014) contend that France, Turkey, Germany, the 
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom each has a unique national narrative 
of belonging to which veiled Muslims must conform or be stigmatized as 
outsiders. From a diff erent but no less orderly perspective, Sabine Berghahn 
(2012) contends that governments with strict separation of church and state 
tend to be intolerant vis-à-vis veiling while states having formal relations 
with religious organizations tend to be tolerant. Th e rich detail provided 
in these otherwise superb studies tends to belie the neat ordering proff ered 
by the authors. In actuality, the politics of veiling in Europe is fraught with 
controversy. As a result, policies are polymorphous, indeed messy. In their 
ambitious cross-national study, for example, Sieglinde Rosenberger and 
Birgit Sauer (2012a: 12, 3) found a “multifaceted spectrum of approaches 
to headscarf policies” that “is much more complex than a . . . typology can 
cover” (Rosenberger and Sauer 2012a: 12). Likewise, Sevgi Kiliç, Saharso, 
and Sauer (2008: 403) fi nd that national models cannot explain the full com-
plexity of policies regulating the head scarf (see also Siim 2014).
At fi rst thought, veiling policy would seem to be unambiguous; govern-
ments either permit or prohibit the Islamic practice. Th e reality, however, is 
far more fl uid and complex. France likely jumps fi rst to mind when the topic 
of veiling in the European context crops up. Th e French National Assembly 
voted in 2004 to ban the veil (and all other “ostentatious” expressions of 
religious affi  liation) from public schools (though not universities). In 2011, 
a law took eff ect proscribing in public the full-length burqa covering the 
face (niqab), which the European Court of Human Rights upheld in 2014. 
Proscribing veiling supposedly originated in Creil in 1989 when three pupils 
of Moroccan heritage who refused to unveil were expelled by administrators 
of Gabriel Havez Secondary School for violating the 1905 law separating 
religion and state (even though the same school had allowed veiled students 
in 1988). In 1989, two veiled girls were also expelled from Altrincham Girls’ 
Grammar School in the United Kingdom. Th e Muslim pupils were eventu-
ally readmitted on condition that the veils conformed to school uniform 
colors. However, four years earlier, the authorities of the Dutch town of 
Alphen aan de Rijn had banned the hijab (headscarf), though their policy 
was later overturned by the lower house of parliament. Yet, in supposedly 
intolerant France, the Conseil d’Etat, in the vast majority of cases (forty-
one of forty-nine) regarding covering that came before it between 1989 and 
2004, struck down prohibitions in the name of guaranteeing female stu-
dents’ (though not female teachers’) “freedom of conscience” (Haut Conseil 
à l’Intégration 2000: 56)—a stance prominently supported by fi rst lady Dan-
ielle Mitterand, who insisted on the girls’ “right to be diff erent.” Th e court 
cases helped to fuel a national debate that raged in, among other places, the 
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nation’s newspapers throughout the 1990s, laying the ground for the 2004 
law, which itself was, like the 2011 law, opposed in conspicuous public dem-
onstrations of covered protesters and their allies (such as Le Monde itself). 
Th e burqa ban also drew criticism from the Conseil d’Etat (2010) for rais-
ing “strong constitutional and statutory uncertainties.” Th e heated discord, 
refueled in 2013 by the controversial recommendation of the Haut Conseil 
à l’Intégration to ban the veil from universities (Fredette 2014: 164), is pre-
sumably why the French characterize the issue as “la guerre des voiles” (war 
of the veils) as opposed to, say, the “national consensus regarding veiling” 
(Bertossi 2012).
In the supposedly tolerant, multicultural Netherlands, dozens of women 
sacked for veiling have sought justice before the Equal Treatment Commis-
sion. Th ough the commission has ruled in favor of the coverer in all but one 
of its rulings, the quantity and frequency of the cases cast doubt on a fi rm 
and widespread Dutch consensus in the matter. Indeed, anti-veiling legisla-
tors have tirelessly sought to fi nesse a French-like ban through parliament. 
In 2005, they managed to push through a burqa ban, though the law was 
subsequently withdrawn when the Council of State deemed it unconstitu-
tional. Roughly the same fate befell the 2007 parliamentary initiative to pro-
scribe the niqab from public. Buoyed by the success of his Party for Freedom 
(PVV) in the 2010 elections, Geert Wilders made proscription of the hijab 
for all public employees a major bargaining chip for any coalition involv-
ing his party. Th e cabinet of the coalition eventually formed with the PVV 
approved a burqa ban but dissolved in 2012 before it could implement the 
policy. In fact, state offi  cials have possessed since 2002 the legal authority 
to ban the niqab in state institutions, have exercised it, and have been vin-
dicated in 2005 by the Equal Treatment Commission. Furthermore, judges 
and police offi  cers are forbidden to don Islamic garb.
Th e situation in Germany has been very fl uid. In 1998, education offi  -
cials in Baden-Württemberg dismissed Fershta Ludin for refusing to unveil 
when teaching in public school. In 2003, the Constitutional Court nullifi ed 
the ban but left  a legal loophole by maintaining that the fi ring would have 
been constitutional had it been stipulated in statutory law, which in the case 
of education is the jurisdiction of individual Länder. Seven Christian Dem-
ocratic Land governments swift ly legislated laws that forbade public school 
teachers to don the hijab (but not the Christian habit or Jewish yarmulke). 
Th e Berlin Law on the Ideological Neutrality of the State, passed by a coali-
tion of Social Democrats and the Left  Party in 2004, proscribed the out-
ward manifestation of all religious symbols by teachers (but not students), 
as did Bremen and Lower Saxony. However, North Rhine-Westphalia, so 
long as it was run by Social Democrats, refused to outlaw the headscarf de-
spite the fact that fi ft een veiled teachers were employed in its schools. When 
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the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) took control in Düsseldorf in 2006, 
however, it quickly legislated a ban on Islamic but not Christian or Jewish 
covering. Needless to say, each of these laws has occasioned stiff  opposition, 
and it should be noted that attempts to extend the ban beyond the schools 
to private businesses were ruled unconstitutional in 2002 by the Federal 
Labor Court for violating the right to religious freedom. Despite evidence 
from pollsters of overwhelming support among the masses for a burqa ban 
in 2011, German mainstream politicians tabled the discussion (Bowen and 
Rohe 2014: 158). Th en in 2015 the Constitutional Court reversed its 2003 
decision, ruling that a general ban of the headscarf for teachers violated the 
religious freedom guaranteed in the Constitution.
Th e United Kingdom too has a variety of regulations. Preferring to re-
solve disagreements through pragmatic mediation on a case-by-case basis, 
British offi  cials have not established a uniform policy in the law books. How-
ever, we should not misinterpret the absence of a formal legal ban on veil-
ing in public schools as national consensus. First, some schools ban Islamic 
coverings and some do not. Second, there would be no need for case-by-case 
mediation if there were no deadlocks between proponents and opponents 
of covering. Th ird, though in the vast majority of mediated cases a way is 
found to permit veiling, the compromise oft en nevertheless involves restric-
tions, for instance, as to the color or design of the hijab. Female Muslim 
judges, for example, may cover themselves but it must be with the wig tradi-
tionally worn in British courts. Th e topic of veiling has long been salient and 
controversial. Th e case of Shabina Begum drew national attention in 2005 
in part because Tony Blair’s wife, Cherie Booth, successfully argued before 
the Court of Appeal for Begum’s right to wear the jilbab (a fl oor-length dress 
coat) to the school that had banned it. Foreign Minister Jack Straw stirred 
up controversy in 2006 when he publicly stated that niqab-wearing women 
made him feel uncomfortable because he could not see their facial expres-
sions. Since 2007, when the government granted public schools the authority 
to ban the niqab, it is more likely forbidden than allowed in British schools.
Th e situation is equally fl uid elsewhere. Like the U.K., Austria has no 
blanket bans. Th ere, where Islam has been offi  cially recognized and sup-
ported by the state since 1912, teachers and pupils alike are permitted to 
cover. In 1995, however, the government rejected the proposal of the offi  -
cially recognized Islamic Religious Community to mandate veiling for fe-
male students during Islamic religious education classes in public schools. 
In 2005, Interior Minister Liese Prokop announced her objection to veiled 
teachers, and, since 2006, the Freedom Party has endorsed a ban on veiling 
in the public schools. Fervor over the headscarf erupted in Denmark in 2006 
(the year following the Muhammad cartoon controversy) when Asmaa Ab-
dol-Hamid began co-hosting a TV talk show. Th e Palestinian refugee wore 
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a hijab and refused to shake hands with male guests, preferring to raise her 
hand to her heart as an alternative greeting. Aft er the Danish People’s Party 
(DPP) failed to win parliamentary approval for its proposed ban on veiling 
in state-supported institutions, Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s center-right gov-
ernment in 2009 passed legislation to ban veils for judges. In 2003, the High 
Court had already permitted proscription of veiling in private companies 
if part of a general dress code. Th e Swedish Board of Education upheld a 
ban on the burqa in schools but not the hijab, while the Equality Ombuds-
man annulled a niqab prohibition at the Västerort Adult High School. In 
2010, Norway maintained its ban on the hijab for offi  cers of the court and 
police despite the ruling of the Anti-Discrimination Tribunal that the 2009 
ban violated the Anti-Discrimination and Gender Equality Acts. Belgium, a 
state that has offi  cially recognized Islam since 1974, banned the burqa from 
public in 2011; several municipalities, such as Maaseik (2004) and Antwerp 
(2005), had done so several years earlier. Yet dozens of women refused iden-
tity papers because they would not unveil for photos fought successfully in 
court to acquire the documents. In 2011, the Constitutional Commission 
of Italy cleared the way for the burqa ban proposed by Berlusconi’s Popolo 
della Libertà party (PDL), but the embattled prime minister resigned before 
he could make it law. Similarly, the Spanish Cortes appeared poised in 2010 
to legislate a burqa ban, but in the end the bill failed by a narrow margin of 
twenty-one votes. In 2013, the Spanish Supreme Court nullifi ed a municipal 
burqa ban in Lleida (and therewith bans in several cities across Catalonia). 
Swiss policies vary from canton to canton. Sixty-fi ve percent of the voters of 
Ticino voted in 2013 to ban the burqa in public. In Turkey, where veiling has 
been prohibited in all government institutions since 1923, Prime Minister 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party government in 2008 
moved to relax the ban at state universities and then for state employees 
in 2013 (except judges, police, and military offi  cers). Th e 2008 amendment 
touched off  a fi restorm among Kemalist protesters who demonstrated by the 
tens of thousands against the relaxation as the fi rst step down the slippery 
slope to an Islamic Republic of Turkey. In the same year, the Constitutional 
Court declared the amendment null and void (for country-to-country de-
tails see VEIL at www.veil-project.eu; Islamaphobia Watch at http;//www.
islamophobia.watch.com/islamophobiz-watch/category/hijab; or Siim 2014; 
Rosenberger and Sauer 2012b; Nielsen 2009).
International bodies are also not marching in lock step. While the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights in the 2004 case Şahin v. Turkey upheld 
the prerogative of a state to ban veiling in the interest of public order, the 
European Council in 2010 spoke out against general prohibitions like those 
against the burqa. Th e United Nations Commission on Human Rights ruled 
in 2005 against proscribing the veil (though in a case from Uzbekistan). 
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FIFA disqualifi ed Iran’s female footballers from the 2012 Olympic Games 
because their uniform included the hijab but issued new rules in 2014 per-
mitting head coverings.
Th is brief overview stressing controversy and fl uidity treats only of-
fi cial policies. Countless female Muslims encounter de facto regulations. 
Abundant credible sources document the widespread harassment of and 
discrimination against covered women and girls at work, in school, or on 
the street (Antidiskriminierungsstelle 2013; Amnesty International 2012; 
Ansari and Hafez 2012; Gauci 2012; Zick, Küpper, and Hövermann 2011; 
Zivilcourage und Anti-Rassismus Arbeit 2011; Peucker 2010; Commission 
on British Muslims and Islamophobia 2004; Forum against Islamophobia 
and Racism 2002; Runnymede Trust 1997). With the relatively rare excep-
tion of those possessing the time, fortitude, and means to endure arduous, 
lengthy, and expensive legal action in court, such mistreatment represents 
their lived reality, regardless of what formal law stipulates. Th e same holds 
true for female Muslims who are bullied or pressured to cover against their 
will (Alonso 2012: 479; Ranstorp and Dos Santos 2009; Brouwer 2004: 52; 
Amara 2003; Macey 1999; Ashfar 1994). Such de facto constraints add to the 
polymorphous and contradictory character of veiling regulations. Th us, the 
informal climate regarding Islamic garments can vary between diametri-
cally opposite extremes within the space and time it takes to ride the subway 
or bus to one’s destination.
Th ere is, then, nothing remotely resembling the stable consensus toler-
ating the outward display of garments and symbols of Christian or Jewish 
devotion that has long prevailed across Europe. Th is might incline some 
to want to conclude that Muslims “brought” the controversy to Europe 
and that the controversy pits Muslims against non-Muslims. Close exami-
nation, however, reveals no fi rm divide between the two groups. Rather, 
what can be identifi ed as fragments of liberal, nationalist, and postmodern 
reasoning turn up among both Muslims and non-Muslims. Furthermore, 
frequent fragilization occasions blurring of the purely theoretical lines 
distinguishing the three public philosophies and breeds tolerance of dis-
courses and policies that are “messy . . . [and full of] tensions and contra-
dictions” (Korteweg and Yurdakul 2014: 4). Th ere exists “a range of legal 
approaches . . . to the handling of the issue by courts, legislatures, human 
rights activists, the media and within the public debate more generally” 
(Vakulenko 2012: 55).
Unfree Veil
Many arguments against veiling have a feminist fl avor. However, in that they 
typically object to female heteronomy, most fall within the ethical ambit of 
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liberalism with its insistence on the autonomy of the individual. Furthermore, 
bans on veiling are oft en driven by perfectionist reasoning. Th ey are meant to 
compel women and girls to adorn themselves against their will in the name of 
liberating them from the alleged error of their ways. Removing the veil is seen 
as but the fi rst step in a larger process of education and self-refl ection that is 
supposed to culminate in genuine, enlightened rather than illusory, benighted 
volition on the part of female Muslims. Like Rousseau’s Émile, it is presumed, 
they will one day be grateful for being forced to be free.
Voices condemning veiling as the subjugation of women are many and 
can be heard across Europe. In her book Th e Caged Virgin, the prominent 
Dutch feminist Ayaan Hirsi Ali (2006: xi) excoriates the hijab as a “constant 
reminder to the outside world of a stifl ing morality that makes Muslim men 
the owners of women.” In Britain, Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, journalist and 
chairwoman of British Muslims for Secular Democracy, condemns the veil 
as a “physical manifestation of the pernicious idea of women as carriers of 
Original Sin” (Independent 9 October 2006), while feminist columnist Polly 
Toynbee maintains that “the ideology of the veil” is “covering and control-
ling women” (quoted in Cesari 2013: 9). Similarly, Th e Turkish Federation 
of Berlin-Brandenburg deplores both the hijab and burqa as “instruments 
for the oppression of women” (quoted in Yurdakul 2006: 161). Necla Kelek 
(2007: 114), the author of the 2005 bestseller Die fremde Braut (Th e Foreign 
Bride), alleges that “political Islam wants . . . to establish an Apartheid of the 
sexes in free European societies,” whereby “women in public don’t have the 
right to be human” (quoted in Cesari 2013: 9). Sixty-seven eminent French 
women signed a petition, originally published in Le Monde (7 December 
2003) and reprinted in the feminist magazine Elle (8 December 2003), that 
called on Jacques Chirac to pass the law banning the headscarf, arguing that 
“the Islamic veil . . . subjects all women, Muslim and non-Muslim, to an in-
tolerable discrimination. Any accommodation in this regard would be per-
ceived by every woman in this country as a personal aff ront on her dignity 
and liberty.” “Remember,” beseeches Fadela Amara (2006: 93), the leader of 
the French association Ni Putes Ni Soumises (Neither Sluts Nor Slaves) and 
organizer of a national march in 2003 under that slogan, “the headscarf is 
not simply a religious matter.  .  .  . It is foremost a means of oppression, of 
alienation, of discrimination, an instrument of power over women used by 
men.” Her successor, Sihem Habchi, maintained that “the burqa is the most 
violent symbol of the oppression of women and has nothing to do with the 
Muslim religion, my religion” (quoted in Joppke and Torpey 2013: 25).
Similar liberal fragments frequently fall from the lips of lawmakers. 
When proposing the ban for public school teachers in Baden-Württemberg 
in 2004, for example, the Land’s (and Germany’s future) minister of educa-
tion, Christian Democrat Annette Schavan, averred that
Veil  111
the headscarf constitutes a political symbol [that is] a part of a fe-
male oppressive history. It can symbolize an interpretation of Politi-
cal Islamism, which confl icts with the principle of equality between 
men and women. In that sense, it is also incompatible with a funda-
mental value embedded in our constitution. (Quoted in Andreassen 
and Lettinga 2012: 25)
Th e Social Democratic president of the German parliament, Wolfgang 
Th ierse, condemned the headscarf as “a symbol of oppression” (Frank-
furter Allgemeine Zeitung 4 January 2004). Across the Rhine, Bernard 
Stasi, who headed the presidential commission that recommended the 
French ban in 2004, referred to the hijab as a “sign of the alienation of 
women,” while the government’s offi  cial mediator for helping to resolve 
headscarf disputes in schools, Hanifa Cherifi , claimed that the veil repre-
sents a “restriction of mixity, of individual liberty, and of gender equality” 
(quoted in Laborde 2008: 115). In his defense of the burqa ban of 2011, 
President Sarkozy, who had earlier publicly opposed the ban, insisted that 
the garment is “not a religious symbol, but a sign of subjugation and deg-
radation” (Le Monde 24 June 2009). Demonstrating that opposition to the 
burqa is not confi ned to the political Right, Communist Party member 
André Gerin, who introduced in the National Assembly the bill to ban the 
burqa, claimed that this “walking prison” subjects women to “an unbear-
able situation of reclusion, exclusion and humiliation. Her very existence 
is denied” (Le Monde 19 June 2009). Likewise, the legislator who intro-
duced Italy’s bill, the Moroccan-born member of Premier Silvio Berlus-
coni’s PDL, Souad Sbai, justifi ed the bill on grounds that “we have to help 
women get out of this segregation . . . to get out of this submission. I want 
to speak for those who don’t have a voice, who don’t have the strength to 
yell and say, ‘I am not doing well’” (Huffi  ngton Post 2 August 2011). Geert 
Wilders, who proposed the burqa ban to the Dutch parliament, derided 
the niqab as “an insult to everyone who believes in equal rights” (quoted 
in Jenkins 2007: 196). “Th e Islamic head scarf is a symbol of women’s sub-
mission,” claims the Danish People’s Party (quoted in Siim 2014: 225). Th e 
2001 ruling of the European Court of Human Rights in Lucia Dahlab v. 
Switzerland, which upheld a ban on the headscarf, maintained that the 
garment “appears to be imposed on women by a precept that is laid down 
in the Koran and which . . . is hard to square with the principle of gender 
equality” (quoted in Vakulenko 2012: 46).
Fragments of liberal perfectionism’s insistence on informed over merely 
free choice invariably crop up in response to complaints that the bans vio-
late the autonomy of Muslim women who freely choose to cover. Th us, Hirsi 
Ali (2006: 31–32) retorts:
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Because they have internalized their subordination, they no longer 
experience it as an oppression by an external force but as a strong 
internal shield. . . . Th ey are like prisoners suff ering from Stockholm 
syndrome, in which hostages fall in love with the hostage takers and 
establish a deep intimate contact with them.
Likewise, the chairwoman of the Turkish Women’s International Network 
in the Netherlands argues that “restrictions such as wearing headscarves are 
made up by men who are using women as marionettes. Women . . . main-
tain that their scarves are a purely voluntary aff air, for they do not want to 
be repudiated by their family and community” (De Volkskrant 22 March 
2001). Lale Akgün, Bundestag member for the Social Democratic Party 
(SPD) and its spokesperson on issues related to Islam, dismissed the idea 
that voluntarily donning a headscarf could represent authentic liberty: “It 
is absurd to declare clear subordination under a symbol of gender separa-
tion as emancipation” (Tageszeitung 26 January 2004). A few weeks later, a 
group of roughly 100 prominent women, many of whom were of Turkish 
background, reinforced Akgün by contending in an open letter that veiling 
was rarely voluntary even if women and girls claimed otherwise (Tageszei-
tung 14–15 February 2004). In France, Anne Vigerie of the Cercle d’Etude 
de Reformes Feministes and Anne Zelensky, president of the Ligue du Droit 
de Femmes, co-published an editorial insisting that the veil symbolizes 
“submission to men. Th e fact that women choose to wear it does nothing to 
change its meaning. . . . Th ere is no surer oppression than self-oppression” 
(Le Monde 30 May 2003). Following this perfectionist line of thinking, the 
Stasi Commission refused to hear public testimony from veiled women on 
grounds that their views could not possibly be autonomous. Likewise, the 
Conseil Constitutionnel upheld the burqa ban, arguing that those who don 
it “misrecognize the minimal requirements of living in society” by being 
unaware that they “fi nd themselves placed in a situation of exclusion and in-
feriority clearly incompatible with the constitutional principles of freedom 
and equality” (quoted in Bowen and Rohe 2014: 155).
Liberal perfectionism defends compulsion in the name of emancipating 
those unwilling to liberate themselves. Th us, French minister of immigra-
tion Eric Besson endorsed the burqa ban with the argument that “public 
authority is founded on protecting the dignity of the person, if necessary 
against the person herself” (quoted in Joppke and Torpey 2013: 34). Ciska 
Dresselhuys, chief editor of the Dutch feminist magazine Opzij, who refus-
es to hire veiled reporters, maintains that tolerating the Islamic sartorial 
practice amounts to “justifying and submitting to an error” (quoted in An-
dreassen and Lettinga 2012: 19). Although it was not in conjunction with a 
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burqa ban per se, even the Home Offi  ce (2002: para. 2.3) foresaw that “it will 
sometimes be necessary to confront some cultural practices which confl ict 
with these basic [liberal] values—such as those that deny women the right 
to participate as equal citizens.” With similar perfectionist zeal, Article 5 
of the UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
against Women endorses the “modifi cation of social and cultural patterns of 
conduct of men and women” in an eff ort to “eliminate prejudices of female 
inferiority.” As Joan Scott (2007: 131) incisively observes, it is only the au-
tonomy of “those who had made the right choice” that is protected.
From the perspective of liberal perfectionism, there is no more appro-
priate place for the liberal state to force citizens to be free than the pub-
lic schools. Unsurprisingly, bans apply mostly, though not exclusively, to 
schools. In the fi rst place, schools rear young and therefore impressionable 
minds that can supposedly be more easily molded or resocialized away from 
the illiberal ideas inculcated in the home. Th e Stasi Commission (Stasi 2004: 
128), for example, justifi ed France’s 2004 ban with the following reasoning:
Th ere are pressures constraining young girls to wear religious signs. 
Th eir family and social environment impose on them a choice that 
is not their own. Th e Republic cannot remain deaf to these girls’ cry 
of distress. Th e space of the school must remain for them a place of 
liberty and emancipation.
Across the channel in the Begum case, Baroness Hale approvingly quoted Ra-
day (2003: 709): a “mandatory policy that rejects veiling in state educational 
institutions may provide a crucial opportunity for girls to choose the feminist 
freedom of state education over the patriarchal dominance of their families.” 
Similarly, German feminist Alice Schwarzer (2010: 17) has supported a ban 
on veiling in German schools with the argument that compulsory uncovering 
exposes the girls to an invaluable critique of their parents’ values.
Second, the liberal democratic state, because it is ruled by its citizenry, 
has an especially acute, even existential interest in fostering liberal citizens. 
Th e Stasi Commission (2003: 56), for example, recommended the ban as 
necessary to fulfi ll the schools’ responsibility to produce “enlightened citi-
zens.” It follows in liberal perfectionist logic that the liberal state should 
permit neither symbols nor acts of repression and subjugation in its schools. 
In the open letter to President Chirac mentioned above, the sixty-seven sig-
natories averred: “To accept the Muslim headscarf in schools and public ad-
ministration is to legitimize a symbol of the submission of women in places 
where the State should guarantee a strict equality of the sexes” (quoted in 
Cesari 2013: 9). Again, Baroness Hale voiced a similar argument:
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Like it or not, this is a society committed, in principle and in law, 
to equal freedom for men and women to choose how they will lead 
their lives within the law. Young girls from ethnic, cultural or reli-
gious minorities growing up here face particularly diffi  cult choices: 
how far to adopt or to distance themselves from the dominant cul-
ture. A good school will enable and support them. (Quoted in Jop-
pke 2009: 99)
As Hale implies, public schools in liberal democracies should promote 
open-mindedness and critical thought, including self-refl ection, so that 
their graduates can mature into citizens capable of rational deliberation. 
Th us, schools must stand as “a privileged locus for the inculcation of the 
habit of independence through the exercise of critical judgment” (Kintzler 
1996: 33). As an allegedly obstinate and obscurantist commitment to Is-
lamic orthodoxy, veiling is said to foreclose dialogue. For instance, Necla 
Kelek, in supporting a ban on headscarves in German primary schools, 
contended that the sartorial custom sends the closed-minded message that 
there is but one form of proper femininity: “Th is is not compatible with our 
society, which needs equal, self-assertive, and responsible citizens” (quoted 
in Deutsche Islam Konferenz 2009). Likewise, Alice Schwarzer (2010: 13) 
argues that to exempt Muslim girls from co-educational swimming classes 
because they refuse to don immodest swimwear in the presence of boys is to 
reinforce rather than challenge gender stereotypes. In the United Kingdom, 
Dr. Taj Hargey, an imam and chairman of the Muslim Educational Centre 
of Oxford, endorsed prohibiting the burqa and niqab in public schools be-
cause the religious practice “means that Muslim children are being brain-
washed into thinking they must segregate and separate themselves from 
mainstream society” (Telegraph 2 October 2010). Something similar seems 
to be what Tony Blair had in mind when he denounced the garments as “a 
marker of separation” (Guardian 6 October 2006).
Veiling is also objected to with the allegation that it amounts to pros-
elytizing. Furthermore, the long-standing liberal suspicion of religion 
manifests itself in the insistence that proselytizing should have no place 
in a school committed to open dialogue and critical examination. Th us, in 
Lucia Dahlab v. Switzerland of 2001, the European Court of Human Rights 
upheld a school’s refusal to let a public school teacher veil in the classroom 
with the claim that “it cannot be denied outright that the wearing of the 
headscarf might have some kind of proselytizing eff ect” (quoted in Vaku-
lenko 2012: 45). An interesting dimension of this fragment of perfectionist 
logic is the contention that veiling constitutes unwarranted proselytizing 
whether or not the veiled Muslim intends it as such. Such reasoning fi gured 
prominently in Ludin v. Land Baden-Württemberg of 2003, which legally 
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paved the way for the bans on veiled public school teachers in eight of 
Germany’s sixteen Länder. Ludin swore that she covered not in order to 
proselytize, but to fulfi ll a purely personal commitment to Islamic piety. 
Th e Constitutional Court conceded as much but ruled that the “objec-
tive reception” (objektiver Empfängerhorizont) of the headscarf among her 
colleagues and pupils was more signifi cant than her subjective intentions 
and, therefore, trumped her right to freedom of religion (quoted in Vaku-
lenko 2012: 119). Indeed, the court contended that the mere possibility 
that the hijab could be perceived as proselytizing merited “precautionary 
neutrality” (quoted in Saharso 2007: 17). Chancellor Gerhard Schröder 
defended the ruling by claiming that the German state had no business 
telling private citizens how to dress, but with teachers acting as public 
servants in schools, “there we expect another way to dress” (Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung 24 November 2004).
In France, the veil, even when worn by students, represents what Presi-
dent Chirac termed “an aggressive sign of religious proselytism” (BBC On-
line News 17 December 2003). Likewise, Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raff a-
rin defended the 2004 ban, maintaining that “religion cannot be a political 
project as was clearly the case with the wearing of the Islamic veil” (New 
York Times 4 February 2004). Whereas the German justices made the case 
for “precautionary neutrality,” the French National Assembly discerned a 
need for “reinforced protection” against proselytizing (quoted in Joppke 
and Torpey 2013: 29). Th e British House of Lords, in its decision to uphold 
the ban on the niqab, declared it legal for school offi  cials to “wish to avoid 
clothes which were perceived by some Muslims (rightly or wrongly) as sig-
nifying adherence to an extremist vision of the Muslim religion and to pro-
tect girls against external pressures” (quoted in Vakulenko 2012: 122). Th e 
High Court agreed in 2007 that “many girls might become subject to pres-
sure to wear the niqab” (quoted in Vakulenko 2012: 63).
Foreign Veil
Fragilization in the direction of nationalism becomes detectible when the 
entity to be protected by the veiling ban switches from female Muslims to 
the receiving society. Islamic veiling is objected to less because it subjugates 
Muslim women and more because it represents an unwanted foreign prac-
tice that purportedly disturbs or even imperils the native majority’s culture 
and “way of life.” Listen, for instance, to Wilders’s animus voiced before 
parliament in 2007:
Dutch citizens . . . have had enough of burkas, headscarves, the ritu-
al slaughter of animals, so-called honour revenge, blaring minarets, 
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female circumcision, hymen restoration operations, abuse of homo-
sexuals, Turkish and Arabic on the buses and trains as well as on 
town hall leafl ets.” (Quoted in Hampshire 2013: 33–34)
Th e Vlaams Blok calls for the “repatriation of those who reject, deny or com-
bat our culture and certain European values,” with one party leader adding 
that the veil amounts to a “‘contract’ signed by Muslim women to be de-
ported” (quoted in Bleich 2011: 96).
Grave concern for the well-being of the receiving nation is hardly con-
fi ned to the Far Right. Prime Minister Raff arin, for instance, argued that 
the 2004 ban would help to ensure “the permanence of our values” that are 
“constitutive of our collective history” and the “principal factor of the moral 
or spiritual unity of our nation” (quoted in Joppke 2009: 50). Likewise, Im-
migration Minister Besson asserted that “the burka is unacceptable and 
contrary to the values of the national identity” (Le Monde 25 October 2009). 
In the United Kingdom, shadow Home Minister David Davis maintained 
that the issue of Islamic veiling raises “the question of the very unity of our 
nation” (Sunday Telegraph 15 October 2006). Self-described “left ie” journal-
ist Yasmin Alibhai-Brown asserted that the niqab so deeply off ends British 
sensibilities that it ought to be proscribed for that reason alone. “Th ere is 
such a thing as British society,” she maintained, implying something like 
the stance “when in Rome do as the Romans do” (International Herald Tri-
bune 23 October 2006). Similarly, Gudrun Krämer (2011), an eminent Ger-
man scholar of Islam and respected public intellectual, argues that banning 
the niqab is “legitimate” because the garment is “a demarcation, which in 
the context of my culture, of German culture, is an expression of latent ag-
gression. Th at doesn’t have to be the case everywhere, above all not in places 
where most women wear veils; but this is how I perceive it here.” Similarly, 
Dominique Schnapper threw her support behind the burqa ban because 
“France is the country where everyone says ‘bonjour’” face to face (quoted in 
Joppke and Torpey 2013: 44).
In political rhetoric nationalist and liberal fragments oft en fall from the 
same lips. Th us, Wilders, Alibhai-Brown, Besson, and Raff arin were each 
quoted above denouncing the veil as a violation of women’s individual lib-
erty. Consider Sarkozy’s statement that the burqa is
not a religious symbol, but a sign of subservience and debasement. 
I want to say solemnly, the burka is not welcome in France. In our 
country, we can’t accept women prisoners behind a screen, cut off  
from all social life, deprived of all identity. Th is does not conform to 
our idea of a woman’s dignity. (Le Monde 24 June 2009)
Veil  117
Th e concern for the autonomy of the women who wear the burqa is plain. 
But equally unmistakable is the president’s indignation that the act trans-
gresses the French (“our”) idea of a woman’s dignity. It is hard not to be 
left  with the impression that the indignity is somehow graver because it is 
happening in “our country” rather than just in any country. We hear simi-
lar combining of or fragilization between nationalist and liberal reasoning 
in the support of banning veiling put forth by Peter Skaarup, a member of 
parliament representing the Danish People’s Party:
According to Danish norms it is discriminatory to veil. Th e fact 
that women must hide their sexuality, cover their hair, that is, in a 
Danish context, an expression of the devaluation of the woman . . . 
and that is what we have fought against with our struggle for gender 
equality, and therefore the veil is a problem for our society. . . . Th e 
right thing is therefore to ban the headscarf and live accordingly 
[sic] to our customs here in Denmark. (Quoted in Andreassen and 
Lettinga 2012: 22)
We can also read in Skaarup’s remark the common complaint that veil-
ing forces the host nation to regress—that is, to reexperience objectionable 
practices that it had allegedly purged from its ranks. Th us, the populist 
Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn opined: “I don’t feel like having to go through 
the emancipation of women and homosexuals all over again” (Volkskrant 9 
February 2002; see also Scheff er 2011: 3). Similarly, British journalist Mi-
nette Marrin complained: “A woman shrouded in veils represents . . . a pre-
Enlightenment religion and a view of relations between the sexes that the 
mainstream of this country can no longer accept” (Sunday Times 22 Octo-
ber 2006). Again, here, the indignity to the nation caused by veiling would 
seem to be equal if not greater than that to the female Muslims. Or in Th eo 
Sarrazin’s angry words, “I don’t have to accept anyone who lives off  the state, 
rejects this same state . . . and constantly produces new little headscarf girls” 
(quoted in Bahners 2011: 279).
In terms of actual policy, nativism is typically said to have its greatest 
impact where Islamic veiling is proscribed or circumscribed while sartorial 
practices more commonly and longer associated with the majority culture 
are permitted. Th e country most oft en spotlighted for such blatant national-
ist favoritism is Germany, where public teachers could not (until 2015) don 
the hijab but could teach in a Christian habit or a Jewish yarmulke (Joppke 
2009; Saharso 2007; Amir-Moazami 2007). For example, sentence one of 
Baden-Württemberg’s 2004 statute reads: “Teachers are not allowed . . . [to] 
give external statements [äussere Bekundungen] of a political, religious or 
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ideological nature which could endanger or disturb the neutrality of the 
Land towards pupils or parents or . . . the political, religious or ideological 
peace of the school.” However, sentence three further stipulates: “Th e repre-
sentation of Christian or occidental values or traditions corresponds to the 
educational mandate of the [regional] constitution and does not contradict 
the behavior required [Verhaltensgebot] according to sentence 1” (quoted 
in Joppke 2009: 72). Unsurprisingly, the Catholic Bishops Conference of 
Germany (Saharso 2007: 16) and the Jewish Community of Germany (Spie-
gelonline 2 April 2004) endorsed the law. Both reasoned that due to their far 
deeper heritage in Germany, neither Christian nor Jewish symbols (respec-
tively) should be put on a par with Islamic imagery.
Some qualifi cations deserve mention. First, eight of sixteen Länder pro-
scribed the hijab (as of 2015) but not Jewish or Christian outward symbols. 
Half of the Länder hardly constitutes a national consensus of ethnonational-
ism. Furthermore, governments that do not formally favor Judeo-Christian 
symbols do so informally. Take France for example. Th e 2004 ban does, in 
keeping with liberal universalism, prohibit all “ostentatious” religious sym-
bols. However, Chirac assured his compatriots that the law was designed to 
target the “Islamist veil” (BBC Online News 17 December 2003) and would 
only outlaw “manifestly over-sized crosses” and not ones that adorn conven-
tional jewelry such as necklaces or rings (quoted in Hargreaves 2007: 114). 
In fact, the governmental circulaire with instructions on how to implement 
the 2004 ban gives prerogative to headmasters to proscribe the religious 
“signs [that are] ostensible in intent,” including when the students deny any 
proselytizing intent. Because most headmasters view neither Jewish nor 
Christian symbols as intentional proselytizing, Muslim students wind up 
being the primary target of administrative discretion (Laborde 2008: 65). 
Indeed, the UN Human Rights Commission’s special rapporteur chided the 
French government for “selective interpretation and rigid application” of 
the ban as well as for “abuses that provoked feelings of humiliation, in par-
ticular amongst young Muslim women” (United Nations 2005). As for the 
2011 (burqa) ban on full facial covering in public, it formally exempts facial 
coverings “in the context of festivities (disguise for a carnival or as Father 
Christmas) or traditional expressions (processions, particularly religious)” 
(quoted in Vakulenko 2012: 22).
Th e point to stress, again, is that the policy reality in France is no more 
purely republican than it is consistently ethnonationalist in Germany. As 
for countries that do not proscribe veiling, their public schools either for-
mally or informally tolerate myriad Christian symbols to such an extent 
that the latter far outnumber Islamic veils in the overwhelming majority of 
classrooms. Nativist particularism thus proves diffi  cult to eradicate even in 
states with a formally liberal policy.
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Hyperbolic Veil
Fragilization toward postmodernism turns up among the opponents of 
the veil through hyperbolic exaggeration of the threat it poses. Deliber-
ate hyperbole manifests an appreciation, whether acknowledged or not, 
of the postmodern postulate that truth is constructed rather than discov-
ered, subjective rather than objective. Like the postmodern icon Andy 
Warhol’s remark that “art is what you can get away with” (originally ut-
tered by Marshall McLuhan), many opponents of veiling seem keen to ex-
pand the limits of credulity. In the public letter that arguably elevated the 
headscarf debate from low to high politics, from political oblivion to “po-
litical hysteria” (Terray 2004), fi ve prominent French intellectuals—Alain 
Finkielkraut, Elisabeth Badinter, Régis Debray, Elisabeth de Fontenay, and 
Catherine Kintzler—likened Creil in 1989 to Munich in 1938 (the “Munich 
of the republican school”) and beseeched French educators not to repeat 
the fateful error of appeasement committed by Neville Chamberlain with 
Hitler (Le Nouvel Observateur 2 November 1989). Th us were three teen-
aged girls (and no more than an estimated 2,000 veiled pupils in the whole 
of France) equated with the bellicose chancellor of a mighty nation-state 
poised to invade and occupy France. Th e analogy to the Nazis is common. 
For instance, Chahadortt Djavann (2004), an Iranian novelist domiciled in 
Paris, has compared the veil to the yellow star forced upon Jews under the 
Nazi regime; so too has Alice Schwarzer (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 4 
July 2006). Likewise, Sarkozy’s eventual minister for urban renewal, Fadela 
Amara, described the hijab as “an instrument of oppression that is imposed 
by the green [meaning Islamist] fascists” (quoted in Jenkins 2007: 196–97).
Another gross distortion comes in associating the veil with terror-
ism. Likely the cleverest and most eff ective wheedling emanated from the 
Swiss committee Yes to the Ban on Minarets, whose 2009 poster depicted a 
woman wearing a burqa treading on a Swiss fl ag from which arose numer-
ous minarets fashioned to resemble missiles. Th e cover of Melanie Phillips’s 
2007 bestseller Londonistan shows a woman on whose hijab are etched the 
words “I love Al-Qaeda.” Th e Stasi Commission (2003: sec. 3.2.2) inveighed 
against veiling as “permanent guerilla war.” Regarding a diff erent kind of 
terrorization, a Spanish government minister likened veiling to “the prac-
tice of female genital circumcision. Th ese cannot be understood as a cul-
tural or religious concept, but only as savagery” (quoted in Th e Observer 1 
February 2004).
With even greater frequency the veil is equated with cultural annihi-
lation. Th e reader should keep in mind that of the more than fi ve hun-
dred million persons living in the EU, only between two and three mil-
lion of them regularly wear Islamic covering in public. For example, Dutch 
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politicians pushing the burqa ban have outlandishly warned that the 
Netherlands is teetering on the brink of turning into Afghanistan. Th ey 
deliberately refer to all covered Muslims as burqa-wearers when in fact no 
more than 400 women wear the black chador associated with the Taliban 
(Moors 2009: 18). Th e same applies to Vlaams Belang in Belgium, where 
an estimated thirty women don the chador (Tyrer 2013: 45). Similarly, An-
dré Gerin promoted the French burqa ban as a necessary step to halt the 
“Talibanization” of France (quoted in Joppke and Torpey 2013: 22). As early 
as 1989, Le Figaro had featured a front page depicting Marianne, the his-
toric symbol of the republic, wearing a chador with the headline “Will the 
French Ever Be French Again?” Likewise, the Danish People’s Party (DPP), 
in a 2009 advertisement, vituperated: “Th e Islamic head scarf . . . is not only 
about ‘30 grams of cloth.’ It is about tyranny and submission. . . . Give us 
back Denmark” (quoted in Siim 2014: 225). As mentioned, Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen’s center-right government in 2009 banned the hijab for judges, 
though there neither had been nor was at the time a single veiled judge in 
the Nordic country. Without going so far as to imply, like the DPP, that his 
homeland actually lay in the possession of veiled Muslims, Siv Jensen, lead-
er of Norway’s Progress Party, nevertheless pointed to veiling as evidence 
of “sneak-Islamization” (snikislamisiering) “through the backdoor” (quoted 
in Siim 2014: 226–27). In 2012, Vlaams Belang politician Filip Dewinter 
organized a campaign for “women . . . fi ghting against the Islamization of 
society” with a poster that depicted his daughter An-Sofi e clad in a burqa 
opened to reveal a bikini. Th e caption read: “Freedom or Islam? Dare to 
choose” (De Standaard 5 February 2012). Similarly, David Sexton, a colum-
nist for the Evening Standard (16 June 2007), hurled invective at the veiled 
women of the United Kingdom as a “walking rejection of all our freedoms” 
(emphasis mine). For Bernhard Henri Lévy, the very “soul of Europe [is] at 
stake” (Libération 11 February 2008).
“Systematic exaggeration” (Bahners 2011: 154) has extended beyond 
veiling to other issues aff ecting female Muslims. So-called “honor killings” 
of Muslim women who have allegedly disgraced their family by consort-
ing with non-Muslims—for example, Fadime Sahindal (Sweden, 2002), 
Ghazal Khan (Denmark, 2003), Schijman Kuashi (Netherlands, 2005), 
Hatan Sürücü (Germany, 2005), and Banaz Mahmod Babakir Agha (Brit-
ain, 2007)—have frequently become sensationalized fl ashpoints (Korteweg 
and Yurdakul 2014; Fredette 2014: 132). In the case of Sürücü, experts on 
gender and Islam published an open letter criticizing Islam critics Serap 
Çileli, Seyran Ateş, and Necla Kelek for deliberately exaggerating and ex-
ploiting the case in an eff ort to advance their personal Islamophobic agen-
das (Terkessidis and Karakaşoğlu 2006; see also Schneiders 2010b). Th e 
fi lm La Squale (2000) and the book Dans l’enfer des tournantes (translated 
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into English as To Hell and Back) by Samira Bellil (2002) focused French 
national attention on the arresting problem of gang rape among Muslims 
in the banlieues, when, in fact, the despicable act transpires in non-Muslim 
circles as well (Muchielli 2005). Burned Alive, the 2005 best-selling French 
memoir of a woman who survived being doused with gasoline and set ablaze 
by her brother, appears to have been largely fabricated with the assistance 
of writer and promoter Marie-Th érèse Cuny, who “assisted” at least two 
other women in similar fashion (Abu-Lughod 2013: 124). So-called “forced 
marriages” have also garnered much sensationalized attention in widely 
circulated books such as Brick Lane (Ali 2004), Die Fremde Braut (Kelek 
2005), and Th e Caged Virgin (Hirsi Ali 2006), which depict real or fi ctional 
accounts of young women dragooned into marrying men whom they de-
spise (Chin 2010; Surkis 2010). In reality, however, the overwhelming ma-
jority of arranged marriages result from negotiations freely entered into 
by the bride and groom with their parents (Roy 2007: 89). Th eo van Gogh 
and Ayaan Hirsi Ali’s Submission [2004] provokingly brings all these issues 
together in a short fi lm shot in English (with Dutch subtitles) that received 
wide distribution via YouTube. In it, a lone woman narrates the tale of the 
injustices committed against her by her father, uncle, and husband. Each 
of the injustices, she claims, is sanctioned by verses in the Qur’an, which 
she cites and which appear tattooed on her naked body made visible by the 
sheer, see-through burqa that she wears. Th e fi lm caused a sensation that 
culminated in van Gogh’s murder at the hand of an incensed Moroccan 
Dutchman and Hirsi Ali’s fl ight from the Netherlands due to death threats. 
Perhaps the most incongruous allegation regarding female Muslims fell 
from the lips of Silvio Berlusconi, who in 2011 tried to justify his relation-
ship with a seventeen-year-old Moroccan prostitute on grounds that he was 
liberating the damsel from a life of repeated rape and abuse infl icted on her 
by a misogynistic Islamic culture (Cousin and Vitali 2012: 60).
Gross distortion is not confi ned to the opponents of veiling. More than 
a few Islamist organizations seek to reverse the stigmatization of veiling by 
demonizing the uncovered. I employ the admittedly imperfect term “Is-
lamism” loosely and broadly to envelop the beliefs of all those who strive 
toward a society in which Islamic precepts and laws—typically understood 
as those enunciated in the Qur’an and Sunna—predominate. Among those I 
label “Islamists” the general idea tends to prevail that God revealed through 
the Prophet Muhammad (and by some accounts certain subsequent Had-
ith as well) suffi  cient guidelines for leading a morally upstanding life as an 
individual and as a community in all times and places. Islamists tend in 
various ways to see Islam as integral rather than antithetical to modern life 
and believe that the latter needs to conform to the former rather than vice 
versa (Göle 2004: 14–15). Th ey view and practice “Islam as a way of life” (a 
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common slogan among Islamists) rather than a private spiritual confession 
(Maréchal 2008: 204–7). Due to limited space, I gloss over the signifi cant 
diff erences in strategy for achieving the Islamist goal—diff erences ranging 
from pietist personal conversion stressed by such groups as Tablighi Jamaat 
(Association for the Propagation of Islam), Jamaat Nur, the Süleymanli, and 
the Gülen Movement, to nonviolent political action practiced by the Mus-
lim Brotherhood and its European affi  liate, the Union of Islamic Organiza-
tions in Europe (UOIE), the Islamische Gemeinde Milli Görüş (IGMG), the 
Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), or the Jama’at-i Islami, to violent jihadist 
militant organizations such as Hizb ut-Tahrir (arguably), Al-Muhajiroun, 
Supporters of Shariah, Islamic Cultural Institute of Milan, Al-Jama’a Al-
Islamiya, and Groupe Islamique Armé. Th e connections between these Is-
lamist organizations are typically informal and oft en strained, though they 
all tend to see themselves working in the service of the international Islamic 
community or umma (Ceylan and Kiefer 2013: 82–88; Pargeter 2008: 65). 
As a leader of the United Kingdom Islamic Mission (UKIM) remarked, “We 
belong to the international Islamic movement, neither to Jama’at, nor to Ikh-
wan [Muslim Brotherhood] nor to the [Islamist] Refah party in Turkey—but 
all of them are our friends” (quoted in Vidino 2006). “Notwithstanding their 
variations,” observes one analyst, “Islamists in general deploy a religious 
language and conceptual frame, favor conservative social mores and an ex-
clusive social order, espouse a patriarchal disposition, and adopt broadly 
intolerant attitudes toward diff erent ideas and lifestyles” (Bayat 2013b: 7). 
Furthermore, despite adhering to distinct schools of Islamic jurisprudence 
(fi qh), such as the Mâliki (North Africa), Hanaf ı̂  (Turkey, India), Hanbalı̂  
(Saudi Arabia), and Shâfi’ı̂  (Egypt), what I am calling “Islamist” organiza-
tions typically interpret some form of veiling outside the exclusive presence 
of family as a religious obligation (Hellyer 2006: 340). But let the reader be 
forewarned that Islamist (not to mention Islamic) doctrine and practice are 
highly complex and evolving phenomena, full treatment of which would de-
mand a separate volume (Mandaville 2014; Cesari 2013; Leiken 2012; Lau-
rence 2012; Yükleyen 2012; Göle 2011; Vidino 2010b; Bowen 2010; Roy 2007; 
2005; Abu Zayd 2006; Nielsen 2003; Schiff auer 2000).
To reiterate, Islamist organizations and personalities frequently employ 
distorting images and claims in their eff ort to defend and encourage veil-
ing. Non-Muslim European women are oft en depicted as sinfully unchaste, 
indeed wantonly oversexed and sexualized. Th us, the Union for Islamic 
Development and Culture in Bulgaria laments that “women can be seen in 
the streets dressed in clothes that barely cover their underwear (and this 
is taken as normal) . . . [trying] to appear as sexually attractive as possible 
. . . and disappointed if no one turns their head to look at them” (quoted in 
Ghodsee 2012: 119). Al-Muhajiroun claims that in British secular schools 
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“children are taught to conform to a code of dress that shows their naked-
ness. . . . Children grow up idolizing pop-stars and footballers rather than 
appreciating the Messengers from their creator and worshiping God alone” 
(quoted in Wiktorowicz 2005: 169). Th e preoccupation with women and 
girls as sex objects is typically made to mushroom into myriad additional 
problems that plague Western women’s lives. In her study of the Swedish 
journal Salaam, for instance, Jonas Otterbeck (2000: 259) found that
Swedish (or Western) women is a recurrent theme. Th e Swedish 
woman . . . is described as a victim of several powers. She is exploited 
by commercialism, especially by the fashion industry. She is over-
worked and underpaid, has a full-time job and all the housework. 
She never has time for her children who will end up on the streets 
which will lead them to self-destruction, drugs, crimes and a high 
suicide rate. Her marriage will eventually break down and lead to 
divorce due to unrealistic hopes built on the fi rst moments of love 
and passion in the relationship.
By contrast, the veil is implausibly exalted as a foolproof safeguard 
against perilous Westernization. Fereshta Ludin, the woman at the center 
of Germany’s headscarf controversy, insisted that her veil ensured “protec-
tion against Western decadence” (quoted in Oestreich 2004: 116). Inversely, 
Muslims are warned at websites such as “Th e Choice between the Burka and 
the Bikini” that removing the veil in public represents the fi rst capricious 
step down a treacherous path ineluctably leading to mundane profanity 
and eternal damnation (www.allaahuakbar.net/womens/choice_between_
burka_and_bikini.htm). Likewise, at the website “Islam: Die Wahre Reli-
gion,” German Salafi st Ibrahim Abou-Nagie warns that unveiled women 
will land in hell (www.diewahrereligion.de). One internet meme that has 
found wide distribution depicts a veiled woman ascending a staircase to 
heaven and an unveiled, secularly clad woman descending a staircase into 
hell. Unveiling is further said to invite certain harassment from lascivious 
Western men, which will either lead to rape or, worse, consorting and for-
nicating with them which, in turn, will alienate the wayward women from 
their true family and community. Typically, verses from the Qur’an will be 
cited to emphasize divine injunction: “O Prophet! Tell thy wives and daugh-
ters, and the believing women, that they should cast their outer garments 
over their persons (when outside): that they should be known (as such) and 
not molested” (Qur’an 33:59). Such purported Qur’anic approbation is re-
inforced by an abundance of popular fi lm and fi ction widely distributed 
among Muslim immigrants that dramatize stories of unsuspecting Muslim 
daughters and wives lured from chastity and piety into depravity and ruin 
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by mischievous European playboys (Gerlach 2006: 58–59). So great appeared 
the danger that Sheikh Mohamad Kamal Mostafá of Fuengirola, Spain, pub-
lished the book Women in Islam, which instructed Muslim men to beat their 
wives and daughters if necessary to keep them from straying from Islamic 
virtue. When it was learned that the book was widely circulated by major 
Islamist institutions in Madrid and Barcelona, a national furor erupted that 
culminated in criminal prosecution of the author (Jenkins 2007: 184–85). 
Similarly, Swedes were riled in 2012 when an undercover camera team from 
Swedish Television taped imams in several (state-funded) mosques advis-
ing wives to tolerate beatings from and unwanted sex with their husbands 
(Yilner 2012). France deported Tunisian imam Mohamed Hammami in 
the same year for advocating corporal punishment of wayward wives and 
daughters (Al Jazeera, 31 October 2012), just as it had done with Abdelkader 
Bouziane in 2004 (Le Monde 6 October 2004). An uproar was ignited in 2001 
when Khalil El-Moumni, a conservative imam from Rotterdam, asserted in 
a television interview that un-Islamic sexual impropriety can lead to ram-
pant homosexuality, as evidenced by the legalization of same-sex marriage 
in the Netherlands. Th is “sin,” he added, if not stopped “will lead to extinc-
tion,” “for who will make children when men and women can marry each 
other?” (quoted in Uitermark, Mepschen, and Duyvendak 2014: 243).
I do not aim to bombard the reader with outlandish allegations. I wish 
rather to point out fragilization toward postmodernism’s tenet that truth is 
whatever passes for truth. Th ese anti-European allegations are no less es-
sentializing distortions of Europeans than are the anti-Islamic insinuations 
that Muslims are misogynist. Th e former too blatantly ignore conspicuous 
counter-evidence of non-Muslim European men and women who do not fi t 
the stereotype. Furthermore, the preposterous notion that veil-lessness leads 
to certain ruin engages no less in fear-mongering than the claims of the im-
pending Islamization of Europe. Just as the Islam-bashers gloss over the fact 
that an extremely small proportion of women in Europe cover, the defenders 
of strict Islamic orthodoxy equally glaringly overlook the thousands upon 
thousands of devout Muslim women who regularly attend mosque but who 
choose to cover only there in the sacred sanctuary (Mandel 2008: 306). Like 
the Islamophobes, the Islamists spotlight extreme and typically rare cases 
and pass them off  as the norm. Th ey also conveniently neglect the more 
nuanced dialogue and debate among sophisticated exegetes of the Qur’an 
regarding what the holy writ does and does not require women to wear (for 
example, Kaddor 2010; Hamidi 2009; Mohr 2006; Safi  2003; Barlas 2002).
Islamists’ rejection of modern European society does not have to mean 
that they are unaff ected by it. Keep in mind that they must regularly wit-
ness their adversaries shrewdly and eff ectively producing and circulating 
gross distortions of the veiling phenomenon. Th ey cannot be unaware that 
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for vast numbers of Europeans such distortions pass for truth. In a You-
Tube video spotlighting the conversion of women to Islam, the imam of 
the video’s sponsor, the Central Mosque of Birmingham, explains to watch-
ers that rampant Islamophobia spreads apocryphal slander regarding 
the status and treatment of women in Islam (https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=Cx37WaHDwuc). Nor can Islamists be unaware that the images 
inform policy makers and policy. Islamists, then, hardly need to read Ni-
etzsche or Foucault to conclude that, in politics at least, knowledge is con-
structed to serve partial interests and agendas. Likewise, they do not need to 
steep themselves in Stanley Fish’s (1999: 273) postmodern analysis to recog-
nize that political actors who confi ne their pronouncements and programs 
to what is objectively true more likely hamper than help their political for-
tunes. Th e theory of fragilization does not necessitate the total conversion 
to postmodernism and rejection of Islam. Th e theory posits only a soft ening 
or opening toward some fragmentary aspects of a public philosophy with 
which one does not explicitly identify.
Postcolonial Veil
Another postmodern fragment that Islamists oft en invoke to oppose bans 
on veiling is the postcolonial trope. Postcolonial analysis of anti-veiling 
rhetoric and regulation abounds. All take a page from Edward Said’s in-
fl uential Orientalism, which, as discussed in Chapter 2, analyzed the phe-
nomenon as a power-knowledge discourse enabling and legitimizing Euro-
pean domination of the Orient. During colonial times, asserts Leyla Ahmed 
(1992: 152), the veil represented “the most visible marker of the diff erentness 
and inferiority of Islamic societies.” Th e French, for instance, publicly and 
forcibly unveiled Muslim women during the war of independence in Alge-
ria to demonstrate the necessity of French colonial rule for the liberation 
of women (Vakulenko 2012: 97; Mas 2006; Bouteldja 2004). Th e “civilizing 
mission” (Vergès 2011) is said to be resurrected through a “neocolonial at-
titude” (Amiraux 2006: 30) and “post-colonial discourse” (Freedman 2006: 
181) that represents veiled Muslims in Europe as benighted and subjugated. 
In the “subalternization” of the headscarf controversy (Berghahn 2009: 61), 
“leaders, intellectuals and feminists all speak for Muslim women, thereby 
infantilizing them and reinscribing colonial binary oppositions—secular/
religious, free/oppressed, liberal/illiberal and the like—that further deprive 
them of agency” (Cesari 2013: 143). Needless to say, “the hegemonic policy 
of representation dominated by the logic of speaking about and not with 
the Other” (Amir-Moazami and Salvatore 2003: 73) self-servingly projects a 
fl attering image of non-Muslim European women (as well as their men who 
do not force them to veil) as enlightened and liberated (Mavelli 2012: 68; 
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Göle 2011: 94; Mandel 2008: 294–310; Scott 2007: 161–62; Freedman 2006: 
181; Guénif-Souilamas 2006; Terray 2004). “Muslims are constructed as the 
‘other’ to modern European democracies and the boundaries of ‘belonging’ 
are renegotiated within the context of the headscarf debates” (Gresch, Ros-
tock, and Kiliç 2012: 56). Sarkozy is said to have subconsciously acknowl-
edged the ultimately ideological and political nature of the neo-Orientalist 
discourse in his remark “If I enter a mosque, I take off  my shoes. If a young 
Muslim enters school, she has to take off  her veil” (Le Figaro 12 September 
2003). Laïcité is thus exposed as no less a particular faith than Islam and 
unveiling as no less politically imposed than the proscription on shoes in 
mosques (Vakulenko 2012: 118).
It goes without saying that Islamists are familiar with Said’s Orien-
talism. But Islamists appear to be familiar with and keen to exploit post-
colonial analysis far beyond the pioneering classic (Kersten 2011: 12–25). 
For example, Houria Bouteldja (2004) of the European Muslim Network 
denounces the “neo-colonial instrumentalization of the cause of women.” 
She avers that “the media frenzy over the full-face veil ban in France is the 
latest political maneuver by the Sarkozy government looking to frame the 
presence and visibility of . . . Muslims . . . as a threat to national identity” 
(Bouteldja 2011). Iqbal Sacranie, erstwhile head of the Muslim Council of 
Britain, discerned in the French ban of 2004 “an institutionalized Islamo-
phobia that is unfortunately taking root in several parts of Europe. . . . Ban-
ning hijab will send a strong signal throughout the Muslim world that the 
French government is intent on revisiting its dark and brutal days in North 
and West Africa” (quoted in Baran 2011: 145).Th ose Anna Piela (2010: 429) 
dubs “Islamist feminists” are wont to complain of a double stigmatization 
of female Muslims through neo-Orientalist discourse: fi rst for simply be-
ing Muslims and second for being the pious adherents of a faith that par-
ticularly oppresses women. Rather than being seriously asked why they 
cover, veiled Muslim women are presumed to have no autonomous opinion 
of their own. Albeit a male, an imam with the L’union des Organisations 
Islamique de France (UOIF) complained on behalf of his confessional sis-
ters: “Muslim women who wear a foulard are still asking themselves why 
our French co-citizens feel ill at ease with them, and they have no satis-
factory answer” (Le Monde 5 September 2004). Samy Debah, head of the 
French Collective against Islamophobia, deploys a postcolonial fragment in 
his critique of the burqa ban: “Th e niqab law is a pretext to reduce the vis-
ibility of Muslims in public spaces. It exposes an old French colonial refl ex, 
that ‘Arabs and blacks’ only understand force and you can’t talk to them” 
(Guardian 12 April 2011). Although the “colonial refl ex” would, of course, 
not be appropriate in the German case, we can still discern the tone of stig-
matization and domination in the opposition of the IGMG to the German 
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ban for school teachers: it “cultivates prejudices against Muslims, encour-
ages continued discrimination against Muslims in all social spheres, and 
negatively aff ects the integration eff orts of Muslims” (quoted in Yurdakul 
2006: 151). Similarly, Sacranie responded to Salman Rushdie’s assertion that 
the veil “sucks” by saying, “Islamophobes are currently doing all they can to 
attack Islam” (Telegraph 11 October 2006). Massoud Shadjareh, chair of the 
Islamic Human Rights Commission in London, reproved the 2014 ruling 
of the European Court of Human Rights upholding the French burqa ban:
Th is judgment is indicative of the structural marginalisation of 
Muslims. . . . Th is judgment is yet another that has refused to uphold 
core human rights values for some of the most oppressed within Eu-
ropean society, in particular, Muslims targeted by discriminatory 
national laws. (Th e Islamic Human Rights Commission, 4 Septem-
ber, 2014, www.ihrc.org.uk) 
Fatima, one of the three girls originally expelled in Creil in 1989, simply ex-
claimed regarding the French authorities: “Th ey have taken revenge on us” 
(quoted in Collet 2004: 135).
From this perspective, veiling becomes an act of real and symbolic resis-
tance to Western demonization and domination of Muslims. An imam with 
the Union of French Islamic Organizations (UOIF), for example, implored 
Muslims to defy the 2004 ban (Le Monde 5 September 2004). Similarly, 
Mohamad Achamlane, leader of the Islamist organization Forsane Alizza 
(Knights of Pride), which was outlawed by the French Interior Ministry in 
2012, publicly burned the French civil code to demonstrate his organiza-
tion’s defi ance of the burqa ban (BBC News 30 March 2012). In response 
to the Dutch Equal Treatment Commission’s 2005 ruling that the Islamic 
College in Amsterdam could not fi re Samira Hadad for wishing to teach 
without a hijab, the college’s administration stated its intent not to comply 
with the decision (Vakulenko 2012: 39–40). Th e Munich-based hip-hop star 
Ammar implores female Muslims to “never give up”: “Even if they continue 
to spread lies/Allah will stand by you” (quoted in Gerlach 2006: 92–93; my 
translation from the German).
It is hard not to detect in such rebellious words and deeds the infl uence 
of Frantz Fanon’s (1965a) Th e Wretched of the Earth. Th e anticolonial celeb-
rity wrote:
In the beginning the veil was a mechanism of resistance, but its value 
for the social group remained very strong. Th e veil was worn because 
tradition demanded a rigid separation of the sexes but also because 
the occupier was bent on unveiling Algeria. (Fanon 1965b: 63)
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Nor can it be lost on any committed Islamist that the uproar over veiling in 
Europe began only in the wake of and in response to the Iranian Revolution 
and its resistance to Western domination. Needless to say, nowhere in Eu-
rope are Islamists leading a war of independence on the scale of Algeria in 
the 1950s or a revolution like Iran’s in 1979, but in those corners of Europe 
where veiling is mandatory Islamists have eff ected what we can call “micro-
rebellions.” In 2011, for example, Anjem Choudary, leader of the banned 
Islam4UK, created a stir when he announced a campaign to establish in sev-
eral British cities “Shariah-controlled zones” in which, among other things, 
uncovered women would be proscribed. Choudary himself seems to have 
had little success (Daily Mail 28 July 2011), and, of course, public veiling is 
de jure mandatory nowhere in Europe.
However, there are areas—some small, others rather expansive—where 
veiling is for all intents and purposes de facto law. Th ere female Muslims 
beyond the age of puberty are placed under so much pressure to cover in 
public that for them the de facto law of the street trumps formal law. Wom-
en, Muslim and non-Muslim, who fail or refuse to observe the mandate 
are harassed and even driven out of the area, which can be a single street, 
apartment complex, or entire neighborhood (Alonso 2012: 479; Gest 2010: 
103; Ranstorp and Dos Santos 2009; Roy 2007: 85; Jenkins 2007: 182, 252; 
Obin 2004; Brouwer 2004: 50–51; Kepel 2004: 51; Amara 2003; Macey 1999; 
Ashfar 1994). For example, in the Band of Gold campaign in both Birming-
ham and Bradford during 1995 young Muslim men harassed and eventually 
expelled prostitutes from their neighborhoods (Samad 2007: 166). Salafi  as-
sociations oft en organize campaigns to denounce unveiled women and girls 
in neighborhoods and schools where their members are highly concentrated 
(Kepel 2004: 51). With considerable fi nancial resources at hand due to Saudi 
ties, Salafi  foundations are known to deny grants to applying organizations 
that tolerate uncovered female members (Bowen 2010: 117). When in 2003 
Interior Minister Sarkozy told an audience of the UOIF (with ties to the 
Muslim Brotherhood movement) that women would have to unveil for their 
offi  cial ID photos, he was literally booed off  the stage. Indeed, the French 
press’s spotlighting of the event fi gured signifi cantly in the subsequent leg-
islating of the 2004 ban (Joppke 2009: 46).
We should take pains not to exaggerate the intimidation of Islamist re-
sistance. In the fi rst place, harassment of veiled women surely exceeds that 
of unveiled women in both frequency and intensity. In the second place, 
more than a few women pressured to cover simply remove the hijab once 
they have exited the “sharia zone,” or they move out of the zone altogether 
(Roy 2007: 86–87). As Roy (2007: 97) sagely observes, Islamic fundamen-
talists, like Christian and Jewish—or even atheist fundamentalists for that 
matter—would not be true to their beliefs if they did not try to realize them 
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in practice. Th us, Islamist entrepreneurs have opened women-only Islamic 
gyms (for instance, Al-Hayat in Cologne and Orty in Paris) where female 
Muslims can exercise without violating sharia. Because Islamic fundamen-
talists tend to view going out uncovered in public as a sin, they would be 
impious if they were not to oppose and resist statutes banning the veil. It 
should be, then, in a liberal democracy neither surprising nor alarming that 
Islamist organizations such as the UOIF and IGMG sponsor the legal en-
deavors of women and girls sacked or expelled for veiling to overturn the 
bans. It should shock no one that the deputy head of the Muslim Council of 
Britain, Inayat Bunglawala, chastised British Muslims for Secular Democ-
racy in 2002 for permitting female members of its organization to unveil 
(Baran 2011: 133). Nor should it be considered unusual or untoward that 
Islamists proselytize. Jusuf al-Qaradawi, leader of the European Council for 
Fatwa and Research (ECFR), tells his millions of followers on television and 
the internet that all Muslims “should keep up in mind that calling others 
to Islam is not only restricted to scholars and sheikhs, but it goes far to en-
compass every committed Muslim,” including female Muslims, who should 
seek to convince their non-Muslim sisters of the virtue of dressing modestly 
(quoted in Shavit 2007: 16). Or as Nadeem Elyas, chairman of the Zentralrat 
(Central Council) der Muslime in Deutschland put the matter, his organi-
zation would observe German laws even if they violate Islamic precepts “as 
long as Muslims are in the minority” (quoted in Joppke 2009: 114). Likewise, 
Abdallah ben Mansour, former secretary-general of the UOIF, stated that “a 
law once forced Jews to wear yellow stars, and was eliminated. . . . As long as 
the law prohibits the veil, we will respect it, but we will try to get it changed” 
(Le Figaro 6 May 2003). It should also be noted with regard to the allegation 
that Islamists want to impose veiling that when two French reporters were 
kidnapped in Iraq in 2004 and held as ransom in exchange for rescinding 
the ban in France, all major French Islamist organizations denounced the 
deed and implored the French state not to accede to the demands. Th e UIOF 
spokeswoman said she would readily replace one of the journalists rather than 
have her veil “tainted with the hostages’ blood” (quoted in openDemocracy 
11 November 2004; https://www.opendemocracy.net/faith-europe_islam/
article_2216.jsp).
Voluntary Veil
Once European Muslims begin to seek rather than spurn the approbation 
of the state, they drift  (or fragilize) away from Hobbesian postmodernism 
into the normative orbit of either liberal multiculturalism or communi-
tarianism. Hobbesian postmodernism interprets European states as instru-
ments of domination in the hands of non-Muslim majorities for whom the 
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demonization of Muslims is constitutive of their very identity. Here benefi -
cial state assistance for Muslims is by defi nition impossible. Th e only sen-
sible position is resistance and revolution.
For many Muslims, usurping the European state is neither possible nor 
desirable. Th ey want the state’s support for their religious practices and 
therefore work either to prevent or to rescind veiling bans. An obvious place 
to turn for normative backing is to liberal multiculturalism. Th ey contend 
that Muslims should enjoy the same rights as non-Muslims. IGMG, for ex-
ample, frequently argues that women should be no less free to don the hijab 
than to wear a miniskirt (Amiraux 2007: 138). Needless to say, the Islamist 
organization does not condone miniskirts. However, in a normative milieu 
with a venerable liberal tradition of defending individual liberties it makes 
political sense to off er the analogy. Th us, the Islamic Human Rights Com-
mission (in the U.K.) has “urged people to be supportive for [sic] a woman’s 
right to wear the veil as this complies with the values upon which western 
civilization was founded—the protection of human and religious rights” 
(quoted in Hadj-Abdou and Woodhead 2012: 192). Th e association Criti-
cal Muslims in Denmark claims veiling is justifi ed by the “freedom of re-
ligion and self-defi nition” (quoted in Gresch, Rostock, and Kiliç 2012: 66). 
Many Muslim organizations opposed to veiling bans invoke, like the UIOF 
(Hervieu-Léger 2007: 213), Article 9 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, which stipulates that “everyone has the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion . . . either alone or in community with others and 
in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, 
practice and observance.” “Th e way forward,” argues the Polder Moslima 
Headscarf Brigade, the Dutch association of professional Muslim women 
formed in 2009,
is not to insist on social, let alone theological, conformity, but on 
observance of the law and the basic rules of democratic society. As 
long as people play by the rules of free speech, free expression, inde-
pendent judiciaries, and free elections, they are democratic citizens, 
whatever they choose to wear on their heads. (Quoted in Buruma 
2010: 114–15)
French Muslims have cleverly expressed this liberal normative fragment 
by wearing hijabs made from the French tricolors to their public demon-
strations against the bans (Strassburger 2000). Th e British organization 
Protect Hijab campaigns with the slogan “Our Choice, Our Freedom, Our 
Right” (quoted in Hadj-Abdou and Woodhead 2012: 192), while the fashion 
company StyleIslam sells thousands of tote bags inscribed with “Hijab, My 
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Right, My Choice, My Life” (http://www.styleislam.eu/?ActionCall=WebAc
tionArticleSearch&Params%5BSearchParam%5D=hijab).
Ample scholarship exists demonstrating that covering can enhance 
rather than undermine personal autonomy. Th e reader will remember 
from Chapter 2 the tenet of liberal multiculturalism whereby robust affi  li-
ation with a religious or ethnic community can fortify rather than endan-
ger self-determination. Regarding the headscarf, the pioneering study was 
conducted by Françoise Gaspard and Farhad Khosrokhavar (1995: 47), who 
concluded that many of their subjects “desire to be French and Muslim, 
modern and veiled, autonomous and dressed in the Islamic way” (see also 
Abu-Lughod 2013; Göle 2011: 134–36; Haug, Müssig, and Stichs 2010; Jes-
sen and Wilamowitz-Moellendorff  2006; Karakaşoğlu-Aydin 2000; Klink-
hammer 2000; El Guindi 1999). Subsequent studies have found that while 
veiling can exemplify mass conformity in Muslim majority societies where 
the sartorial habit is commonplace, in Europe it oft en represents a “mark of 
bold individualism” (Favell 1998: 178). Shabina Begum, the girl at the center 
of the jilbab controversy in the United Kingdom, complained to BBC Online 
News (22 March 2006; http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4832072.stm): “I don’t see 
why I was told to go home from school when I was just practicing my reli-
gion. I’m just a teenager—not many teenagers go out there and challenge the 
system.” Indeed, Anastasia Vakulenko (2012: 124) reports that in practically 
all of the high-profi le court cases involving veiling, lawyers for covered girls 
and women have emphasized the courage and independence demanded to 
swim against the tide of secular mass conformity. Researchers also fi nd that 
veiling frequently expresses an admirable statement against discrimination 
and symbolizes praiseworthy solidarity with the oppressed that under other 
circumstances most people would approvingly associate with human rights 
activists (Göle 2003: 820–24). On a personal level, the decision to veil can 
open up opportunities for signifi cant growth and independence. For exam-
ple, female Muslims can appease or outmaneuver conservative family mem-
bers who might attempt to impede their wives, daughters, or sisters from 
taking a job outside the home or pursuing a diploma if they were to insist on 
doing so without the veil. Similarly, young Muslims can and do subtly chal-
lenge and change tradition by choosing diff erent styles of hijab not worn, 
for example, by the older generation (Bowen 2012b: 71–74; Dwyer 1999: 5). 
Piela (2010: 429) identifi es “Muslim feminists” who outspokenly condemn 
patriarchal practices of compulsory veiling that have no credible justifi ca-
tion in the Qur’an. Indeed, they equate patriarchy with blasphemy because 
it exalts men rather than reserving exaltation for God alone (Piela 2010: 431; 
see also Ali 2014).Th ese free-thinking Muslims tend to insist that the holy 
script is open to multiple plausible interpretations and that, therefore, each 
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pious woman should decide herself when, where, how, and whether God 
obligates her to cover (Piela 2010: 426).
Prominent Muslims echo these academic fi ndings and thereby distrib-
ute them beyond the confi nes of the academy. Lord Bhikhu Parekh (1999: 
73), who served as chairman of the Commission on the Future of Multi-
Ethnic Britain from 1998 to 2000, explains that covering can be “a highly 
complex autonomous act intended both to remain within the tradition and 
to challenge it. . . . To see it merely as a symbol of their subordination . . . is 
to miss the subtle dialectic of cultural contestation.” In 2010, Baroness Say-
eeda Warsi, the fi rst Muslim cabinet minister in the U.K., weighed in on the 
burqa controversy in favor of free choice, claiming “just because a woman 
wears the burqa, it doesn’t mean she can’t engage in everyday life” (quoted 
in Chesler 2010: 42). Ayten Kiliçarslan (2014), member of the executive com-
mittee of the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Aff airs and the only veiled 
member of the Deutsche Islam Konferenz sponsored by the Federal Minis-
try of the Interior, contends that only those who wish to ban the veil see it 
(mistakenly) as unwanted subjugation: “No woman who wears the heads-
carf of her own free will sees it as a symbol of oppression.” “Th e state should 
remain neutral regarding the diff erent interpretations of the headscarf.” As 
mentioned, Asmaa Abdol-Hamid caused a stir in 2006 when she became the 
fi rst veiled woman to host a talk show (Adam og Asmaa) on Danish TV. She 
went on to become a candidate for parliament with the Red-Green Alliance. 
“Wearing a headscarf does not mean that I’m oppressed or deprived,” she 
insisted. “Otherwise I wouldn’t have got so far as I have today” (KVINFO 
16 May 2007; http://kvinfo.dk/search?fi lter=Asmaa+Abdol-Hamid+). Is-
lamic women’s organizations such Al Nisa (Netherlands), trendy magazines 
for female Muslims such as Sisters (U.K.) or Ala (Turkey) or upscale on-
line fashion studios such as New Hijab in Geneva (www.newhijab.com) or 
MuslimGear (www.muslimgear.com) widely distribute images and stories 
of veiled women leading modern, independent lifestyles. Th ese “hijabistas,” 
as they are sometimes labeled, want to look and feel as fashionable and “to-
gether” as non-Muslim “fashionistas.” In Germany, the younger ones are 
called Frauleinwunder, veiled girls who creatively dress themselves in ways 
that express eroticism more cleverly than their unveiled counterparts (Man-
del 2008: 309).
Th e freedom to choose to cover or not resonates with many infl uential 
non-Muslims. “We are a free country,” declared David Cameron. “People 
should be free to wear whatever clothes they like in public or in private.” 
He added, however, that the niqab should be proscribed in court because “a 
jury needs to be able to look at someone’s face” (Reuters 29 September 2013.) 
Tony Blair had said of the veiling debate in 2006: “Issues such as these are 
matters of personal views, not government policies” (quoted in Joppke 2009: 
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24). Similarly, Interior Minister Sarkozy opposed the proposed 2004 ban 
because veiling “is a personal decision that belongs to the private sphere. 
As for the question of the veil in schools, the Conseil d’Etat has already 
made a decision [to permit veiling]” (Libération 21 February 2003). In 2005, 
a group of sixty-eight members of the European Parliament signed and pub-
lished a Written Declaration on Religious Rights and Freedoms in France and 
throughout the European Union, which berated the French ban as a violation 
of the religious freedom that the EU should guarantee in all its member 
countries. German president Johannes Rau, warning in 2003 against the 
slippery slope, said that “banning the headscarf is the fi rst step toward the 
creation of a secular state that bans religious signs and symbols from public 
life” (quoted in Klausen 2005: 153). In that same year, three German politi-
cians renowned for their involvement with immigration issues, Rita Süss-
muth (CDU), Barbara John (CDU), and Marieluise Beck (Greens), opposed 
the ban for school teachers in an open letter published in Die Tageszeitung 
(15 December 2003):
Th e equal treatment of all religions is mandated by the constitution. 
A diff erent treatment of Islamic symbols as opposed to Christian or 
Jewish ones is problematic from the viewpoint of integration and 
exacerbates confl icts instead of reducing them. (Quoted in Yurdakul 
2006: 160)
German cardinal Ratzinger (the future Pope Benedict XVI) opined that “I 
would not prohibit a Muslim woman from wearing the headscarf,” though 
he added in particularist language, “but even less are we prepared to ac-
cept prohibition of the cross” (quoted in Joppke 2009: 71). Th e archbishop of 
Canterbury also defended veiling, arguing that “the ideal of a society where 
no visible public signs of religion would be seen . . . is a politically dangerous 
one” (Jurist 23 October 2006). Add to these high-profi le individuals out-
spoken NGOs such as Human Rights Watch, Human Rights without Fron-
tiers, and International and Minority Rights Group, all of which condemn 
France’s bans (Vakulenko 2012: 19). Amnesty International, for example, 
denounces the ban as a violation of women’s “rights to freedom of expres-
sion and religion” (BBC News 27 November 2013).
Freedom to don the Islamic veil is well established in much European 
statute. Despite the many polls, parties, and politicians opposed to veiling, 
the practice is permitted in Europe much more than it is prohibited. Fur-
thermore, where bans exist, they typically face formidable battles in local, 
regional, national, or international courts that more oft en than not decide 
against the proscriptions (for instance, Germany in 2015). As Joppke (2009: 
20) concludes, through “(mostly) silent and highly legalistic ways .  .  . the 
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Islamic headscarf has made mighty inroads into western societies.” As far as 
veiling is concerned, dire warnings that Europe lies poised to repeat with its 
Muslim citizens the abominable persecution it once committed against Jews 
are overblown. Th ey are better understood as deliberate political hyperbole 
designed to construct rather than refl ect truth.
Mandated Veil
When Muslims seek state authority to mandate rather than simply wear the 
veil, they tend to employ fragments of communitarian logic. Th ey contend 
that non-Muslims cannot grasp the persistent and profound importance 
of veiling within Islam. For these (mostly Islamist) Muslims, covering is 
a plainly divine commandment, and piety lies in submitting to God’s will. 
From this perspective, the right to choose to cover or not is itself a sin. It 
transfers the authority to determine right and wrong from God to the indi-
vidual, which represents the unholiest of blasphemies. Th e religious obliga-
tion of the believing Muslim is to obey, not to judge God (Asad 2003: 197). 
Listen to the reasoning in an open letter to President Chirac published in 
2003 by the ECFR, led, as mentioned, by Jusuf al-Qaradawi, whose books 
such as Th e Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam and On the Jurisprudence of 
Muslim Minorities are translated into multiple languages and distributed 
widely throughout Muslim communities in Europe:
Wearing the headscarf is a devotional commandment and a duty 
prescribed by the Islamic Law, and not merely a religious or politi-
cal symbol. Islamic women consider this to be an important part of 
their practising of the teachings of their religion. Th is adherence is a 
commandment that has not been made conditional on any (specifi c) 
public place, regardless whether this is a place for religious service or 
an offi  cial or non-offi  cial institution. By their very nature, the teach-
ings of Islam do not know any contradiction or division in the life 
of a Muslim practising his religion. Th is is a matter upon which all 
Islamic schools in past and present have agreed and which has been 
confi rmed by specialised Muslim scholars in all parts of the world. 
(Quoted in Shadid and van Koningsveld 2005: 36–37)
Ali Kizilkaya, longtime IGMG activist and chair of the Koordinierungsrat 
(Coordination Council) der Muslime in Deutschland (KRM), which itself 
acts as the offi  cially recognized representative of Islam in the North Rhine-
Westphalia, caused a stir in 2006 when he insisted that veiling is an uncondi-
tional “religious commandment” that “cannot be contextualised according 
to diff erent countries and places” (quoted in Qantara.de 19 October 2012). 
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Th e inconveniences of veiling are not lost on pious Muslim women. How-
ever, they view the practice diff erently than secular individualists. Th ose 
Piela (2010: 433) labels “non-feminist traditionalists” interpret the hardships 
of abiding by traditional gender precepts, like veiling, polygamy, or docile 
obedience to husbands, as tests designed by God that if passed will result 
in eternal salvation—a far greater joy than, say, unveiling on a hot day. In 
this same vein the Union for Islamic Development and Culture in Bulgaria 
contends that the
hijab is not an attribute of fake modesty. It delivers a certain message 
to people. First, the message is that the woman has decided to submit 
all aspects of her life to the will of God; and second, that she wants to 
be judged on the basis of her virtues and deeds and not her beauty, 
elegance and sex appeal. (Quoted in Ghodsee 2012: 120)
Actually, however, the communitarian stance is not that non-Muslim 
offi  cials should comprehend, let alone agree with this line of pious thinking. 
Rather, precisely because it strikes them as alien, they ought not to meddle. 
Th ey ought to grant Islamic organizations the presumption of equal worth 
and that they have compelling reasons unique to their own tradition and 
community for mandating veiling. Aft er all, Islam antedates secular Eu-
ropean states and will likely outlive them. Th e wisdom of Islam—a world 
religion—is well established and should stand beyond reproachful second-
guessing on the part of non-Muslim lawmakers. Th us, Qawadawi’s ECFR 
insists that it alone has the authority to prescribe what is proper Islamic 
attire for female Muslims residing in Europe (Islamophile Ressources Is-
lamiques en langue française; http://www.islamophile.org/spip/spip.php?
page=recherche&recherche=voile). Similarly, Nadeem Elyas exclaimed in 
2004: “We want to keep our identity as Muslims in Germany, as German 
Muslims.  .  .  . Society does not have a right to decide for us what parts of 
Islam are acceptable and which are not. Th at step has to come from us” 
(quoted in Klausen 2005: 30). Although the Austrian government refused its 
request to mandate veiling in Islamic religion classes in public schools, the 
offi  cially recognized Islamic Religious Community in Austria (Islamische 
Glaubensgemeinde in Österreich) continued to insist, when facing demands 
of the Freedom Party in 2003 to ban veiling, that the sartorial practice rep-
resents an internal matter for the Muslim community alone to determine 
(Avramopoulou, Çorbacioğlu, and Sanna 2012: 40). Likewise, declaring that 
only Muslims should determine proper practice, the Muslim Council of 
Britain (2007) also urged that veiling should be mandatory in Islamic edu-
cation classes. Th e Islamic Council of Norway (Islamsk Råd Norge) agreed 
with Oslo’s 2006 proscription of the niqab in secondary schools because 
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“the niqab is not obligatory in Islam.” However, the organization harshly 
criticized the government for not consulting with the council fi rst, arguing 
it alone should determine what is obligatory in Islam (quoted in Vakulenko 
2012: 42). Even the prime minister of a secular state, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, 
in response to Şahin v. Turkey, said that “the Court [the European Court of 
Human Rights] has nothing to say on this issue, we have to ask the Ulama” 
(Hürriyet 16 November 2005).
Sympathy for the communitarian outlook can be heard from non-
Muslim Europeans as well. In 2004, for instance, the pope, archbishop of 
Canterbury, and vice-president of the World Jewish Congress each criticized 
the French ban and warned secular states in general about interfering in the 
internal matters of religious organizations (Vakulenko 2012: 19). Manifest-
ing the philosophical kinship between nationalism and communitarianism, 
a number of Far Right nationalist parties such as France’s National Front, 
the Vlaams Blok, and Austria’s Freedom Party have endorsed the idea of 
separate Islamic schools with the discretion to choose whatever dress code 
they deem appropriate (Fillitz 2006: 112; Wieviorka 2002: 144). Th e same 
holds for the French New Right think tank GRECE and its German sister 
organization the Th ule Seminar. Jean Marie Le Pen went so far as to claim 
that he prefers veiling because it makes it easier to distinguish clearly be-
tween Muslims and non-Muslims (Tyrer 2013: 48).
European states do tolerate and even support Islamic organizations that 
mandate veiling. Most mosques, many of which receive public subsidies of 
one sort or the other, mandate veiling for female Muslims and non-Muslims 
alike. Islamists organizations whose members must cover count among the 
many organizations that European governments at various levels fi nancially 
assist to off er services to immigrant communities (more about these in the 
next chapter). In 2000 when deciding to annul a municipal ban on veiling, a 
Belgian judge consulted the Islamic and Cultural Centre of Belgium, which 
explained that it was a religious duty to cover in public (Shadid and van 
Koningsveld 2005: 45). In 1993, the Federal Administrative Court of Ger-
many, in what would become an important precedent-setting decision, sided 
with the Muslim parents of a twelve-year-old Turkish girl who sought an ex-
emption from mandatory co-educational swimming classes because her veil 
might slip off  in front of boys (Joppke 2009: 55). Indeed, many schools and 
municipalities throughout Europe now provide single-sex swimming hours 
to accommodate female Muslims (Shavit and Wiesenbach 2012: 53–54; Ba-
ran 2011: 138). Nor should we forget that European governments tolerate 
hundreds of Islamic organizations that mandate veiling simply by virtue 
of the fact that they are allowed to operate legally without state subsidies. 
Keep in mind too that far more discretion and money are granted to Roman 
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Catholic churches, all of which forbid women from serving in the most sig-
nifi cant ecclesiastical offi  ces.
Pragmatic Veil
Th e seemingly intractable controversy over the practice of compulsory veil-
ing garners much public attention. In actuality, however, on a daily basis 
across Europe, thousands of Muslims and non-Muslims forge pragmatic 
resolutions of the confl icts by bending principle, engaging ambiguity, and 
tolerating inconsistency. Th ese pragmatists tend to be ordinary citizens 
tasked with fulfi lling concrete responsibilities—teaching students, parent-
ing kids, providing social services, hiring able employees, keeping jobs—
who simply cannot aff ord to paralyze their immediate eff orts by becom-
ing bogged down in stubborn disagreement over incompatible principles. 
In such situations, observes Anne Norton (2013: 226), “the ‘clash of civili-
zations’ has given way to conviviality in popular practice. Th e opposition 
of ‘us vs. them’ has given way to the complex demands and possibilities of 
ordinary life together.” Without necessarily being either able or willing to 
articulate a coherent doctrine of hospitable postmodernism, these everyday 
problem-solvers regularly follow fragmentary precepts of the public philos-
ophy, such as relaxing principle, attending to context, probing alterity, and 
embracing hybrid solutions.
Concrete cases are too numerous to detail in full; a few outstanding 
examples will have to suffi  ce. As mentioned in the introduction, although 
Altrincham Girls’ Grammar School expelled two pupils for veiling in 1989, 
they were allowed to return so long as the veils conformed to the colors 
of the school’s uniform. Since then, many schools in the U.K. require and 
many Muslims agree to wear veils that match the school uniforms. In 1993, 
for example, Shabina Begum’s school (Denbigh High) had consulted with 
both Muslims and non-Muslims to devise a design of the shalwar kameeze 
in school uniform colors (Joppke 2009: 97). Indeed, when the controversy 
over Begum’s jilbab broke out in 2004, Denbigh off ered Begum free daily 
transportation to nearby schools that permitted the garment. Begum ob-
stinately refused, took the school to court, eventually lost, spent two years 
without classroom instruction, and ultimately enrolled in one of the schools 
to which Denbigh had off ered to transport her (BBC News 22 March 2006). 
In the case of Aishah Azmi, who was sacked for refusing to shed the niqab 
when teaching, a solution was found in 2006 whereby the state-controlled 
Anglican junior high school permitted Azmi to wear the niqab when not 
teaching, including “when she was moving to diff erent parts of the school” 
(quoted in Joppke 2009: 102).
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Pragmatic solutions can be found beyond the shores of “multicultural” 
Britain. Th e Dutch state allowed policewomen to wear blue hijabs until 2001, 
when veils were proscribed. As intimated, the 1993 ruling by Germany’s 
Federal Administrative Court, whereby girls may not be forced to unveil in 
physical education classes, has prompted numerous pragmatic adjustments. 
Some schools simply exempt the girls from swimming classes. In others 
where parents and teachers alike do not want the girls to forego swimming 
instruction, gender-segregated instruction takes place or the burkini is 
required. Veiled girls have also been integrated into co-educational classes, 
like volleyball, where the hijab does not appear to pose any danger to the 
wearer (Collet 2004: 121–22). A 2007 study conducted by the Intercultural 
Council of the Ministries of Culture of the Länder found that in the vast ma-
jority of cases a mutually agreeable solution is reached by parents, teachers, 
and pupils (reported in Migration und Bevölkerung October 2007; http://
www.migration-info.de/ausgabe/oktobernovember-2007-807). We should 
always keep in mind as well that the number of cases is typically small; in 
the entire school system of Berlin in 2004/2005, for instance, there were 
only fi ft een girls who sought exemption (Bahners 2011: 254).
Private-sector businesses in particular have proven imaginatively fl ex-
ible. More interested in profi t than stalemate, employers and employees have 
devised numerous ways to keep female Muslims on the job, to a point where 
Veit Bader (2007: 164) reports that the headscarf issue has proven easier 
to resolve than others, such as excused absences for religious holidays or 
daily prayer. Th e Dutch department store Vroom and Dressman and the 
supermarket chain Albert Heijn have designed special headscarves with the 
respective business logos in the store’s brand colors (Saharso 2007). Switzer-
land’s largest supermarket chain, Migros, employs a case-by-case approach 
that emphasizes the need to respect “diff erentness” (Neue Zürcher Zeitung 
20 July 2007).
Th ese approaches would appear far more fl exible and accommodating 
than those of the French. For example, the school whose ban on the veil in 
physical education was upheld by the European Court of Human Rights in 
Dogru v. France (2008) expelled Dogru despite the fact that she proposed 
wearing a hat or a balaclava (Vakulenko 2012: 115). Other evidence, how-
ever, points to much more fl exible pragmatism, even in France. For example, 
of the 639 cases between 2004 and 2011 in which female pupils defi ed the 
French ban, 550 disputes were solved through what the Education Minis-
try termed “dialogue” (Leiken 2012: 32). Most resolutions involve striking a 
compromise such as a bandana that covers the hair but not the entire head 
and neck like the hijab (Bertossi and Bowen 2014). In another example, the 
Driving Standards Agency does compel women applying for licenses to un-
veil for their photo but only in a private room in the presence of a female 
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examiner (Joppke 2009: 105). Arguing that arrests for violating the burqa 
ban of 2011 would be a waste of time, the French police union announced 
that gendarmes would not arrest women for wearing the burqa in public. 
Likewise, boutique owners on and near the Champs Élysées made it known 
that they intended neither to turn away nor to report burqa-clad patrons 
(Guardian 12 April 2011).
More than a few Islamist organizations have also exhibited fl exibility. 
Th e UOIF, for instance, endorsed the aforementioned bandana compromise 
but added that turtleneck sweaters should be permitted to cover the neck 
(Hellyer 2009: 183). Th e UOIF also agreed in 2004 to sign the statement 
of the Conseil français du culte musulman (CFCM) that declared veiling 
a “religious prescription” as opposed to a “religious obligation,” but only 
on condition that the CFCM would call for recognition of “interested third 
parties” to consult with offi  cials in particularly diffi  cult cases. As long as 
state offi  cials were open to negotiations, the UOIF agreed not to encourage 
its members to defy the 2004 ban. As one of the organization’s imams put 
the matter, “Th e only Muslims who will survive spiritually are those who 
know how to moderate, adapt and negotiate their practices with the real-
ity of French society” (quoted in Laurence 2012: 214, 215). Similar concilia-
tion issued forth from the Unione della Comunità Organizzazioni Islami-
che in Italia (UCOII) in regard to a 2009 proposal to proscribe the niqab 
in public schools: “Th e niqab is against the law, which requires everyone’s 
faces to be recognizable.” At the same time, however, the UCOII upbraided 
the proposal, alleging that there were no niqab-wearing students in Italian 
schools (quoted in Laurence 2012: 215). Similarly, the general secretary of 
MCB, Farooq Murad, has said “it is wrong to force anyone to wear the veil” 
but also added that it is equally wrong for government to force anyone to 
discard it (BBC News 4 November 2013). With regard to swimming classes 
in German schools, the female deputy director of IGMG’s legal department, 
Gülüzar Keskin, has pleaded for each pupil’s right to “decency,” leaving to 
case-by-case negotiation, however, exactly how decency is to be realized 
(Amir-Moazami 2011: 11).
Th e practical wisdom emerging from these pragmatic compromises 
would seem to emphasize open-ended negotiations with all interested par-
ties as well as context-specifi c rulings and statutes subject to trial and open 
to renegotiation. Draft ing the opinion of the House of Lords, Lord Bingham 
of Cornhill (2006: §34) argued that confl icts regarding veiling should al-
ways be considered as matters pertaining to “a particular pupil and a par-
ticular school in a particular place at a particular time.” “Th e House,” he 
insisted, “is not, and could not be, invited to rule whether Islamic dress . . . 
should or should not be permitted in the schools of this country” (§2). In 
the same year, the spokesman for the Department of Education and Skills 
140 Chapter 4
stressed the same kind of contextual specifi city: “What an individual pupil 
should or should not wear in school is a matter for individual schools in 
consultation with parents” (BBC News 22 March 2006). Similar advice was 
recommended by three of the four constitutional experts summoned for tes-
timony by the Landtag of Baden-Württemberg, though their counsel was 
not heeded (Joppke 2009: 74). Th e SPD, however, has endorsed the case-by-
case strategy (Andreassen and Lettinga 2012: 26), and Länder such as Ham-
burg, Schleswig-Holstein, and Saxony have implemented it (von Blumenthal 
2009). Th is was the same approach prescribed by the Conseil d’Etat in 1989, 
endorsed by Interior Minister Sarkozy (Le Monde 10 May 2003), and car-
ried out by state-appointed mediator Hanifa Cherifi  before (and even aft er) 
the blanket ban of 2004 (Korteweg and Yurdakul 2014: 24–25). Resolutions 
seem to work best when involved parties suspend the stubborn attitude 
that compromising one’s principles must needs constitute failure. Th us the 
French section of Milli Görüş urged that “we should fi nd a ‘modus vivendi’ 
which will permit each one not to lose face in front of the others” (quoted 
in Strassburger 2000: 136). Malika Hamidi (2009) of the European Muslim 
Network beseeches all involved to keep an open mind by posing “audacious 
questions that help in changing mentalities.” Th rough “bypassing fears and 
stereotypes” negotiators open themselves to resolutions neither sanctioned 
nor imagined by rigid adherence to principle.
Nilüfer Göle (2011: 137) advises “mature multiculturalism.” Mature 
multiculturalism embraces diversity but without the naïve presumption 
that all forms of diff erence are salutary. Traditional Muslim women, for 
example, can learn much from exposure to Western-style feminism, but 
they should not be impervious to its imperious dismissal of all forms of 
Islamic veiling as subjugation (see also Balibar 2004: 156–57). Relatedly, 
conventional secular feminists can sensitize themselves to their own nar-
row-mindedness through encounter with the Islamist critique of liberal 
feminism’s simplistic equation of women’s liberation with having the same 
rights and opportunities as men. But this should not mean that Islamist 
teaching and practice regarding women should be beyond reproach. In-
deed, vigorous resistance to unchecked patriarchy can be heard from with-
in Islamist circles. For example, IGMG, as part of its campaign to encour-
age girls and women to pursue higher degrees and professional careers, 
off ers classes, workshops, and support groups designed to equip pious fe-
male Muslims with Qur’an-based objections to traditional patriarchal cus-
toms and mores that impede female fl ourishing (Joppke 2009: 61; Ewing 
2008: 79). Rather than rejecting and eschewing their religious tradition, 
these (mostly but not exclusively female) Islamist activists are competing 
within their organizations for leadership positions from which they can 
redefi ne and reshape that tradition (Piela 2012: 33–39; Schiff auer 2008a: 
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126; Laborde 2008: 144–46; Amir-Moazami and Salvatore 2003: 60–70). 
According to Hamidi (2009), these eff orts manifest a “new way of thinking: 
feminist in its demands and deeply rooted in the Muslim tradition.” Th e 
Islamist activist discerns a new, hybrid “model/profi le of European Mus-
lim women [that] is half-way between the western model of emancipation 
and the traditional model of the Muslim woman.” Mature multicultural-
ism would shy away from neither including Hamidi and others like her in 
the policy-making process nor exploiting their insights to determine on a 
case-by-case basis when and where state intervention is needed to stop veil-
ing (or other) practices truly harmful to girls and women.
Conclusion
Th e present chapter, like the previous one, demonstrates how in practical 
politics fragments from all three public philosophies—liberalism, national-
ism, and postmodernism—become combined in eff orts to advance and le-
gitimize a particular political agenda. Th us, opponents of the veil curse it as 
an intolerable violation of female individual liberty with one breath and as 
an aff ront or even threat to “our” national way of life with the other. More-
over, few opponents can resist the postmodern temptation to exaggerate the 
desultory consequences of veiling by likening it to savagery or slavery. For 
their part, proponents of veiling hail it as an expression of bold and brave 
individualism while also pronouncing it a communal prerogative that Is-
lamic organizations should be allowed to mandate for individual members. 
As far as postmodern-inspired manipulation of the truth is concerned, pro-
ponents of the veil outlandishly equate its banning (that usually aff ects only 
a few hundred or thousand persons at most) with the Christian Crusades or 
European imperialism.
Such practical political bricolage or montage manifests more than mere 
philosophical laxity and imprecision on the part of political practitioners. It 
refl ects, normatively speaking, expanding mutual fragilization in the pro-
tracted Kulturkampf among liberalism, nationalism, and postmodernism. 
It refl ects diff use, if not fully conscious appreciation that liberal, nationalist, 
and postmodern forms of normative reasoning, while diff erent and con-
fl icting, nonetheless prove persuasive to voters. In an increasingly fragilized 
normative atmosphere political activists who confi ne their moral justifi ca-
tions to a single public philosophy run the risk of handicapping their pros-
pects of political success. Consistently principled strategizing is an academ-
ic luxury (or burden) that is simply too costly in practical politics.
Furthermore, examining the headscarf controversy from the van-
tage point of fragilization and fragmentation helps to avoid two common 
oversimplifi cations. First, the controversy does not pivot around Muslim 
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versus non-Muslim perspectives, as the clash-of-civilization thesis pos-
its. Th e chapter provided ample examples of persons of both Muslim and 
non-Muslim heritage who oppose veiling by invoking fragments of liberal, 
nationalist, and postmodern reasoning. Likewise, both Muslims and non-
Muslims work to permit veiling and also deploy crisscrossing fragments of 
liberal, nationalist, and postmodern logic.
Second, diff erences from one country to the next are neither as distinct 
nor as fi rm as the national models paradigm postulates. In the fi rst place, 
the chapter showed that the debates about whether to proscribe or permit 
veiling share much in common across Europe. Th ere does not appear, for in-
stance, to be an unmistakable preponderance of liberal perfectionism in the 
French debate, liberal multiculturalism in the British discussion, or nativist 
nationalism in the German context, as the national models paradigm im-
plies. Rather, strains of each as well as of communitarianism and Hobbesian 
and hospitable postmodernism are discernable across European countries. 
Th e discordant yet increasingly fragilized discourse is truly Europe-wide.
As far as actual policies are concerned, the national diff erences appear 
starker at fi rst glance but begin to blur when viewed through the lens of frag-
mentation and fragilization. France’s ban on all ostentatious religious symbols 
in public schools would seem to be normatively motivated by unadulterated 
liberal perfectionism. However, by attuning to fragilization toward nativism 
we were able to realize that the ban, both in design and in implementation, 
actually targets Islamic symbolism. Th is means that in actuality the French 
policy diff ers far less from the statutes of the CDU-controlled German Länder 
that, until the 2015 ruling of the Constitutional Court, proscribed the hijab 
(for teachers) but permitted the yarmulke and habit. As for the sway of na-
tivism in Germany, half of the Länder followed policies that accorded with 
liberalism until the court decided squarely in favor of individual autonomy 
in 2015. Attention to fragilization toward communitarianism and especially 
Hobbesian postmodernism helped to shed light on the de facto mandatory 
veiling transpiring regularly in numerous corners of European countries, 
though none of the latter formally sanctions the practice. And focus on hospi-
table postmodernism revealed that pragmatic problem-solvers (again Muslim 
and non-Muslim) in both places that ban veiling and those that allow it con-
trive makeshift  compromises that eliminate or alleviate real human suff ering 
caused either by veiling or unveiling.
Both the policies and conditions under which (un)veiling takes place are 
in fl ux. Th ey alter because they are contested. Across Europe we encounter 
“opposed answers to the same question” (Bowen and Rohe 2014: 155). “No 
agreement exists on the meaning of . . . terms, nor about the strategies they 
entail” (Andreassen and Lettinga 2012: 18). Th e national models paradigm 
does not exclude the possibility of change but, with its emphasis on path 
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dependency and national accord, it inclines toward accentuating constancy 
and consensus as opposed to fl uctuation and contestation. Th e paradigm 
foregrounds the winners in the political process, whereas the approach 
taken in this chapter spotlights winners and losers. But today’s losers can 
swift ly become tomorrow’s victors. In countries like France, Belgium, and 
Germany, veiling bans are being contested in the courts, legislatures, and on 
the streets. No one should be surprised if the bans are circumvented, nulli-
fi ed, or rescinded, as, in fact, took place in Germany in 2015. Nor should one 
(or, hopefully aft er reading the current chapter, could one) consider coun-
tries without bans such as Austria, the Netherlands, or the United Kingdom 
immune to anti-veiling strivings, for they exist in those countries as well. 
Finally, regardless of whatever formal laws are registered on the books, in-




A new religious pluralism is shaking up Atlantic democracies.
—Thomas Banchoff, Democracy and the New Religious Pluralism
T he comparative study of church-state relations has generated its fair share of tidy models. Bader’s (2007: 203) impressive study, for example, de-lineates fi ve models: strong establishment (Greece, Serbia, Israel), weak 
establishment (England, Scotland, Norway, Denmark), plural establishment 
(Finland), nonestablishment combined with public institutionalization of re-
ligious pluralism (Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, Austria, Belgium, Spain), 
and strict separation (France, United States). Triandafyllidou (2010b: 11) dis-
tinguishes between “Absolute secularism” (France), “Moderate secularism” 
(Sweden, Netherlands), “Moderate religious pluralism” (Britain, Germany, 
Spain, Italy, Greece), and “Absolute religious pluralism” (no European land 
yet) (also see Monsma and Soper 2009; Casanova 2007). Th is national mod-
els paradigm has been extended to analyze mosque-state relations in Europe, 
yielding the claim of, say, a distinctly French style of handling Islam clearly 
demarcated from a German, British, or Swedish approach (Joppke and Torpey 
2013; Fetzer and Soper 2005). Scrupulous comparativists never fail to off er 
the obligatory caveat that no country perfectly fi ts any one ideal type but pro-
ceed nonetheless to assign countries to typology cells to yield the kind of tidy 
contrasts and comparisons just mentioned (Bader 2007: 201–5). Faced with 
muddle or model, in other words, the analysts prefer the latter.
I resist this urge and instead employ a deliberately disordering tack that 
emphasizes policy muddle born of normative diversity and discord. Now 
diversity and discord over the role of religion in politics represent rather 
recent phenomena in Europe during the postwar era. Many scholars concur 
that during the generation following World War II, something close to a po-
litical consensus formed in Europe that religion should be a private matter 
with virtually no role to play in politics outside of innocuous tokenism (such 
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as a prayer to open a session of parliament). Most Europeans fell into the cat-
egory of “believing without belonging” (Davie 1994) or “belonging without 
believing” (Hervieu-Léger 2004). José Casanova (2007: 63) rightly charac-
terizes the period as “the triumph of the knowledge regime of secularism.” 
Th is consensus has evanesced. To be sure, many remain confi dent, even su-
perciliously so, that European-style secularism represents a model that oth-
ers should copy. But this position no longer goes unchallenged. As Haber-
mas (2006: 2) remarks, “divisive political moods [are] crystallizing around” 
secularism as we move into the “post-secular” age. Grace Davie (2007: 238) 
observes that “religion has become an increasingly salient factor in public 
debate.” Göle (2004: 151, 14) discerns a “sacralization of public opinion” and 
postulates that “the conspicuous way in which Islam is appearing in the 
national public spheres is destabilizing homogenous structures and conven-
tional principles of consensus.” Similarly, Casanova (2006: 77) notes that 
Muslims are causing a stir “not only because of their religious otherness as 
a non-Christian and non-European religion, but more importantly because 
of their religiousness itself as the ‘other’ of European secularity.”
However, I want to resist the temptation to assert that the growing dis-
cord in Europe regarding secularism pits antisecular Muslims against sec-
ular non-Muslims, as several popular books contend (Fallaci 2006; Ye’or 
2005; Schwarzer 2002a). Against this binary reading I submit that viewing 
the politics of secularism through the normative prism of liberalism, na-
tionalism, and postmodernism off ers a more nuanced interpretation. Warn-
ings that fundamentalist zealots must be prevented from injecting religious 
and even theocratic tendencies into politics stem from the liberal tradition. 
Claims that European nations must insist on and even strengthen their Ju-
deo-Christian character against the diluting eff ects of “Islamization” echo 
nationalist thinking. Postmodernism yields the notion that liberal secular-
ism is itself a faith like both Christianity and Islam in the sense of ulti-
mately being based on arbitrary axioms and contingent beliefs that must be 
imposed in one way or the other on believers and unbelievers alike. Acting 
like pragmatic bricoleurs, political actors, both Muslim and non-Muslim, 
regularly deploy these and other fragments of liberal, nationalist, and post-
modern thinking, creating a highly fragmented and, we shall see, fragilized 
normative atmosphere that contributes to “messy empirical data” (Laurence 
2012: 28) revealing “contradictory policies” and “inconsistent institutional 
arrangements” of “stunning complexity” (Bader 2007: 53, 276).
Liberal Neutrality
Every European government formally honors in some way the liberal sec-
ular ideal of neutrality. According to this norm, the state should neither 
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determine the religion of its citizens nor discriminate among them on the 
basis of the religion they do (not) choose to follow. In addition, the state 
must see to it that nonreligious organizations do not coerce or discriminate 
on the basis of creed. Most European constitutions enshrine this principle. 
Article 16 of Spain’s Constitution is standard:
Freedom of ideology, religion and worship of individuals and com-
munities is guaranteed, with no other restriction on their expression 
than may be necessary to maintain public order as protected by law. 
No one may be compelled to make statements regarding his or her 
ideology, religion or beliefs.
Furthermore, European states typically pledge to honor various interna-
tional conventions and treaties that also guarantee religious freedom, such 
as Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights or Article 4 of 
the United Nations’ Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intoler-
ance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief.
As regards Muslims, European governments have regularly trans-
gressed this liberal tenet or have tolerated its transgression by others. Nu-
merous organizations and reports have documented pervasive discrimi-
nation against European Muslims in practically all walks of life (Hafez 
2014; Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 2013: 
191–230; Antidiskriminierungsstelle 2013; Amnesty International 2012; 
Ansari and Hafez 2012; Zick, Küpper, and Hövermann 2011; Peucker 2010; 
Open Society Institute 2010; 2002; European Union Agency for Funda-
mental Rights 2009; European Union Monitoring Centre 2006; see also 
www.islamophobia-watch.com). Such analyses draw conclusions regard-
ing Islamophobia for numerous European lands similar to those arrived 
at by the Runnymede Trust (1997) for Britain: “In twenty years it has be-
come more explicit, more extreme, more pernicious and more dangerous 
. . . [and] is part of the fabric of everyday life in modern Britain, in much 
the same way that anti-Semitic discourse was taken for granted earlier in 
this century” (quoted in Joppke 2009: 90).
Shamed by such illiberal practices, many European governments have 
taken steps to redress the abuses. Th e EU’s so-called “Framework Directive” 
“establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and 
occupation,” issued in conjunction with the 2000 Race Directive, explicitly 
denounces discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief and calls on 
member states to take concrete steps against both direct and indirect dis-
crimination with the aim of “ensuring full equality in practice” (Article 7). 
Many member states have passed laws and established governmental agen-
cies to combat discrimination such as the Netherlands’ Equal Treatment 
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Law (1994), the Commission for Equality and Human Rights in the United 
Kingdom (2004), the Haute Authorité de Lutte contre la Discriminations 
et pour l’Egalité in France (2005; since 2011 Défenseur des Droits), and the 
Antidiskriminierungsstelle des Bundes in Germany (2006). Going a step 
further, most European governments have sought to counterbalance inher-
ited institutional favoritism by establishing formal, high-profi le relations 
with Islam that aim to parallel and (eventually) emulate those already in 
place between the state and Christianity (and oft en Judaism) in most Euro-
pean countries. While some states, such as Austria, Belgium, Spain, Greece, 
Sweden, and the Netherlands, already had close ties with Islamic represen-
tatives long before 9/11, others deliberately moved to form them thereaft er. 
Th us did France found the Conseil Français du Culte Musulman in 2003, 
Britain the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board in 2005, Italy 
the Consulta per l’Islam Italiano in 2005, and Germany the Deutsche Islam 
Konferenz in 2006.
Th ese relations are highly complex and protean. In the fi rst place, coun-
tries have intricate and varying existing relations between church and state 
into which Islam is expected to fi t—already a problematic endeavor given sig-
nifi cant diff erences between Christianity and Islam, such as the latter’s gen-
eral lack of centralized authority to represent the creed before the state (Lau-
rence 2012; Pêdziwiatr 2007; Godard 2007; Warner and Wenner 2006; Fetzer 
and Soper 2005). Second, as we shall see as the chapter unfolds, mosque-state 
relations turn out to be sites of vehement normative discord, although far less 
over the fi ner points of theology than over the competing stances of secular-
ism spawned by liberalism, nationalism, and postmodernism.
We must enter this normative thicket from somewhere. Liberal multi-
culturalism represents a good starting point, for it prima facie informs the 
state’s gesture to reach out to Islam and Muslims. According to liberal mul-
ticulturalism, the state should be neutral. It should treat all (signifi cant) reli-
gions equally, on condition, however, that their adherents eschew theocracy 
and recognize the supreme sovereignty of manmade law in mundane aff airs 
(Habermas 2008a; Bader 2007: 112; Casanova 1994: 211). Furthermore, be-
lievers and unbelievers alike are expected to respect personal autonomy—
that is, the right of each individual freely to choose which faith(s) he or she 
wishes to embrace, abandon, or ignore. In the European context, this means 
extending to Islam and Muslims similar if not identical benefi ts (such as 
tax breaks for mosque construction; subsidies for private religious schools; 
religious education in public schools; marriage and burial rights; pastoral 
clerical services in hospitals, prisons, and the armed services; and public ac-
cess TV time) to those long granted Christian (and other) denominations in 
most if not all European societies. Th e Austrian political philosopher Rainer 
Bauböck (2002: 170) writes:
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Th e state can live up to its obligation of equal concern and respect 
for all citizens by, on the one hand, extending whatever historical 
privileges the dominant religion has enjoyed to the minority congre-
gations and, on the other hand, abolishing those that involuntarily 
subject non-believers to some religious authority. (see also Modood 
2003: 164; Hervieu-Léger 2001: 101–3)
Something like this moral vision has received typically sententious en-
dorsement at the highest political levels. As early as 1993, French interior 
minister Charles Pasqua posited: “It is no longer enough to talk of Islam 
in France. Th ere has to be a French Islam” (quoted in Schain 1999: 216). 
Th is new engagement with Islam subsequent interior minister Nicolas 
Sarkozy would label “positive secularism”—the state’s encouragement of 
rather than separation from religious communities. In 2009 in an editorial 
in Le Monde (9 December), President Sarkozy voiced his desire to “put the 
Muslim religion on an equal footing with all other great religions.” Ger-
man interior minister Wolfgang Schäuble also expressed his wish that the 
“Muslims in Germany” become “German Muslims” (Frankfurter Allgeme-
ine Zeitung 26 September 2006), while Angela Merkel has exclaimed that 
“Islam belongs in Germany” (Deutsche Welle 12 January 2015). Tony Blair 
fi rst visited a mosque at the outset of Ramadan in 1999, Her Majesty or-
dered a prayer room built at Windsor Castle for her lone Muslim servant 
in 2004, and Prince Charles has voiced his wish to be crowned “Defender 
of Faiths” rather than “Defender of the Faith” (Th e Independent 22 March 
2014). Furthermore, the EU’s draft  constitution of 2004 did not (aft er much 
debate however) refer to Europe’s Christian roots, and the criteria for mem-
bership stipulated in the European Council Summit in Copenhagen of 1993 
do not include Christian heritage. Th e applications for membership from 
predominantly Muslim Turkey and Morocco are currently being negotiated 
(if amidst objections). Th e offi  cial message is unmistakable: Muslims are 
welcome and should not have to quit their creed as a consequence of resid-
ing in traditionally Christian Europe. As the founder of the Muslim Council 
of Britain, Iqbal Sacranie, approvingly noted, “Th ere is now an open door to 
the government” (quoted in Lewis 2002: 133).
Th e warm welcome, however, usually comes accompanied by the liberal 
quid pro quo demanding allegiance to the constitution and commitment to 
the secular values it enshrines. For example, the Italian interior minister, 
Giuseppi Pisanu, maintained in 2002: “Italian Islam must harmonize with 
.  .  . Italian rules” (quoted in Laurence 2012: 107). In the very same edito-
rial mentioned above, Sarkozy averred that integration for Muslims “means 
accepting gender equality, secularism and separation of the temporal and 
spiritual.” Across the Rhine, Chancellor Angela Merkel urged that “anyone 
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coming here must respect our constitution and tolerate our Western and 
Christian roots” (Financial Post 17 February 2006). “In Germany only the 
constitution is valid, not Sharia” (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 8 October 
2010). Tony Blair, while averring that the only sure strategy for defeating 
Islamist extremism had to embrace Islam, nonetheless emphatically added: 
“Th ere has to be a shared acceptance that some things we believe in and we 
do together: obedience to certain values like democracy, rule of law, equality 
between men and women. . . . Th is common space cannot be left  to chance 
or individual decsion. It has to be accepted as mandatory” (Wall Street Jour-
nal 9 November 2010).
Euro-Islam
Th e desired end of such outreach is “Euro-Islam,” a neologism as telling as 
it is fashionable. It is telling because Euro-Islam is not only conceived as an 
Islam befi tting life in Europe, but also as a Europeanized Islam—that is, an 
Islam that has been subjected to a similar self-scrutiny and self-reform as 
the Christian denominations are alleged to have undergone in the modern 
age (Roy 2004: 29). In the notion of Euro-Islam we can detect the blurry line 
between liberal perfectionism and voluntarism. To the extent that the state 
resolves to shape Euro-Islam and actively recruit Muslims to it, as we shall 
see below, liberal perfectionist logic weighs in. However, if the state leaves it 
to Muslims themselves to articulate, preach, and practice Euro-Islam, lib-
eral voluntarism prevails.
It just so happens that Muslim reformers abound in Europe. Promi-
nent Egyptian-born Italian journalist Magdi Allam, for example, long in-
sisted that “Islam is a faith which, in a moderate interpretation, is abso-
lutely compatible with the values shared by the Italian civil society and 
the Italian Constitution” (Il Grillo 2 April 2001). Advocates of Euro-Islam, 
self-appointed modernizers like Naser Khader (Denmark), Baroness Kish-
wer Falkner, Ziauddin Sardar, Maajid Nawaz, Shahid Malik (U.K.), Bassam 
Tahhan, Dounia Bouzar, Mohammad Arkoun, Malek Cheleb, Samia Labidi 
(France), Lamya Kaddor, Seyran Ateş, Bassam Tibi (Germany), Ehsan Jami, 
the late Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd (Netherlands), Mansur Escudero (Spain), 
and Sadiq Jalal al-Azm (Belgium), tend to start from the assumption that 
the conventional practice of Islam in the sending countries has over the cen-
turies taken on countless cultural and ethnic accretions that are not integral 
to the pristine faith. As envisaged by its proponents, Euro-Islam would ab-
rogate, for example, any theocratic ambitions and embrace democracy. It 
would tolerate all other creeds, including atheism, and recognize the right 
of each individual to choose or craft  his or her own faith. Th e prohibition 
of apostasy would have to be excised from Islamic doctrine. Furthermore, 
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this “liberal Islam” (Bouzar 2004) would purge from conventional Islam 
all precepts and rituals that off end modern democratic sensibilities, such 
as eye-for-eye justice, the subordination of women to men, or homophobia 
(Marcouch 2008). Likewise, this “enlightened Islam [which] is compatible 
with world civilization, with Europe, and with the spirit of the Republic” 
(Cheleb 2004) would systematically disavow Qur’anic interpretations of na-
ture belied by modern science and underscore the many passages in congru-
ence with current science. Most importantly, it would entail subjecting the 
Qur’an to the same kind of rational scrutiny applied in biblical criticism 
since the nineteenth century. Th e sacred text would be read not as the iner-
rant and literal word of God, but as the words of specifi c men formulated in 
specifi c times—indeed, times very diff erent from our own (Abu Zayd 1996: 
68). Bassam Tahhan writes:
Th e tradition regards the Koran as one-dimensional and fi xed. Th is 
approach is not rationalist. To be a rationalist is to accept that each 
era, with its [particular] methods and discoveries, presents its own 
reading of the Koran, and this is the way it will be until the end of 
days. (Quoted in Jenkins 2007: 140)
Once European Muslims understand that there exists no real alternative 
to interpreting the Qur’an, it is believed they will become more comfortable 
customizing the creed to better jibe with modern rationalism, including de-
mocracy and pluralism. A thorough “rethinking [of] Islam” (Arkoun 1994) 
harbors the potential to bring forth an Islam based on independent judgment 
(ijtihad) rather than on slavish obedience to authority. Th is Euro-Islam, its 
proponents contend, is likelier to survive and thrive in a culture such as 
Europe’s that prizes free choice (Bencheikh 1998). Th e self-acknowledged 
Habermasian and Euro-Muslim Bassam Tibi (2002: 37–38) summarizes:
By acknowledging cultural and religious pluralism, Euro-Islam 
would give up the claim of Islamic dominance. Th us defi ned, Euro-
Islam would be compatible with liberal democracy, individual hu-
man rights, and the requirements of a civil society. It would also 
contrast sharply with the communitarian politics that result in 
ghettoization. To be sure, the politics of Euro-Islam would not allow 
complete assimilation of Muslims. Yet it could enable the adoption 
of forms of civil society leading to an enlightened, open-minded Is-
lamic identity compatible with European civic culture.
Dozens if not hundreds of Islamic organizations in Europe have en-
dorsed some version of Euro-Islam. For instance, the Islamic Charter draft ed 
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by the Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland in 2002 explicitly renounces 
the goal of creating a theocracy and declares that “Muslims affi  rm the liberal 
democratic order of the Federal Republic of Germany, including party plu-
ralism, women’s right to vote, and religious liberty.” Furthermore, “Muslims 
accept the right to change one’s religion, to have another religion or no reli-
gion at all” (quoted in Joppke 2009: 113). Similarly, Denmark’s Demokratiske 
muslimer (www.demokratiskemuslimer.dk), formed in 2006 in the wake of 
the cartoon controversy by Social Liberal MP Naser Khader, dedicates itself 
to “furthering the understanding that Islam is compatible with democracy” 
(trikkefrihed.dk at http://www.trykkefrihed.dk/de-demokratiske-muslimer-
hvor-blev-de-af.htm). A like message resounds from Islamic political parties, 
such as the Islamic Party of Britain or the Muslim Democratic Party in Bel-
gium, which seek to elect more Muslims to public offi  ce.
Perhaps the most persuasive case for an Islam compatible with Europe-
an secular ways and norms issues forth from millions of European Muslims, 
who daily choose to live in this way. A bevy of survey studies documents 
among European Muslims widespread support for liberal democratic val-
ues in general and secularism in particular (Cesari 2013: 21–80; Algan and 
Aleksynska 2012: 312–13; Kaya 2012: 86; Saunders 2012: 62–68; Haug, Müs-
sig, and Stichs 2010; Inglehart and Norris 2009; Pew Global Attitudes Proj-
ect 2006; Peter 2006; Diehl and Schnell 2006; Klausen 2005; Lucasson 2005; 
Tribalat 1996). Th e Scientifi c Council for Government Policy of the Neth-
erlands (2006: 198), for instance, urged readers to keep in mind that “the 
overwhelming majority of Muslims, of course, fully comply to [sic] the rules 
of the democratic constitutional state.” If we are to believe the polling of the 
Pew Global Attitudes Survey of 2006, between half and three-quarters of Eu-
ropean Muslims, depending on the country, see no problem with remaining 
pious in modern secular society. It is actually non-Muslim Europeans who in 
far greater numbers discern a profound confl ict between Islam and secular-
ism (Pew Global Attitudes Project 2006). Jocelyn Cesari (2007: 114) argues 
that most Muslims in Europe “resemble the ‘pickers and choosers’ of other 
religions in the West. Like ‘consumers,’ they tailor their religious practice 
and tradition to their own subjective specifi cations.” Th is “personalization” 
(LeVine 2003: 102) of religion yields a “patchwork quilt” (Wuthnow 2005) 
or “bricolage” of “experienced Islams” with “quasi unlimited itineraries of 
belief identifi cation” (Hervieu-Léger 2007: 203, 216; see also Yükleyen 2012: 
145–51). Individualized Islamic practice helps to explain the immense pop-
ularity among European Muslims of several televangelist-like imams such 
as Amr Khaled (3.5 million Facebook “likes”), Mustafa Hosny (1.65 million 
“likes”), Ahmad al-Shugairi, Moez Masoud, and Fethulla Gülen (Economist 
29 October 2011; Gerlach 2006: 29–31). Th ese purveyors of “popular Islam” 
(Mandaville 2014: 392) send a steady message over television and computer 
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screens imploring Muslims to interpret and practice Islam in ways that fi t 
their personal lives, independent of the precepts emanating from traditional 
Islamic authorities. “We should decide our own lifestyles,” preaches Khaled 
(quoted in Gerlach 2006: 40). Th ough hardliners deride this as “Islam light,” 
there is not much they can do to diminish the prominence of these cleri-
cal mavericks, because Islam lacks a central authority like the Vatican to 
certify bona fi de preachers (Hervieu-Léger 2007: 209; Warner and Wenner 
2006; Roy 2000). Th e result is the prevalence of “Pop-Islam,” “cool Islam,” 
or even “Cola Quran” customized to fi t into a quotidian consumer culture 
that bedazzles Muslims no less than non-Muslims (Foroutan and Schäfer 
2009; Gerlach 2006: 109; Boubekeur 2005: 12). Olivier Roy (2004: 124–25) 
contends that consumerism has so diluted Islamic belief and practice that 
the term “Muslim” now connotes no more than a loose affi  liation (“neo-
ethnicity”) with Islam that includes millions of persons who seldom observe 
the creed’s doctrine. Th ese are “cultural Muslims” (Akbarzadeh and Roose 
2011: 320) who are no more religious in any “thick” sense than the “Chris-
tian” Europeans who “believ[e] without belonging” (Davie 1994) or “belong 
. . . without believing” (Hervieu-Léger 2004; also see Gest 2010: 106; Brett-
feld and Wetzels 2007; Allievi 2003: 23–24; Dassetto 2000).
Th is would all seem to be good news for liberal secularism, and it is. 
Most European governments seek to integrate Islam into the secular order, 
and most European Muslims appear to be integrating. Yet it is premature 
to predict victory for liberal secularism, as does Laurence (2012: 245); for 
opponents (both Muslim and non-Muslim) of the liberal multicultural vi-
sion of secularism are many, and their voices too have swayed increasingly 
fragilized policy makers.
Communitarian Secularism
Let us begin with Muslim opponents who chide European governments 
for their insistence on Euro-Islam. Th e critics discern an imperious eff ort 
to dictate to Muslims how they should worship—a kind of thinly veiled 
“churchifi cation” of Islam (Roy 2004: 29). Th ey do not oppose secularism 
per se; rather, they work with a diff erent normative conception of state neu-
trality informed by communitarian reasoning. Briefl y recalling from Chap-
ter 2, communitarianism posits that any genuine community, including a 
small diaspora, should be permitted to determine itself the chief values and 
standards according to which it lives. It should not be compelled to observe 
or honor norms and values foreign to itself. Th e ethical core of communi-
tarianism resides in what Charles Taylor (1994: 66) calls “the presumption 
of equal worth.” In our case, this means that mosques and their related or-
ganizations should be presumed to have good reasons for organizing and 
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governing themselves the way they do, including when their measures ap-
pear objectionable to “outside” offi  cials or to the majority population. From 
this diff erentialist perspective, individuals are said to gain greater satisfac-
tion from organizations in which they can recognize themselves and their 
values—in which, in other words, they experience a sense of ownership and 
authorship. Furthermore, such self-governing organizations of persons who 
recognize themselves as a community tend to be more attuned to members’ 
particular needs and can customize programs to meet them, making more 
productive and eff ective use of resources than “outsiders” (Walzer 2004: 56).
Embassy Islam
Th e most infl uential advocates of a communitarian approach to Islam in 
Europe have arguably been the governments of sending countries with 
large numbers of Muslim émigrés. Th e European embassies and consulates 
of countries such as Pakistan, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Turkey have 
steadfastly and oft en successfully applied diplomatic pressure on European 
governments to be permitted to superintend the everyday practice of Islam 
for their émigrés in Europe. Not long aft er they signed bilateral agreements 
with receiving countries in the 1960s to send workers, the foreign ministries 
of the sending countries negotiated additional bilateral accords to provide 
cultural centers (for instance, the Maghrebi amicales), radio and television 
programs, prayer rooms, and imams to service the particular cultural and 
religious needs of expatriates (Brand 2006: 14). As the number of immi-
grants grew, and especially once the families of what had been mostly male 
laborers and students joined them in the 1970s and 1980s, their govern-
ments expanded the outsourcing agreements to include teachers, curricula, 
and textbooks for “mother-tongue” classes in the public schools providing 
instruction in the language, culture, and religion of the immigrant pupils’ 
respective homelands. Th e embassies erected their own “offi  cial” mosques 
and associated Islamic organizations and federations, such as the Diyantet 
İşleri İslam Birliği (Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Aff airs) or La Fon-
dation Hassan II pour les Marocains Résidant à l’etranger (Hassan II Foun-
dation for Moroccans Living Abroad) and the related Féderation nationale 
des musulmans de France. Algeria exercised its infl uence by gaining control 
of the Grande Mosquée de Paris, whose chief imam has long been appoint-
ed by Algiers. Th e Saudis underwrote and thereby controlled the Islamic 
Council of Europe based in London, the Munich Islamic Center, the Islamic 
Cultural Center (ICC) of Brussels (recognized by the Belgian government as 
the offi  cial representative of Islam in Belgium since 1974), and the Centro Is-
lamico Culturale d’Italia (CICI) in Rome. Th ese organizations have aspired 
and in many cases managed to become hubs of religious activities for their 
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expatriates and their descendants in Europe, coordinating and overseeing 
intricate transnational networks of Islamic services ranging from Friday 
worship to aft er-school religious education (Qur’an schools) to provision of 
halal foods, proper Islamic burial (oft en back in the homeland), or travel 
accommodations for the haj to and from Mecca (Cesari 2013: 245–54; Lau-
rence 2012: 30–69; Pargeter 2008: 16–31).
Th e European embassies of the sending countries have waged vocifer-
ous campaigns against the assimilation of their émigrés, underscoring ad-
herence to Islam as an indelible marker of diff erence. What observers label 
“embassy Islam” promotes interpretation and practice of the creed in the 
diaspora identical to the offi  cially sanctioned Islam of the sending countries 
(Laurence 2012: 30; Gould 2009: 62). Th e secretary general of the Saudi-
sponsored Organisation of the Islamic Conference, which has worked close-
ly with the Islamic Council of Europe established in 1973, maintained: “Th e 
most serious problem that can face a minority is social absorption by the 
majority. Such an absorption is usually the result of a long assimilation pro-
cess that nibbles at the Islamic characteristics of the minority until it disap-
pears altogether” (quoted in Laurence 2012: 38–39). Th e Pakistani minister 
for religious aff airs was more hopeful, asserting in 1980 that adherence to 
Islam made Muslims in Europe like “sand in water—they cannot possibly 
get dissolved and be assimilated” (Brohi 1980: 31). According to its mis-
sion statement, the Hassan II Foundation “strives to maintain and develop 
fundamental ties between Moroccans living abroad with their home coun-
try” (quoted in Laurence 2012: 66). Th e Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious 
Aff airs (DITIB), whose offi  cial mission since 1971 has been to “instill love 
of fatherland, fl ag and religion,” obliges the approximately 900 mosques it 
sponsors in Germany to observe the laws and statutes of the Turkish Repub-
lic (quoted in Dere 2008: 292–93). Th e embassy-sponsored organizations not 
only preach and teach almost exclusively in the languages of their respective 
homelands and thereby encourage separatist congregations of mainly native 
speakers; they also in their sermons, pamphlets, curricula, and classes are 
known directly or indirectly to reinforce jingoistic, misogynistic, homopho-
bic, authoritarian, and other illiberal norms and values that, while perhaps 
commonplace in the sending countries, confl ict with the allegedly predomi-
nant values of the liberal democratic receiving countries (Laurence 2012: 
68–69; Gest 2010: 121; Mohr 2006: 38, 267; Zeeuw 1998). Employing classic 
Herderian logic, embassy representatives contend that their citizens abroad 
will identify only with an Islam they can recognize, and that is the Islam 
of the homeland: “Once an immigrant encounters another society which 
is new to him .  .  . he starts to ask questions of identity and he fi nds that 
the fi rst response that comes to him is religion and nation.  .  .  . Belonging 
to a nation, belonging to a religion can give comfort” (quoted in Laurence 
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2012: 221). Indeed, the embassies have stubbornly resisted cooperation with 
nongovernmental Islamic organizations in Europe, arguing that sending 
country governments should be granted exclusive control over the provi-
sion of Islamic services to their respective diasporas (Laurence 2012: 55, 68, 
159–62, 218–22; Steinberg 2010: 151–56; Bowen 2010: 26–60). Turkish prime 
minister Erdoğan went so far as to aver in 2004 that DITIB, which answers 
to his government, should “be accepted as the EU’s only partner on related 
issues” in recognition of the “leading role played by Turkey in the Islamic 
world” (quoted in Laurence 2012: 230–32). CICI proclaims itself “the only 
credible interlocutor for Italian authorities,” while the ICC has been rec-
ognized as the “interlocuteur privilegie” in Belgium since 1978 (quoted in 
Laurence 2012: 68).
Communitarianism serves the concrete interests of the embassies. As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, they are keen to keep ties to the homeland ro-
bust so as to encourage the remittances that are so important to economic 
prosperity and arguably regime stability. Embassies further have sought to 
marginalize, indeed squelch, nongovernmental Islamic associations in Eu-
rope, many of which have been led by radical and exiled dissidents associ-
ated with Islamist movements, such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, 
the Turkish Milli Görüş (National Vision), the Algerian Islamic Salvation 
Front, the Moroccan Justice and Spirituality Movement, and the Tunisian 
Islamic Tendency Movement. No comfortably ensconced governmental of-
fi cial can easily erase the memory of the Iranian Revolution of 1979, which 
was originally fomented by cassette tapes smuggled in from France, where 
Ayatollah Khomeini resided in exile. If anyone needed a reminder, Rachid 
al-Ghannouchi, aft er twenty-two years of exile in the United Kingdom, re-
turned triumphantly to his native Tunisia following the ouster of President 
Zine el-Abidne Ben Ali in 2011. Th e embassies have long argued that with-
out the availability of their “moderate Islam” the exiled radicals will win the 
hearts and loyalties of the Muslims in Europe (Laurence 2012: 37, 55).
Communitarianism has also dovetailed nicely with the interests of re-
ceiving governments, who have tended to prefer embassy Islam as the lesser 
of two evils and more likely to encourage docility among immigrants than 
radical Islamism, whose political mobilizing occasionally turned violent 
in European streets during the 1980s and 1990s (Laurence 2012: 35–38). 
As one French offi  cial remarked, “Algeria, Morocco, and Turkey were able 
to off er France a common front that was perhaps not pro-Western but at 
least anti-terrorist” (quoted in Laurence 2012: 37). Favoring embassy Islam 
also pleased governments with which European states wanted to main-
tain cordial relations for geopolitical reasons. Erstwhile Italian prime 
minister Guilio Andreotti explained regarding oil-rich Saudi Arabia: “All 
the mosques the Saudis have built around the world became elements of 
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propaganda. I am not naïve. But the important thing is to try to have a rela-
tionship with them” (quoted in Laurence 2012: 54). More importantly still, 
communitarianism has aided receiving governments in placating their pub-
lics. Tolerating and even fostering an essentially separatist Islam oriented to 
the homeland has reinforced the convenient though illusory notion that the 
Muslims were temporary guestworkers who would one day repatriate. Nat-
urally, the degree of communitarianism has varied from country to country. 
France went so far as to instruct judges in the 1980s to apply Islamic law 
(for example, polygamy and unilateral husband divorce) in family matters 
for fi rst-generation migrants, though this policy was halted in 1993 (Bowen 
2010: 175). Since the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, Greece has permitted shar-
ia law in family matters for the Turkish Muslim minority in Western Th race 
(Triandafyllidou 2010c: 202). However, as Laurence (2012: 32) incisively 
concludes, “Every European government, whether overtly ‘multicultural’ or 
not, accepted outside funds and allowed outside authorities—from Algeria, 
Morocco, and Turkey to Saudi Arabia, Libya, and beyond—to infl uence its 
local Muslim population.” In this way, the very same governments that have 
endorsed the liberal goal of integration and today vilify “multiculturalism” 
for encouraging Muslim separatism have long fostered the latter. But that is 
precisely the kind of policy messiness that we should expect in a fragmented 
and fragilized normative milieu.
NGO Islam
In similarly messy fashion, the liberal policy of guaranteeing freedom of 
religion and association has made possible, if largely unintentionally, a form 
of communitarianism practiced by nongovernmental Islamic associations 
in Europe. From the time of their fi rst arrival on European soil, Muslim 
migrants who did not wish to affi  liate with the worship centers overseen 
by their governments have established independent mosques and Islamic 
organizations. In the early years, these were typically very small-scale op-
erations housed in abandoned warehouses or other undesirable, low-rent 
commercial spaces and fi nanced through meager budgets patched together 
with tiny donations, principally from indigent migrants. Th ese independent 
mosques too tended to orient to the homeland—however, not to the offi  cial 
Islam sanctioned by their homeland governments, but rather to the actually 
practiced Islam of the villages from which most migrants originated. As 
migrants followed fellow villagers who migrated before them in a process of 
“chain migration,” they sought to recreate in the receiving country the con-
ditions of the village back home. It was common, for instance, to recruit an 
imam from the village of origin to run the community’s mosque in the set-
tlement land. Islam was thus pivotal to establishing this comforting “ersatz 
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home” in a threatening foreign environment (Schiff auer 2010: 46), but it was 
an Islam characterized by a very high degree of “ideological infl exibility” 
(Ansari 2004: 346; see also Macey 1999). Th e recruited imams as well as 
their fl ocks oft en exhibited “frozen clock syndrome”: nothing should change 
in their religious practice from the moment they left  the village, even if cul-
tural life in the village continued to evolve (Pickles 1995: 107; see also Leiken 
2012: 62, 244). Th is “guestworker Islam” (Ceylan 2006: 177) has tended to 
be a largely “defensive religion” at the cultural epicenter of an insular com-
munity life that has rarely extended much beyond the confi ned “triangle 
of fl at, work, and mosque” (Schiff auer 2010: 47)—what Justin Gest (2010: 
79) labels the “square mile mentality.” Th ese tiny congregations of faithful 
Muslims were “rarely heard and even more rarely recognised and listened 
to beyond their own communities” (Werbner 2002: 6–7; see also Simonsen 
2000: 148–50). Well over three-quarters of imams in Europe neither are citi-
zens of the destination country in which they reside nor speak its dominant 
language profi ciently (Laurence 2012: 144). Th ough they have never received 
nearly as much aid from receiving governments, when the latter did allot 
fi nancial aid (oft en at the municipal level) to the independent mosques, it 
was almost always given along with maximum discretion to mosque leaders 
to use the aid as they deemed necessary (Laurence 2012: 74–75; Leiken 2012: 
213–14; Schain 2010: 140–41; Gest 2010: 87–92; Mohr 2006: 268; Fadil 2006: 
57). Whether simply tolerated as part of guaranteeing freedom of religion 
and association or directly funded with little or no oversight in a policy of 
multiculturalism, nongovernmental Islamic associations were also able to 
practice and preach norms and values profoundly at odds with those of-
fi cially espoused by the receiving governments and allegedly embraced by 
their majority publics (O’Brien 2013a: 75–77; Frampton and Maher 2013: 
40–51; Abadan-Unat 2011: 128; Bowen 2010: 30; Gest 2010: 121; Otterbeck 
2010: 112; Briggs, Fieschi, and Lownsbrough 2006: 27; Ceylan 2006: 249–51; 
Mohr 2006: 38; Werbner 2002: 6–7; Shaw 2000; Gardner 1995).
In the late 1970s and 1980s, many of the small mosques began organiz-
ing into federations. Th e most adept of the organizers have turned out to be 
Islamists, many of whom took refuge in Europe as political exiles persecuted 
by homeland governments for alleged radicalization of Islam—for example, 
in Nasser’s Egypt of the 1960s and 1970s as well as under Mubarak in the 
1990s, in Turkey with the recurrent party bans and coups during the 1980s 
and 1990s, in Morocco with Hassan II’s campaigns against the Justice and 
Spirituality Movement, or the cancelled elections in Algeria in 1991 won by 
the subsequently ousted Islamic Salvation Front (Laurence 2012: 77). In this 
way, major Islamist movements across the Islamic world, such as the Mus-
lim Brotherhood, Milli Görüş, Jama’at-i Islami (Islamic Community), and 
Deobandi, came to have European counterparts—respectively, the Union 
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of Islamic Organisations in Europe (with national branches in most lands 
such as the L’union des Organisations Islamique de France or L’Unione 
delle Comunità e Organizzazioni Islamiche in Italia), the Islamische Ge-
sellschaft  Deutschland and the Islamische Gemeinde Milli Görüş (with af-
fi liated branches beyond Germany, for instance, in the Netherlands, France, 
and Belgium), the United Kingdom Islamic Mission, and Tablighi Jamaat 
(for details see Laurence 2012: 85–97; Meijer and Bakker 2012; Baran 2011: 
73–83; Boubekeur and Amghar 2006; Amin 2002: 965; Grillo 1998: 198).
Th e nongovernmental activists have sought to distinguish themselves 
from and vie with the embassies for the allegiance of European Muslims. 
Th is the former have accomplished by increasingly directing their ener-
gies and resources away from the homeland to the situation in Europe. In 
particular, they have focused their eff orts on pragmatically addressing the 
real-life problems of pious Muslims striving to practice their faith in a Eu-
ropean environment not especially conducive to doing so. Doctrinally this 
has involved establishing a novel school of Islamic jurisprudence—fi qh al-
aqalliyyat—to issue rulings on what constitutes pious behavior for Muslims 
living in the non-Muslim majority societies of Europe. Th ere now exist doz-
ens of books (Qaradawi 1999), websites, hotlines, radio and television call-in 
talk shows, such as Al-Shari’ah wal-Hayat (Islamic Law and Life) carried on 
the Al Jazeera network or found at www.Islamonline.net, and sponsored by 
the hugely popular Jusuf al-Qaradawi and his organization, the European 
Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR), formed in 1997 by the Union of 
Islamic Organisations in Europe (UOIE). From these sources devout Mus-
lims can seek helpful advice on how to work, date, marry, educate, dress, 
eat, fast, pray, and even die piously in Europe (Mandaville 2014: 380–82; 
Parray 2012; Gerlach 2006: 60–67)—what the ECFR labels “integration 
without assimilation” (quoted in Joppke and Torpey 2013: 148). Institution-
ally, these nongovernmental Islamic federations have sponsored most of the 
legal battles to win exemptions for Muslims whose religiously required be-
havior transgresses statutes and regulations of European governments and 
businesses. Th us, L’union des Organisations Islamique de France (UOIF) 
funded the legal battle of the three girls from Creil to attend school wear-
ing the hijab (Laurence 2012: 208); the Islamische Gemeinde Milli Görüş 
(IGMG), which warns of the “rising danger of assimilation,” sponsored Fer-
shta Ludin’s court case in Baden-Württemberg (quoted in Bundesministe-
rium des Innern 2008: 252). Th e IGMG was also behind the successful eff ort 
in 2002 to legalize halal butchering in Germany over the remonstrations 
of animal rights activists who deem the ritual slaughter without anesthetic 
cruel (Joppke and Torpey 2013: 65). Various forms of halal slaughtering are 
permitted in France, Italy, Spain, Finland, Denmark, the United Kingdom, 
and Belgium, although the Dutch parliament banned the practice in 2011 
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(Financial Times 3 August 2011). Th e IGMG also steered the endeavor to 
exempt Muslim girls from mandatory mixed-gender swimming classes in 
public schools because their parents “do not wish their daughter[s] to be 
emancipated as Westerners understand that term” (quoted in Joppke and 
Torpey 2013: 59; Rohe 2004: 92). Th e nongovernmental organizations have 
led the campaigns, in Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and 
to a lesser extent in France and Switzerland, to allow Muslims to be buried 
separately from non-Muslims and facing Mecca (Bader 2007: 18; Koopmans 
et al. 2005: 55–56). Th e same generally holds true for eff orts to gain from 
non-Muslim employers special prayer spaces and break periods for Muslims 
keen to meet the Islamic requirement to pray toward Mecca at designated 
moments fi ve times per day or, for instance, not to be required to handle 
pork products or alcohol (Maréchal 2008: 36–37; Bader 2007: 18; Hervieu-
Léger 2007: 204; Koopmans et al. 2005: 55–56). Indeed, Ruud Koopmans 
and colleagues (2005: 155) found that in Europe Muslims seek exemptions 
from statute and convention more than any other minority community 
(also see Shavit and Wiesenbach 2012: 49; Pêdziwiatr 2007; Yurdakul 2006: 
157; Lewis 2006: 170).
To justify such exemptions they frequently deploy fragments of commu-
nitarian logic. For example, the Institut Européen des Sciences Humaines 
in Château-Chinon, which has strong ties to the UOIF, has long off ered to 
supply French schools with its graduates to teach Islamic instruction, but 
only on condition that it and it alone determine the content of the train-
ing (Khosrokhavar 2010: 138). In 2001 aft er a protracted political and legal 
struggle, the IGMG-affi  liated Islamic Federation of Berlin scored a major 
communitarian victory by winning the privilege to write and implement 
the curriculum for Islamic religious education in Berlin schools (Yurdakul 
2009: 98–99). However, aft er a few years in operation city offi  cials terminat-
ed the program by replacing all denominationally specifi c religious instruc-
tion with a generic religious studies curriculum (Schiff auer 2006). Longtime 
Milli Görüş activist Ali Kizilkaya, who heads the Koordinierungsrat der 
Muslime in Deutschland (Coordinating Council of Muslims in Germany), 
which off ers religious education for the schools of North Rhine-Westphalia, 
insists that only his organization can and should determine what consti-
tutes “correct belief.” “People will have to get used to that,” he adds, “some-
thing that should not be that diffi  cult since this same prerogative Christian 
churches have long enjoyed” (quoted in Qantara.de 19 October 2012; https://
en.qantara.de/content/islamic-religious-education-in-germany-allah-or-
the-advisory-council). Indeed, several other German Länder (Lower Sax-
ony, Hesse) have recently contracted with Islamic organizations to off er 
Islamic instruction in public schools (Ceylan and Kiefer 2013: 154). Ap-
provingly citing the example of separate Christian and Jewish courts in the 
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Ottoman Empire, Abdullah Bin Bayyah (2002) of the ECFR advocates the 
establishment in contemporary Europe of fi qh courts (tribunals of Islamic 
jurisprudence) staff ed by Muslim judges appointed by the ECFR but with 
the backing of the secular state. Indeed, in the United Kingdom several Is-
lamic tribunals, such as London’s Islamic Sharia Council, the Muslim Arbi-
trational Tribunal in Nuneaton, or the (all-female) council in Birmingham’s 
Central Mosque, are currently operating (Griffi  th-Jones 2013; Bowen 2012a: 
82–83). Th e Arbitration Act of 1996 recognized the rulings of such Chris-
tian, Jewish, and Islamic tribunals as legally binding in civil matters so long 
as both parties voluntarily submit to the arbitration (Saunders 2012: 91). As 
mentioned, something roughly similar has existed in Greece for the Turkish 
Muslim minority in Western Th race since the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 
(Triandafyllidou 2010c: 202).
Many non-Muslims endorse diff erentialist exemptions for Muslim Eu-
ropeans. Erstwhile archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams touched off  
a great row in 2008 when he asserted that aspects of sharia dealing with 
private matters (for example, divorce) should be “recognised” by British 
law, a position seconded later that year by the country’s highest justice, 
Lord Phillips (Bowen 2012a: 72–73). Prominent legal experts and offi  cials 
in other lands have announced their interest in something similar, for 
example, Norwegian Prime Minister Erna Solberg (Drammens Tidende 6 
November 2003; see also Cesari 2013: 115–20; Bowen 2010: 176; Migration 
und Bevölkerung February 2012; Radio Netherlands Worldwide 3 Septem-
ber 2009). In 2002, while mayor of Amsterdam, subsequent Labour Party 
leader Job Cohen advocated state subsidies to Islamic organizations even 
when some of their practices (for example, subordinating women) off end 
the sensibilities of most Dutch citizens (Buruma 2006: 245). When con-
ceding in 1999 that North African immigrants were not likely to disap-
pear from French soil in the foreseeable future, French New Right guru 
Alain de Benoist maintained
that ethnocultural identity should no longer be relegated to the private 
domain, but should be acknowledged and recognized in the public 
sphere. Th e New Right proposes, then, a communitarian model which 
would spare individuals from being cut off  from their cultural roots 
and which would permit them to keep alive the structures of their col-
lective cultural lives. (Benoist and Champetier 2012: 3:2)
I in no way wish to imply that communitarianism is upstaging liberal multi-
culturalism. For instance, a German judge in 2007, claiming that the Qur’an 
permits wife battery and that it is not unusual in Moroccan cultural circles, 
denied divorce to a Moroccan Muslim wife complaining of physical abuse 
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at the hands of her husband. Th e decision caused a national scandal and 
was swift ly nullifi ed. Virtually the same thing recurred in 2008 with the 
decision of a court in Lille that granted a divorce to a Muslim husband on 
grounds that his wife was not a virgin at the time of their marriage (Surkis 
2010). My point is that governments allow and European Muslims encoun-
ter at once both integrative and separatist policies and opportunities—a 
conclusion that several studies have drawn (O’Brien 2013a; Scholten 2011; 
Otterbeck 2010: 112; Sunier 2010: 125; Spena 2010: 169; Schiff auer 2002: 
15). Th ere is no consistent and uniform policy toward Islam, just as there 
is no overarching ethical consensus favoring liberal multiculturalism over 
communitarianism.
Hobbesian Postmodernism
A conspicuous number of Muslim persons and organizations have severed 
or spurned relations with European governments (Roy 2007: 49; Boender 
2006: 107; Scientifi c Council 2006: 202; Klausen 2005: 87; Bielefeldt and 
Bahmanpour 2002; Modood 1994). For example, Martin Muñoz and col-
leagues (2003: 119) found that roughly one-third of the Islamic organiza-
tions in Spain eschew state funds and prefer to remain independent and 
separate. Jonas Otterbeck (2010: 107) estimates the number in Sweden at 25 
percent. Hizb ut-Tahrir (Liberation Party) maintains that
the hopeless track record of the current Muslim MPs is clear proof 
of how they must abandon our communities and Islamic values to 
remain within those parties. Th e path for voting for, and participat-
ing in, these secular parties will no doubt bring harm rather than any 
good to our community. (Quoted in Akbarzadeh and Roose 2011: 314)
As distrust of the state intensifi es, the sway of Hobbesian postmodernism 
comes into play. Communitarianism nurses the hope for a neutral state in 
the application of the presumption-of-equal-worth principal to Islam. By 
contrast, Hobbesian postmodernism rejects the possibility of neutrality 
and conceives the state as an integral part of a complex array of powerful 
persons and forces for which the demonization and domination of Islam 
are constitutive. Th us, anything approaching a more level playing fi eld can 
only be achieved by eluding and resisting state authorities—to wit, by build-
ing pockets of resistance and autonomy among Muslim diasporas amidst 
the surrounding dar al-harb (abode of war) (Boubekeur 2007). Göle (2011) 
argues that Islamists have since the Iranian Revolution of 1979 become in-
creasingly emboldened about resisting Western secularization (see also Par-
geter 2008: 16). As the prominent Islamist leader Rachid al-Ghannouchi has 
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opined, “One day, we will be able to infl uence the West as much as it has 
infl uenced our countries” (quoted in Maréchal 2008: 263).
I hasten to add, however, that in real politics the boundaries between 
Hobbesian postmodernism and communitarianism are as shift ing and po-
rous as those between the latter and liberal multiculturalism. As will be 
demonstrated below through an analysis of consultative bodies established 
of late in many European lands between the state and Islam, some organi-
zations make overtures to the state despite distrusting it. Others trust the 
state initially but begin to doubt aft er frustrating experiences. In many or-
ganizations the leaders and the rank-and-fi le alike are divided on what is 
the best strategy to pursue: enthusiastic support, cautious cooperation, or 
obstinate rejection. Some pursue all three at one time or the other depend-
ing on the context. Precisely such fl uidness and polyvalence—that is, messi-
ness—should be expected in a normative landscape rife with fragmentation 
and fragilization.
Islamism
With that caveat registered, we can nonetheless discern the sway of Hobbes-
ian postmodernism among Muslim organizations, particularly Islamist 
ones. I emphatically reiterate that Islamists and their supporting organiza-
tions are not monolithic. Critical diff erences in doctrine and strategy divide 
them, but they all tend to concur on the ultimate superiority of God’s law as 
they interpret it, especially in the Qur’an, Sunna, and Hadith. In the context 
of this chapter on secularism in Europe, it makes sense to lump the diff ering 
groups and beliefs together under a single category. Islamists, like Christian 
and Jewish fundamentalists, who, by the way, outnumber Islamic funda-
mentalists in Europe by a factor of two to one (Jenkins 2007: 75), pose a 
challenge to the secular European state’s demand, in theory at least, that all 
its citizens eschew theocracy and submit to man-made law (Roy 2007: 23).
For Islamists, resisting European-style secularism means much more 
than simply maintaining a particular identity; it is about defending their 
access to eternal salvation. Th ey resolutely believe that the majority of Eu-
ropean Christian and Jewish denominations have, in submitting to the 
conditions of Western secularism, made a tragic mistake, with grave con-
sequences for all humanity. By subordinating themselves to man-made law, 
they have forfeited the role of moral leadership, thereby opening the way 
for unbuttoned hedonism to become the ersatz religion of the masses and 
leaving morally unguided and unchecked an economic and political elite 
that has ravaged the planet and its peoples through wanton pursuit of this-
worldly profi t and power. Secularism, for Islamists, is synonymous with the 
triumph of sin over morality, evil over good. Th ey resolve to resist it, which 
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they believe they do best by endeavoring to live by Islamic precepts as much 
as possible in all aspects of their lives, private and public. IGMG’s website 
(www.igmg.de), for instance, claims the organization is committed to “the 
application of Islamic principles to the public sphere.” In an interview in 
2003, UOIF leader, Lhaj Th ami Brèze, repeated the tenet of the Muslim 
Brotherhood that “the Qur’an is our constitution,” though he later denied 
it (Laurence 2012: 72). Th is theocratic philosophy was profoundly inspired 
by Sayyid Qutb’s Milestones, still a widely read and praised book among 
Islamists, in which the venerated martyr denounces all man-made laws as 
the product of ignorance (jahilyya) and calls on his brethren to defy, de-
pose, and replace them with Islamic law wherever possible (Qutb 2007: 1–2). 
Hassan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, spoke of Islam as 
a “comprehensive order” (quoted in Rosen 2008: 118). Likewise, Jama’at-i 
Islami’s founder, Abul Ala Maududi, envisaged an Islamic union based on 
sharia that would “supersede all other ties” (quoted in Landau 1990: 227). 
Th e UKIM website (www.ukim.org) claims the organization strives for “a 
caring and sharing society . . . based on the ideals, values, and principles of 
Islam.” Similarly, Hizb ut-Tahrir maintains that “Islam is a complete way of 
life that provides guidance for man in all aspects of life . . . the truth revealed 
by the creator of man, life and the universe” (quoted in Akbarzadeh and 
Roose 2011: 313). Th e website IslamQA declares that swearing allegiance to 
a non-Muslim state is impious (Cesari 2013: 136).
In the context of such avowedly theocratic statements, it might seem 
like the height of folly to posit infl uence from Godless postmodernism on 
God-fearing Islamists. To be sure, I argue neither that Islamists produce 
no independent thought nor that they are secret disciples of, say, Nietzsche 
or Heidegger. I do contend, however, that common postmodern tropes or 
fragments oft en turn up in Islamists’ stances, if for no other reason than 
that they persuade audiences and thereby advance Islamist agendas. Here 
I concur with Roy (2005), who refutes the putative portrayal of Islamists as 
proverbial ostriches with their heads sunk deep in the sands of a medieval 
outlook. Th e French scholar prefers to read Islamist activists as fully inte-
grated into a single global political discourse whose successful ideas and 
tactics they keenly study and dexterously exploit (see also Weimann 2015; 
Vidino 2010a: 11; Bunt 2009; Wiktorowicz 2005: 12–25; LeVine 2003; Gray 
2003). Moreover, in the context of Europe, in good part because postmod-
ernism enjoys there a respected tradition, postmodern arguments strike 
many as persuasive.
European Islamists encounter experiences that oft en resonate strongly 
with postmodern interpretations. Take, for example, the arguably central 
postmodern tenet that truth is constructed rather than found and, therefore, 
that truth is whatever passes for truth. European Muslims are daily inundated 
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with distorting images of their creed and their practices that they know all too 
well many non-Muslims accept as the truth. Th ere now exists a plethora of 
studies that fi nd in practically every European country that images of Islam 
and of Muslims tend to be monolithic, negative, and reductionist (Pollack and 
Müller 2013; Cesari 2013: 7–20; Commission Nationale 2008; Moore, Mason, 
and Lewis 2008; Navarro 2008; Poole 2002; see also islamophobiawatch.com); 
moreover, they tend to attribute disagreeable behavior (such as higher rates 
of crime, of high school dropout, of joblessness, or of extremism) among per-
sons of Muslim heritage to their purported socialization to the “culture of 
Islam” (Fredette 2014; Rommelspacher 2010: 445; Gest 2010: 56; Roy 2007: 88). 
Th e negative images tend to be widely cited by politicians and in media (print 
and electronic), and they strongly weigh upon public opinion (on politics, see 
Amnesty International 2012; Ansari and Hafez 2012; Morgan and Poynting 
2012a; European Commission against Racism and Intolerance 2011; Sayyid 
2009; Ansari 2004; on media, Meijer 2013; Schneiders 2010a; Zapata-Barrero 
and Qasem 2008; Deltombe 2005; Geissler and Pöttker 2005; Poole 2002). Not 
surprisingly, then, the 2011 Pew Global Attitudes Survey found that 36 per-
cent of those polled in Britain and France, 55 percent in Germany, and 63 per-
cent in Spain have an “unfavorable” attitude toward Muslims in general (Pew 
2012). Indeed, many of these studies have been conducted by scholars with 
postmodernist and postcolonial leanings, profoundly informed, as already 
noted, by Said’s (1978) Orientalism. Gest (2010: 56) is representative:
Interpretations of Islam that portray it as irreducible, impenetra-
ble, undiff erentiated and immune to processes of change have long 
obscured the complexities of the historical experience of Muslims 
across diff erent societies. Today, these perceptions persist, overlook-
ing the complicated process of acculturation and mutual adaptation 
by Muslims and institutions of Western Europe. Th ey ignore Islam’s 
plasticity and diversity, and instead allow exaggerated misimages—
stemming from exotica or invented in a narrow historical context 
and augmented by selective episodic details—to constitute Muslim 
history and tradition. And by considering Islam as an undiff eren-
tiated whole, essentialist discourse is able to broad-brush Muslims 
as a threat to the equally undiff erentiated “good” societies of the 
West. (see also Cesari 2013: 139–45; Kaya 2012: 211; Göle 2011: 155; 
Amiraux 2010: 145; Sayyid 2009: 198–99; Ewing 2008: 28; Schiff auer 
2006: 111; O’Brien 1996: 43–104; Muñoz 1994: 219)
Islamists oft en echo such postmodern readings. Th at is, they go be-
yond the liberal claim that the distortions are inaccurate and in need of 
correction (Hafez 2011) and endorse the postmodern assertion that they 
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are constitutive of European identity itself. In this reading, Europeans have 
long relied on a negative image of Islam to project and sustain their su-
percilious self-understanding. Tariq Ramadan, the grandson of the Muslim 
Brotherhood founder, Hasan al Banna, and arguably the poster child of the 
Brotherhood movement in Europe, says of the avidly secularist Left  in Eu-
rope who vilify Islam:
Convinced that they are progressive, they give themselves the ar-
bitrary right to proclaim the defi nitively reactionary nature of reli-
gions. . . . Th e possibility that Islam could engender resistance is not 
even imagined . . . unless it’s to modernity. In the end, only a handful 
of “Muslims-who-think-like-us” are accepted, while the others are 
denied the possibility of being genuinely progressive fi ghters armed 
with their own set of values. By doing this, the dialogue with Islam 
is transformed into an interactive monologue which massages “our 
ideological certainties” just as Huntington wanted to ensure “our 
strategic interests.” (Ramadan 2009)
But one does not, like Ramadan, have to be an Oxford don who wrote his 
dissertation on Nietzsche to have “fragilized” toward postmodernism. 
Th us, a speaker at a Hizb ut-Tahrir meeting in London in 2008 maintained 
that “the West needs hatred for Islam to support its interventions in the 
Muslim world” (quoted in Gest 2010: 112). “Th e ones who are behind this 
negative propaganda,” writes the Swedish journal Salaam, deliberately set 
out to “make Islam look like a weird, horrible and strange faith so that no 
one ever should come to think of taking an interest in or convert to that 
faith” (quoted in Otterbeck 2000: 261). Th e imprint of Said’s Orientalism 
is unmistakable: “Th e Orient has helped to defi ne Europe (or the West) as 
its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience.  .  .  . European culture 
gained its strength and identity by setting itself off  against the Orient” (Said 
1978: 1–3). Again, I do not suggest that, say, Hizb ut-Tahrir supporters ad-
mire, like Said, Nietzsche or Foucault, though they might. Rather their anti-
European rhetoric would not resonate as well if it were not for Nietzsche’s, 
Foucault’s, and Said’s contribution to postmodern thought.
Said (1978: 3), of course, famously contended that Orientalist discourse 
made up a critical part of “a Western style for dominating, restructuring, 
and having authority over the Orient.” Whether or not Said himself was 
infl uenced by Qutb and other Islamists, will-to-power fragments frequently 
fi nd their way into Islamist propaganda in Europe. It should come as no sur-
prise that Islamist organizations regularly excoriate “western foreign poli-
cy” as wanton humiliation and devastation of Muslim lands and peoples. 
While the United States and Israel come in for the greatest criticism in the 
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present age, European governments earn Islamist scorn for allying with the 
oppressors as well as for initiating the protracted domination of Muslims 
in the medieval Crusades and in modern colonialism. Hizb ut-Tahrir, for 
instance, contended that the Boston Marathon bombing of 2013 had to be 
understood in a wider context in which
the USA and its allies have committed numerous heinous crimes 
against Muslims .  . . [w]hether . . . Guantanamo Bay, the deaths of 
Iraqis on false pretences [sic], the systematic destruction of Afghani-
stan since 2002, the drone attacks in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia 
. . . overt support for Israel’s crimes in Palestine. (Hizb ut-Tahrir, 23 
April 2013, www.hizb.org.uk/current-aff airs/boston-bombings) 
In his 2002 book Naal bou la France (Damn France), Farid Abdelkrim, presi-
dent of Jeunes Musulmans de France, denounced France as a neocolonial pow-
er that conspired with the West to commit the 9/11 atrocities and pin them on 
Osama Bin Laden (also see Leiken 2012: 232; Schiff auer 2010: 183; Wiktoro-
wicz 2005: 68, 12; Werbner 2004: 463). IGMG alleged that Salman Rushdie’s 
Satanic Verses was actually published by the CIA (Laurence 2012: 207).
Islamists decry demonization and domination of Muslims within Eu-
rope as well. Britain’s Islamchannel, for instance, advertises itself as the 
“Voice of the Voiceless, Voice of the Oppressed.” IGMG too presents itself 
as “supporting the socially disadvantaged and oppressed” (Das islamische 
Portal, www.igmg.de/gemeinschaft /wir-ueber-uns). In response to France’s 
veil ban, Abdullah Ben Masour, general secretary of the UOIF, criticized 
the French state for portraying “a twelve-year-old child .  .  . like an enemy 
.  .  . just because she wants to do her own thing” (quoted in Koopmans et 
al. 2005: 170). Kalim Siddiqui, who founded the Muslim Parliament UK in 
1989, charged that “post-Christian secular society,” including “the British 
Government,” seeks “to destroy our values” (quoted in Kepel 1997: 143). 
Similarly, Abdul Wahid, chairman of Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain, claims “the 
government’s long-term objective is to manufacture a compliant, subdued, 
secular Muslim community in Britain” (quoted in Akbarzadeh and Roose 
2011: 314). Al-Islam, the journal of the Munich Islamic Center, charges “in a 
society where the majority of the population—and nearly all politicians—are 
critical of or reject Islam, one cannot expect Muslims to enjoy real freedom” 
(quoted in Meining 2012: 228). Abou Jahjah, leader of the Antwerp-based 
Arab-European League, talks of “Flemish cultural terrorism” against the 
Islamic community of Belgium (Telegraph 29 November 2002). Complaints 
about the relentless and systematic oppression of European Muslims have 
for at least two decades represented a major theme in the lyrics of famous 
Islamist hip-hop and rap artists such as IAM (Imperial Asiatic Men), Lala 
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Man, 3ème CEil, Fun-Da-Mental, Mecca2Medina, Poetic Pilgrimage, Salah 
Eddin, Pearls of Islam, or Yazid. Th e latter sings: “I’m the Arab, stopping 
oppression is my mission” (quoted in Jenkins 2007: 172; also see Aidi 2014).
In such critique we can discern the postmodern notion of the “negative 
other.” Muslims are the “new Jews,” the latest group Europeans love (need) 
to hate. Social scientists may explain such Europe bashing as an “escape 
from the oppressive tedium of being constantly identifi ed in negative terms” 
(Gardner and Shuker 1994: 164), “inverted othering” (O’Brien 2013a: 72), 
“adversarial assimilation” (Leiken 2012: 47), or “apartism” (Gest 2010: 49). 
Journalists declare it the new “coolness” (Jenkins 2007: 127). Regardless of 
the label or explanation, the critical rhetoric borrows fragments from schol-
arship on immigration with postmodern and postcolonial leanings whose 
fi ndings are now widely disseminated. Th us, to take but a small sampling, 
Göle (2011: 155) spotlights the “‘alterizing,’ orientalizing, Islamizing, or even 
barbarizing” of European Muslims, Valérie Amiraux (2010: 145) “the conti-
nuity between pre- and post-colonial imagination, discourse and practice in 
handling Muslim otherness in France,” Gerdien Jonker (2006: 126) “the old 
binary construction of ‘Oriental (Muslim) culture’ versus ‘Western enlight-
enment,’” and Ricard Zapata-Barrero (2006: 145) the protracted history of 
“Maurophobia” in Spain. To repeat, I do not aim to paint Islamists as post-
modernists. Rather, I contend that postmodern fragments are so pronounced 
and compelling that Islamists would be foolish not to exploit them simply 
because they originate with or are augmented by many non-Muslim think-
ers. Fragilization occurs, in part at least, because it proves politically useful.
Nor do Islamists draw exclusively on postmodern arguments, though 
they tend to predominate. Islamists can be heard deploying classic liber-
al arguments against oppression that inveigh against the alleged hypoc-
risy of European governments that fail to live up to their own standards. 
IGMG, for instance, “reminds that the majority of Muslims in Europe are 
excluded from direct democratic participation” and claims that “politi-
cal participation must be independent of social diff erences such as immi-
grant background or ethnic heritage” (Das islamische Portal, www.igmg.
de/gemeinschaft /wir-ueber-uns). Here Islamists sing in unison with human 
rights NGOs like SOS-Racisme—or the European Commission itself, for 
that matter. And why not? Oppressed people have for centuries played the 
hypocrisy card to shame explicitly liberal states into quitting or correcting 
their illiberal practices.
As intimated above, fragilization toward postmodernism manifests it-
self when Islamists reject the possibility of a neutral state that treats Muslims 
and non-Muslims equally and fairly. Th e postmodern reading of secularism 
theorizes it, like liberalism more generally, as a modern Western construct 
or discourse whose very presuppositions exclude the possibility of a rational 
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critique of secular tenets. To oppose secularism is to be irrational, to be un-
der the spell of religious enthusiasm (Asad 2003). Th ose Muslims, Islamists 
or not, who believe that God’s revealed truths should be taken seriously in 
the public sphere are a priori conceived of as lunatics and zealots with their 
heads clouded by a premodern and prerational outlook. Needless to say, this 
dualist reading conveniently projects as progressive and rational all those 
who accept the secular condition to relegate religion to private life. Again, 
so standard is this postmodern interpretation of secularism that one need 
but eyes to fi nd it swift ly (Mavelli 2012; Amir-Moazami 2011; Asad 2006; 
Connolly 2005; Nordmann and Vidal 2004). Th e analysis understandably 
resonates with Islamists. Th ey are daily surrounded by images of Muslims 
that depict them as backward and benighted. Moreover, the vast majority of 
non-Muslims (and many credulous Muslims) accept these images as truth, 
despite, from Islamist perspective, their blatant inaccuracy. What more ob-
vious conclusion to draw in their shoes than that European governments 
and publics cannot and will not abandon or amend these prejudices because 
to do so would undermine their own positive image? And to boot, the very 
same argument is corroborated by the hippest cutting-edge research!
Th e savvy political response is resistance, for to conform to the secu-
lar order is to help perpetuate one’s own domination. Th e fi ght-the-power 
message resounds in Islamist rap and hip-hop. Fun-da-Mental sing: “I’M 
the soldier in the name of Allah.  .  .  . So watch out now I’m comin’ at ya.” 
(Quoted in Samad 2007: 165).
Here again the imprint of widely dispersed postcolonial thought, such 
as Frantz Fanon’s Th e Wretched of the Earth, is unmistakable (see also Aidi 
2014; Majid 2000; Said 1993; Nandy 1988). What Jørgen Nielsen (1999: 95) 
has labeled “resistance Islam” takes many forms. Th e next chapter treats 
violent resistance or what many term “terrorism.” At this juncture, I want 
to focus on (for the most part) nonviolent resistance. In pure theory (re-
membering that no actual humans correspond to pure theory), Islamist 
resistance occurs whenever Muslims put God’s laws in front or in place 
of secular laws. Th at is, one permits and embraces (as much as possible) 
only those practices of the secular order that do not contravene one’s un-
derstanding of God’s precepts—for instance, sharia. Th is is the stated goal, 
for example, of the Sharia4 movement with branches in many European 
countries. Such acts of Islamist defi ance include, but are hardly limited to, 
taking multiple wives and arranging marriages (oft en not recognized by 
the state) (Bowen 2010: 156–65); eating only halal food and imbibing no 
alcohol; dressing modestly, including pressuring others to do so (Alonso 
2012: 478–79; Gest 2010: 109; Jenkins 2007: 182, 252; Kepel 2004: 51; Amara 
2003; Macey 1999; Ashfar 1994); sending children to private Qur’an schools 
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or summer camps to “unlearn” the secular teachings of the public schools 
(Leiken 2012: 53; Bowen 2010: 125; Schiff auer 2008a: 59–70; Pargeter 2008: 
142; Lewis 1994: 141); shooing homosexuals, sex workers, drug dealers, and 
other purveyors of Western “decadence” out of the neighborhood (Leiken 
2012: 195; Schiff auer 2008a: 105; Pargeter 2008: 143; Taheri 2005); protest-
ing books (Satanic Verses, Irshad Manji’s Islam, Liberty and Love), news-
papers (Jyllands-Posten), fi lms (Submission), and performances (Voltaire’s 
Mahomet, Mozart’s Idomeneo) that “insult” Islam (Pargeter 2008: 187–203; 
Jenkins 2007: 280); cyberattacking hostile broadcasts (TV5Monde); and, of 
course, conventional proselytizing such as handing out Qur’ans on street 
corners (Khosrokhavar 2010: 139; Schiff auer 2010: 222; Shavit and Wiesen-
bach 2009; Jonker 2006: 141–45; Nielsen 2003: 34).
Motivating such acts is the desire and attempt to create spheres of Is-
lamist autonomy in which Islamic laws and practices prevail, including 
when they transgress secular laws. Other scholars prefer diff erent labels 
such as “protection zones” (Schiff auer 2008a: 69), “zones of exclusion” (Kas-
toryano 2006: 66–67), or domains of “Islamic ambiance” (Bowen 2010: 105), 
but they all document the same general phenomenon of enclaves where Is-
lamist practices represent the expected norm rather than the ridiculed ex-
ception (see also Alonso 2012: 478–79; Roy 2004: 281–82). Th ese “Islamist 
milieux” (Laurence 2012: 101) oft en amount to no more than the four walls 
of a fl at or mosque but in some cases can envelop broad swaths of neigh-
borhoods and boroughs where large numbers of Muslims concentrate, such 
as East London, Amsterdam’s Slotervaart, Brussels’ Sint-Jans-Molenbeek, 
Paris’s banlieues, or Berlin’s Kreuzberg (Metcalf 1996). In 2011, for example, 
in the London neighborhoods of Waltham Forest, Tower Hamlets, and Ne-
wham there appeared daubed on traffi  c signs and lampposts bright yellow 
posters reading “You are entering a Sharia-controlled zone—Islamic rules 
enforced” (Daily Mail 28 July 2011). In 2014, Salafi sts organized the “sharia 
police” to patrol the streets of Wuppertal, discouraging young Muslims 
from drinking, gambling, or fornicating (Deutsche Welle 7 September 2014). 
Indeed, some such districts receive quasi-governmental recognition when 
police treat them as “no-go areas” where formal law either need not or can-
not be rigorously enforced (Leiken 2012: 38).
Naturally, illegal acts transpire. So-called “honor killings,” for instance, 
have garnered inordinate and sensationalized attention within European 
society, despite the fact that their numbers are rare and pale in compari-
son to “standard” domestic violence homicides (Altinbaş 2013; Korteweg 
and Yurdakul 2014). Th e overwhelming majority of acts of “self-imposed 
apartheid” (Kepel 2004: 253) are perfectly legal. Moreover, they are legally 
protected by freedom of religion, speech, and association clauses anchored 
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in European constitutions and inspired by fundamental liberal principles 
safeguarding the autonomy of the individual. In no few cases, furthermore, 
formally liberal secular governments provide monetary or institutional sup-
port to vehemently antisecular organizations that have successfully made 
the case for state aid using the classic communitarian logic of the presump-
tion of equal worth. Th is is what I mean by “policy messiness.” Th is thicket 
of crisscrossing, overlayering, and contradictory policies and realities—sec-
ularisms instead of secularism—results, at least in part, from vibrant but 
vying public philosophies, none of which is able defi nitively to smite rivals 
due to a protracted Kulturkampf (O’Brien 2013a).
Liberal Perfectionist Secularism
Let us not, however, underestimate the resolve of those who consider Islam 
a threat. As the perceived threat grows, so too does the apparent appropri-
ateness of liberal perfectionism. In Chapter 2, we already encountered the 
blurred—that is, fragilized—line between liberal voluntarism and perfec-
tionism. Habermas (2008b), for instance, observes:
It is a well-known fact that the Catholic Church fi rst pinned its col-
ors to the mast of liberalism and democracy with the Second Vatica-
num in 1965. And in Germany, the Protestant churches did not act 
diff erently. Many Muslim communities still have this painful learn-
ing process before them.
But the German liberal adds that “the state can only encourage rather than 
impose the learning process of self-refl ection that leads to questioning 
one’s own religion enough to tolerate others and non-believers and realize 
that doing so is the most rational approach.” But encouragement, espe-
cially strong encouragement, already starts one down the slippery slope 
toward perfectionism. No doctrine that posits absolute universal princi-
ples, as does liberalism, can fully elude the temptation of perfectionism. 
It becomes unsettling not to correct blatant ignorance and injustice, even 
when they appear to be voluntarily willed or tolerated (Bader 2007: 124–
25). Many in Europe are convinced that the errors, both empirical and 
ethical, committed by pious Muslims are too grave to leave uncorrected. 
Th ey implore the state assiduously to defend the secular democratic order 
against Muslims, who are presumed to reject and imperil it. Th e state, 
then, should be anything but neutral toward Muslims. Rather, it should 
rigorously test their loyalty to liberal democratic principles and resocialize 
or repress those who fail. “Laïcité must be a [shared] culture, or it will not 
be” (Debray 2003: 43).
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In this context, some version of the “clash of civilizations” argument 
tends to surface. In a widely read book, former German chancellor Helmut 
Schmidt (2011: 71) argued that the fact that roughly a quarter of the 
world’s governments are Islamist-leaning and none is a democracy should 
occasion profound skepticism and caution regarding the prospects for a 
Euro-Islam compatible with Western democratic values and laws. Frits 
Bolkenstein (1991), as leader of the People’s Party for Freedom and De-
mocracy, had two decades earlier made a similar argument that attained 
great salience in the Netherlands. We already encountered the claim in the 
previous chapter that Islam is inherently misogynistic. Another common 
charge is that the Qur’an, as well as the example of Muhammad, teaches 
Muslims to be intolerant of unbelievers and even to convert them with 
the sword if necessary (insinuated, for instance, by Benedict XVI in his 
notorious Regensburg speech in 2006). Although the pontiff  spoke of the 
distant past, Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci perceived a much more im-
mediate threat in her second best-selling rant against Islam, Th e Force of 
Reason (2006): “Europe becomes more and more a province of Islam, a 
colony of Islam. In each of our cities lies a second city: a Muslim city, a city 
run by the Koran. A stage in the Islamic expansionism” (quoted in Jenkins 
2007: 244). An international chorus of prominent opinion leaders, includ-
ing, from France, André Gerin, Samira Bellil, Pascal Bruckner, André 
Glucksmann, Emmanuell Todd, Chadortt Djavann, and Caroline Fourest; 
from the Netherlands, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Hafi d Bouazza, Frits Bolkestein, 
Paul Scheff er, Herman Philipse, and Hans Jensen; from Germany, Hen-
ryk Broder, Hans-Peter Raddatz, Th ilo Sarrazin, Ralph Giordano, Seyran 
Ateş, Alice Schwarzer, and Necla Kelek; from Norway, Shabana Rehman 
Gaarder and Bruce Bawer; from the United Kingdom, Bat Ye’or, Mela-
nie Phillips, Farrukh Dhondy, Roy Jenkins, and Niall Ferguson; and from 
Italy, Magdi Allam, Giovanni Sartori, and Galli della Logia, has sounded 
the alarm. Th ough the verses of the individual authors, like their political 
affi  liations, may vary, their common refrain is in unison: Islam is illib-
eral and antidemocratic and, therefore, pious Muslims and the organiza-
tions that represent them threaten democracy, indeed Western Civiliza-
tion itself. Accompanying these voices are the clarion sounds of mostly 
sensationalized, best-selling books and articles as well as widely viewed 
documentaries and reportage spotlighting alarming practices of forced 
marriage, honor killings, genital mutilation, anti-Western indoctrination, 
and terrorist plotting on European soil (Dirie 1999; Bellil 2002; Kelek 
2005; Çileli 2002; Phillips 2007). All of these warnings against a threaten-
ing Islam revivify inveterate Orientalist readings of Islamic civilization 
such as Ernest Renan’s from 1883 (and thereby provide evidence for the 
postcolonial reading mentioned above):
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Any person with a bit of education about current aff airs clearly dis-
cerns the actual inferiority of Muslim countries, the decadence in 
states ruled by Islam, the intellectual nullity of races which behold 
exclusively their culture and education to this religion.(Quoted in 
Taras 2012: 146) 
Dutch Freedom Party leader, Geert Wilders, used crasser words: “I hate Is-
lam . . . the ideology of a retarded culture” (Guardian 17 February 2008).
Th ese harsh critics of Islam hurl even sharper barbs at liberal apprehen-
sion and vacillation. Indeed, their indignation over alleged liberal spine-
lessness points to the very kind of fragilization that we have been pursuing 
throughout this book. Paul Scheff er (2011: 325), for instance, denounces the 
“cosmopolitan disillusion” of the Dutch elite preaching multiculturalism. 
Pascal Bruckner (2007) inveighs against the communitarian infl uence that 
prompts European governments to tolerate “parallel societies” of “small, 
self-isolated social groups, each of which adheres to a diff erent norm” and 
“enclaves in which individual autonomy is squashed.” Th ierry Chervel takes 
aim at postmodernism:
In the confrontation with Islamism, the Left  has abandoned its 
principles. In the past it stood for cutting the ties to convention and 
tradition, but in the case of Islam it reinstates them in the name 
of multiculturalism. It is proud to have fought for women’s rights, 
but in Islam it tolerates head scarves, arranged marriages, and wife-
beating. It once stood for equal rights, now it preaches a right to dif-
ference—and thus diff erent rights. It proclaims freedom of speech, 
but when it comes to Islam it coughs in embarrassment. It once sup-
ported gay rights, but now keeps silent about Islam’s taboo on ho-
mosexuality. Th e West’s long-due process of self-relativisation at the 
end of the colonial era, which was promoted by postmodernist and 
structuralist ideas, has led to cultural relativism and the loss of crite-
ria.(Der Tagesspiegel 9 February 2009; emphasis in original) 
“What has come of us,” complains Ralph Giordano, “when we have to be 
concerned whether or not our actions and negotiations please radical Mus-
lims?” (Die Welt 25 October 2008). Th e intended message is plain: European 
governments should side with liberalism and defend and spread its core val-
ues even if doing so off ends Muslims (or communitarians and postmodern-
ists for that matter). In the words of Stern editor Hans Ulrich Jörges, “We 
must defend and foment what the Islamic nations are lacking, democracy, 
minority rights, women’s rights, the Enlightenment, and separation between 
Church and State” (Stern 14 February 2006). Likewise, Peter Michalzek 
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argued in the left -leaning Frankfurter Rundschau (23 March 2007) that “one 
cannot consider Islam a religion among others, a religion that might have a 
right to exist under the big roof of European tolerance.”
Some of the most vociferous and compelling proponents of liberal per-
fectionism are Muslims, typically ex-Muslims. Th ese oft en highly promi-
nent critics of Islam enjoy an exalted standing among European publics 
as “experts by real-life experience,” insiders, so to speak, who purport-
edly “know” the true nature of Islam because they have suff ered fi rsthand 
as victims of its smothering oppression. Th ey appear frequently on talk 
shows, at public fora, and in governmental hearings. Many are the same 
women whose voices we heard in the previous chapter excoriating veiling 
as the outermost manifestation of pervasive misogyny in Islamic doctrine 
and practice. Whether male or female, they all tend to urge European 
governments to protect liberalism from Muslims who seek its demise. 
Germany’s Seyran Ateş (2008: 199) denounces “kowtowing [Kniefall] to 
Islam” (quoted in Rommelspacher 2010: 449). Afshin Ellian (2006) of the 
Netherlands warns:
Free speech is in danger of being increasingly restricted by invok-
ing “Islamophobia” and “racism.” .  .  . Intellectuals themselves are 
increasingly calling for self-censorship and politically correct re-
porting of intolerant tendencies. Has this country lost its appetite 
for freedom? Has the country where Pierre Bayle and John Locke 
published their books become a land of veiled opinions?
Following the Danish cartoon controversy, several prominent public intel-
lectuals with Muslim backgrounds, including Salman Rushdie, Ayaan Hirsi 
Ali, Chahla Chafi q, Irshad Manji, Mehdi Mozaff ari, Maryam Namazie, Tas-
lima Nasreen, and Ibn Warraq published (with fi ve non-Muslims as well) a 
manifesto against Islamist “totalitarianism”:
We reject “cultural relativism,” which consists in accepting that men 
and women of Muslim culture should be deprived of the right to 
equality, freedom, and secular values in the name of respect for cul-
tures and traditions. . . . We appeal to democrats and free spirits of 
all countries that our century should be one of Enlightenment, not 
of obscurantism.(Jyllands-Posten 28 February 2006) 
Also prominently and oft en eff ectively warning against extremist Islam 
are the many migrant NGOs with a strong secularist leaning, such as the 
Mouvement des maghrébins laïques de France, the Türkische Gemeinde 
in Deutschland, the (Swiss) Forum for Progressive Islam, the Democratic 
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Muslims in Denmark, or the Central Committee for Ex-Muslims (Germany, 
U.K., Scandanavia and the Netherlands).
Politicians have responded by pledging to use the instruments of the 
state to prevent radical Islam and promote Euro-Islam. Th e next chapter 
focuses on governmental eff orts to monitor and thwart suspected terror-
ists. Chapter 3 drew attention to mandatory civics courses and oaths of al-
legiance that seek to teach and test the internalization of liberal democratic 
values by Muslim citizens and residents. Th e previous chapter detailed poli-
cies in many European countries that proscribe veiling and thereby literally 
compel Muslim women and girls (depending on the context) to dress “secu-
lar” in the hope that by doing so they will learn to appreciate liberal demo-
cratic values. Such measures stem from a combined liberal perfectionist and 
Orientalist presupposition that Muslims require state assistance to “mod-
ernize” or “Westernize.” Th ey cannot be depended on to do it themselves.
Th is perfectionist logic is detectable in a spate of governmental initia-
tives designed to gain greater infl uence over the preaching and teaching of 
Islam in Europe. Britain, for example, introduced in 2004 mandatory Eng-
lish classes for imams before obtaining visas to enter the kingdom. Since 
2002, the Dutch government requires a six-month training program in 
language, social and political institutions, and the “Dutch ways of life” for 
imams coming to serve in Islamic organizations in the Netherlands (Lau-
rence 2012: 186). Belgium and France have similar programs in Morocco 
(Laurence 2012: 227). Following the Charlie Hebdo shootings, the French 
Interior Ministry announced that all imams who serve as chaplains in 
French prisons will be required to earn a diploma in civic responsibility to 
be off ered by a dozen French universities. Th e University of Lyon has since 
2012 off ered a course in “Understanding Secularity” for imams (France 24 
26 February 2015). Germany since 2006 has through the Goethe Institute 
and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation provided training in German lan-
guage and values to imams in Turkey who plan to migrate to Germany. Th e 
municipal governments of Munich, Berlin, Stuttgart, and Frankfurt have 
off ered parallel programs for imams already residing in Germany (Lau-
rence 2012: 234). Th e same holds true in Spain, where the programs are 
administered by the publicly funded Foundation for Pluralism and Coex-
istence (Astor 2014: 1725–26). Th e French Interior Ministry established in 
2007 a program at the Institut Catholique in Paris of “republican training” 
for imams and other Muslims who work with or for Islamic organizations 
(Laurence 2012: 227; Chebel d’Appollonia 2010: 132). Leiden University and 
the Free University of Amsterdam off er bachelor’s and master’s degrees in 
Islamic theology (Laurence 2012: 186). In its mandatory political education 
for the seventh through nineth grade the Land of Northrhine-Westphalia 
instructs teachers to make students aware of “Islamist extremism” and its 
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“unconstitutionality” (Ministerium für Schule und Weiterbildung 2010: 3). 
Germany established in 2011 Islamic studies centers at the universities of 
Münster, Tübingen, Osnabrück, Giessen, and Frankfurt that train imams 
and teachers of Islamic religious education in public schools. Beginning in 
2006, the University of Vienna has off ered a master’s degree in “Islamic Re-
ligious Pedagogy” (Drees and Konigsveld 2008).
Th e perfectionist logic also turns up in the various Islamic councils 
mentioned above. Th ough ostensibly motivated by a liberal multiculturalist 
desire to welcome Islam into the European secular order, the governmen-
tal sponsors of the councils tend to presume that interaction with properly 
secularized European offi  cials will serve as a model for Muslims to emulate. 
Sarkozy, for example, contended when defending the establishment of the 
French Council:
If you fi nd Islam to be incompatible with the Republic, then what 
do you do with the fi ve million people of Muslim origin living in 
France? Do you kick them out, or make them convert, or ask them 
not to practice their religion? .  .  . With the French Council for the 
Muslim Religion, we are organizing an Islam that is compatible with 
the values of the Republic. (Le Figaro 30 April 2003) 
Th e dominant path-dependency approach to comparative migration studies 
would, of course, expect such a statement from France, where republican 
assimilationism is said to be ensconced. But listen to the justifi cation of the 
new centers for Islamic studies in Germany from erstwhile education min-
ister Annette Schavan:
If it were the case that Islam and democracy or Islam and modern 
society could not be made compatible, then a Muslim must either 
depart from his belief or from Europe. But that cannot be the only 
option. Th e charge of theology is also to translate religion into the 
present. Th eology can accomplish such an interpretation of Islam in 
keeping with our times. In addition to that these new professorships 
should educate imams for our mosques and teachers for Islamic ed-
ucation in the public schools. (Die Zeit 14 April 2011)
Both ministers start from the presumption that Islam is and will remain at 
odds with democracy if the state does not intervene to resocialize Muslims 
to liberal democratic norms and values. As mentioned in Chapter 3, Camer-
on had just such an intervention in mind in 2010 when he called for “a more 
active, more muscular liberalism” that does not “stand neutral between dif-
ferent values,” but rather proudly and unfl inchingly promotes “freedom of 
176 Chapter 5
speech, freedom of worship, democracy, the rule of law, equal rights regard-
less of race, sex or sexuality” (quoted in Joppke and Torpey 2013: 153).
Nowhere is liberal perfectionism more pervasive than in public schools. 
No state that fi nances and superintends public education can fully avoid 
molding young minds (Bader 2007: 324; Gutmann 1994: 23; Macedo 2000: 
3–5). Several European governments (Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Greece) already off er Islamic religious instruction in public schools. Many 
national, regional, or municipal governments are attempting or contem-
plating doing so (Fetzer and Soper 2005). Th ough the specifi cs of providing 
Islamic education (in public schools or state-funded and overseen private 
schools) as well as the complications (such as identifying a reliable repre-
sentative of Islam with whom to collaborate) vary from place to place, all 
such eff orts are motivated in part by the perfectionist desire not to leave the 
religious socialization of young Muslims to imams, parents, and peers fully 
independent of state oversight. Far more important, however, than a few 
hours per week of religious instruction is doubtless the fact that the over-
whelming majority of European Muslim pupils and students attend public 
schools whose curricula for all subjects are either craft ed or supervised by 
state offi  cials. Muslim youth are, in other words, generally exposed to the 
same secularizing tendencies at school as their non-Muslim classmates. Th e 
fears and complaints of conservative Muslim parents who detest the secu-
larist teachings, pressures, and temptations that their children encounter 
in public schools might be paranoid to a certain extent but they are hardly 
groundless. Of course, it would be foolish to suggest that schools impart 
purely unadulterated liberal secular values. Nevertheless, public schools, in 
both the formal setting of the classroom and the informal interactions that 
take place elsewhere on campus, surely represent powerful and pervasive 
loci of state-sponsored favoritism toward secularism in both public and pri-
vate life (Roy 2007: 16–17).
Christian Favoritism
We can also hear voices calling for deliberate favoritism toward Christian-
ity. Not surprisingly, the Vatican has led the charge. In Istanbul in 2006, 
Benedict XVI observed that Islamic civilization is on the rise “because of its 
people’s conviction that [it] can provide a valid spiritual foundation to their 
lives. Such a foundation seems to have eluded old Europe, which, despite its 
enduring political and economic power, seems to be on the road to decline” 
(Ratzinger 2006: 65). Th e German pontiff  implored all Christians to “renew 
Europe’s awareness of its Christian roots, traditions and values” (quoted in 
Kaya 2012: 195). Two years later in a public spectacle adroitly orchestrated 
in St. Peter’s Basilica, Benedict XVI baptized Magdi Allam. Th e prominent 
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Egypt-born and until then Muslim Italian journalist has since 2003 become 
a vehement and outspoken opponent of Islam. He, for example, rejects the 
ecumenical trend of including Islam among the three “Abrahamic” religions 
on grounds that it fosters “the de-legitimization of Christianity” (Catholic 
World Report 8 April 2013). Somewhat more surprisingly, given his afore-
mentioned endorsement of integrating aspects of sharia into British law, 
Archbishop of Canterbury Williams warned that “moving toward a secular 
society in Christian Britain—where the Queen is the head of the Church of 
England and religion still features in public institutions—would be more 
radical than can be imagined” (Jurist 23 October 2006). Th e Church itself 
emphasized that “the contribution of the Church of England in particular 
and of Christianity in general to the underlying culture remains very sub-
stantial.  .  .  . It could certainly be argued that there is an agenda behind a 
claim that a fi ve per cent adherence to ‘other faiths’ makes for a multifaith 
society” (Telegraph 8 October 2006). Even Baroness Warsi, a Muslim min-
ister without portfolio in the Cameron Cabinet, claimed that Europe needs 
to be “more confi dent in its Christianity” (BBC News 14 February 2012). 
Matthias Koenig (2007: 928) discerns a wide-reaching “reinterpretation of 
Church-State relations as symbols of national identity.”
More than a few politicians have jumped on the pro-Christianity band-
wagon. Frau Merkel exclaimed at the annual party conference of her Chris-
tian Democratic Union in 2010 that “the problem is not too much Islam, 
the problem is too little Christianity, too little discussion of the Christian 
view of man and of the Judeo-Christian ethical foundation” (das islamische 
Portal 19 November 2010). Several of her political allies, such as Interior 
Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich and former chancellor candidate Edmund 
Stoiber, have averred that “Islam does not belong to Germany” in a way 
that would merit treatment by the state as equal to Christianity (Friedrich 
quoted in Die Welt 3 March 2011; on Stoiber see Süddeutsche Zeitung 18 Feb-
ruary 1999). And the chancellor herself opined that Germany is a country 
“in which we celebrate Christian, not Muslim holidays” (quoted in Cesari 
2013: 8). Former vice-president of the European Parliament, Italian Mario 
Mauro (2004), averred that “Europe will be Christian or it will not be at 
all.” Perhaps no one has articulated the Christian favoritism argument with 
greater pith or rhetorical force than Austria’s Freedom Party, whose slogan 
for municipal elections in Vienna in 2005 read “Pummerin statt Muezzin” 
(Pummerin instead of Muezzin; “Pummerin” is the name of the bell at St. 
Stephen’s Cathedral). Again, according to path-dependency theory, such 
particularist utterances are to be expected from leading politicians in coun-
tries with a strong ethnonationalist heritage, such as Italy, Germany, and 
Austria. But then how do we explain Sarkozy, who at an audience with the 
pope in the Lateran Palace in 2007, proclaimed
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that a nation which ignores its ethnic, spiritual and religious heri-
tage commits a crime against its culture .  .  . its patrimony, its arts 
and popular traditions, which deeply permeate our manner of liv-
ing and thinking. Pulling out roots is to lose meaning, to weaken 
national identity, to further impoverish social relations which have 
such a need for symbols of memory. (Quoted in Taras 2012: 61) 
Or what about David Cameron, who in his Easter message in 2014 said we 
need to be “more confi dent about our status as a Christian country” (Church 
Times 16 April 2014)? One might reply by saying that the French and Brit-
ish leaders, like the other politicians, were tailoring their words to fi t their 
audience. Th at is precisely my point. Rather than consistently committing 
to a particular public philosophy, fragilized politicians employ and oft en 
combine fragments of liberalism, nationalism, or postmodernism whenever 
they seem likely to please a given audience.
A common confl ation of universalist and particularist logic turns up in 
the oft -heard outcry to protect “our Judeo-Christian civilization” or “our 
Western way of life” from “creeping Islamization” (Sarrazin 2010; British 
National Party 2010: 17; Dippel and Prill 2007; Fortuyn 1997). Th e German 
movement European Patriots against the Islamization of the Occident (PE-
GIDA) is exemplary. Th e movement purports to protect modern universal 
liberal values, such as freedom and equality for all, that are presumed not 
only to have been championed and largely realized in Europe since the En-
lightenment, but to have been foreshadowed in a longer Judeo-Christian 
heritage involving such important notions as the equality of all persons 
before God. Th e Germans are not alone. Prime Minister Berlusconi pro-
claimed in 2001:
We are proud bearers of the supremacy of western civilisation, which 
has brought us democratic institutions, respect for the human, civil, 
religious and political rights of our citizens, openness to diversity 
and tolerance of everything. . . . Europe must revive on the basis of 
common Christian roots.(Guardian 27 September 2001) 
In pure theory, of course, universal rights cannot belong to any specifi c per-
son, people, or civilization in the sense of being “ours” and not “theirs.” 
Th eir universality resides precisely in their belonging to all or to no one per-
son or group particularly. However, logical consistency is rarely prized or 
effi  cacious in real politics. On the contrary, the inconsistent rhetoric packs 
greater political punch. Th e norms and values are worth protecting not only 
because they are universal and therefore ethically superior to all others; they 
are also “ours.” Th e particularistic logic adds a powerful aff ective dimension 
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akin to protecting one’s (cultural) off spring. Moreover, if the superior mo-
rality is honored in “our way of life” and stems from “our Judeo-Christian 
heritage,” so runs the particularistic (and culturist) thinking, then it cannot 
be part of “their (Muslims’) way of life” or “their civilization” in anything 
like the profound way it is part of “ours.” And this, in turn, represents (yet 
another) reason to distrust or fear “them.” In this regard, it is interesting to 
note that in addition to very openly pro-Christian opinion leaders like Alain 
Besançon and Alexandre Del Valle, some prominent atheists such as Um-
berto Eco or Regis Debray have taken to calling themselves “cultural Chris-
tians” in an eff ort to underscore precisely this kind of purported cultural 
affi  nity among non-Muslim Europeans as well as the cultural “otherness” of 
those of Muslim heritage (Jenkins 2007: 263).
Both anti-Islamic and pro-Christian sentiment infl uence policy mak-
ing. In 2009, for example, Switzerland banned (through a referendum) the 
erection of minarets. Movements to follow the Swiss example are being led 
by the Freedom Party in Austria, the Lega Nord in Italy, and the Danish 
People’s Party in Denmark. Film star Brigitte Bardot has drawn much at-
tention (and fi ve fi nes for “inciting racial hatred”) arguing that France has 
too many mosques and too few churches (Aidi 2014: 141). Th ough their 
success varies from neighborhood to neighborhood, campaigns to op-
pose the erection of individual mosques are nearly as common as the new 
mosques themselves. In addition to alleging that the mosques will harbor 
terrorists, the opponents also typically contend that the Islamic edifi ces 
besmirch the architectural integrity (its particular “European” charm or 
unity) of “our” cities (Astor 2014: 1725; Tyrer 2013: 77; Cesari 2013: 96–98; 
Alonso 2012: 479–80; Allievi 2010). Similarly, the Muslim call to prayer 
is forbidden by many but hardly all European municipalities. As reported 
in the previous chapter, France and Belgium in 2011 banned the full-face 
burqa from the public sphere, while prohibitions on other forms of Islamic 
covering in certain places are in force or under consideration in many Eu-
ropean countries. Th e “tolerant” Netherlands passed a bill in 2011 making 
proper Islamic slaughtering (halal) illegal. Animal rights activists around 
Europe have lobbied with diff erent degrees of success to outlaw the prac-
tice because it employs no anesthetic (Financial Times 3 August 2011).We 
should not overlook the anti-Islam undertones in widespread opposition 
to Turkey’s membership in the EU. To be sure, the opposition goes far be-
yond Turkey’s seventy-fi ve million Muslims and involves economic, po-
litical, and military concerns that have little or nothing to do with Islam. 
Nonetheless, many sympathize with Pope Benedict XVI, who as cardinal 
in 2004 spoke out against Turkey’s accession because Islam stands in “per-
manent contrast” to Europe’s Christian tradition (quoted in Kaya 2012: 
240). All this, of course, is to say nothing about the daily discrimination, 
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institutional and personal, experienced by individual Muslims trying to 
fi nd employment, education, housing, fi nancing, and so on. Th e fact that 
most, not all, European governments have established anti-discrimination 
agencies only in the last ten or fi ft een years (mainly in response to the 2000 
EU Race Directive) testifi es to the protracted de facto policy of tolerating 
discrimination against Muslims. Aft er all, the Muslims began arriving in 
large numbers as early as the 1950s, meaning roughly fi ve decades of the 
regularized sins of omission on the part of governments vis-à-vis the sins 
of commission of their non-Muslim citizens. Any suggestion that the re-
cently formed agencies will swift ly eliminate anti-Muslim discrimination 
smacks of political naiveté of the highest order.
Far more pervasive, however, is blatant favoritism toward Christianity. 
In 2004, Pope John Paul II championed a nearly successful eff ort to have Eu-
rope’s “Christian heritage” inserted in the preamble of the EU (draft ) Con-
stitution. Formally established Christian churches exist in Iceland, Lichten-
stein, Greece, Denmark, and Britain. Th e latter’s Parliament passed the UK 
Education Act of 1988, which stipulates that a majority of the acts of collec-
tive worship in state-run schools are to be “wholly or mainly of a broadly 
Christian character” and that in religious education the content “devoted to 
Christianity in the syllabus should predominate” (quoted in Fetzer and Sop-
er 2005: 39). Similarly, Clause 140 of Bremen’s Constitution obligates public 
schools to teach “Biblical history in a Christian context” (quoted in Fetzer 
and Soper 2005: 113). Until 2009, Catholic religious education was manda-
tory for all pupils in Spanish public schools (Zapata-Barrero and de Witte 
2010: 185). Greek public schools mandate daily Orthodox prayers, except 
in Western Th race with its large Turkish minority (Triandafyllidou 2010c: 
208). Bavaria and Italy permit the display of crucifi xes in all classrooms in 
public schools, a statute upheld by the European Court of Human Rights in 
Lautsi v. Italy in 2011 (Joppke and Torpey 2013: 154–58). Th e French prov-
ince of Alsace-Moselle provides Catholic and Protestant (as well as Jewish) 
religious education in its public schools (Laborde 2008: 69). State aid for 
private religious schools overwhelmingly favors Christians. Germany has 
thousands of Christian schools compared to two Islamic schools (Mons-
ma and Soper 2009: 196); the Netherlands 5,000 compared to 42 (Monsma 
and Soper 2009: 59; Sunier 2014: 60); Britain 7,000 compared to 140 (Cesari 
2013: 100; Monsma and Soper 2009: 151), despite the fact that more Muslims 
weekly attend mosque than Anglicans weekly attend church (Berger 2007: 
20). Even in laïque France, roughly a fi ft h of French pupils attend religious 
(mostly Christian) schools, 85 percent of whose costs are covered by the 
state (Adrian 2011: 422). By contrast, a mere twenty-nine private Islamic 
schools exist with only one (Lycée Averroes) subsidized by the French state 
(Cesari 2013: 100; see also Commission de réfl exion 2006). Add to this the 
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fact that European lands remain fully saturated in Christian lore, ritual, and 
symbolism, from hourly ringing of church bells to offi  cially declared Chris-
tian holidays, all of which Muslims must suff er. Th e (Gregorian) calendar 
itself is of Christian origin! Laborde (2008: 17) labels such favoritism “soft  
rules,” mostly unorchestrated, unoffi  cial yet pervasive favoring of Christian 
norms, expectations, and presuppositions as “normal” and Muslim ones as 
“abnormal” (also see Bader 2007: 153–56). Th is represents the religious di-
mension of Billig’s (1995) “banal nationalism” (mentioned in Chapter 3). As 
Davie (2007: 238) perspicaciously observes, “In European society, the reli-
gious playing fi eld is not level, nor is it likely to become so in the foreseeable 
future.” Even in the purportedly “multicultural” Netherlands, “in terms of 
institutional arrangements, there is no question of an Islamic pillar [state-
funded religious organization] . . . or at least one that is in any way compara-
ble to the Roman Catholic or Protestant pillars of the past” (Rath 1999: 59).
Islamophobic Hyperbole
Neither Christianity, then, nor liberal secular democracy, for that matter, 
lies gravely imperiled, at least not by Muslim Europeans, who comprise at 
most but 5 percent of Europe’s population. And yet such exaggerated warn-
ings are made with great frequency despite the existence of plentiful evi-
dence (cited above) disproving them. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a political 
issue more saturated in humbug and hyperbole than the question of Islam 
in Europe. Here we can detect the considerable political sway of Hobbesian 
postmodernism. We encounter fragilization in particular toward the same 
two postmodern tenets or fragments that we encountered with regard to 
veiling: truth is what passes for truth, and what passes for truth does so as a 
result of shrewd manipulation of words, images, and symbols.
Deliberate distortions of Islam and Muslims have become nearly ubiq-
uitous in Europe (Bowen 2012a; Lean 2012; Hafez 2011; Schneiders 2010b; 
Gardell 2010; Allen 2007; van Dijk 2007; Rigoni 2007; Deltombe 2005; 
Geissler and Pöttker 2005; Poole 2002). Th e previous chapter noted the 
frequent and risible comparison between allowing girls to don the hijab in 
public schools and Chamberlain’s appeasement of Hitler in Munich in 1938. 
Wilders likened the Qur’an to Mein Kampf. Prominent French intellectual 
Bernhard Henri Lévy uses the catachresis “fascislamist,” while Le Figaro 
columnist Yvan Rioufol prefers “nazislamist” (both quoted in Rigoni 2007: 
109–10). British columnist Christopher Hitchens spoke of “fascism with an 
Islamic face” (Slate 22 October 2007) and best-selling Italian journalist Ori-
ana Fallaci of “the new Nazi-Fascism” (quoted in New Yorker 5 June 2006). 
Necla Kelek (2005: 47) anathematized Islam for promoting a “slave mental-
ity” among its adherents. Ayaan Hirsi Ali called Muhammad a “perverted 
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tyrant whose teachings cannot be reconciled with democracy” (Trouw 25 
January 2003) and compared him to “all those megalomaniac rulers in the 
Middle East: bin Laden, Khomeini, Saddam” (quoted in Jenkins 2007: 190).
Typically accompanying such distortions of Islamic doctrine are gross 
exaggerations of its impact in Europe. Populist politicians from Enoch Pow-
ell to Jörg Haider to Jean Marie Le Pen to Pim Fortuyn to Siv Jensen have 
shrewdly garnered votes spreading fear of the imminent Islamization of 
Europe. Mario Borghezio, an Italian member of the European Parliament, 
warns that soon Christmas songs will be banned at the behest of “a bunch of 
shit Islamic bastards” (quoted in Tyrer 2013: 118). Prominent German femi-
nist Alice Schwarzer (2010: 17) lamented the “Shariazation of German law.” 
Melanie Phillips (2007) entitled her bestseller Londonistan, while Bat Ye’or 
(2005) declared the entire continent “Eurabia.” One Islamophobic YouTube 
video with over one million hits features a reconfi gured map of “Europe 
2015” on which France has been renamed “Th e Islamic Republic of New 
Algeria,” the United Kingdom “North Pakistan,” Germany “New Turkey,” 
and so on (YouTube, youtube.com/watch?v=wiLdDe7Eha4). Indeed, dozens 
of Islamophobic websites such as Islam Watch, Politically Incorrect, Reposte 
Laique, Die Grüne Pest, Nürnberg 2.0, or Stop the Islamization of Europe 
regularly maintain a steady cyber-stream of unfi ltered and hateful balder-
dash regarding Muslims.
Roy (2007: 88) aptly explains how the culturalizing and essentializing 
logic works:
Islam is thus turned into an essence, as though it has become the in-
variant that determines attitudes in very diff erent contexts. A mur-
der with blows from a rock [as in the Ghofrane case in Marseille in 
2004] is defi ned as a stoning. Th e macho attitudes of young men in 
the banlieues, regrettably similar in very diff erent contexts (from Los 
Angeles to Moscow), is attributed to Islam. Adolescents’ intentions 
to assert themselves by wearing provocative clothing is a banality in 
secondary schools, but the aff air of the veil has been experienced as 
the penetration of the school system by Islamism.
Studies repeatedly fi nd that the sobriquets most frequently associated with 
Muslims in reportage are “terrorist,” “extremist,” “militant,” “fanatical,” 
“radical,” and the like. Th e overwhelming majority of media coverage de-
picts Muslims as “threats” or “problems” (Zick, Küpper, Hövermann 2011; 
Moore, Mason, and Lewis 2008; van Dijk 2007; Poole 2002). Bowen (2012a: 
57) labels the approach “block thinking, whereby the diversity of perspec-
tives within a social group are collapsed into a single caricature.”
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We need to recognize that these specious distortions are more oft en de-
liberate rather than merely ignorant. We need, that is, to comprehend them 
as being justifi ed by a normative outlook, Hobbesian postmodernism, which 
justifi es manipulating images if for no other reason than that it discerns 
no prudent alternative to doing so. First, there now exists so much credible 
evidence of the kind already mentioned above that refutes the stigmatiz-
ing stereotypes of Muslims that it no longer seems plausible that educated, 
intelligent Islam-bashers could be unaware of it. Th is means that the critics 
willfully choose to neglect evidence at odds with their own positions. For 
instance, precious few of the prominent Islam naysayers possess advanced 
degrees in any branch of Islamic studies and most exhibit little interest in 
learning from or contributing to that scholarly enterprise, though, as said, 
they have to be aware of its existence (Meijer 2013; Schneiders 2010b). Fur-
thermore, we have to presume that the opponents of Islam are keenly aware 
of the equally large body of social scientifi c literature (also cited above) that 
demonstrates that the reductionist, essentializing stereotypes of Muslims 
shape mass public opinion far more extensively than more nuanced inter-
pretations of specialists. Th ird, and perhaps most importantly, no political 
activist can be oblivious to the surge in fame and success of anti-Islamic 
parties and politicians in Europe that was discussed in Chapter 3 (Europe-
an Commission against Racism and Intolerance 2011: 7; Art 2011; Howard 
2010; Givens and Luedtke 2005). Indeed, “blaming Islam” (Bowen 2012a) 
has mushroomed into a full blown “industry” (Lean 2012). Scapegoating 
Islam and Muslims has become similar to an irresistible fad that power-
hungry politicians, ambitious reporters, and greedy media moguls cannot 
aff ord to ignore. Th e prevaricators peddle it like a hot new product or brand. 
Robert Leiken (2012: 269) summarizes this mentality:
Nuance, specifi city, and complexity rank as outsiders in a political 
culture that rewards partisanship, a media that reduces complex sto-
ries to “sound bites,” an academy that merchandizes what it calls 
“theory,” agenda-driven foundations and a think-tank world where 
policy oft en precedes, or even precludes, research.
But the players in this game do more than capitalize on an existing dis-
course; they also help to produce and sustain it. Th ey fashion “me-
diatized” Muslims who pass for actual Muslims amongst much of the 
general public (Sunier 2010: 133). As Hirsi Ali notoriously conceded 
once the lies of her autobiography were exposed, “Yes, I made it all up” 
(Quoted in Qantara.de 1 June 2015, http://en.qantara.de/content/ayaan-
hirsi-alis-controversial-theories-on-islam-hailed-as-a-female-luther).
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I do not wish to imply that anti-Islam political activists are postmod-
ernists through and through, though surely some are. I do not doubt that 
many of them sincerely see themselves as striving to defend human rights 
or protect their national culture. However, they have fragilized enough to-
ward postmodernism to deem it naïve to think that they can succeed politi-
cally without manipulating the truth. Th ey fi nd politically unsophisticated 
and reckless the notion that the mass public can or even cares to appreciate 
the objective facts in all their complexity. Th ey accept that fear-mongering 
and scapegoating wins votes and that sensationalized reporting sells best. 
Th ey recognize that politics is as much or more about symbols than about 
substance, that the polls are more important than the truth, and that we 
live in an age in which there is no business but show business (Postman 
1985). Th ey have internalized that fragment of Hobbesian postmodernism 
that interprets politics as a struggle to establish one’s preferred discourse as 
the “prestige” discourse over and above rivals. Th ey do not trust their oppo-
nents to play “fairly” and conclude, reluctantly and sadly perhaps, that they 
must demonize and dominate or be demonized and dominated. Th ey agree, 
whether they have read Stanley Fish (1999: 240) or not, that since there is no 
escaping the political game, one should play it “and play it to win.”
Europhobic Hyperbole
Hobbesian postmodernism manifests itself markedly in what some authors 
have called “the clash of perceptions” (Nyiri 2010). Th e notion denotes the 
widely documented phenomenon whereby non-Muslims perceive Muslims 
diff erently than the latter perceive themselves (see also Chebel d’Appollonia 
2015: 28 and 88–89; Pew Global Attitudes Project 2006). Th e prevailing 
misperceptions of Muslims in Europe have reached the level of what Stanley 
Cohen (1980: 9) identifi es as “moral panic” (also see Morgan and Poynting 
2012a; Bahners 2011). Moral panic occurs when opportunistic political 
agents manage to stigmatize a targeted group in such a way that the group’s 
purported moral deviance becomes convincingly portrayed as an existential 
threat to the society as a whole. Moral panics tend to take place largely in the 
realm of symbolic politics, having little or no basis in fact. However, the oth-
erwise very important literature that documents the stigmatization of Mus-
lims in Europe tends to overlook reverse stigmatization or what we might 
call “reciprocal moral panic.” Islamists, for example, oft en invert the stigma 
of themselves to portray the West and Westerners as an existential threat to 
the umma. Non-Muslim Europeans (as well as lapsed Muslims) are repre-
sented as superfi cial and hedonistic, power-hungry and oppressive, promis-
cuous and lascivious, greedy and sly, even rapacious and sadistic. Th e Irani-
an intellectual Jalal al-e Ahmad’s notion of “Westoxifi cation” (Gharbzadegi) 
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receives popular and simplifi ed expression in dozens of vituperating pam-
phlets, websites, and fi lms that warn pious Muslims to avoid exposure to, let 
alone emulation of Western ways, lest they steer the righteous into iniquity 
and eternal damnation. For example, the website www.einladungzumpara-
dies (invitation to paradise) shows multiple images of supposed Western 
materialism and decadence and then claims that Muhammad “would say 
no, never [to these things] and spurn them (www.youtube.com/watch?v=8-
YDZAPycnM). A piece translated and widely circulated by the Saudi-spon-
sored London publishing house Al-Firdous enjoins readers: “Do not take the 
Jews and Christians for friends.” It is “forbidden for a Muslim to go to live 
amongst the infi dels and acknowledge their authority over him” (Qahtani 
1999: 3:2). A Belgian website goes so far as to assert that “he who does not 
consider to be an infi del one who follows a religion other than Islam, such 
as the Christians, or who doubts their vileness or approves of their ways, he 
himself is a infi del” (http://assabyle.com/index.php?id=510.). Hizb ut-Tahrir 
similarly contends: “If Muslims surrendered to these calls to assimilate into 
the system we would inevitably lose our distinct Islamic values” (quoted in 
Akbarzahdeh and Roose 2011: 314). One Milli Görüş imam posited that “if 
Turkey were allowed into the EU, the Turkish people would have to give up 
Islam, give up their culture and their history” (quoted in LeVine 2003: 122; 
also see Jonker 2006: 138). Such warnings are oft en accompanied by admo-
nitions to the audience to dedicate their lives to the inevitably triumphant 
struggle against the perfi dious West that will usher in a new golden age of 
genuine peace, prosperity, and justice for the global umma (Dinç 2014: 42–
43; Ramadan 2001; Parvez 2000). Th e noble-sounding, international message 
seems to resonate particularly strongly among younger European Muslims 
who fi nd it easier to identify with this heroic global movement than with the 
distant homeland of their immigrant parents or with the receiving country 
from which they feel rejected and marginalized (Cheleb d’Appollonia 2015: 
89–90; Cesari 2013: 130–37; Ceylan and Kiefer 2013: 71–99; Leiken 2012: 47; 
Gest 2010; Jenkins 2007: 127; Roy 2004; Lepoutre 1997; Withol de Wenden 
1996; Gardner and Shuker 1994: 164). A number of prominent European 
intellectuals of Muslim heritage, including Tariq Ramadan (1999a: 55–56), 
have warned that large segments of Muslim youth in Europe are being in-
doctrinated into dualistic and reductionist interpretations of the West as the 
Great Satan (also see Lewis 2006: 172–73).
It is important, especially in conjunction with Hobbesian postmod-
ernism, to underscore this reciprocating stigmatization because the war-
ring sides not only prey on, but also rely on one another. Th e preposter-
ous deeds or sayings of the Islam-haters are spotlighted to corroborate 
the outlandish deeds and sayings of the Europe-haters and vice versa. To 
cite just one example, some Muslims became indignant when they learned 
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that the Danish newspaper Jyllands Posten not only published an insult-
ing cartoon of Muhammad in 2005 but refused to print an unfl attering 
caricature of Jesus in 2003. Some of the protesters in a demonstration in 
Britain organized by al-Ghurabaa carried placards reading “Europe you 
will pay—Your 9/11 is on the way.” Such belligerent threats then become 
the focus of editorials and statements claiming “Islam is intolerant” (Jen-
kins 2007: 238). We could cite additional examples ad infi nitum and ad 
nauseam. Th e important point is that this vicious circle of mutual recrimi-
nations is auto-generating. Th e dueling sides at once berate but also cre-
ate their rivals. Th ey become locked in a hermetically sealed discourse 
of hyperbole and invective that neither pays nor draws attention to more 
nuanced discussion and analysis (O’Brien 2015; Tyrer 2013: 121; LeVine 
2003: 102). Furthermore, much of this “hyperdiscourse” (Amir-Moazami 
and Salvatore 2003: 68) or “phantom controversy” (Foroutan 2011: 8) takes 
place exclusively in cyberspace where the ease and stakes of manipulat-
ing images increase exponentially. Th ere the Hobbesian postmodern logic 
that one must “market” the “truth” in order to win the inevitable power 
struggle becomes all the more compelling.
Hospitable Postmodernism and the Third Space
Th ough largely drowned out by the obstreperous voices informed by 
Hobbesian postmodernism, the more accommodating sounds of hospitable 
postmodernism are audible. Briefl y recalling from Chapter 2, hospitable 
postmodernism retains the nihilism of its scrappier ken and like it rejects 
the feasibility of an overlapping normative consensus, whether based on 
universal reason or cultural homogeneity. However, hospitable postmod-
ernism refuses to jettison the possibility that rival parties adhering to fun-
damentally diff erent worldviews can learn to interact with one another via 
mutually respectful and benefi cial practices. Such cooperation, it is argued, 
becomes possible when combating parties relax or relinquish their insis-
tence on possessing the moral high ground. When they forego the fi nger-
pointing that goes with condemning the adversary as evil, they produce and 
enter a fi gurative or actual “third space” (Bhabha 1994: 38) that neither par-
ty presumes to own or to determine as “our territory.” In such inchoate and 
anomic realms and relations unexpected hybrid combinations and cross-
fertilizations can be encountered and explored that can yield previously un-
imagined solutions to seemingly intractable antagonisms. Such solutions, as 
noted in the previous chapter, will always have to be context-specifi c, prag-
matic, and provisionary and must remain open to renegotiation. Th e ideas 
of hospitable postmodernism, even when not specifi cally labeled as such, 
are well established, widely circulated, and even directly applied to religious 
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pluralism in Europe (see O’Brien 2015; Norton 2013; Göle 2011; Modood 
2009; Schiff auer 2008a; Davie 2007; Volf 2007; Asad 1997).
Post-Islamism
Fragments of this friendlier reading of the postmodern condition are de-
tectable in the words and deeds of political activists whom some observers 
dub “post-Islamists” (Mandaville 2014: 369–99; Bayat 2013b; Schiff auer 
2010; Roy 1998). I adopt this admittedly less-than-perfect label to refer to 
a new generation of Muslim intellectuals and activists in search of a “fu-
sion of religiosity and rights, faith and freedom, Islam and liberty [that] 
transcend[s] Islamism by building a pious society with a civil nonreligious 
state” (Bayat 2013a: x). While their critique of many aspects of modern 
Western societies is unmistakably informed by the thought of earlier Is-
lamists such as Qutb or Maududi, post-Islamists eschew the wholesale re-
jection of Western society associated with both the Islamist pioneers as 
well as their contemporary orthodox adherents. “I don’t deny my Muslim 
roots,” claims Tariq Ramadan, “but I don’t vilify Europe either” (Time 
11 December 2000). Likewise, the London-based Quilliam Foundation 
aims to show “the public that it is possible to express legitimate griev-
ances with social and political issues without having to adopt simplistic 
narratives of there being a ‘war on Islam’” (Quilliam Foundation; http://
www.quilliamfoundation.org/about/). Th e same holds true for the Mus-
lim members of the popular Danish musical trio Outlandish (Aidi 2014: 
xxiv). Th e proponents of this “neo-Islam” (Foroutan and Schäfer 2009) in 
Europe tend to stem from the middle class and to be highly and mostly 
Western educated (Khosrokhavar 2010: 143–44; Ewing 2008: 79; Werbner 
1996: 115). Th at said, they operate within a fully “transnational religious 
discourse” (Mandaville 2003: 129) that is profoundly in touch with and 
deeply colored by prominent reformist thinkers in the Middle East such 
as Abdolkarim Soroush, Muhammad Shahrur, Rachid al-Ghannouchi, 
Fatima Mernissi, and Jusuf al-Qaradawi. Th ese mavericks in Europe are 
contesting for leadership, oft en with success, with an older, more strictly 
anti-Western guard in Islamist associations such as the UOIE, IGMG, or 
the U.K. Islamic Mission. Th ey have also founded their own independent 
associations such as Young Muslims (U.K.), the Federation of Student Is-
lamic Societies, the Union des Jeunes Musulmans (France), or the Asso-
ciation of Young Italian Muslims. Th ey support or produce research in 
think tanks such as the Institut Européen des Sciences Humaines (Paris), 
the ECFR (Dublin), Ta-Ha (London), and the Islamic Foundation (Leices-
ter). Th ey publish their ideas in journals and magazines such as Q-News, 
Th e Muslim News, La Medina, and Die Islamische Zeitung or on websites 
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such as islamonline.com, Islam21.net, oumma.com, Islam.de, and huda.
de, as well as sponsoring conferences like those at Le Bourget or Chateau 
Chinon or Islam Expo (London), which attract thousands of mainly young 
Muslims (Jonker 2000; Mandaville 2000; Boubekeur 2007: 20–28). Th eir 
ideas reach a very wide audience. For example, Ramadan, arguably their 
most celebrated spokesman, made the list of 100 most infl uential persons 
at Time in 2004, Prospect Magazine in 2008, and Foreign Policy in 2010.
Post-Islamists adamantly reject the conventional binary opposition be-
tween Islam and liberalism that paints them as mutually exclusive norma-
tive outlooks. Ramadan (2010: 257), for instance, chides European Muslims 
for falling prey to “simplistic versions of ‘us versus them’” that teach that 
“you are more Muslim when you are against the West.” Post-Islamists genu-
inely laud European democracies for their protection of individual liberty, 
especially religious freedom. Ramadan (1999b: 18) reminds readers that it is 
precisely the separation of church and state that can “protect the total inde-
pendence of Muslims in France.” Similarly, the erstwhile leader of IGMG, 
Mehmet Erbakan, contends that European Muslims live in far superior con-
ditions for freely exercising their religion than 90 percent of their Muslim 
brethren in the so-called “Islamic world,” where authoritarian regimes have 
traditionally quashed religious freedom. Such authoritarian rule, even when 
done in the name of Islamic law, he maintains, “is not a fulfi llment of God’s 
will rather its perversion” (quoted in Schiff auer 2010: 258). So impressed 
by the conditions of religious freedom was the Tunisian exile (until 2011) 
al-Ghannouchi that he famously changed Europe’s designation from the 
conventional dar-al-harb (abode of war) to dar-al-Islam (abode of Islam) 
(Kepel 1999: 152). Ramadan (1999a: 150) endorsed the Tunisian’s recatego-
rization but augmented it to dar al-shahada (abode of testimony). By tak-
ing full advantage of the extensive freedoms available to them in Europe, 
argued Ramadan (1999a: 142–50), European Muslims could realize a new 
kind of “Islamic citizenship” that could stand as a model (testimony) for the 
rest of the Islamic world to emulate. But this they will only achieve when 
they abandon their “Pakistani, Turkish or Arab” “ghettos” (both “social 
and intellectual”) and “integrate themselves into European cultures, which 
become a new dimension of their own identity” (Ramadan 2010: 259–60). 
Similarly, Muhammad Abdul Bari, former general secretary of the MCB, 
stated: “In my view the moral and ethical principles of our faith urge us 
to become conscientious, responsible citizens and active participants in the 
life of our nation” (quoted in Akbarzahdeh and Roose 2011: 315). Indeed, 
on their websites the UOIF (uoif-online.com), the IGMG (igmg.de), and the 
MCB (mcb.org), despite their Islamist connections, each publicly proclaims 
in no uncertain terms its fi delity to the constitution of France, Germany, 
and Britain, respectively.
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Post-Islamists, however, do not off er unconditional praise of European 
society. Th ey retain signifi cant dimensions of the critique of modern liber-
alism and secularism bequeathed by their Islamist forefathers. Th ey are es-
pecially troubled by the vapid spirituality and triumphant materialism that 
they discern in modern Western lifestyles. Al-Ghannouchi, for example, 
argues that modernization eroded older values stemming from religious 
belief. “But no new morality could develop to fi ll the gap. It is in this moral 
vacuum that personal aggrandizement and socio-economic exploitation 
have become rampant. . . . Islamic resurgence represents a rebellion against 
this state of aff airs” (Ghannouchi 2000: 117). Th e spiritual, and thereby the 
ethical, dimension of life is said to be neglected by Europeans who have be-
come mesmerized by their admittedly impressive physical accomplishments 
and the comforts of modernization. “We do not want modernization with-
out soul or values,” asserts Ramadan. “We want ethical reform. We want 
to transform the world in the name of the justice and human dignity that, 
sadly, are oft en forgotten in the current inhumane global (dis)order” (New-
Statesman 6 April 2006). For Ramadan, modern nationalism provides a je-
june substitute for genuinely religious identity. Th e former teaches humans 
“how” to exist but not, like Islam, “why” they exist. It leaves them lacking a 
deeper meaning and purpose with which to assess rather than merely accept 
the latest trends and fashions of modern life. It no less than robs human-
kind of its proper and proportionate relationship to the rest of the universe 
by anthropomorphically and mistakenly placing man at the center of that 
universe (Ramadan 1999a: 172).
In the eyes of post-Islamists, Europe urgently needs an infusion of ethics 
of just the kind that a great religion like Islam can provide. Th ey see Islam 
as a wellspring of transcendental values such as the fundamental equality of 
all humans before God, humility and respect for God’s creation (environ-
ment), individual responsibility and industry, but also sympathy, aid, and 
justice for the downtrodden and unfortunate that if adapted and applied to 
modern life could greatly improve it (see Vidino 2010a; Hellyer 2009: 118; 
Ewing 2008: 79; Cesari 2007: 117–18; Modood and Ahmed 2007: 192; Fadil 
2006). Jamal Badawi of the ECFR writes:
Islam is a faith that resonates with pure human nature.  .  .  . It also 
teaches universal morality, justice and compassion. We believe as 
Muslims that these positive and constructive qualities are not a 
monopoly of Muslims but are embedded in upright human nature. 
(Quoted in Pargeter 2008: 177)
Similarly, the IGMG maintains that “by orienting itself around the Islamic 
sources,” it can constructively contribute to “protecting the poor and the 
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needy, opposing injustice, disseminating what is good and rejecting what is 
bad, and establishing justice in social relations” (das islamische Portal, igmg.
de/gemeinschaft /wir-ueber-uns). In contrast to conventional Islamists, who 
have traditionally been more oriented toward aff ecting change in the coun-
tries from which they emigrated, post-Islamists are keen to engage and im-
prove politics in Europe. However, they want to do so qua Muslims. Th us 
did the founding members of the Union des Jeunes Musulmans enunciate 
in 1987 their goal to “live our spirituality in the open and not in a reclusive 
way in the private sphere” (quoted in Bowen 2010: 22). IGMG maintains 
that “Islam is a social and individual way of living, the infl uence of which 
certainly does not end at a mosque’s doorstep” (das islamische Portal, igmg.
de/gemeinschaft /wir-ueber-uns). Likewise, the Muslim Council of Britain 
(2007) strives for “a multi-faith, pluralist society with a conscious policy 
of recognizing that people’s cultural and faith identities are not merely a 
private matter but have public implications.” Each organization echoes the 
words of the infl uential leader of the ECFR, Jusuf al-Qaradawi, who asserts: 
“No Muslim who believes that Islam is the word of God can conceive that 
this great religion will ever accept being a mere appendix to socialism or any 
other ideology” (quoted in Soage 2010: 29).
Post-Islamists do not merely want to join European societies (integrate); 
they want to change them. Th e only way that Muslims can contribute to 
Europe qua Muslims is if the understanding of what it means to be Eu-
ropean expands to include Muslims. Th is necessitates, according to post-
Islamists, a rethinking of European identity and the norms and values that 
defi ne it not as something fi xed and preordained, but rather as an ongoing 
and evolving project in which Muslims become key players. Th is is Europe 
reimagined as a work in progress, indeed as one demanding still much work 
and much progress. Amir-Moazami and Armando Salvatore (2003: 73) call 
this outlook “the both/and logic” whereby post-Islamists demand to join the 
game of modern life but also to change the rules by which it is played (also 
see Cesari 2007: 116–18; Boubekeur 2007).
Post-Islamists are calling for just the type of open-endedness prescribed 
by hospitable postmodernism. Need I repeat the caveat that I do not mean to 
equate post-Islamists and hospitable postmodernists? Rather, pragmatic and 
ambitious Muslim activists who understandably seek to inject themselves 
and their ideas into the mainstream of the societies that they now consider 
home deploy fragments of postmodern (and other) logic in an eff ort to le-
gitimize their political aspirations (Bayat 2013b: 8; Bowen 2010: 14; Rich 
2010: 123; Jonker 2006: 136). Given that the mainstream generally paints 
and treats them as outsiders to Europe, these “autodidactic” “tinkerers” 
(Roy 1994: 95, 97) would be foolish not to echo a postmodern observation 
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like that of Tal Asad (1997: 194), who contends that discussion has pivoted 
around the question of “whether Muslim communities can really adjust to 
Europe” rather than “whether the institutions and ideologies of Europe can 
adjust to a modern world of which culturally diverse immigrants are an 
integral part.” Th e same holds true for arguments of, say, Derrida (1992: 29): 
“It is necessary to make ourselves the guardians of an idea of Europe . . . but 
of a Europe that consists precisely in not closing itself off  in its identity and 
in advancing itself in an exemplary way towards what it is not, toward the 
other heading or the heading of the other.”
Ramadan (2010: 262) captures and capitalizes on this postmodern spirit 
of open-endedness and indeterminacy with his call for a “new ‘We.’” Th is is 
a new understanding of what it means to be European that includes rather 
than excludes Islam and that views “Muslims—with their spirituality, ethics 
and creativity”—as a “contribution” rather than a threat. Th is will demand 
recognition that
European societies have been changing, and the presence of Mus-
lims has forced them to experience an even greater diversity of 
cultures. As a result, a European identity has evolved that is open, 
plural and constantly in motion, thanks to the cross-fertilisation be-
tween reclaimed cultures of origin and the European cultures that 
now include new (Muslim) citizens. (Ramadan 2010: 258–59)
As Ramadan’s remark makes clear, post-Islamists do not pretend to have 
all the answers. Th ey seek dialogue but, in hospitable postmodern spirit, dia-
logue that remains open, even if uncomfortably so, to all participants willing 
to enter discussion. Dilwar Hussain (2011) of the European Muslim Network, 
for instance, insists that “we . . . need to reach a point where (sensible and ra-
tionally argued) religious voices can be given consideration and not automati-
cally disregarded as ‘superstitious.’” Likewise, foregone conclusions of where 
dialogue will lead have to be resisted. Th e UOIF’s commitment to open dia-
logue is typical of other organizations with post-Islamist leanings:
Diversity is inherent in human nature. Th e UOIF believes that dia-
logue is the best way to achieve mutual recognition among mem-
bers of a common society. Th e UOIF opposes a rupturing discourse 
based on the hatred and rejection of others.  .  .  . Th e only accept-
able approach to dealing with the emergence of problems of mis-
understanding is dialogue, explanation and education. (Union des 
Organisations Islamiques de France; www.uoif-online.com/v3/spip.
php?article19)
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Official and Unofficial Hospitable Postmodernism
Fragilization toward hospitable postmodernism admittedly remains slight 
among state offi  cials but hardly nonexistent. We can discern, for instance, 
resistance to demonization in the decision of Britain’s Home and Foreign 
Offi  ces to fund the Radical Middle Way, a project that sponsors speeches 
and discussion groups, oft en led by prominent Islamist personalities such 
as Ramadan, Kemal Helbawi, or Shaykh Abdullah bin Bayyah. “Radical 
Middle Way,” explains its webpage, “is a safe place for people to ask dif-
fi cult questions and explore challenging issues” (Radical Middle Way; radi-
calmiddleway.org). We hear a similar openness toward indispensable but 
unsettling dialogue in Otto Schilly’s remark as interior minister in 2002: 
“Th e state cannot aff ord to ignore the . . . dynamics and potentially explo-
sive nature of religious questions. . . . Integration will only succeed when we 
take into account the new religious needs of Muslims” (quoted in Laurence 
2012: 107). Something similar would seem to be the guiding spirit of Dus-
seldorf ’s “Ibrahim trifft   [meets] Abraham” project, which brings disaff ected 
youths of various faiths together to air their grievances in a non-judgmental 
atmosphere designed to foster exchange of perspectives (Ceylan and Kiefer 
2013: 132–40). A similar program since 2005 under the label “Dialog macht 
Schule” in Essen, Stuttgart and Berlin challenges its teen participants to 
“suspend assumptions and value judgments” in the interest of fostering open 
exchange (quoted in Ceylan and Kiefer 2013: 142). Most European govern-
ments have experimented with supporting Muslim hip-hop artists due to 
their appeal among youth and despite their oft en vehement critique of Eu-
ropean societies and regimes (Aidi 2014: 205–11). Likewise, we hear some 
of the postmodern spirit of reimagining Europe in the European Commis-
sion’s call to “rewrite European history” so as to include the major transfer-
ence of knowledge that came to Europe from the Islamic world during the 
Middle Ages in places like al-Andalus (Aidi 2014: 327). Austrian chancellor 
Wolfgang Schüssel claimed in 2006 that “Islam is a real component of the 
European identity through the accomplishments of its grand scientifi c and 
cultural heritage” (Quoted in Godard 2007: 200). In like spirit, Tony Blair 
(2001) has said: “It is time the west confronted its ignorance of Islam. Jews, 
Muslims and Christians are all children of Abraham. Th is is the moment to 
bring the faiths closer together in understanding of our common values and 
heritage, a source of unity and strength.” His British Foreign Offi  ce spon-
sored in 2006 a conference of European Islamist organizations whose fi nal 
resolution read: “Following the teachings of the Holy Qur’an and the high 
standard which it sets, Muslims can enrich Europe as exemplary members 
of society and role models of decency and goodness” (Topkapi Declaration 
2006). Sarkozy has spoken approvingly of “the cross-fertilization of ideas, 
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thinking and cultures .  .  . [which] means recognizing, understanding and 
respecting the Other,” although in the same (highly fragmented and fra-
gilized) editorial he also endorsed “assimilation” as well as the Swiss ban on 
minarets (Le Monde 9 December 2009). President Hollande stated in 2013 
that “France knows that Islam and democracy are compatible” (quoted in 
Fredette 2014: 17). And the European Council has proclaimed that “integra-
tion is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all im-
migrants and residents of Member States” (Council of the EU, Justice and 
Home Aff airs 2004: 19–24).
At this point in time, though, fragments of hospitable postmodernism 
are likelier to be found in far smaller and less grand contexts of private ini-
tiatives and lives. Not surprisingly, churches, synagogues, and mosques fre-
quently organize ecumenical encounters open to the notion that “our social 
identities are not constituted by one exclusive set of relations or mode of 
belonging” (former archbishop Rowan Williams quoted in Bowen 2012a: 77; 
also see Laurence 2012: 217; Zapata-Barrero and de Witte 2010: 189; Otter-
beck 2010: 114–16). Many churches allow mosque-less Muslim communities 
to use their Christian sanctuaries for worship, thereby temporarily turn-
ing them into sacred Islamic spaces. Not all these experiences are planned, 
but rather emerge serendipitously. In some cities where Muslims make up 
a large percentage of a neighborhood, non-Muslims have come to appreci-
ate and partake in the fast-breaking feasts during the month of Ramadan 
(Roy 2007: 85). Or on a more intimate level, a Muslim falls in love with a 
Christian or an atheist—or Christian grandparents fi nd themselves with a 
Muslim granddaughter. Such prosaic examples are, of course, far removed 
from the august halls where lawmakers make formal policy. However, a bur-
geoning body of research reveals that a rapidly increasing number of such 
small-scale experiences with unexpected but, in the end, managed hybrid-
ity is gradually but profoundly altering the way that people who reside in 
Europe understand themselves and their home (Berg and Sigona 2013; Nor-
ton 2013; Meyer and Brysac 2012; Yildiz 2012; Bowen 2010; Foroutan and 
Schäfer 2009; Wise and Velayutham 2009; Schmitt 2003).
Conclusion: Islam Councils
I conclude this chapter with a brief discussion of the Islam councils that 
have been established in many European countries to facilitate better rela-
tions between state and mosque. Th e unfurling dynamics of the councils 
nicely exemplify the central themes of this chapter: policies toward Islam 
are polymorphous and oft en contradictory and self-defeating; this messi-
ness results in signifi cant measure from the vying public philosophies of 
liberalism, nationalism, and postmodernism; fragilization among and 
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fragmentation of the public philosophies lead policy makers to become in-
creasingly comfortable with ambivalence and inconsistency; the normative 
pluralism and bricolage and their impact on policy are generally similar 
from one European polity to the next.
Initially, state offi  cials justify the establishment of the councils by invok-
ing the inclusiveness of liberal multiculturalism. Islam is to be welcomed 
into the political order so long as its representatives respect the values en-
shrined in the constitution. Th e following offi  cial mission of the Consulta 
per l’Islam Italiano is typical. It is
a consultative body of the Interior Ministry that conducts research 
which formulates positions and proposals for the purpose of encour-
aging institutional dialogue with the Islamic communities in order 
to identify the most adequate solutions for a harmonious inclusion 
of Islam within the national community with respect to the laws of 
the Italian Republic.(Quoted in Spena 2010: 171) 
Th e invitees initially endorse the offi  cial goals. Th e leader of L’Unione delle 
Comunità e Organizzazioni Islamiche in Italia (UCOII), for example, stat-
ed: “I want to make clear that we are for the respect of the Italian constitu-
tion” (quoted in Laurence 2012: 213).
However, it does not take long for fragilization in the direction of liberal 
perfectionism to emerge, especially in response to critics who charge that 
the councils consort with enemies of democracy. One French politician ar-
gued that “when one recognizes ‘moderate Islamist’ organizations as offi  cial 
interlocutors . . . are we aware that these are allies of Islamist totalitarianism 
who betray democracy?” (quoted in Laurence 2012: 202). Th is claim that 
Islamist organizations, despite their publicly stated allegiance to the consti-
tution, cannot be trusted due to their duplicity can commonly be heard by 
Islam naysayers around Europe (Baran 2011: 173; Steinberg 2010: 153; Dip-
pel and Prill 2007; Vidino 2006; Fourest 2004; also see Laurence 2012: 202, 
243; Bahners 2011: 220–21).
Offi  cials feel compelled to address the anti-Islamic allegations with 
guarantees of unfl inching promotion and defense of democratic values. 
Sarkozy, who as interior minister formed the Conseil Français du Culte 
Musulman in 2003 and wrote that “secularism does not mean the refusal 
of all religions, but the respect of all beliefs” (Le Monde 9 December 2009), 
also maintained: “It is precisely because we recognize the right of Islam to 
sit at the table of the republic that we will not accept any deviation. Any 
prayer leader whose views run contrary to the values of the republic will be 
expelled” (quoted in Ross 2007: 212). Similarly, Interior Minister Manuel 
Valls in 2013 contended that it was “necessary to show” that Islam can be 
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compatible with democracy. Valls’s German counterpart, Wolfgang Schäu-
ble (2009), who founded the Deutsche Islam Konferenz and who averred 
that “there is no alternative to integrating Islam in Europe,” urged that “we 
must insist that Muslims identify with the constitution” (quoted in Lau-
rence 2012: 101). Th e Christian Democratic interior minister went so far as 
to require the imams on the council to cross out passages in their Qur’ans at 
odds with gender equality (Amir-Moazami 2011). Th is demeaning gesture 
came in the wake of sensationalized coverage of and hysterical national fo-
cus on the honor killing of Hatan Sürücü in 2005. Despite the fact that none 
of the imams had anything to do with the crime, the hyperbole surround-
ing it infl uenced the conference’s proceedings. Similarly, in the wake of the 
murder of Th eo van Gogh, the anti-Islamic fervor reached such intensity 
in the Netherlands that the Contactorgaan Moslims en Overheid (Contact 
Body for Muslims and Government) began rolling back its cooperation 
with Islamic organizations (which too had nothing to do with the murder) 
until eventually it was defunded in 2009 (Laurence 2012: 187). Offi  cials in 
Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom expelled representatives from the 
IGMG, UCOII, and the MCB, respectively, due to allegations of close ties 
with the Muslim Brotherhood (Joppke and Torpey 2013: 82; Laurence 2012: 
184, 213; Hellyer 2009: 158). Governments such as France, Italy, and Germa-
ny have also sought to stack the councils with “independent experts” (oft en 
non-Muslims or ex-Muslims) to dilute the presence of Islamic organizations 
(Laurence 2012: 173; Bader 2007: 337–38). Th is tactic tends to anger many 
Muslim participants, since the councils’ ostensible mission is to facilitate 
dialogue and cooperation between the state and Muslims. As some imams 
from the German Islam Conference who were perturbed by the inclusion 
of prominent feminists sarcastically quipped, “Th is is as if we tried to enter 
into dialogue with Catholics, and for this purpose we invite the Pope and 
pop star Madonna” (Tageszeitung 29 September 2006). More importantly, 
such patronizing acts backfi re. By expelling or alienating the Islamic orga-
nizations with the largest number of members, the councils are rendered 
dubious in the eyes of large segments of the Muslim population whom the 
councils were initially established to attract (Laurence 2012: 194).
For their part, Islamist organizations have been very wary about cooper-
ating with the councils. In the fi rst place, many of their actual and potential 
members are wont to believe Europhobic hyperbole that paints European 
governments as oppressive. As Roy (2007: 49) perspicaciously observes, so 
long as “Muslim identity is tinged with a strongly anti-imperialist hue,” 
enthusiastic support from a European government can oft en “amount to 
giving them [the state-supported Muslim organizations] the kiss of death” 
(also see Laurence 2012: 194; Akbarzadeh and Roose 2011: 319; Pargeter 
2008: 201; Patel 2007: 51–52; Scientifi c Council 2006: 202). When Islamist 
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organizations do explore cooperation with the councils, they typically do 
so with communitarian expectations. Th ey welcome the prospect of gov-
ernment assistance for the provision of religious services to Muslims but 
they fully expect that they themselves will determine the doctrinal content. 
Th ey understandably resist when offi  cials or other non-Muslims insist on 
reinterpreting and rewriting Islamic doctrine. Th e Islamic Council, for in-
stance, refused to endorse the Islam Konferenz’s statement on “German So-
cietal Order and Value Consensus” because it allegedly falsely interpreted 
Islamic doctrine as a hindrance to integration (Joppke and Torpey 2013: 
82). Aft er stymied negotiations with the Dutch government over the con-
tent of imam training at public universities, the Contactorgaan Moslims en 
Overheid announced in 2005 that it intended to establish its own indepen-
dent training institutions (Boender 2006: 11). Islamic organizations have 
oft en refused to accept any interpretation of the Qur’an other than their 
own. It deserves mention that many of the current councils have predeces-
sors from the 1990s, most of which stalled or unraveled due in large part to 
refused or withdrawn cooperation from Islamic organizations (for details, 
see Laurence 2012: 159–62, 204–8; Amir-Moazami 2011; Silvestri 2010; Gest 
2010: 140–41; Rigoni 2009: 483; Schiff auer 2008b; Godard 2007; Warner and 
Wenner 2006: 458). A French advisor to three interior ministers from those 
years vented his frustration: “One cannot negotiate with the Islamists—it’s 
‘my way or the highway’ with them, because what’s in the Qur’an is law and 
superior to any administrative or historic arguments you can make [as an 
administrator]” (quoted in Laurence 2012: 205).
Nor have the embassies proven to be wholly supportive. Most welcome 
the public assistance from receiving country governments. However, for 
their own communitarian reasons, the embassy representatives have voiced 
robust opposition to the inclusion onto the councils of other Islamic as-
sociations independent of their governments. Th ey have charged Islamists 
with radicalism and have played an important role in cajoling state offi  cials 
to reduce or eliminate the representatives of Islamist organizations from 
the councils (Laurence 2012: 220–25). DITIB’s position is typical: “We sug-
gest that the German state try . . . making DITIB the monopoly, the offi  cial 
interlocutor of the government. If every federation is going to be treated 
equally, what is the motivation to refuse radicalism?” (quoted in Laurence 
2012: 222). Needless to say, the Islamist NGOs have strongly criticized the 
undue infl uence of the embassies on the councils, further impeding orches-
trated cooperation (Laurence 2012: 225–26).
Nativism too has hampered the councils. Th ey are woefully underfunded, 
convene rarely, and accomplish nothing even remotely similar to the kind of 
cooperation that exists between church and state (Laurence 2012: 179, 194–
95). One offi  cial in the French council observed: “We support it politically 
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but we don’t give any money” (quoted in Laurence 2012: 179). When a Lega 
Nord politico assumed the helm at the Interior Ministry in 2008, the meetings 
of the Consulta were suspended for two years (Laurence 2012: 179). In fact, 
the Charter of Values drawn up by the Consulta underscores Italy’s Judeo-
Christian character: “Italy .  .  . developed under Christianity, which perme-
ated all aspects of its history and, together with Judaism, prepared the way to 
modernity and the principles of freedom and justice” (Quoted in Spena 2010: 
174). No mention is made of the resplendent Arab Islamic cultural legacy from 
medieval Sicily. Likewise, at the 2006 German Islam Conference, Interior 
Minister Schäuble underscored that Germany was a country with “Christian 
roots and traditions” (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 27 September 2006) 
and demanded that the Muslim attendees identify with the “German value 
community” (deutsche Wertgemeinschaft ), to which many Muslims objected 
on grounds that Muslims, as Schäuble made plain, were not traditionally con-
sidered part of this community (Amir-Moazami 2009: 203).
And yet the councils have a way of surviving or reviving despite their 
frustrations and failures (Laurence 2012: 196). Th e participants, as dissatis-
fi ed as they might be with the councils, fear the alternative: mounting antipa-
thy and recrimination. Th ey perceive the increasing ugliness of a Hobbesian 
war of all against all without limits. Whether by philosophical conviction 
or mere pragmatism, many who persevere do so with a new appreciation of 
the nonaccusatory and open-ended spirit of hospitable postmodernism. A 
British offi  cial for the Department for Community and Local Government, 
which deals extensively with the Mosques and Imams National Advisory 
Board, commented in 2010:
Today we must have a relationship of semi-autonomy and arms-
length distance, including criticizing where due, to keep the cred-
ibility within the Muslim communities themselves—many of whom 
are not happy with internal policies or foreign policies of the UK 
government. Th at space is crucial to the credibility of the new 
council.”(Quoted in Laurence 2012: 194) 
A Muslim participant in the German Islam Conference refl ected:
I was long of the opinion that we were working without achieving 
any results. Th at was frustrating. Today I must correct that assess-
ment. We have achieved results at all levels. Islamic organizations 
and representatives who were not able to speak to one another have 
now found dialogue and discussion. We have also managed to dis-
mantle some prejudices in Germany. Th e black box of Islam has be-
come more transparent.(Quoted in Laurence 2012: 197) 
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Dilwar Hussain (2011) of the European Muslim Network, for example, 
argues that fruitful exchange comes “by fostering education and critical 
thinking, by encouraging open, pluralistic and free spaces of debate and by 
encouraging people to dialogue in safe spaces so they can build meaning-
ful relationships that cut through the polarised impasse of today.” In 2007, 
in reference to the rules governing the French council, Islamist leader Lhaj 
Th ami Brèze invoked Churchill’s well-known aphorism considering democ-
racy: “We need to fi nd the least worst system.” Th is statement becomes even 
more signifi cant when readers remember Brèze’s previous quotation (from 
2003), in which he obstinately insisted: “Th e Qur’an is our constitution” 
(quoted in Laurence 2012: 242). Th ese expressions of moderation represent 
hopeful signs of an emerging third space in many corners of Europe.
6
Terrorism
All told, there were 65 jihadist terrorist incidents in Europe from 
2001 to 2009, involving 336 people; this represents less than 1% of 
all terrorist incidents on the continent during those years.
—Doug Saunders, Th e Myth of the Muslim Tide
If Europe cannot be articulated in terms of complex space and 
complex time that allow for multiple ways of life (and not merely 
multiple identities) to fl ourish, it may be fated to be no more than 
the common market of an imperial civilization, always anxious 
about (Muslim) exiles within its gates and (Muslim) barbarians 
beyond.
—Tal Asad, Formations of the Secular
T errorism is not new to Europe. In the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, for example, revolutionary political organizations such as the Red Army Faction (RAF) or the Red Brigades and irredentist groups like 
the Irish Republican Army (IRA) or the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) 
committed acts of violence in eff orts to advance their political agendas. 
Earlier, during the tumultuous interwar years, political violence in the 
form of paramilitary clashes regularly transpired in many European 
countries. Of course, the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of 
Austria and his wife in 1914 triggered World War I. However, Islamist 
terrorism carried out against targets in Europe is quite novel. Th ere was, 
of course, the hostage-taking episode at the Munich Olympic Games of 
1972, but it was directed at Israel by Palestinian gunmen who did not 
directly invoke Islam. European offi  cials have over the last two decades 
had to show heightening attention to Islamist terrorism as a result of a 
succession of alarming events: a series of lethal bomb attacks in Paris 
carried out by the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) in 1995, the Hamburg 
Al Qaeda cell that led the attacks of 9/11, the involvement of residents 
of France and Spain in the Casablanca bombings of 2003, the Madrid 
rail bombings of 2004, the murder of Th eo van Gogh in Amsterdam in 
2004, the London Tube bombings on 7 July 2005 (7/7), the slaying of 
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two U.S. airmen and the serious injury of two others by Arid Uka at the 
Frankfurt airport in 2011, Mohammad Merah’s lethal shooting spree in 
Toulouse and Montauban in 2012, the bus bombing that killed six people 
in Burgas in 2012, the bloody slaying of Jeremy Rigby in 2013 in Wool-
wich, the murder of four persons at the Brussels Jewish Museum in 2014, 
the murderous gunning of over 200 persons in Paris during the year 
2015 (Charlie Hebdo and the coordinated attacks of 13 November), and 
the lethal attack on a cultural center and synagogue in Copenhagen in 
2015, not to mention abundant reports of young militants recruited from 
Europe to fi ght for jihadists in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere. 
Analysts regularly speak of “securitization”—the process by which issues 
such as immigration or cultural diversity come to be increasingly viewed 
and treated through the lens of their alleged impact on domestic security 
(Waever et al. 1993).
Several oversimplifi cations are common in the analysis of counter-
terrorism in Europe. One draws a fi rm distinction between U.S. and Euro-
pean strategies. Th e U.S. government allegedly treats terrorism primarily 
as an external threat and therefore prefers military action such as the inva-
sions and occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq to thwart terrorists before 
they can reach U.S. shores; European governments purportedly consider 
terrorism largely “homegrown,” such as in the case of the 7/7 bombers, and 
therefore prefer a combined strategy of domestic police action to arrest ter-
rorists and integration to discourage radicalization (Andreas and Nadel-
mann 2006; Rees and Aldrich 2005; Leiken 2005; Kagan 2004). Th e theory 
downplays or altogether ignores the fact that several European governments 
have allied with the United States in international military operations, such 
as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan or the 
“Coalition of the Willing” in Iraq (Keohane 2008). I hasten to add, how-
ever, that the present chapter focuses on terrorism and counter-terrorism 
within Europe while recognizing, of course, that both inevitably have extra-
European dimensions (Vidino 2013; Kegley 2003).
Th e aforementioned claim that European governments employ the com-
bined strategies of policing and integrating measures (Chebel d’Appollonia 
and Reich 2008: 1), while vaguely correct, nevertheless lacks nuance. As will 
become clear below, signifi cant diff erences stemming from the diff ering 
normative logics of liberalism, nationalism, and postmodernism abound on 
how best to pursue either strategy. Relatedly, the common assertion that the 
issue of terrorism in the end normatively distills down to a preference for se-
curity generally favored by the Right versus a preference for liberty defended 
by the Left  (Banks, De Nevers, and Wallerstein 2008: 4; Chebel d’Appollonia 
and Reich 2008: 2; Balzacq and Carrera 2006) proves to be too simplistic. 
Instead, mutual fragilization among liberal, nationalist, and postmodern 
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moralities has led activists to propose and governments to adopt a varied, 
ever-changing, and jumbled conglomeration of counter-terrorism measures. 
Th e policies “pursue wide-ranging and cross-cutting objectives” stemming 
from an “incoherent and fragmented counter-terrorism agenda” (Bossong 
2013: 13, 11). Th e result is “paradoxical eff ects and unintended consequenc-
es” (Friedrichs 2008: 3), producing “messy, localized, complicated realities” 
(Ireland 2010: 34). Such policy messiness turns up in most European gov-
ernments and therefore casts doubt on the theory of distinct national styles 
of counter-terrorism such as French assimilation and deportation versus 
British multiculturalism and conciliation (Klausen 2010; Kirschner and 
Sperling 2010; Leiken 2005).
Finally, the analysis of this chapter belies the clash-of-civilizations the-
sis. Th e latter postulates a greater tolerance of and propensity for politically 
motivated violence among Muslims than among (Western) non-Muslims 
(Huntington 1996; see also Phillips 2007; Fallaci 2006; Besson 2005; Ye’or 
2005; Schwarzer 2002a). Like the three preceding chapters, this one too will 
demonstrate that Muslim Europeans vehemently disagree among them-
selves and generally along the same liberal, nationalist, and postmodern 
contours that inform the diff ering views expressed by non-Muslim Euro-
peans. However, as will become abundantly clear, the clash thesis, in spite 
of and very likely because of its distortions, enjoys considerable normative 
sway in the politics of terrorism and counter-terrorism in Europe.
Combatting Terrorism with Equal Rights
Guaranteeing equal rights to Muslims is ultimately the surest weapon 
against terrorism; inversely, denying equal rights is the surest way to foment 
terrorism. Some version or other of this fragment of cosmopolitan reason-
ing fi gures prominently in the political discourse regarding terrorism in Eu-
rope. Th e widely circulated British columnist Timothy Garton Ash provides 
a typical formulation:
Th e profound alienation of many Muslims—especially the second 
and third generations of immigrant families, young men and wom-
en themselves born in Europe—is one of the most vexing problems 
facing the continent today. If things continue to go as badly as they 
are at the moment, this alienation, and the way it both feeds and is 
fed by the resentments of mainly white, Christian or post-Christian 
Europeans, could tear apart the civic fabric of Europe’s most estab-
lished democracies. It has already catalyzed the rise of populist anti-
immigrant parties, and contributed very directly to the terrorist at-
tacks on the United States [and Europe]. . . . If we, the—for want of a 
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better word—traditional Europeans, manage to reverse the current 
trend, and enable . . . [Muslims] to feel at home as new Muslim Euro-
peans, they could be a source of cultural enrichment and economic 
dynamism, helping to compensate for the downward drag of Eu-
rope’s rapidly aging population. If we fail, we shall face many more 
explosions.(New York Review of Books 5 October 2006) 
According to this line of reasoning, oft en dubbed “winning hearts and 
minds” or “soft  power,” persons treated with respect and dignity will have 
no reason to commit acts of terror. Persons welcomed and enabled to par-
ticipate fully and equally in society will do just that lawfully and peacefully 
(Chebel d’Appollonia and Reich 2010; Limbach 2007; Bader 2007: 258; Frey 
2004; Ignatieff  2004: x; Williams 2003).
European Muslims, on the whole, would appear to represent no excep-
tion. Th us, survey evidence indicates that they have as much or more confi -
dence in European democratic institutions as non-Muslims (Foroutan et al. 
2015; Cesari 2013: 20–81; Saunders 2012: 62–66; Haug, Müssig, and Stichs 
2010; Inglehart and Norris 2009; Gallop 2009; Diehl and Schnell 2006; Me-
troscopia 2006; Pew Global Attitudes Project 2006; Tribalat 1996). Th ey 
equally abhor violence and terrorism as a means to political ends (Gallop 
2009; 2007). As Kymlicka (2010: 44) succinctly states, relations between Eu-
ropean states and Muslim residents should be “taken out of the ‘security’ 
box, and put in the ‘democratic politics’ box.”
From the cosmopolitan perspective, the European Muslims most likely 
to entertain, abet, or commit terrorism are persons who feel alienated from 
and mistreated by the very European societies in which they make their 
homes. Most of the “Muslim” terrorists in Europe have not come straight 
from the battlefi elds of Iraq, mountains of Afghanistan, or deserts of Ara-
bia but rather were long-term resident aliens or even citizens of the Euro-
pean societies that they sought to terrorize. Take the example of 7/7 suicide 
bomber Mohammad Sidique (“Sid”) Khan, who came of age in Beeston, 
spoke English with a perfect Yorkshire accent, took a degree from Leeds 
Metropolitan University, and became a “learning mentor” at Hillside Pri-
mary School. Only aft er his exposure to and indignation over the deprived 
immigrant children and youth whom he served did Khan become enthralled 
with the ideas of jihadist mullahs such as Abdullah el-Faisal and Abu Ham-
za al-Masri. Indeed, a majority of jihadists active in Europe—Mohammad 
Atta (9/11 hijacker), Jamal Zougam (Madrid bomber), Khaled Kelkal (Paris 
Metro bomber), Mohammad Bouyeri (van Gogh assassin), Essid Sami Ben 
Khemais (Strasbourg and Rome cyanide plots), Mehdi Nemmouche (Brus-
sels Jewish Museum suspect), Chérif and Said Kouachi (Paris Charlie Hebdo 
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massacre), to name a few—appear to have radicalized aft er residing there 
for longer durations ( Leiken 2012: 71; Chebel d’Appollonia and Reich 2010: 
3–5; Tirman 2010: 67; Roy 2009; Pargeter 2008: 113–24; Banks, De Nevers, 
and Wallerstein 2008: 56–70; Bakker 2006). Social deprivation and alien-
ation also help explain why Europe’s prisons, disproportionately fi lled with 
inmates of Muslim heritage, make fertile recruiting ground for Islamist 
militants, as was the case with Chérif Kouachi (Beckford, Joly, and Khos-
rokhavar 2006).
Th e same explanation seems plausible for other forms of violence. 
Th e rioters of mainly Pakistani origin in Oldham, Leeds, Bradford, and 
Burnley in 2001 were responding to a brutalizing rampage by white thugs 
through the Glodwick neighborhood of Oldham on the night of 26 May. 
Th us did Tony Blair blame the riots on the “bad and regressive motive of 
white extremists” (Spiked Online 29 May 2001). Riots engaged in by youth 
of mostly North African descent in Paris in 2005, like those in Stockholm 
in 2013 involving disaff ected immigrants from Africa and the Middle 
East, were sparked by allegations of police brutality. Th ese instances of 
social unrest, like the riots in London in 2011 that did not involve large 
numbers of Muslims, appear to have been classic eruptions by underprivi-
leged youth venting stored-up anger that had little or nothing to do with 
Islam per se.
Th e cosmopolitan logic makes good sense to many policy makers. For 
instance, the EU Annual Report on Human Rights asserts that “eff ective 
counter-terrorism measures and the protection of human rights are not 
confl icting but complementary and mutually reinforcing goals” (Euro-
pean Union 2007: 39; see also Organisation for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe 2007). Th e European Security Strategy maintains that terror-
ism “arises from complex causes [that] include . . . the alienation of young 
people living in foreign societies” (European Council 2003: 5). Prominent 
lawmakers endorse the idea of genuine equal rights as a potent antidote 
to homegrown terrorism. In 2003, for example, Interior Minister Sarkozy 
claimed that it is “catastrophic [to deny] the cultural and religious iden-
tity of Muslims. An identity denied is an identity that radicalizes” (quoted 
in Laurence 2012: 121). In 2008, President Sarkozy announced: “I want 
the state to be exemplary. Exemplary in the implementation of policies 
in favor of equal opportunity, exemplary in fi ghting against discrimina-
tion, exemplary in promoting diversity” (quoted in Geisser and Soum 
2012: 55). At her “integration summit” of 2013, Chancellor Merkel averred 
that peace and harmony could prevail among traditional Germans and 
the immigrant community only if prejudices “vanish from our thoughts” 
(raus aus den Köpfen) (Deutsche Welle 28 May 2013). In 2011, in regard 
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to young Muslims who entertain the idea of embracing radical Islamism, 
Prime Minister David Cameron conceded that “we have failed to provide a 
vision of society to which they feel they want to belong” (quoted in Good-
man 2014: 142–43).
Cosmopolitanism has shaped a signifi cant amount of soft -power poli-
cy. As for eliminating discrimination against Muslims, Chapter 3 treated 
the considerable anti-discrimination laws and measures, such as the Racial 
Equality Directive adopted by the EU in 2000 which was either antedated 
or emulated in most EU member states. Regarding Muslims and the fi ght 
against terrorism per se, the EU has pledged to observe human rights. For 
example, the EU’s counter-terrorism coordinator, Gijs de Vries, maintained 
in 2006 that
the struggle against terrorism is fi rst and foremost a confl ict over 
values. To win the battle for hearts and minds our policies to com-
bat terrorism must respect the rights and values we have pledged 
to defend, including the rights of prisoners. Abu Grahib, Guanta-
namo and CIA renditions have damaged America’s standing in the 
world and have compromised our common struggle against terror-
ism. Credibility matters. Th e European Union continues to believe 
that in this battle we should be guided by established international 
legal standards, including international human rights law. (Quoted 
in Keohane 2008: 137)
Indeed, the European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy aims “to combat 
terrorism worldwide while honoring human rights to make possible for its 
citizens an area of freedom, security and justice (Council of the EU 2005: 
2). In 2002, at the urging of the European Parliament (EP), the European 
Commission formed the EU Network of Independent Experts on Funda-
mental Rights. Th e group of legal specialists compiles annual reports that 
are designed to identify in counter-terrorism measures real or potential vio-
lations of the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights (2000), such as invasion 
of privacy, refoulement, extraordinary rendition, and torture (Commentary 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2006, http://
cridho/uclouvain.be/en/eu_experts_network/; see also Dalgaard-Nielsen: 
2009: 254). For its part, the EP has proven itself to be a staunch defender of 
individual rights when it comes to counter-terrorism. To cite but two ex-
amples, the EP investigated and condemned the extraordinary rendition 
program of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), including the complicity 
of the European Council and several EU member states (Fava 2007). Th e 
EP also refused to ratify the 2009 SWIFT Agreement (on fi nance tracking 
of suspected terrorist organizations) until the U.S. government agreed to 
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tighter controls on and monitoring of the acquired information (Bossong 
2013: 114; Dalgaard-Nielsen 2009: 254).
All EU member states recognize the European Convention on Human 
Rights (1950). Article Th ree protects against torture (“inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment or punishment”), Article Five guarantees liberty and securi-
ty (unless convicted of a crime), and Article Six guarantees a fair and public 
trial. Of course, sovereign states do not have to abide by the convention, 
but when they do not, they can and oft en do fi nd themselves hauled before 
the European Court of Human Rights. It, for instance, ruled in Othman 
v. United Kingdom (2012) that alleged Al Qaeda conspirator Abu Qatada 
could not be deported to Jordan “given the real risk of the admission of 
evidence obtained by torture” (quoted in Telegraph 17 January 2012). Abu 
Qatada was fi nally deported in 2013. In 2010, the court postponed the ex-
tradition from the United Kingdom to the United States of fi ve terrorist 
suspects, including the fi rebrand preacher Abu Hamza, until in 2012 the 
U.S. government agreed not to pursue the death penalty or to try them be-
fore military tribunals. It furthermore deserves mention that by virtue of 
the EU Treaties of Maastricht (1993), Amsterdam (1999), and Nice (2003), 
all of which commit signatories to the European Convention on Human 
Rights, the latter has become EU law. Th is means plaintiff s can also turn to 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ), whose decisions are not only binding 
on member states but also trump national laws whenever they confl ict with 
EU law. For instance, in M and Others v Her Majesty’s Treasury (2010), the 
ECJ ruled that social security benefi ts may not be denied to family mem-
bers of suspected terrorists.
National courts have also assiduously defended human rights. In 2004, for 
instance, Britain’s High Court ruled that the section of the Anti-Terrorism, 
Crime and Security Act of 2001 that allowed for indefi nite detention of for-
eigners breached the European Convention on Human Rights, which had 
been incorporated into British law in the Human Rights Act of 1998. As 
Lord Hoff mann opined: “Th e real threat to the life of the nation, in the sense 
of a people living in accordance with its traditional laws and political values, 
comes not from terrorism but from laws such as these” (quoted in Tsoukala 
2008: 81). Led by Interior Minister Jacqui Smith, the Brown government 
introduced and the House of Commons passed a bill in 2007 allowing forty-
two days of detention without charges; the Law Lords again squashed it in 
2008 (Klausen 2010: 52). In 2006, the German Constitutional Court ruled 
unconstitutional the police’s practice of electronic dragnetting (Rasterfahn-
dung), whereby data were collected on persons through a profi ling scheme 
(for instance, young and of Arab origin), regardless of whether the persons 
were actually suspected of involvement with terrorism (Tyrer 2013: 56). 
Four years later, a Munich court found insuffi  cient evidence to convict eight 
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Islamists, including prominent imams Reda Seyam and Hassan Dabbagh, 
of organizing to incite violence (ARD-Terrorismus Blog 30 March 2010). In 
2012, the Norwegian Court of Appeal nullifi ed an incitement-to-terrorism 
conviction against Mullah Krekar, who had purportedly threatened to kill 
Minister of Local Government and Regional Development Erna Solberg. In 
2003, Norway had ordered the deportation of Krekar but did not implement 
the order because he could face the death penalty in Iraq (Aft enposten 6 De-
cember 2012). In 2008, the appeals court of Th e Hague acquitted or severely 
reduced the sentences of eight alleged members of the so-called “Hofstad 
Network” who had been found guilty in 2006 by the court of Rotterdam 
for plotting to bomb, among other targets, the Dutch parliament. Th ough 
the Brussels criminal court sentenced Abdelkader Hakimi to eight years in 
prison for his involvement with the Madrid bombings, the Belgium govern-
ment refused to extradite him to Morocco, where he had been sentenced 
to death in absentia. In 2011, he was released aft er the European Court of 
Human Rights ruled that he had not received a fair trial. In 2013, the Court 
of Appeal in Milan sentenced the former director and deputy director of 
the Italian Military and Intelligence Security Service (SISMI) to ten years 
in prison for their cooperation with the CIA’s abduction and extraordinary 
rendition of Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr (commonly referred to as “Abu 
Omar”) to Egypt in 2003 (although the Supreme Court of Cassation acquit-
ted the directors in 2014).
Because freedom of religion represents one of the rights that Muslims 
should be guaranteed, the cosmopolitan approach to counter-terrorism 
necessarily entails a liberal multicultural facet. In this line of thinking, feel-
ing unencumbered and, like many Christians, even being state-subsidized 
in the exercise of their faith should help prevent radicalization among Eu-
ropean Muslims. Furthermore, the experience of freely determining their 
religious beliefs and practices is thought to foster among Muslims respect 
for the right of non-Muslims to do the same. Th is radicalization-prevention 
strategy loomed large in the motives and justifi cations of the many out-
reach programs (for instance, the Islamic councils) initiated by European 
governments in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and the Madrid and London 
bombings (and discussed in detail in the previous chapter; see also Lau-
rence 2012: 7–11). Indeed, virtually all of the Muslim participants in the 
councils, including Islamists, publicly declared their loyalty to democracy 
and renounced terrorism in general and specifi c terrorist acts in particu-
lar. For instance, the general secretary of the Islamische Gemeinde Milli 
Görüş (IGMG), Oguz Ücüncü, stated in 2004: “We condemned the terrorist 
attacks of March 11 [in Madrid] as we did on September 11, and we con-
demn any other act of terror” (quoted in Laurence 2012: 211). In the same 
year, L’Unione delle Comunità e Organizzazioni Islamiche in Italia (UCOII) 
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made public a “manifesto against terrorism and for life” and organized 
peace marches in several Italian cities on 11 September to demand the re-
lease of Italian hostages in Iraq (quoted in Laurence 2012: 212). Similarly, 
on 7/7, the Muslim Council of Britain (2005) released a statement “utterly” 
condemning the bombings. General Secretary Farooq Murad stated that the 
MCB “recognise that our community must remain vigilant and steadfast 
against those who commit such acts in the name of Islam and thus pervert 
our faith for their own ends.”
Th ese organizations were marching in lockstep with Jusuf al-Qaradawi, 
spiritual leader of the international Muslim Brotherhood movement, who 
two days following the 9/11 attacks issued a fatwa that condemned Al Qae-
da’s “illegal jihad”; “Our hearts bleed because of the attacks that have target-
ed the World Trade Center, as well as other institutions in the United States.” 
Th e murders in the United States, he continued, could not be justifi ed on 
any ground, including “the American biased policy toward Israel on the 
military, political and economic fronts” (Islam Online, www.islamonline.
net, 13 September 2001). Aft er riots broke out in the Paris suburbs in 2005, 
the UOIF issued a strong renunciation of violence: “It is strictly forbidden 
for any Muslim .  .  . to take part in any action that strikes blindly at pri-
vate or public property or that could threaten the lives of others” (quoted in 
Khosrokhavar 2010: 139). A decade later in response to the attacks on the 
Paris offi  ces of Charlie Hebdo in 2015, “Th e UOIF condemns in the strongest 
terms this criminal attack, and these horrible murders” (Huffi  ngton Post 7 
January 2015). As the president of the British Muslim Council, Iqbal Sacra-
nie, put the matter, “Th ere is no such thing as an Islamic terrorist—that is 
off ensive” (Sunday Express 10 July 2005). Similarly, the Islamic University of 
Rotterdam published on its website (www.islamicuniversity.nl) on 13 Sep-
tember 2001 a statement entitled “A Terrorist Cannot Be a Muslim, Nor Can 
a True Muslim Be a Terrorist.”
Not surprisingly, detractors (treated below) cast doubt on the sincerity 
of the pronouncements, especially those emanating from Islamists (Baran 
2011: 126–34; Khosrokhavar 2010: 143; Rich 2010: 132–33; Tibi 2008: 12). 
However, many, in keeping with the tradition of liberal voluntarism, retort 
that it suffi  ces for Muslims to observe the rule of law in democracies and ab-
stain from committing or facilitating terrorist acts. For peaceful and demo-
cratic order to prevail it is necessary neither that European Muslims dem-
onstrate nor possess a deep and thorough commitment to democracy or 
even nonviolence. For instance, France’s highly infl uential Islam expert, Ol-
ivier Roy (2007: 93), argues regarding the prevention of Islamist extremism:
It is, in fact, participation in the political process that leads believers 
with little inclination toward democracy as a social ideal to accept 
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the rules of the game and oft en to become strong defenders of those 
rules. If we had to wait for everyone to become a democrat before 
creating democracy, France would still be a monarchy.
Community-Based Counter-Terrorism
At this juncture it becomes critical to draw attention to a fi ne but impor-
tant distinction between liberal and communitarian interpretations. As 
Roy’s remark manifests, liberal multiculturalism remains optimistic but 
not insistent that European Muslims internalize the democratic values that 
allegedly predominate in Europe. By contrast, communitarianism, with 
its emphasis on particularism, deems it neither likely, necessary, nor de-
sirable that Muslims adopt “European” values. In the fi rst place, Muslims 
by defi nition identify with Islam. Th e mores and customs that shape their 
daily lives stem from a long-standing Islamic tradition. Th ough they may 
not uncritically accept all of these traditions, it is very improbable that they 
sense a burning need signifi cantly to alter or reform, let alone jettison, them. 
Furthermore, according to the communitarian outlook, Islam and Islamic 
civilization have unfolded more oft en than not in contradistinction to and 
even confrontation with Christianity and Western civilization, whether it 
be as a vying monotheistic creed, rival geopolitical region, or, more recently 
within Europe, as a minority immigrant community clearly distinguished 
from the majority culture. From the communitarian viewpoint, it is na-
ively optimistic to think cosmopolitanism can overcome these profound 
diff erences between Muslim and non-Muslim Europeans. Even if integra-
tive words and deeds could manage to heal the wounds incurred through 
decades of discrimination and under-privilege within Europe (doubtless 
an unlikely eventuality itself), there would still be foreign policy. Muslims 
belong not just to a local Islamic community but also identify with the in-
ternational Islamic community (umma): “Hold fi rmly to the rope of Allah 
all together and do not become divided” (Qur’an 3:103). Needless to say, few 
Muslims have forgotten the Crusades or European colonialism. Moreover, 
recent European foreign policies have bitterly disappointed and angered un-
told European Muslims, whether much delayed intervention to protect per-
secuted Bosnian Muslims (1992–1995), the Iraq War (2003–2011), the EU’s 
decision to cut aid to the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip (2006), or enduring 
support of both Israel and dictatorial Arab regimes (Bilgrami 2014: 263–65; 
Bonino 2012: 22). Well-sounding pledges to “promote good governance, 
democracy, education and economic prosperity outside the EU” like that 
found in the European Council’s Strategy and Action Plan to Combat Ter-
rorism will unlikely succeed in placating European Muslims outraged by 
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repeated injustices purportedly infl icted on the umma by Western govern-
ments (Council of the EU 2007).
Th e unappeasable nature of Muslim indignation and alienation does 
not, however, have to mean that European governments have no soft -power 
option at their disposal in the fi ght against terrorism. But it does mean, in 
the communitarian worldview, that an eff ective strategy of verbal persua-
sion needs to emanate from and be largely implemented by the Islamic 
community itself. Muslim organizations and personalities can use Islamic 
doctrine and reasoning, such as “there shall be no compulsion in religion” 
(Qur’an 2:256), to convince potential extremists to eschew terrorism. Par-
ticularly European Islamist organizations such as the MCB, UIOF, UCOII, 
and IGMG have assiduously and opportunistically sought since 9/11 to con-
vince European offi  cials of the merits of this strategy (Vidino 2012: 66; Ba-
ran 2011: 126; Rosen 2008; Kepel 2004: 266). Th us, IGMG’s Oguz Ücüncü 
added to the condemnation of violence cited above:
But what we did as an Islamic organization is more than just dem-
onstrating. We have been using our infrastructure in order to con-
demn the terrorist attacks and violence in general, but also to inform 
our people to not give any kind of support or sympathy to terrorists. 
(Quoted in Laurence 2012: 211)
Th e Islamists urge European governments fi nancially to back their organiza-
tions and simultaneously give them considerable discretion as to how they go 
about identifying, reaching, discouraging, and thwarting would-be terrorists.
Many governments at various levels have experimented with “community-
based” approaches emphasizing “self-policing” (Briggs, Fieschi, and Lowns-
brough 2006). Perhaps the most dramatic example unfolded in London in the 
wake of the 9/11 attacks. In the 1980s and 1990s the British government had 
gained a widespread reputation for granting asylum to Islamist militants fl ee-
ing authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and South Asia. A tacit under-
standing or “covenant of security” was said to exist between the radicals and 
offi  cialdom: asylum, including the freedom to pursue their political agendas 
regarding their homelands, in exchange for not carrying out acts of politi-
cal violence in the U.K. (Leiken 2012: 184–85; Pargeter 2008: 156–58). Omar 
Bakri Muhammad, who headed the British group Al-Muhajiroun, quipped to 
a television reporter in 1997: “If I lived in Saudi Arabia, I could never get away 
with what I do here, ha ha” (quoted in Pargeter 2008: 32). Th e covenant, if it 
ever existed, dissolved arguably with 9/11 but surely on 11 September 2002, 
on which day Abu Hamza al-Masri sponsored at the Finsbury Park Mosque 
in North London a conference entitled “September the 11th 2001: A Towering 
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Day in History.” Speeches and leafl ets lionized the hijackers as the “Magnifi -
cent 19.” Subsequently, the Muslim Contact Unit of the Metropolitan Police 
partnered with Salafi sts to identify the militants and their illegal activities. 
Although “hard power” was ultimately used in the form of a raid in 2003 to 
arrest the jihadists, including al-Masri, Scotland Yard acknowledged that the 
operation could not have succeeded had the Salafi sts not convinced the con-
gregation that the obstreperous militants were misrepresenting Islam to the 
world and transgressing its sacred dictates (Saunders 2012: 104–5). Eventually 
in 2005, the Muslim Association of Britain, an organization with ties to the 
Muslim Brotherhood movement, was “invited” to assume leadership of the 
mosque (Baran 2011: 134).
At the national level, the Blair government made the Muslim Council of 
Britain into a quasi-offi  cial interlocutor aft er 9/11. Th e prime minister made 
numerous high-profi le appearances with leaders of the organization. Fol-
lowing the Tube bombings in 2005, the Home Offi  ce turned primarily to the 
MCB (despite allegations of its close ties to the Jama’at-i Islami, reportedly 
the South Asian counterpart to the Muslim Brotherhood) to provide the 
personnel for seven working groups tasked with investigating radicalism 
in Muslim communities (Frampton and Maher 2013: 37; Mandaville 2010: 
150–1; Awan 2007b: 208). Later that year, the groups submitted to Blair their 
fi ndings and recommendations in Preventing Extremism Together (Home 
Offi  ce 2005). From the report emerged the Preventing Violent Extremism 
Programme (commonly referred to simply as “Prevent”), which was placed 
under the supervision of the Department for Communities and Local Gov-
ernment. Th rough its subsequently devised programs, like the Preventing 
Violent Extremism Pathfi nder Fund, hundreds of millions of pounds were 
channeled to local Islamic associations to enable them to devise initiatives 
designed to off er a rejection of terrorism targeting Muslims that was rooted 
in Islamic doctrine (Frampton and Maher 2013: 40–47; Tyrer 2013: 108; 
Klausen 2010: 53–54). Th e supervising minister justifi ed the policy in un-
mistakably communitarian terms:
Strong mosques positioned at the centre of the community and ef-
fectively governed will be better able to withstand attempts to hijack 
them by certain groups supporting violent extremist interpretations 
of Islam. Th us, the goal of state outreach to Muslim communities 
was twofold: vaccination against radicalism, on the one hand, and 
the routinization of religious observance for Muslims, on the other. 
(Quoted in Laurence 2012: 149)
Th e approach seemed to bear fruit in 2011 when, according to Scotland 
Yard, Salafi st mosques in South London were principally responsible for 
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keeping Muslim youths from joining in the riots that ignited during August 
(Aidi 2014: 213).
Th e U.K. holds no monopoly on community-based counter-terrorism. 
In response to 9/11, Sarkozy insisted that the UIOF be included in the newly 
formed Conseil Français du Culte Musulman. Th e then interior minister 
and his advisors maintained that the UIOF eschewed political violence, had 
an impressive organizational infrastructure with long tentacles throughout 
the Muslim community that gave it clout on the streets, and therefore rep-
resented the most eff ective agent for persuading young Muslims to abstain 
from terrorism (Daguzan 2013: 105; Kepel 2004: 274). “What we should be 
afraid of,” Sarkozy explained to his detractors who stressed no involvement 
with the UIOF, “is Islam gone astray, garage Islam, basement Islam, under-
ground Islam” (quoted in Taras 2012: 152). Yves Bertrand, director of the 
Direction Centrale des Renseignements Généraux (Central Directorate of 
General Intelligence) from 1999 to 2004, commented that “many of [our] 
observers were expecting problems . . . [but] the mosque leaders and associa-
tions have controlled their troops very well” (quoted in Bonelli 2008: 107). 
Indeed, it was leaders of the Dhaou Meskine and Larbi Kechat mosques 
who had more success than the gendarmerie in quieting the 2005 riots in 
the banlieues of Paris (Bowen 2010: 43). A similar story holds for the riots 
that broke out in Antwerp aft er a Muslim schoolteacher was shot dead by a 
neighbor in 2002 (Fadil 2006: 57).
Communitarian reasoning also moved German interior minister 
Schäuble to insist that the IGMG be invited to join the Deutsche Islam Kon-
ferenz in 2006. Th e advisor to the chancellor on religious aff airs said the 
government, if it were to have a good chance of reaching alienated young 
Muslims, had to be willing to explore “interacting with political Islamists 
in the grey zone” (quoted in Laurence 2012: 171). By the latter she meant 
an ideological orientation that does not perfectly accord with the German 
Constitution but that nonetheless rejects terrorism. Defending his decision 
to include the UCOII in the Consulta per l’Islam Italiano, Italian interior 
minister Giuseppe Pisanu similarly claimed: “I took into account what the 
UCOII is today—not its past—and the eff orts it has made for a positive role 
of the Muslim Brotherhood in the whole world.” Aft er the council’s fi rst 
meeting in 2005, he observed that “anyone participating in this meeting 
would have understood that there is a moderate Islam in Italy” (quoted in 
Laurence 2012: 171, 216). In 2004, Spanish prime minister Zapatero, build-
ing off  Iranian president Khatami’s idea of a “Dialogue of Civilizations,” 
proposed before the United Nations an Alliance of Civilizations, “a grand 
alliance with moderate Islam to isolate violent members” (quoted in Planet 
and de Larramendi 2013: 123). Th e domestic dimension of the eventually ad-
opted program involved subsidizing initiatives of groups tied to the al-Adl 
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wa al-Ihssane (Moroccan Muslim Brotherhood) to reach out to alienated 
Moroccan immigrants (Planet and de Larramendi 2013: 123). Zapatero’s op-
ponents, the People’s Party, had already in its 1996 platform recommended 
“that simplistic formulas of a generalized rejection of these [Islamist] move-
ments be eschewed and imaginative channels for relationships and dialogue 
be found with its moderate manifestations” (quoted in Planet and de Lar-
ramendi 2013: 121).
Not surprisingly, the communitarian strategy draws criticism. Par-
ticularly non-Islamist Muslim organizations and secular immigrant as-
sociations (oft en bypassed due to the strategy) contend that the policy is 
perilously imprudent. Even if Islamists manage to dissuade some potential 
terrorists from committing violence, the critique argues, they will do so 
not by spreading respect for democracy but rather theocracy. Th e Mus-
lim Brotherhood movement, for example, has eschewed violence since the 
1990s but only, according to critics, because its leaders concluded that ter-
rorism is not the most effi  cient way to establish an Islamic state. Th e ulti-
mate goal remains Islamization, not democratization. Moreover, given the 
continued popularity among Islamists in Europe of pioneering ideologues 
like Sayyid Qutb, whose famous book Milestones does espouse militancy, 
European states have no guarantee that Islamist organizations will not 
either turn a blind eye to terrorists within their ranks or, worse, surrepti-
tiously aid and abet them, all the while using European taxpayers’ money 
to do so (Meijer 2013: 72; Alonso 2012: 479; Bakker 2012: 186–87; Baran 
2011: 13–14, 179; Khosrokhavar 2010; Rich 2010: 132–33; Mandaville 2010: 
150–51; Patel 2007: 51–52; Jenkins 2007: 274; Jonker 2006: 131; Hirsi Ali 
2006; Fourest 2004). “A choice must be made,” avers Bassam Tibi (2008: 
31), “between Qutb and Kant, or, in the case of Europe, between a Muslim 
Europe or Euro-Islam—that is, the Islamization of Europe or the Europe-
anization of Islam.”
Liberal Perfectionist Soft Power
Such suspicion of unreliable commitment to counter-terrorism among 
some Islamic organizations predictably prompts fragilization toward liberal 
perfectionism. European offi  cials feel moved to prescribe to Islamic orga-
nizations in no uncertain terms what constitutes proper counter-terrorism 
preaching and practice. In 2005, Dutch prime minister Balkenende presid-
ed over the publication of the Behavioral Code against Extremism/Contract 
with Society (Gedragscode tegen extremism/Contract met de Samenleving), 
which the leaders of several Amsterdam mosques publicly signed (Laurence 
2012: 175). France and Spain each have produced guidebooks for how imams 
are to be trained to foster democracy and discourage extremism. France, 
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Germany, and Austria coordinated to draft  a handbook for how Muslim 
clerics should preach counter-terrorism in prisons (Bossong 2013: 114). In 
2006, Interior Minister Schäuble said that “the number of Islamists is not 
the same thing as the number of potential terrorists [but] Islamists have a 
vision of state order that we do not share. . . . We must insist that Muslims 
in Germany identify with [not merely observe] the constitution” (quoted in 
Laurence 2012: 101). Similarly, Sarkozy promised before the National As-
sembly in 2003 not to tolerate any “communities of immigrant origin [that] 
organize themselves to resist Republican integration” (quoted in Freedman 
2006: 179). Denmark goes so far as to compel naturalizing immigrants (not, 
however, Nordics) to swear an oath to teach their children to reject terror-
ism (Sainsbury 2012: 111).
Even the reputedly permissive British government has set limits. In 
2008 in a critique of the Labour government’s support of allegedly extrem-
ist Islamic organizations, David Cameron asserted: “Th e message should 
be clear: to those who reject democracy; to those who preach hate; to those 
who encourage violence; you are not part of the mainstream. You will not 
get public funding. You are not a welcome part of our society” (quoted in 
Frampton and Maher 2013: 50). Actually, in that same year, however, the 
Brown regime, through the Department of Communities and Local Gov-
ernment as part of its Prevent strategy, had announced the formation of a 
board of hand-picked Islamic theologians who were to draft  standards of 
good practice to which all members of the Mosques and Imams National 
Advisory Board would be held. Th e predictable indignation at such patron-
izing treatment came from several corners of the Muslim community. For 
instance, Muhammad Abdul Bari, general secretary of the Muslim Council 
of Britain, responded:
In a country where the State is largely neutral on theological mat-
ters, and where no other similar arrangement exists for other minor-
ity faiths, such an initiative will inevitably be met with skepticism 
and mistrust. For too long now, British Muslims have been viewed 
by this government through the narrow prism of security. British 
Muslims—like all citizens—have every right to peacefully disagree 
with government policies if they wish and they do not need to be 
‘re-programmed’ by a government-approved list of theologians. 
(Muslim Council of Britain, 18 July 2008, www.mcb.org/uk/media/
presstext.php?ann_id=303)
Indeed, it is not diffi  cult to imagine the furor that would erupt if Chris-
tian organizations were compelled under strict governmental supervision 
to evince that they do not support terrorism.
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Most European governments authorize surveillance by their police and 
intelligence services of Islamist organizations, including even those with 
which the government formally cooperates (Bundesministerium des In-
nern 2014: 19–25; Frampton and Maher 2013: 38; Bossong 2013: 115; Mei-
jer 2013: 72; Bleich 2010b: 10; Bonelli 2008: 110; Algemene Inlichtingen- en 
Veiligheidsdienst 2007; 2002). As reported in the previous chapter, offi  cials 
in Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom have broken off  relations (usu-
ally temporarily) with the IGMG, UCOII, and the MCB, respectively, as a 
result of intelligence reports alleging that the organizations did not unam-
biguously reject political extremism (Joppke and Torpey 2013: 82; Laurence 
2012: 184, 213; Hellyer 2009: 158). In the British case, it became known 
(through an Observer article) that MCB general secretary Daoud Abdullah 
had joined ninety other Islamist leaders in signing a pro-Hamas declaration 
at the January 2009 Shura Council conference in Istanbul. Th e declaration 
implored the “Islamic Nation” to use any and all means to oppose Israel and 
its allies. In March, relations with the MCB were halted. Th e Home Offi  ce 
announced, in strong liberal perfectionist language, that it would no longer 
countenance views that “fall short of supporting violence and are within 
the law, but which reject and undermine our shared values and jeopardize 
community cohesion” (quoted in Baran 2011: 179). However, relations were 
restored in 2010 aft er the MCB publicly declared its reproof of violence (Ba-
ran 2011: 167).
Concern over Islamists’ allegedly unreliable commitment to counter-
terrorism is more likely to elicit calls for hard power. Th e sense of anxiety 
regarding partnering with Islamist associations comes forth clearly in the 
continuation of the above-cited quotation from Yves Bertrand, erstwhile 
director of French General Intelligence, that “the mosque leaders and as-
sociations have controlled their troops very well which, I would add, doesn’t 
necessarily reassure us. It means that the very dense social fabric is in per-
fect working order . . . that the community is very well controlled by these 
associations” (quoted in Bonelli 2008: 107). Or as Lorenzo Vidino (2010b: 
199) questions, are European governments aiding “fi refi ghters or arsonists” 
(see also Alonso 2012: 486)?
Hard Power
No European state confi nes its counter-terrorism strategy to soft  power, 
whether liberal or communitarian (more likely both at once, as we have 
seen). Hard power (on the domestic front) can entail surveillance, intelli-
gence-gathering, search and seizure, arrest, prosecution, conviction, and 
imprisonment or deportation. Hard-power strategies presuppose the exis-
tence of militants actively plotting to commit acts of terrorism on European 
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soil. Th ey presuppose, in other words, that soft  power alone does not suf-
fi ce and perhaps even enables terrorists. Normative justifi cations for prefer-
ring hard to soft  power vis-à-vis the Muslim community typically invoke 
fragments of liberal perfectionism or nativist nationalism. Th e former hy-
pothesize such extensive animosity toward democracy in Islamic doctrine 
and practice that use of political violence on the part of Muslims to subvert 
democratic governments and principles should not be ruled out but, on the 
contrary, expected. Nativism tends to be somewhat more oriented toward 
defending native territory rather than democracy per se, perceiving Islam as 
an inherently expansivist civilization that will stop at nothing to extend the 
borders of the dar al-Islam (abode of Islam). Th ese represent fi ne theoretical 
distinctions that become wholly blurred and blended in the arguments of 
harsh Islam critics who endorse hard power. Moreover, it is diffi  cult to point 
to another political stance in Europe that has benefi ted more from essential-
izing distortion and exaggeration than the claim that Islam and Muslims 
pose a serious terrorist threat in Europe. Put diff erently, we cannot fully ex-
plain the frequency and extent to which European governments deploy hard 
power without attending to the role played by what we in previous chapters 
have been calling postmodernist hyperbole.
Fear of Aggressive Islam
Th e previous three chapters covered, respectively, the common allegations 
that Islam, and by extension its believers, are anti-democratic, misogynist, 
and theocratic. Here we focus on the charge that they are violent, or at least 
more prone to violence than non-Muslim Europeans. Hirsi Ali alleged in 
an interview with the Evening Standard (2 February 2007) that “violence 
is inherent in Islam. It’s a destructive, nihilistic cult of death. It legitimizes 
murder.” On the website islamwatch.org, she further explained:
Muhammad built the House of Islam using military tactics that in-
cluded mass killing, torture, targeted assassination, lying and the in-
discriminate destruction of productive goods. . . . A close look at the 
propaganda produced by the terrorists [of today] reveals constant 
quotation of Muhammad’s deeds and edicts to justify their actions 
and to call on other Muslims to support their cause. (Hirsi Ali 2006)
Such charges oft en point to verses in the Qur’an that purportedly command 
believers to exercise violence. Favorites (oft en taken out of context) read 
“when you encounter the unbelievers strike off  their heads” (47:4) or “slay 
them wherever ye fi nd them and drive them out of the places whence they 
drove you out” (2:191–93). Indeed, Hirsi Ali’s former political partner in the 
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Dutch parliament, Geert Wilders, produced in 2008 a YouTube fi lm, Fitna, 
which plucks numerous quotations from the Qur’an while surrounding 
them with images of the most heinous acts of terrorism—a tactic used by 
numerous Islamophobic websites such as Islam Watch, Politically Incorrect, 
Die Grüne Pest, Nürnberg 2.0, or Stop the Islamization of Europe, which 
reach millions of viewers. Th e same year also saw publication of Hans Jan-
sen’s Islam for Pigs, Monkeys, Donkeys and Other Animals, epithets allegedly 
used in the Qur’an to refer to non-Muslims. Jansen too blamed the world 
religion with an estimated 1.6 billion adherents for promoting and legiti-
mizing terrorism of the kind practiced by Al Qaeda against non-Muslims.
Dutch Islam-bashers are not alone. Th e prolifi c and frequently inter-
viewed Spanish professor of political science Antonio Elorza (2004: 156) 
calls Islam “a religion of combat.” Th e German orientalist Hans-Peter Rad-
datz (2006), who frequently appears on TV as an “Islam expert,” answers 
his own provocative question of whether there is a direct link “from Allah 
to terror” with the answer: “Put simply, the Christian misuses his religion 
when he uses violence, the Muslim misuses his religion when he does not 
use violence” (quoted in Bahners 2011: 77). Th e prominent French essayist 
Pascal Bruckner (2007) warns that soft  power appeasement will not sway 
Muslims to forgo terrorism, noting that “the more we give in to the radi-
calism of the bearded, the more they will harden their tone. Appeasement 
politics only increase their appetite. Th e hope that benevolence alone will 
disarm the brutes remains for the moment unfounded.” As we have seen 
in previous chapters, the hyperbolic allusion to Hitler usually proves ir-
resistible. Th us in her bestseller Th e Force of Reason, Oriana Fallaci (2006: 
306) accuses:
Th e Qur’an is the Mein Kampf of this [Islamist] movement. Th e 
Qur’an demands the annihilation or subjugation of the other, and 
wants to substitute totalitarianism for democracy.  .  .  . All the evil 
that the sons of Allah commit against themselves and against others 
is in it.
Fallaci’s accusation voices the common anxiety over Islam’s alleged ex-
pansionism. Muhammad is said to have cast the mold by establishing an 
army of holy warriors in Medina that went on to wage jihad (or struggle) 
against the infi dels controlling Mecca. Of course, such expansionist mili-
tancy was attributed to the prophet not only in the controversial cartoon 
published by Jylland-Postens in 2005 but also in the notorious Regensburg 
speech of 2006, in which Pope Benedict XVI (2006), quoting a Byzantine 
emperor, referred to Muhammad’s “command to spread by sword the faith 
he preached.” Many maintain that the covetous Muslims have their eyes 
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trained on Europe. “A youthful Muslim society to the south and east of the 
Mediterranean is poised to colonize—the term is not too strong—a senes-
cent Europe,” warns Niall Ferguson (quoted in Saunders 2012: 55). “Wake 
up, people,” thundered Fallaci following 9/11, “what is under way here is a 
reverse crusade. . . . Th ey will feel authorized to kill you and your children 
because you drink wine or beer, because you don’t wear a long beard or 
chador, because you go to the theatre and cinemas, because you listen to 
music and sing songs” (quoted in Kaya 2012: 6–7). Søren Krarup warns of 
“the slow extermination of the Danish people” (quoted in Hedetoft  2003), 
while Melanie Phillips (2007: 66) contends that “the job of subjugating the 
West is half done” and is being carried out by a “lethal and many-headed 
hydra” (11) of Al Qaeda affi  liates in Europe. Alice Schwarzer (2002b), whose 
2002 bestseller was titled Th e Holy Warriors and the Misguided Tolerance, 
drew the predictable comparison to the Nazis: “Th e parallels to 1933 are 
emerging. . . . Th e holy warriors have already made Italy their logistical ba-
sis, England their propoganda center and Germany their European hub.” 
Elsewhere she warned that the Islamists “have already won an unsettling 
amount of terrain and unfortunately can no longer be stopped with demo-
cratic measures alone” (quoted in Bahners 2011: 246). Sorbonne history pro-
fessor Guy Millière (2004) went so far as to claim that the Muslim question 
“will determine whether France survives or perishes” in the twenty-fi rst 
century. Th ere would appear to be no limit to the number of journalists and 
other authors who catapult themselves onto bestseller lists with books pur-
porting to expose the designs of radical Muslim cells to transform Europe 
into “Eurabia” (Ye’or 2005; see also Marchand 2013; Ulfk otte 2013; Broder 
2006; Besson 2005). As mentioned above, Islamophobic websites abound, 
oft en deploying captivating graphs and images that depict the impending 
Islamization of Europe.
Th e menacing quality of these alarmist warnings relies for its eff ect on 
explicit or implicit essentialization. Islam is presented as a static, monolithic 
collective religion, civilization, and psyche that envelope all Muslims. No 
diff erentiation, diversity, or change is acknowledged. Th e reductionist logic 
concludes that if some Muslims invoke Islam to legitimize terror, then all 
Muslims must have a propensity to do so: within every Muslim there lies a 
real or potential Osama Bin Laden. “A direct line leads from Al Qaeda in 
Iraq and the Intifada in Palestine to the youth with ‘migration background’ 
in Neukölln and Moabit [boroughs of Berlin],” claims German columnist 
Henryk Broder (2006: 115). Similarly, while writing in the weekly L’Express, 
André Glucksmann linked French Muslims to hijab-wearing women in Al-
geria who allegedly engaged in terrorism: “Hijab is a terrorist operation. . . . 
In France, the zealous pupils know that their hijab is covered with blood” 
(quoted in Rigoni 2009: 478). Even Zinedine Zidane’s infamous head butt 
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during the soccer World Cup fi nal in 2006 was widely discussed as a mani-
festation of a greater propensity toward violence and against the rule of law 
among persons of Islamic heritage (Amiraux 2010: 146). Two years earlier, 
French opinion leaders had erupted with indignation over Islam’s supposed 
violent culture in response to the alleged assault by Muslim youths against 
the so-called “Marie L.,” who, it turned out, had faked the story (Fredette 
2014: 136). Given the nigh ubiquity of anti-Islam hyperbole, it should come 
as no surprise that more than two-thirds of those polled in France, Britain, 
the United States, and Germany “are worried about Islamic extremists in 
their country” (Pew Research 2012).
Studies abound that demonstrate the frequency, the potency, as well as 
the utter falsity of such essentializing tropes that necessarily associate Islam 
and being Muslim with terrorism (Lynch 2013; Tyrer 2013; Bonino 2012; 
Morgan and Poynting 2012a; Mudde 2012; Triadafi lopolous 2011; Hickman 
et al. 2011; Jacoby 2010; Schneiders 2010b; Terrio 2009; Zapata-Barrero and 
Qasem 2008; Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008: 616–18; Franz 2007). All 
three qualities point to the infl uential sway of Hobbesian postmodernism, 
at least of its fragment teaching that a commitment to objectivity makes for 
naïve and therefore unsuccessful politicking. Aft er all, it is hard to imag-
ine successfully spurring liberals to defend democracy or natives to defend 
the homeland with the argument that they are 33 times likelier to die from 
meningitis, 822 times likelier to be murdered for nonpolitical reasons, and 
1,833 times likelier to perish in a car accident than to fall victim to terrorist 
attacks, of which only 1 percent are committed by persons invoking Islam 
(Katzenstein 2003: 734; Saunders 2012: 107). Instead media and political ac-
tors fi nd it nearly irresistible to engage in what Michael Murphy (2012: 3) 
calls “the gross exaggeration of the Islamic threat.” We see here nicely how 
mutual fragilization, normative fragmentation, and political bricolage func-
tion together, for Hobbesian postmodern hyperbole is pressed into service 
for a liberal perfectionist (save democracy!) or nativist nationalist (save our 
land!) end, or very oft en for a combination of both (save “our” democratic 
homeland from the “Islamic” terrorists!).
The “New Terrorism”
Th e hyperbole has clearly infl uenced policy makers who want to be seen 
to be protecting their country from the perceived menace. A particularly 
consequential aspect of this reaction issues forth through the declaration 
of a new kind of terrorism that demands extraordinary measures. In the af-
termath of 7/7, Tony Blair exclaimed: “Let no one be in any doubt, the rules 
of the game are changing” (quoted in Dalgaard-Nielsen 2009: 245). Th e war 
metaphor is also very common. Although most frequently associated with 
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George Bush’s proclamation of a “war on terrorism,” it was Chancellor Ger-
hard Schröder who on 11 September 2001 itself labeled the attacks “a dec-
laration of war against the entire civilized world” (Agence France Presse 11 
September 2001). European Parliament president Pat Cox denounced the 
Madrid attacks as “a declaration of war on democracy” (quoted in Bossong 
2013: 39), while German interior minister Otto Schilly discerned in them “a 
new quality of threat for all of Europe” (United Press International 14 March 
2004). A few months later, Dutch prime minister Jan Peter Balkenende 
would call the slaying of van Gogh a “declaration of war” against the Neth-
erlands: “Th ese people do not want to change our society, they want to de-
stroy it” (Associated Press 6 November 2004, http://www.boston.com/news/
world/europe/articles/2004/11/06/dutch_political_leader_cites_arrival_of_
jihad/). President Hollande likewise following the Charlie Hebdo attacks in 
2015 maintained that France found itself at “war” against terrorism (Na-
tional Public Radio Morning Edition, 16 January 2015, http://www.npr.org/
programs/morning-edition/2015/01/16/377634660?showDate=2015-01-16).
Security experts have heralded the dawn of a novel breed of terrorism. 
Its unique features are said to lie in its more sweeping, messianic motiva-
tion in contrast to the very specifi c aims of conventional terrorism, such as 
unseating a government, gaining independence for a territory, or prompting 
the release of jailed comrades. Th e goal would appear to be the humiliation 
of the West by infl icting maximum damage on its interests and people. Th e 
new terrorism purportedly exhibits an indiscriminate disrespect for human 
life, even for its own agents in the form of suicide bombers. Despite the me-
dia concentration on Al Qaeda, Islamist terrorist attacks do not seem to 
be centrally organized or commanded. Decentralization combined with the 
independence of the operatives purportedly lends Islamist terrorism both a 
global reach and an unprecedentedly high degree of unpredictability (Sage-
man 2008). Small cells or even a “lone wolf” can strike anywhere at any 
time. As Eliza Manningham-Buller, chief of the U.K. Security Service from 
2002 to 2007, observed, the new breed of terrorist has the ability to “hide 
in plain sight, to be seen but not noticed” (quoted in Bonelli 2008: 112). Fi-
nally, the new terrorism is said to operate with a high degree of technologi-
cal sophistication in terms of both weaponry (for example, smart bombs, 
jet airliners) and, perhaps more importantly, logistic support (for example, 
dissemination of information or transfer of funds via the internet) (Kegley 
2003: 1–14; see also Weimann 2015; Younas 2014; Lynch and Ryder 2012; 
Awan 2007a; Duyvesteyn 2004).
European governments have enhanced hard-power measures to deal 
with the “new” threat. Th e national models paradigm highlights France in 
this regard (Leiken 2005: 130). Indeed, in the wake of the 1995 Paris Metro 
bombings, France did expand its Vigipirate emergency plan to allow French 
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troops to be deployed to assist police, suspects to be arrested and held for 
four days without access to a lawyer, and non-Frenchmen to be summar-
ily deported if suspected of involvement with terrorism (Leiken 2012: 16; 
Guittet 2008: 137–38). Over the course of the next two years, French police 
arrested 173 persons on charges of involvement with the Groupe Islamique 
Armé (GIA), 138 of whom were subjected to a highly controversial mass tri-
al held in the gym of the Fleury-Mèrogis prison. In the end, police and pros-
ecutors had collected enough evidence to convict and jail only twenty-one 
suspects (Pargeter 2008: 57–58). Th e heightened stages of alert stipulated in 
Vigipirate also empowered police and private security fi rms to carry out un-
impeded search and seizure so that the stopping and questioning of young 
men who “look” North African by police has become routine on the streets 
(Human Rights Watch 2012; Hillebrand 2012: 102; Schneider 2008). A 2009 
study of the Open Society Justice Initiative found that Arabs and blacks in 
France were eight times more likely than whites to be stopped by police 
(New York Times 3 October 2013). Small wonder that half of the incarcer-
ated in France are Muslim despite the fact that Muslims comprise less than 
10 percent of the total population (Taras 2012: 145). In 2003, the National 
Assembly passed legislation making it easier to arrest and deport religious 
leaders who preach violence or values incompatible with the French Con-
stitution. As of 2012, 125 deportation orders had been issued to “radical” 
Islamists (France24 30 January 2013). “We will expel all these imams . . . who 
hold views that run counter to our values and say there is a need to combat 
France,” said Interior Minister Manuel Valls (Huffi  ngton Post 30 January 
2013). In 2014, in the wake of the alleged murder of four persons at the Jew-
ish Museum in Brussels by purported Islamic State (ISIS) sympathizer and 
French national Mehdi Nemmouche, Interior Minister Bernard Cazeneuve 
announced that suspected ISIS supporters would be stripped of their pass-
ports and restricted from leaving France (International Business Times 10 
July 2014).
Th e United Kingdom, conventionally dubbed soft  on terrorism due to 
a penchant for protecting civil liberties (Klausen 2010; Leiken 2005), has 
in fact passed legislation similar to that of France. Even before 9/11, Parlia-
ment had enacted the Terrorism Act of 2000, Section 44 of which authorized 
police in designated areas to “stop and search” any persons regardless of 
whether they are suspected of terrorist activity. In addition, the home sec-
retary subsequently clarifi ed that offi  cers may “take account of a person’s 
ethnic origin in selecting persons to be stopped in response to a specifi c 
terrorist threat” (House of Commons 2005: 16). Minister of State for Com-
munity Safety, Crime Reduction, Policing and Counter-Terrorism Hazel 
Blears conceded that “some of our counter-terrorism powers will be dispro-
portionately experienced by people in the Muslim community” (House of 
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Commons 2005: 46). In fact, stop and search procedures rose 302 percent 
for Asians compared to 230 percent for black people and 118 percent for 
white people between 2001 and 2003 (Tsoukala 2008: 71–72). Since the Tube 
bombings in 2005, Asians are fi ve times likelier than whites to be stopped 
and searched by police (Bonino 2012: 18). According to the Home Offi  ce, 
of the 1,228 terror-related arrests made between 2001 and 2007 only 132 
resulted in formal prosecution (Pargeter 2008: 163–64). In 2010, the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights ruled Section 44 unlawful. Th e Protection of 
Freedoms Act of 2012 repealed Section 44 but still allowed for search and 
seizure without suspicion—however, under signifi cantly narrower condi-
tions of “extreme emergency.”
Th e 2001 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act enhanced the gov-
ernment’s powers to freeze and seize assets, confi scate information, detain 
suspects indefi nitely without trial, and, most controversially, derogate from 
the European Convention on Human Rights due to a “state of emergency 
threatening the life of the nation” (Section 30). Th e Nationality, Immigra-
tion and Asylum Act of 2002 sought to ease deportation by making it legal 
for the home secretary to strip terrorist suspects with dual nationality of 
their British citizenship. In 2006, Parliament expanded the power by chang-
ing the language describing the triggering conditions for the act from “seri-
ously prejudicial to the UK” to the vaguer “conducive to the public good.” 
Finally in 2014, the Immigration Bill made it legal to strip citizenship even 
when it renders the party in question stateless. Home Secretary Th eresa 
May asserted that citizenship “is a privilege, not a right” (New York Times 9 
April 2014). Forty-six persons were stripped of British citizenship between 
2006 and 2014 (New York Times 14 May 2014). To deal with those who could 
not be (easily) deported, the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2005 empow-
ered the home secretary to issue “control orders” against terrorist suspects, 
including no right for the suspects to examine the evidence against them. 
Amounting to a de facto house arrest, control orders allowed for electronic 
tagging as well as restriction of suspects’ communication and movement. In 
2014, May recommended banning jihadists (and neo-Nazis) from the air-
waves, as the Th atcher regime had done to Sinn Féin and the IRA in the 
1980s (Guardian 29 September 2014), as well as confi scating the passports of 
both British citizens and resident aliens suspected of traveling to fi ght with 
Islamists abroad, such as ISIS (New York Times 24 November 2014). Hurried 
through Parliament aft er 7/7 in order to “close the gaps” according to Home 
Secretary Charles Clark, the Terrorism Act of 2006 extended from fourteen 
to twenty-eight days the duration that suspects can be held without trial. 
Th e law also made into punishable off enses the “glorifi cation” of terrorism 
as well as the participation in or facilitation of terrorism training. Tony Blair 
defended the measures: “We need to make our country safe. You can’t do 
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it by the rules of the game we have at the moment: it’s too complicated, 
too laborious; the police are hidebound by restrictions” (Telegraph 12 Oc-
tober 2012). Not to be outdone, David Cameron advocated refusing reentry 
to British citizens who leave Britain to help ISIS abroad, though the Liberal 
Democrats stymied the proposal (Guardian 1 September 2014).
Th e Netherlands, also conventionally considered soft  on extremism, 
passed several laws enhancing hard power in the wake of the murder of 
Th eo van Gogh. Most notably, the Crimes of Terrorism Act of 2004 crimi-
nalized joining a terrorist organization or recruiting for jihad, in addition 
to stiff ening sentences for crimes committed with the intent of carrying out 
or aiding terrorist attacks. Th e Witness Identity Protection Act (2006) al-
lowed reports of the General Intelligence and Security Service to be entered 
into court proceedings as documentary evidence, and the Investigation and 
Prosecution of Terrorist Off ences (2007) expanded search-and-seizure pow-
ers (including third parties not suspected of terrorism) and legalized the 
denial to suspects of full access to evidence (Buijs 2010).
Th e German Bundestag legislated in 2002 and renewed in 2007 the Law 
to Combat Terrorism. Among other things, it vastly expanded the power of 
police and intelligence agencies to monitor and archive private information 
from fi nancial transactions to telephone correspondence to internet surfi ng. 
Th e law empowered the Agency for the Protection of the Constitution to ban 
any organization with a large number of aliens in its leadership or member-
ship that in deed or word supports political violence as well the disruption 
of the public peace or the democratic process. By 2004, authorities had ini-
tiated 194 cases against alleged terrorists (Handcock et al. 2015: 719). Th e 
Taiba Mosque in Hamburg, where the 9/11 plotters had met, was closed in 
2010. In 2014, the “Islamic State” (ISIS) was banned, including even its ban-
ner in physical or cyber space (Deutsche Welle 12 September 2014). Resident 
aliens and refugees may be brought in for questioning regarding their iden-
tity or activities at any time and they may be deported for crimes committed 
not only inside but also outside of Germany so long as the latter transgress 
the fundamental conventions of the United Nations. For example, Abdel-
ghani Mzoudi was deported in 2005 despite having been found innocent in 
2004 of plotting the 9/11 attacks. In the same year, Yakup Taşçı, imam at the 
Mevlana Mosque in Berlin, was deported for having praised suicide bomb-
ers in a sermon. In 2014, Germany instituted a ban on exiting the country 
for German Islamists suspected of aiding ISIS.
With passage in 2005 of the so-called “Package Pisanu,” Italy gave the 
interior minister the power to declare “quick expulsions” or expedited de-
portations of persons suspected of involvement with terrorism. Recruiting 
for and engaging in terrorist training were made illegal, the duration that 
police may hold suspects without formally charging them was lengthened 
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from twelve to twenty-four hours, and powers to track private information 
were broadened (Bleich 2010b: 17). In 2012, for example, Italy deported Mo-
hamed Mannai to Tunisia in defi ance of the European Court of Human 
Rights, which fi ned Rome 21,500 euros. Spain, due to its long battle with 
ETA, already before the Madrid attacks had had tough anti-terror measures 
in place in its Code of Criminal Procedure. Th ese included holding suspects 
up to thirteen days incommunicado and up to four years in pretrial deten-
tion. In 2004, dormant statutes from the Law on Foreigners were reactivated 
to facilitate rapid deportation of suspected Islamist terrorists such as Mo-
hamed Berzizoui, who had been arrested in connection with the Casablanca 
bombings of 2003 but later released (Human Rights Watch 2005). Prime 
Minister Mariano Rajoy has maintained “not everyone fi ts here” (El Pais 11 
November 2010). Police interrogation of young Arab men has become com-
monplace in neighborhoods with a large concentration of immigrants (Gest 
2010: 133). Even the Swedes increased hard power with the Act on Criminal 
Responsibility for Terrorist Off ences of 2003. Although member states are 
wont to obstinately protect their unilateral sovereignty when it comes to 
counter-terrorism, the EU has endeavored to encourage hard-power coop-
eration. Th rough statutes such as the Action Plan on Combating Terror-
ism of 2001, the European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy of 2005, and 
the Prüm Convention of 2005 (not ratifi ed by all EU member states), the 
EU facilitates international sharing of police and intelligence information 
as well as cross-border pursuit of suspects (Bossong 2013). In 2007, the Eu-
ropean Commission also took steps to criminalize terrorist training and 
recruitment as well as “the public provocation to commit terrorist off enses” 
(quoted in Handcock et al. 2015: 719).
While pledging to respect the civil liberties of Muslims and oft en do-
ing so, most European governments have simultaneously curtailed them 
through enhanced hard power. Across Europe, in the name of fi ghting 
terrorism, millions of Muslims have been electronically monitored, thou-
sands physically searched or arrested, and hundreds convicted, jailed, or 
deported. In addition, dozens of Islamic organizations have been banned or 
defunded (Bleich 2010b; Neal 2010). Stefano Bonino (2012: 19) speaks of the 
“criminalization of a whole population [European Muslims]” and Werner 
Schiff auer (2008b: 225) of the “Muslimization” of the terror threat. Human 
rights NGOs such as the German Institute for Human Rights, the Islamic 
Human Rights Commission, Human Rights Watch, and Mouvement contre 
le racisme et pour l’amitié entre les peoples (Movement against Racism and 
for Friendship between Peoples) regularly record and condemn the wide-
spread violation of Muslims’ human rights through counter-terrorism mea-
sures. Th e following assessment regarding Italy in Amnesty International’s 
Annual Report 2013 is typical: “Th e authorities regularly failed to protect 
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the rights of refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants. . . . No systemic mea-
sures were taken to prevent human rights violations by police and ensure 
accountability” (www.amnesty.org/en/region/italy/report-2013). French po-
litical scientist Laurent Bonelli (2008) coined the clever term “liberticide” 
to describe the phenomenon whereby a majority of the citizens of liberal 
democracies out of fear of terrorism support (or at least do not resist) grave 
curtailments of civil rights (Le Monde 11 September 2008). Ariane Chebel 
d’Appollonia (2010: 130) maintains that human rights abuses have become 
so rampant that “the victims of counterterrorism . . . today outnumber the 
victims of terrorism.” To cite one example that sparked public outrage and 
mass demonstrations, London police raided two homes at the Forest Gate 
apartment complex on 2 June 2006, arrested two Muslims, one of whom 
was shot, and yet failed to fi nd any evidence of their complicity in a terrorist 
plot involving chemical explosives. Other critics contend that the resources 
devoted to hard-power counter-terrorism measures are not only vastly dis-
proportionate to a deliberately exaggerated threat, but also ineffi  ciently and 
ineff ectively deployed by overzealous and poorly informed security agents 
(Chowdhury and Fitzsimmons 2013; Bossong 2013: 5–6; Bonino 2012: 9; 
Croft  and Moore 2010: 834; Bigo and Tsoukala 2008). In 2012, for example, 
3 percent of failed, foiled, or completed terrorist attacks in Europe were re-
ligiously motivated compared to 76 percent planned by separatists (Europol 
2013). Of the 2,139 failed, foiled, or completed terrorist attacks in Europe 
between 2006 and 2010, ten involved Muslims (Europol 2011). In 2008 and 
2009, two-thirds of those arrested on suspicion of Islamist terrorism could 
not be linked to a known terrorist act or organization (Europol 2010). Simi-
larly, the EU’s three “terrorists lists” have been harshly criticized for includ-
ing persons for whom there is no credible evidence to suspect involvement 
with terrorism (Hillebrand 2012: 164–69).
Yet security offi  cials retort that the resources and measures are justifi ed 
because “Islamist terrorism is still perceived as the biggest threat to most 
Member States” (Europol 2010). Th ey claim to have saved thousands of lives 
by foiling attacks like the 2005 plot to blow up the Eiff el Tower, the 2006 
plan to board seven jets in London bound for North America and set off  
liquid explosives concealed in soda bottles, the 2007 conspiracy of the so-
called “Sauerland Cell” to murder U.S. soldiers stationed in Germany, the 
2008 planned simultaneous attacks on Barcelona’s mass transit system by 
fourteen conspirators, the 2009 design to explode bombs in several popular 
retail stores in Amsterdam, the 2014 attack on the European Commission 
building in Brussels allegedly planned by ISIS sympathizers, the 2015 con-
spiracy to target Belgian police, and the 2015 plot to bomb the Frankfurt 
fi nancial district cycling race. Security offi  cials also tend to claim that lay-
persons cannot understand the severity or magnitude of the threat because 
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they are not privy to sensitive intelligence. Th e British home secretary, for 
example, stated that “all those who tell me we are not [under threat] are the 
ones who do not have the security and intelligence information which for 
my sins I carry” (quoted in Tsoukala 2008: 80). Security offi  cials remind 
critics that liberty is meaningless if one is dead. Security has to come before 
civil rights. With terrorism, we are dealing no longer with merely a threat to 
our way of life but to our life itself.
State of Exception
It makes sense at this juncture to revisit the notion of “Schmittian liberal-
ism” introduced in Chapter 3 (Triadafi lopolous 2011: 863). Schmittian liber-
alism marries liberal perfectionism with nativist nationalism in a revealing 
example of what we have been calling “mutual fragilization.” Schmittian 
liberalism borrows from Schmitt’s nationalism (discussed in Chapter 2) the 
idea of a specifi c mortal enemy (Muslims) against whom the nation must 
ready itself to fi ght. Th e enemy’s most menacing quality, however, is alleged 
to be its unswerving hatred of liberal democratic values and societies. Put 
diff erently, the most serious terrorist threat to liberal democracies is said 
to emanate from Muslims because they adhere to an illiberal creed that le-
gitimizes terrorism. Inversely, non-Muslim Europeans are presumed to be 
friendly toward liberal democracy and toward one another precisely be-
cause they are not Muslims.
I do not mean to suggest the total eclipsing of either liberal perfection-
ism or nativist nationalism by Schmittian liberalism. One would be hard 
pressed, for example, to fi nd a European government that does not offi  -
cially condemn all forms of terrorism. Several European states are engaged 
in extensive campaigns to thwart separatist violence, such as from ETA 
in Spain, or anarchist violence, such as from Conspiracy of Fire Cells in 
Greece. Furthermore, especially since Anders Behring Breivik’s murder of 
seventy-seven people in Norway in 2011 and the uncovering in the same 
year of the National Socialist Underground cell that killed nine immigrants 
and a police offi  cer in Germany between 2001 and 2007, several European 
governments have stepped up hard-power measures against Radical Right 
organizations. Th e murders themselves seem to have been motivated pri-
marily by the kind of nativism keen to protect racial purity. Th ese devel-
opments notwithstanding, the rhetoric and resources expended to combat 
political violence exercised in the name of Islam are hugely disproportionate 
to the number of actual acts, whether planned or carried out. For example, 
according to Europol, whereas failed, foiled, or completed terrorist attacks 
invoking Islam comprised under 3 percent of all terrorist attacks reported 
in the EU in 2012, Muslim suspects comprised 30 percent of terrorist-related 
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arrests; in 2013 the numbers were 0 percent and 40 percent, respectively 
(Europol 2013: 42–43; Europol 2014: 46–47).
Th e reference to Schmitt becomes even more apposite due to the German 
thinker’s infl uential theory of the state of exception. Th e theory conceptual-
izes and justifi es the moment when states allow themselves to derogate from 
their own laws. Schmitt (1985: 5) famously wrote: “Sovereign is he who de-
cides on the exception.” For Schmitt, politics, in its profoundest moments, 
necessarily boils down to the friend-enemy (Freund-Feind) confrontation: 
“Th e high points of politics are simultaneously the moments in which the 
enemy is, in concrete clarity, recognized as the enemy” (Schmitt 1996: 67). 
No sovereign can perfectly predict how, when, and where the enemy will at-
tack. Th erefore, no state can write into its formal laws exactly what measures 
will be necessary to prevent annihilation.
Th e exception, which is not codifi ed in the existing legal order, can at 
best be characterized as a case of extreme peril, a danger to the exis-
tence of the state, or the like. But it cannot be circumscribed factually 
and made to conform to a preformed law. . . . Th e precise details of an 
emergency cannot be anticipated, nor can one spell out what may take 
place in such a case, especially when it is truly a matter of an extreme 
emergency and of how it is to be eliminated. (Schmitt 1985: 6)
Th us, any state that restricts its actions to the constitutional order invites its 
own demise. Ironically, according to Schmitt, the rule of law can ultimately 
only be secured through its suspension.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the last quarter century has seen a revival of 
interest in Schmitt’s political thought, especially among postmodern theo-
rists. Th ey take interest not in the racist dimensions of the ex-Nazi’s theo-
ries, but rather in his insistence on the insurmountably antagonistic nature 
of politics (Tralau 2010; Agamben 2005; Mouff e 2000). Some of his ideas jibe 
well with the postmodern tenet regarding the will to power and the result-
ing irreconcilable clash of opposing worldviews. For postmodernists, the 
clashing parties do not necessarily have to be nation-states, as in Schmitt’s 
rendering. Th ey can be any parties advancing incompatible and incommen-
surable stances. Moreover, Schmitt’s concept of the “enemy” can be married 
with postmodernism’s focus on the “Other,” though postmodernists see no 
need to postulate an ultimately mortal clash (Mouff e 2000).
Particularly those scholars working in Foucault’s shadow interpret coun-
ter-terrorism from the perspective of governmentality. On this reading, a 
multifaceted array of interlocking institutions—police, military, academia, 
media, and more—form a power nexus that without being orchestrated 
from a single locus nevertheless eff ectively constructs and represents what 
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passes for terrorism and terrorists, including how they should be thwarted 
(Agamben 1998; 2005). For example, Ole Waever (1995: 54–55) and his col-
leagues from the Copenhagen School of Security Studies, following John 
Searle’s theory of language, resist the temptation to analyze terrorism as an 
objective phenomenon or “real thing” and urge reading it as a “speech act”:
In naming a certain development a security problem, the “state” can 
claim a special right, one that will, in the fi nal instance, always be 
defi ned by the state and its elites. . . . By defi nition, something is a 
security problem when the elites declare it to be so.
Similarly, Tal Asad (2007: 26) explains that “my argument .  .  . is directed 
against thinking of terrorism simply as an illegal and immoral form of vio-
lence and advocates an examination of what the discourse of terror—and 
the preparation of terror—does in the world of power.” Since 9/11, discourse 
theory has drawn much attention to the constructed images of “Islamic ter-
rorism” and the “Muslim terrorist,” which in turn are invoked to justify 
enhanced soft  but especially hard power to combat the threat (Fredette 2014: 
126–40; Kaya 2012: 201–18; Schiff auer 2008b: 206–7; Peter 2008; Asad 2007: 
28–38; Inda 2006: 53). Tim Jacoby’s (2010: 167) analysis is standard:
While this culturalist discourse continues to operate as a means of 
explaining such violence outside the West, its primary function has 
been (particularly since the attacks in New York, Washington and 
Pennsylvania in 2001) to construct and maintain a connection be-
tween Muslims, Islam and violence, and then to present this as the 
primary threat—both internal and external—to the West “itself.”
From the postcolonial perspective, the manufactured threat of Islamic 
terrorism has been exploited to extend even further the reach and grip of 
the West’s neocolonial empire. In the name of security, Muslim lands have 
been newly occupied and their resources, such as Iraq’s oil reserves, secured 
for Western exploitation (Douzinas 2007; Jabri 2007). Th ese “new Crusades” 
have replaced the Cold War dichotomy by “constructing the Muslim en-
emy” (Qureshi and Sells 2003a) to stand in for the Soviet bogeyman (Ruf 
2010; Said 2003: 69).
Th e proclamation by individual writers of a clash between civiliza-
tions does not have the formal performative eff ect of a declaration of 
war. Yet it is more than a description. To warn that an entire civili-
zation and religion is, by defi nition, “our” enemy is to raise a call to 
arms. (Qureshi and Sells 2003b: 2)
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Th e colonial distinction between the “rational” Occident and “irrational” Ori-
ent is said to have been revived in the clash-of-civilizations thesis to predict 
a greater threat of terrorism emanating from the Muslim world and to justify 
diff erential treatment of Muslims, whether in the form of drone killings, the 
reapplication of torture, or the erection of specialized prisons like Guantanamo 
Bay or Abu Ghraib for suspected terrorists. David Tyrer (2013: 140) writes that
this postcolonial condition appears to be embodied in the fi gure of 
the Muslim, at once racially recognizable and yet somehow exces-
sively diff erent, and yet this problem is radicalized within the war on 
terror because of the threat of terrorism that knows no boundaries, 
as the offi  cial discourse reminded us.
Likewise, the West allegedly tolerates or supports Israel’s apartheid-like 
treatment of Palestinians and imperious relations with neighboring Arab 
countries on grounds that the Jewish state faces terrorist foes who are not 
capable or deserving of the kind of rational negotiation among disputing 
parties common in, say, the EU (Yaqoob 2007). Within Europe itself, Mus-
lims are treated as delinquent interlopers who bring their violent ways into 
an otherwise peaceful Europe (Amin 2011; Terrio 2009).
Postcolonial Violent Resistance
I mention postmodern and postcolonial readings of counter-terrorism not to 
test their validity, but rather to shed light on their role as normative forces in 
politics. Islamists who advocate or exercise nonstate political violence directed 
at European targets oft en invoke fragments of postcolonial and postmodern 
thought. Two caveats deserve immediate mention. First, only a tiny propor-
tion of Islamist, let alone Muslim, Europeans engage in terrorism. However, 
they represent more than a mere phantom construction of Islamophobic me-
dia and politics; they do exist (though in small numbers) and they do strike 
(though very infrequently, as the Europol numbers cited above attest). Th ey 
are organized in groups such as Al Qaeda, Al-Muhajiroun, Hizb ut-Tahrir, 
Supporters of Shariah, Al-Jama’a Al-Islamiya, Groupe Islamique Armé, the 
Salafi st Group for Preaching and Combat, and the International Mujahadeen 
Uzbekistan; they are also known to frequent mosques such as Finsbury Park 
in London, Al-Quds in Hamburg, Al-Tawhid in Amsterdam, Grimhøjvej in 
Aarhus, and the Islamic Cultural Institute of Milan (Wiktorowicz 2005: 2–3).
Second, I do not wish to imply that violent Islamists are committed 
postmodernists or that they do not draw on arguments from within the 
Islamic tradition in an eff ort to legitimize their actions. Omar Bakri, for 
instance, exclaimed shortly aft er 9/11:
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Th e Islamic Movements have not used the real weapon yet. . . . Oh 
Osama . . . you and your brothers are now breathing life and dignity 
into the body of the umma. Our main mission as Muslims is to carry 
the Islamic message to the entire world. . . . We are an umma of jihad 
and beyond doubt, we have been chosen by Allah to lead the whole 
world if we hold to his command. (Quoted in Strindberg and Wärn 
2011: 179)
Qutb’s Milestones is known to be very infl uential among militant jihadists. 
In it, the Egyptian Islamist advocated perpetual violent and nonviolent ji-
had to “abolish injustice from the earth, to bring people to the worship of 
God alone, and to bring them out of servitude to others into the servants of 
the Lord” (Qutb 1981: 56). However, as previously stated, the theory of fra-
gilization does not necessitate the total conversion to postmodernism and 
rejection of Islam. Th e theory posits only a soft ening or opening toward 
some fragmentary aspects of a public philosophy with which one does not 
explicitly identify. Presumably, violent Islamists consider the Qur’an Ab-
solute Truth and therefore do not share postmodernism’s thoroughgoing 
moral relativism. However, they borrow from Hobbesian postmodernism 
the contention that the Western state lacks a solid moral foundation and as 
a result exercises arbitrary and biased power. Th e claim that Western states 
have no superior moral foundation to legitimize their treatment of Mus-
lims is critical in justifying the violent Islamists’ decision to contravene the 
conventional monopoly on political violence declared by European govern-
ments. Similarly, fragments of Frantz Fanon’s infl uential theory of postco-
lonial liberation echo through militant Islamist discourse. Th e Martinique-
born psychiatrist and revolutionary for Algerian independence theorized 
that the colonized could only exorcise the inferior self-image imposed on 
them through violence by exercising like violence (“absolute violence”) 
against the colonizer (Fanon 1965a: 37). It is just this notion that Omar 
Bakri invokes in the aforementioned quotation when he lauds Bin Laden for 
“breathing life and dignity into the body of the umma.”
Several studies of militant international jihadism underscore the adop-
tion and adaptation of anti-Western rhetoric in the wake of Marxism’s wan-
ing appeal. Th us, Roy (2005: 324) contends that “Osama Bin Laden is far 
more within the legacy of a tradition of Western radicalism than merely an 
expression of traditional political violence in Islam.”
Al Qaeda is heir to the ultra-left ist and Th ird Worldist movements 
of the 1970s. Th e left  aspect fi zzled and has been replaced by Islamic 
radicalism: the only networks of radical protest are Islamic, but they 
recruit from among the same categories (outcasts from the educated 
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middle class and dropouts from the working class), carry the same 
hatred for “bourgeois” values and attitudes, have the same targets 
(imperialists) and oft en the same pet guerrillas (Palestine), claim 
to be internationalist (ummah instead of the international working 
class), and are built on the same generation gap. (Roy 2005: 324)
Robert Leiken (2005: 127) refers to the same phenomenon as “anti-West 
westernization” (see also Pargeter 2008).
Of particular interest in this regard is Al Qaeda’s emphasis on the “Far 
Enemy.” In 1996, Bin Laden began encouraging his sympathizers to strike 
the “Far Enemy,” a strategy subsequently endorsed by Ayman Al-Zawahiri. 
Th e two Al Qaeda leaders urged militants to strike the Western “occupiers” 
not only in the traditional and sacred lands of Islam from which they were 
to be expelled but also at home (Gerges 2005). Needless to say, ISIS carried 
out this strategy in Paris on 13 November 2015. In audiotapes, Al-Zawraa 
TV, online magazines such as Inspire and Dabiq, or webchat fora like Bab-
ul-Islam and Ansarullah, not to mention YouTube, Twitter and Facebook, 
international jihadists of various stripes, using many languages beyond 
Arabic and English, increasingly reach out to militant zealots living in the 
West with the message that they should “strike at the heart of the unbeliev-
ers” (Quoted in Weimann 2015: 71; see also Younas 2014; Davies, et al. 2011). 
In a 2002 letter to Mullah Omar in Afghanistan, Bin Laden is said to have 
written: “It is obvious that the media war in this century is one of the stron-
gest methods; in fact, its ratio may reach 90% of the total preparation for the 
[our] battles” (quoted in Younas 2014: 11). Th e Global Islamic Media Front 
tells its internet visitors:
Th is is the Internet that Allah has enlisted in the service of jihad and 
of the Mujahedeen, which has come to serve your interests—given 
that half the battle of the Mujahedeen is being waged on the pages 
of the Internet—the sole outlet for Mujahedeen media. (Quoted in 
Awan 2007b: 222)
If militant Islamists want to inspire Westerners to embrace their cause, it 
makes sense to speak to them using normative fragments that likely reso-
nate with them. Th e trope of the imperialist West bent on subjugating Mus-
lims worldwide off ers itself as an irresistible ideological tool.
It should come as no surprise, then, that the trope turns up in ratio-
nalizations of acts of terror committed by violent Islamists. Mohammed 
Bouyeri, murderer of Th eo van Gogh and alleged member of the Hofstad 
Network, claimed:
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Th ere are dark Satanic forces that have sown their seed of evil ev-
erywhere in the world. Th is seed has been sown in the Islamic world 
in the times of colonialism . . . Since the fall of the Ottoman Empire 
. . . the enemies of Islam have been active in gradually carrying out 
their plans aiming at the total destruction of Islam. (Quoted in Pe-
ters 2011: 153)
Th e 7/7 bomber Shehzad Tanweer explained in a YouTube video released one 
year aft er the bombing: “Your government continues to oppress our women 
and children, our brothers and sisters in Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq and 
Chechnya.” He pledged that his deeds represented “only the beginning of a 
string of attacks that will continue and become stronger until you pull your 
forces out of Afghanistan and Iraq and until you stop your fi nancial and 
military support to America and Israel” (“7/7 Bomber’s Will;” youtube.com/
watch?v=FG6a26uX1eA). Likewise, Michael Adebolajo, who cut down Brit-
ish soldier Lee Rigby with a machete in 2013, claimed: “Muslims are dying 
daily by British soldiers. . . . We swear by Allah . . . we will never stop fi ght-
ing you until you leave us alone” (youtube.com/watch?v=WxrtaHkyw5w, 
though YouTube subsequently took down the video). Amedy Coulibaly, 
who killed four hostages in Paris in 2015, complained: “Th ey need to stop 
bombing ISIS. . . . Th ey need to stop forcing our women to remove hijab. . . . 
Th ey need to stop holding our men in jail” (CNN 11 January 2015). Th e Ma-
drid bombers justifi ed their actions as “a response to the crimes you have 
committed in the world, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan” (quoted in 
Forest 2015: 284). Th e alleged German ISIS sympathizer Silvio K pledged 
attacks on German soil as revenge for German arms delivery to Kurdish 
fi ghters in Syria combating ISIS encroachment (Hamburger Morgenpost 10 
September 2014). Similarly, the Moroccan-German Chouka brothers, who 
grew up in Bonn but now reside in the borderlands between Afghanistan 
and Pakistan, regularly send internet videos from the camp of the Interna-
tional Mujahadeen Uzbekistan exhorting Germans, in German, to commit 
acts of terrorism against trains, shopping centers, restaurants, and disco-
theques in Germany. In one video from 2011 entitled Evil Fatherland (Böses 
Vaterland), Mounir promises that “there must and will be, God willing, a 
series of attacks against the German people” in retaliation for the injustices 
its government has perpetrated against Muslims in Afghanistan. In subse-
quent videos, such as Yes, We Are Terrorists, the brothers praise Arid Uka 
and Mohammad Merah (“the knight of Toulouse”) as exemplary Muslims 
whose murderous deeds merit emulation (quoted in Steinberg 2013: 198). 
For his part, Merah claimed to be motivated by French involvement in Af-
ghanistan, the burqa ban, and Israel’s persecution of Palestinians: “Th e Jews 
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kill our brothers and sisters in Palestine” (Telegraph 10 April 2012). ISIS con-
tends: “Oh Americans, and oh Europeans, the Islamic State did not initiate a 
war against you as your governments and media try to make you believe. It 
is you who started the transgression against us, and thus you deserve blame 
and you will pay a great price” (CNN 22 September 2014). Following the at-
tacks on Charlie Hebdo in 2015, ISIS exclaimed: “Th ese are the fi rst drops of 
terror that will be rained down on the West” (Arutz Sheva 8 January 2015).
Islamist organizations that do not necessarily commit but nevertheless 
seem to condone acts of terrorism in Europe also deploy the postcolonial 
fragment. On 21 May 2013, Hizb ut-Tahrir published on its website (hizb.
org.uk) the following statement:
Ultimately such demonization of Islam and Muslims by the British 
political establishment has one main purpose for the UK and other 
Western Governments and that is to justify their foreign policy of 
interference or wars in the Muslim world as in Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Mali or Somalia which is aimed at securing their economic interests. 
We must fi ght back.
Similarly, Abou Jahjah, leader of the Antwerp-based Arab-European 
League, complains: “We’re Belgian citizens but they treat us like foreigners. 
Th e whole system is rigged to exclude us from jobs, houses and everything. 
So we must force them to give us our rights” (Telegraph 29 November 2002). 
Before being deported from Germany to Turkey in 2004, Metin Kaplan had 
implored his followers: “Yes, it is time to strike; both in Turkey and in Eu-
rope. . . . Th e enemies of Islam assume they can attack our religion, beliefs, 
and worship and we Muslims keep silent like sheep” (quoted in Yükleyen 
2012: 239). At times, the popular rap and hip-hop scene would seem to 
condone violence against the West. In 2006, for instance, the British group 
Fun-da-Mental released All Is War (Th e Benefi ts of G-had). Lead vocalist 
Aki Nawaz, who likened bin Laden to Che Guevara, sings: “I’m strapped up 
cross my chest bomb belt attached/Deeply satisfi ed with the plan I hatched” 
(Guardian 28 June 2006).
Europhobic Hyperbole
Islamists who condone or commit violence against European targets of-
ten employ deliberate hyperbole to justify their cause. Much of their anti-
Western rhetoric overlaps with the Europhobic hyperbole that we detailed 
in the previous two chapters and, therefore, does not need to be rehashed 
here. Th e jihadist spin comes in contending that the West is so irrevoca-
bly impious, decadent, and sadistic that violent attacks against its people 
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are necessary and justifi ed to counter its dangerous and lethal impact on 
Muslims (Parekh 2008: 168). Th e most blatantly hyperbolic distortion in 
this act of recriminating stigmatization comes forth in the outlandish 
claim that Western governments themselves have committed the terrorist 
attacks spuriously attributed to Muslims. Th e most common accusation 
in this regard is that the 9/11 attacks were either orchestrated or faked by 
the Central Intelligence Agency (or in some accounts by or with the Israeli 
Mossad), but similar claims have been made about, for example, Britain’s 
MI5 (Secret Intelligence Service) and the 7/7 bombings (Leiken 2012: 57; 
Buijs 2010: 78; Jenkins 2007: 166). It testifi es to the power of persuasion 
that the jihadist websites and other publications possess that a Pew Global 
Attitudes Project (2006: 49) survey found that, among polled Muslims, 
56 percent in Britain, 46 percent in France, and 44 percent in Germany 
refused to believe that Arabs were involved in the 9/11 attacks. Likewise, 
half of the 500 British Muslims surveyed for Channel Four News (4 June 
2007) believed that the government trumped up charges against the con-
victed 7/7 bombers, with a quarter convinced that the government itself 
masterminded the attacks.
Th e rapidly proliferating jihadist websites typically style themselves as 
alternative sources of news and information to the “lies or misconceptions 
that are present in Kuff ar (infi del) sources such as the BBC or CNN,” to 
quote almuhajiroun.com (quoted in Wiktorowicz 2005: 158–59). Th e Global 
Islamic Media Front, for example, stages its hooded spokesman in the same 
kind of setting as a news anchor, behind a desk with projected news feeds 
(Awan 2007b: 221). Such sites portray Western foreign policy as nothing 
short of a thinly veiled crusade (“Crusader West”) bent on destroying Is-
lam (quoted in Weimann 2015: 70). Typically, physical injuries to innocent 
women and children allegedly infl icted by Western government action are 
highlighted and depicted not as unintended and regretted, but rather delib-
erate and wanton (Leiken 2012: 232; Pargeter 2008: 198; Wiktorowicz 2005: 
68; Kepel 2004: 289). By contrast, in publications such as the ISIS magazine 
Dabiq or the fi lm Flames of War, jihadists are one-dimensionally lionized 
as heroic defenders of Islam, miraculously overcoming tremendous odds to 
triumph over Western persecutors (Awan 2007b: 221–22; Sageman 2008: 
113–15). Th e numbers supporting the jihadist movements are also typi-
cally infl ated several-fold (Wiktorowicz 2005: 193). Whether true or false, 
such fulminations can and do infl uence European Muslims. For instance, 
Arid Uka, who shot dead two U.S. airmen in the Frankfurt airport in 2011, 
claimed that he was motivated by a YouTube video depicting U.S. soldiers 
raping Muslim women in Iraq. In fact, the clip originated from the Hol-
lywood fi lm Redacted directed by Brian De Palma (Der Spiegel 10 February 
2012). My intention is neither to bore nor to astound readers with jihadist 
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apocrypha; rather, my point is to shed light on the widespread normative 
sway of the postmodernist tenet that “truth” is what passes for the truth.
Non-Muslim Terror
Lest the reader receive the false impression that terrorism in Europe main-
ly involves Muslims, some mention of non-Muslim terrorism is in order. 
As reported by Europol’s annual European Union Terrorism Situation and 
Trend Report, acts of political violence invoking Islam typically range from 
0 to 3 percent of all terrorist attacks in the EU in any given year. Th ey are 
annually far outnumbered by “separatist” and “left wing” acts, which fall 
outside the scope of this project. What falls within the purview of this study, 
however, are terrorizing acts of violence directed at Muslims and their plac-
es of residence, business, or worship in Europe. Such attacks antedate 9/11 
but have increased since 2001, oft en spiking aft er high-profi le incidents 
such as the slayings of Th eo van Gogh and Jeremy Rigby, 7/7, the Madrid 
bombings, or the lethal attack on Charlie Hebdo (Tyrer 2013: 62–63; also 
see the “Right-Wing Terrorism” chapters of the annual Europol reports). As 
with Islamist violence, anti-Muslim violence is oft en implicitly incited or 
condoned, if not directly organized, by Radical Right organizations such as 
the various national Defense Leagues and Stop Islamisation of Europe as-
sociations, Golden Dawn (Greece), Nordisk (Norway), PEGIDA (Germany), 
or Europe-wide neo-Nazi networks such as the National Socialist Under-
ground. Like jihadists, their eff orts are increasingly backed by extensive in-
ternet and social media sites such as Nuke all Mosques, Islam versus Europe, 
Pro-Reconquista-Europa, Riposte Laique, Die gruene Pest, Th e Brussels 
Journal, Jihad Watch, Gates of Vienna, or Politically Incorrect, all of which 
make extensive use of anti-Islamic hyperbole in their odious propaganda. 
A Pro-Reconquista-Europa headline from 22 July 2014, for example, read: 
“Madrid to Fall [to jihadists] in 2020” (forum.pro-reconquista-europa.com/
viewtopic.php?f=93&t=2267); the headline at Islam versus Europe from 16 
June 2014 was “Black fl ag of Jihad Will Fly over London” (http://islamversu-
seurope.blogspot.com).
Th ough undeniably informed by radically xenophobic nativism, the an-
ti-Muslim militants oft en manifest considerable fragilization toward post-
modernism’s notion of the systematically biased state. However, in their 
worldview, the state is systematically biased in favor of multiculturalism in 
a way that would seem to call for radical action to counter the threat that 
multiculturalism allegedly poses to the homogenous nation (Fekete 2012). 
Mass murderer Anders Behring Breivik, for example, asked in his mani-
festo “how many thousands of Europeans must die, how many hundreds 
of European women must be raped, millions robbed and bullied” before 
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Europe wakes up to the threat posed by Islam (quoted in Fekete 2012: 34). 
He hoped his killings would inspire a modern-day crusade to stave off  what 
he discerned as the galloping Islamization of Europe. But Breivik also de-
spised democratic socialism for allegedly enabling Islamization—ostensibly 
the reason why he bombed a government building in Oslo and conducted 
his shooting spree at a Workers’ Youth League camp thought to be groom-
ing future social democratic leaders.
European states are not above lawlessness. For instance, several Europe-
an governments, including Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom, have, in unequivocal violation of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights, tolerated or facilitated over one thousand extraor-
dinary renditions of suspected Muslim terrorists by the CIA to “black sites” 
where the apprehended have been tortured (Fava 2007; also see Hillebrand 
2012: 96–99 and 126–30). In a related high-profi le case, Abu Omar, an imam 
in Milan, was abducted in a joint operation by the CIA and SISMI on 17 
February 2003, transferred to Egypt, and there interrogated and tortured 
until his release in 2007 (BBC News 4 November 2009). Swedish police had 
in 2001 handed over Egyptian asylum-seekers Ahmed Agiza and Muham-
mad al-Zery to the CIA at Stockholm’s Bromma airport, where the prison-
ers were stripped, drugged, and chained before being transferred to Egypt 
for interrogation that included torture (Washington Post 21 May 2005). 
Likewise, the German citizen Khaled el-Masri was apprehended in Skopje 
by Macedonian police in 2003 and delivered to the CIA, whose agents tor-
tured him for four months before releasing him in a forest in Albania. In 
2004, U.S. ambassador to Germany Daniel Coats convinced German in-
terior minister Otto Schilly not to make the case public (Washington Post 
4 December 2005). A similarly grizzly fate befell Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri 
and Abu Zubaydah, who were tortured by the CIA at a military base in Po-
land. In 2014, the European Court of Human Rights found “coherent, clear, 
and categorical” evidence that the Polish government “facilitated the whole 
process, created the conditions for it to happen and made no attempt to pre-
vent it from occurring” (Los Angeles Times 26 July 2014). Similar cases are 
pending before the court against Lithuania and Romania. Many European 
governments are known to have made bilateral agreements with the United 
States to allow CIA fl ights to refuel or to land under false pretenses. Giv-
en the profound lack of transparency of cross-national counter-terrorism 
working groups like the G6 (Germany, France, U.K., Italy, Spain, and Po-
land) or the EU’s Policy Working Group on Terrorism and the Counter-
Terrorism Group (made up of intelligence heads of each EU member state), 
it is nearly impossible to know what, if any, laws they are breaking behind 
closed doors (Hillebrand 2012; Den Boer, Hillebrand, and Nölke 2008). It is 
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public knowledge that the governments of Germany and France agreed to 
provide the United States with information on the alleged 9/11 conspirator 
Zacarias Moussouai, even though they knew that the prosecution was seek-
ing the death penalty (Keohane 2008: 129).
Finally, readers should not overlook the fact that government offi  cials 
are known at times to turn a blind eye to acts of violence against Muslims 
planned by private citizens. George Morgan and Scott Poynting (2012b: 8) 
refer to this phenomenon as an unoffi  cial “permission to hate.” Perhaps the 
most famous case involved the exposure of several employees of Germany’s 
Agency for the Protection of the Constitution as alleged sympathizers with 
the National Socialist Underground, whose Zwickau cell murdered nine im-
migrants and a police offi  cer (Aust and Laabs 2014).
Th ese various forms of governmental lawlessness manifest consequen-
tial fragilization in the direction of Hobbesian postmodernism. Th ey refl ect, 
in particular, the expanding sway of the nihilistic tenet that moral rectitude 
represents an unsophisticated, Pollyannaish approach to politics that all but 
ensures the ultimate victory of one’s adversaries. Such lawlessness in the 
name of fi ghting terrorism refl ects the growing attitude that politics is about 
winning—and winning only—at whatever price.
Conviviality without Consensus
Th e extensive mark of postmodern thought does not necessarily have to 
motivate violent antagonism in which opposing parties seek to terrorize 
their adversaries. Hospitable postmodernism theorizes conviviality without 
consensus (Norton 2013: 226; Hall 2012: 11; Gilroy 2006: 40). To be sure, 
swaying persons inclined to terrorize one another to live peacefully together 
represents a daunting challenge, and hospitable postmodernism does not 
pretend to assure that the attempt to do so will succeed. However, the at-
tempt can seem prudent in light of the apparent diffi  culty, if not impossibili-
ty, of forging an overlapping consensus around liberalism’s insistence on the 
autonomy of the individual or around nationalism’s loyalty to the nation.
Hospitable postmodern encounters aim not at consensus, but simply 
the regularized act or experience of interacting with adversaries without 
recourse to violence. Th e goal is to habituate nonviolent interaction so that 
it is given a chance to become the norm rather than the exception. To suc-
ceed among parties with vehemently opposing positions, hospitable post-
modernism teaches that participants should be permitted to air their views 
and grievances in an atmosphere free of moral condemnation. Interlocu-
tors suspend their claims to moral superiority in a wager, not a guarantee, 
that doing so can open modes and means of nonviolent communication not 
yet tried or even imagined by participants. Tariq Modood (2009: 180), for 
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example, argues that participants must disavow “an ideological ‘drawing a 
line in the sand’ mentality.” Resolutions, whether sought aft er or achieved, 
should be considered pragmatic, local, and provisionary rather than prin-
cipled, universal, or permanent (Schiff auer 2008a: 129).
How do hospitable postmodern tenets apply to counter-terrorism per 
se? In the fi rst place, European offi  cialdom (the state) would have to relax its 
proclaimed monopoly on defi ning terrorism long enough to enable dialogue 
with (some of) those it otherwise considers Islamist terrorists and their al-
lies. Like liberal cosmopolitanism, the hospitable postmodern approach 
does not discriminate against Muslims as a category of persons deserving 
greater suspicion of terrorism. However, the postmodern tactic goes beyond 
the liberal strategy in not refusing to cooperate with persons who do not 
necessarily put fi rst, like liberalism, the sanctity of the individual human 
being. Similarly, like the community-based approach, hospitable postmod-
ernism does open the door to cooperation with non-liberal Muslims but, 
unlike communitarianism, does not retain the state’s monopoly on defi n-
ing what constitutes terrorism. Indeed, the postmodern strategy does not 
exclude from dialogue those perspectives that contend the European state 
itself sponsors terrorist deeds. For their part, militant Islamists would need 
to suspend their conclusion that the Western state is incapable of treating 
Muslims as anything other than objects of derision and subjugation and 
that not all of its intentions vis-à-vis Muslims are mean-spirited.
Admittedly, hospitable postmodernism shapes the politics of counter-
terrorism less than any of the other six normative stances analyzed above, 
but its mark is nonetheless discernible. Th ose whom we dubbed “Post-
Islamists” in the previous chapter have taken the critical step of declassify-
ing Europe as the dar-al-harb (abode of war). Due to its extensive religious 
freedoms, Europe deserves to be thought of by Muslims as the dar-al-aman 
(abode of truce); Tariq Ramadan (1999a: 150) prefers dar al-shahada (abode 
of testimony), Jusuf Qaradawi dar-al-dawa (abode of proselytization), Ra-
chid al-Ghannouchi dar-al-Islam (LeVine 2003: 105). Th e reclassifi cation 
means that the violent methods of warfare are no longer justifi ed in Europe. 
Qaradawi, for example, has predicted that “Islam would return to Europe 
as a victorious conqueror, aft er having been twice expelled. I maintain that 
this time the conquest will not come of the sword, but of preaching and 
ideology” (quoted in Bruckner 2007). As already mentioned, Qaradawi has 
condemned the terrorist attacks carried out in the name of Islam in the 
West. Ramadan too has condemned terrorist attacks in the West and de-
nounced “the adolescent stupidity” of the rioters in the Paris suburbs in 
2005 (quoted in Leiken 2012: 19). Indeed, virtually all of the major Islamist 
organizations in Europe have rejected Al Qaeda’s “Far Enemy” strategy as 
both unnecessary and un-Islamic (Gerges 2005: 233). For example, aft er the 
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U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, many fatwas issued forth from the Middle 
East calling on Muslims to strike back against Western targets. However, 
the president of the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe, Ahmed 
al Rawi, stated: “Muslims living in Europe should not follow fatwas given on 
this subject in Muslim countries, because Muslims in Europe have a specifi c 
character, which means that those fatwas are not incumbent upon them” 
(quoted in Bowen 2010: 145).
Here we can detect fragilization toward hospitable postmodernism’s 
contextualism and its related rejection of moral universalism. Al Rawi did 
not categorically condemn the fatwas as immoral; rather, he maintained 
that they were not morally applicable to Muslims residing in Europe. Like-
wise, most post-Islamists refuse to condemn violent defense of Muslims in 
Muslim lands occupied by non-Muslims (Bowen 2012: 121; Bakker 2012: 
184; Jenkins 2007: 252; Gerges 2005: 210–28). While both Ramadan and Qa-
radawi, for example, reject violent resistance in Europe, both condoned it in 
(occupied) Afghanistan, Iraq, and Palestine. Furthermore, Qaradawi drew 
much criticism in Europe for endorsing suicide bombings against Israel: 
“It’s not suicide, it is martyrdom in the name of God. . . . Th e Israelis might 
have nuclear bombs but we have the children bomb and these human bombs 
must continue until liberation” (quoted in Jenkins 2007: 252).
In 2005, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Offi  ce (FCO) recom-
mended granting an entry visa to Qaradawi to address the Muslim Unity 
Conference in Manchester. Although Qaradawi did not ultimately attend, 
the visa sparked controversy because of the cleric’s endorsement of suicide 
bombings. Qaradawi had been fêted in 2004 by London mayor Ken Livings-
ton. Th e latter invited the cleric to address a conference sponsored by the 
Muslim Contact Unit of the Metropolitan Police, whose mission since its 
founding in 2002 has been to combat terrorism emanating from the Muslim 
community. Although plainly informed by the communitarian notion of 
discouraging radicalization through Islam-based arguments, the sponsored 
visits also revealed signifi cant fragilization toward hospitable postmodern-
ism. Th e FCO, the mayor’s offi  ce, and the Metropolitan Police were perfectly 
aware of the cleric’s endorsement of suicide bombings in Palestine (not to 
mention violent resistance to occupying troops in Afghanistan and Iraq that 
included British soldiers). Moreover, Prime Minister Blair had reacted to the 
invitation by stating that all those who advocate suicide bombing, “whether 
it’s in London, whether it’s in Afghanistan or Iraq, or it’s in Palestine or 
it’s in Turkey or Kashmir, or anywhere . . . have got no place in our coun-
try” (Telegraph 20 July 2005). Nevertheless, the offi  cials in favor of the visit 
were willing to suspend the judgment on Qaradawi as a supporter of terror-
ist tactics in Palestine to enable his renunciation of terrorism in the U.K., 
including his unequivocal condemnation of the 7/7 bombings. Th us Chief 
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Constable Ian Blair of the Metropolitan Police publicly confi rmed that Qa-
radawi held “views on the Palestinian intifada that probably would not be 
very acceptable” but defended the visit because the beloved sheikh could 
“command an audience of 50,000 young people at the drop of a hat.” Th e 
constable also expressed the hospitable postmodern emphasis on unavoid-
able risk taking: “We are going to talk to him [Qaradawi] however diffi  cult 
that becomes” (quoted in Frampton and Maher 2013: 43–44). Postmodern 
contextualism and pragmatism also infl uenced the advocates of the visits. 
Th ey focused their energies on discouraging radicalization within the con-
text of the U.K. rather than in general or in Palestine. Indeed, the Muslim 
Contact Unit not only foresaw in Qaradawi’s visit
a positive Muslim community impact in the fi ght against Al Qaida 
propaganda in the UK. His support for Palestinian suicide bombers 
adds credibility to his condemnation of Al Qaida in those sections of 
the community most susceptible to the blandishments of Al Qaida 
terrorist propaganda. (Quoted in Frampton and Maher 2013: 44)
Th us, in the specifi c context of thwarting Islamist terrorism in the U.K., 
Qaradawi’s endorsement of suicide bombings was viewed as a pragmatic 
asset rather than grounds for a categorical rejection of cooperation with the 
cleric based on the kind of moral absolutism expressed by the prime minis-
ter. I should add that similar pragmatic, context-specifi c reasoning moved 
the Italian and French foreign ministries to work with Qaradawi in 2004, in 
both cases in conjunction with attempts to free hostages abducted in Iraq.
Conclusion
Th e case of Qaradawi exemplifi es the main theme of this chapter (and book) 
regarding messy policy making. Th e same Qaradawi who was granted a visa 
in 2004 and 2005 by the British government because, in the words of the 
FCO, “having individuals like Qaradawi on our side should be our aim,” was 
denied entry in 2008. Th e Home Offi  ce maintained that it would “not toler-
ate the presence of those who seek to justify any acts of terrorist violence or 
express views that could foster inter-community violence” (quotations from 
Vidino 2010a: 114). Likewise, despite having worked with Qaradawi in 2004 
to secure the release of two French hostages in Iraq, the French government 
in 2012 denied him an entry visa to France, where he was scheduled to ad-
dress a conference sponsored by the UOIF, a participating organization in 
the Conseil Français du Culte Musulman. Although Qaradawi had publicly 
condemned Merah’s lethal attack on a Jewish school in that same year, Pres-
ident Sarkozy defended the decision by saying that people “who maintain or 
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would like to take positions that are incompatible with the republican ideal 
would not be welcome” (Al Jazeera, 27 March 2012, http://www.aljazeera.
com/news/europe/2012/03/201232745312479784.html). A year earlier, Ire-
land had denied a visa to Qaradawi, even though he heads the European 
Council for Fatwa and Research, which is legally headquartered in Dublin.
Th e inconsistencies in Qaradawi’s case are hardly unique. As this chap-
ter has demonstrated, the same governments that pledge to and oft en do 
respect the equal rights of Muslims in an eff ort to discourage their radical-
ization also simultaneously order and oversee unreasonable and even un-
lawful arrests, detentions, and renditions of Muslim suspects on a regular 
basis. With equally blatant inconsistency, European governments that work 
with Islamist organizations in community-based eff orts to counter terror-
ism authorize the surveillance of the same organizations by the police and 
intelligence services. On some occasions, the surveillance so angers the tar-
geted organizations that they break off  ties with offi  cials. On other occa-
sions, (typically sensationalized) media coverage of the intelligence reports 
leads offi  cials temporarily to cease cooperation with Islamists. Small won-
der, then, that analysts fi nd “a multiple set of strategies and tactics” (Banks, 
De Nevers, and Wallerstein 2008: 4) “beset with contradictions” (Asad 2007: 
2) that “oft en produce paradoxical and unforeseen consequences” (Chebel 
d’Appollonia and Reich 2008: 5; see also Argomaniz 2011; Bleich 2010b; 
Croft  and Moore 2010).
Granted, much of this policy messiness stems from the fact that counter-
terrorism policies are devised and implemented in many diff erent and of-
ten disparate offi  ces, ministries, and branches of government (Heath-Kelly, 
Jarvis, and Baker-Beall 2014). Th e argument advanced here, however, is that 
profound normative dissonance plays a signifi cant role as well. Moreover, 
the abiding Kulturkampf among liberalism, nationalism, and postmodern-
ism has occasioned in politics considerable mutual fragilization among the 
public philosophies. Despite their purely theoretical incompatibility, nor-
mative fragments from each—torture is wrong, don’t trust Islamists, do 
whatever it takes to stop terrorism—nevertheless come forth as persuasive 
in various contexts. In their eff ort to sway diverse and highly fragilized pub-
lics, policy makers grow accustomed to moral ambivalence and paradox. 




Th e image of the world daily generated by present-day life concerns 
is now devoid of the genuine or assumed solidity and continuity 
which used to be the trademark of modern “structures.” Th e 
dominant sentiment is the feeling of uncertainty—about the future 
shape of the world, about the right way of living in it, and about 
the criteria by which to judge the rights and wrongs of one’s way 
of living. Uncertainty is not exactly a newcomer in the modern 
world, with its past. What is new, however, is that it is no longer 
seen as a mere temporary nuisance which, with due eff ort, may be 
either mitigated or completely overcome. Th e postmodern world 
is bracing itself for life under a condition of uncertainty which is 
permanent and irreducible.
—Zygmunt Bauman, “Th e Making and Unmaking of Strangers”
This book has argued against viewing European Muslims as a distinct group of political actors. Instead it has urged readers to see Muslims and non-Muslims alike as inhabiting a normative landscape in Europe 
dominated by the vying public philosophies of liberalism, nationalism, and 
postmodernism. Th is is not to contend that Islam does not shape the politi-
cal agendas of (some) Muslims. Rather, it makes good sense to couch one’s 
political goals, however informed, in the language of liberalism, national-
ism, and/or postmodernism, because those three public philosophies carry 
substantial political clout in Europe.
I have employed the notion of Kulturkampf to underscore that none of 
the public philosophies enjoys decisively more political clout than its ri-
vals. Furthermore, the persistence of an inconclusive Kulturkampf has oc-
casioned mutual fragilization—that is, widespread ambivalence and diffi  -
dence regarding the moral superiority of any one public philosophy. Rather 
than try to fi t Muslim and non-Muslim actors into ideological straitjackets, 
in particular the Left  versus Right paradigms so common in political analy-
sis (Goodman 2014; Koopmans, Michalowski, and Waibel 2012; Bornschier 
2010; Joppke 2010; Janoski 2010; Howard 2009; Lahav 2004), this study has 
found it more illuminating to analyze them as pragmatic bricoleurs who 
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opportunistically exploit liberal, nationalist, and/or postmodern public phi-
losophies to suit a particular political goal, space, moment, and audience. 
Th us, we saw, for instance, that IGMG deployed liberal rhetoric to argue 
that female Muslims should have the same right to don the hijab as oth-
ers have to wear a miniskirt, communitarian logic to contend that Muslims 
alone should determine what is proper Islamic practice in the diaspora, and 
postmodern logic to complain that European governments and mainstream 
media stigmatize and marginalize Muslims as potential terrorists—that is, 
as the proverbial negative other. Such bricolage is further facilitated through 
ideological fragmentation. Rhetorical fragments are used as performative 
utterances detached from the more systematic argumentation of a given 
public philosophy as pure theory. Fragmentation helps inconsistencies to 
go less noticed, which in turn fosters greater normative ambivalence. No 
wonder that recent studies uncovered “increased ideological uncertainty” 
(Odmalm 2014: 112) and “deep ambivalence about immigration” across 
migrant-importing countries (Hollifi eld, Martin, and Orrenius 2014b: 26).
Th is book has maintained that ideological bricolage contributes signifi -
cantly to policy messiness. If the analysis presented here convinces readers 
of anything, it ought to be of the messy—that is, polymorphous, multilay-
ered, incoherent, and contradictory—policies concerning Muslims across 
issues and across Europe. Th is fi nding sheds revealing light on the promi-
nent debate in comparative immigration studies about policy convergence 
versus national distinctiveness (Goodman 2014: 65). In none of the four case 
studies were we able to identify the kind of distinct, coherent, persistent 
national approaches posited by the defenders of unique national paradigms 
(Goodman 2014; Korteweg and Yurdakul 2014; Joppke and Torpey 2013; 
Koopmans, Michalowski, and Waibel 2012; Klausen 2010; Kirschner and 
Sperling 2010; Joppke 2009; Howard 2009; Saharso 2007; Amir-Moazami 
2007; Bader 2007; Koopmans et al. 2005; Fetzer and Soper 2005; Leiken 
2005; Brochmann and Hammar 1999; Favell 1998; Joppke 1996; Brubaker 
1992). Instead, in concurrence with other critics of methodological nation-
alism, the present study has also found “complexity” (Banting and Kym-
licka 2013: 591), “contradictions and ineffi  ciencies in policy” (Boswell 2007: 
93), and “confl icting policy outputs” (Hampshire 2013: 12). To be sure, for 
instance, the French do demand that Muslims assimilate to liberal “republi-
can” values. However, we have also unearthed intermingled with assimila-
tive policies not only toleration of but considerable deliberate support for 
communitarian separatism practiced by Muslim associations. Likewise, 
“multicultural” Britain surely implements “community-based” approaches 
to counter-terrorism. But the British government no more shrinks from ap-
plying extensive hard power than the French government does from explor-
ing self-policing programs within Muslim communities. Similar messiness 
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turned up in “ethnonational” Germany, where only half of the Länder pro-
scribed the hijab (but not the habit or yarmulke) for public school teachers. 
Furthermore, we encountered in the previous chapters governments across 
Europe that turn a blind eye to the relentless and ruthless exploitation of 
undocumented migrants as well as illegal and intimidating discrimination 
against “legal” Muslims in myriad walks of life. Th ese “policies” appear no-
where “on the books,” but, as we have stressed, this makes them no less real 
for the victims. Analysis that limits itself to offi  cial policies occludes a large 
dimension of what is actually transpiring.
Th is study does not, however, corroborate the convergence thesis, at 
least not as it is putatively formulated. Th e typical formulation hypothe-
sizes that Europe-wide consensus is congealing around a single normative 
outlook, such as endorsement of “postnational” (Soysal 1994: 3) values and 
“diversity” (Joppke 2009: 120) or, by contrast, around “the return of assimi-
lation” (Brubaker 2001: 531). Th e most conspicuous similarity throughout 
Europe that has emerged in this study is normative Kulturkampf and policy 
messiness. Everywhere we found vehement and enduring political contro-
versy surrounding citizenship, veiling, secularism, and terrorism. Even 
regarding the use of torture we found no unequivocal consensus, at least 
not once we considered the unoffi  cial or downplayed assistance that many 
European governments have lent to the extraordinary renditions of Muslim 
suspects. Consensus appears to be elusive rather than imminent. As Jock 
Young (1999: 15) perspicaciously notes, “the deviant other is everywhere” 
but “everyone is a potential deviant.”
Perhaps the time has come to relax or relinquish altogether the search for 
overarching consensus. Europe has a long and complicated tradition of nor-
mative diversity and discord. Needless to say, it would be wrong and indeed 
unconscionable to deny or dismiss the immense human suff ering that has 
erupted and too oft en recrudesced in Europe in conjunction with ideologi-
cal confl ict. But has not much of this suff ering resulted from perpetrators 
insisting on consensus, insisting that my view be everyone’s view? Isaiah 
Berlin concluded his famous essay “Two Concepts of Liberty” by quoting 
Joseph Schumpeter: “To realize the relative validity of one’s convictions and 
yet stand for them unfl inchingly, is what distinguishes a civilized man from 
a barbarian.” Berlin added: “To demand more than this is perhaps a deep 
and incurable metaphysical need; but to allow it to determine one’s practice 
is a symptom of an equally deep, and more dangerous, moral and political 
immaturity” (Berlin 1969: 172).

Afterword: Paris, November 13, 2015
The page proof for this book were fi nalized only a few hours before the deplorable attacks transpired in Paris on November 13, 2015. Th erefore, no systematic analysis of the tragic events appears in the body of the 
text. However, at this time, only a few days aft er the events, they do not ap-
pear to undermine or alter the lessons and conclusions of this study. Rather, 
the latter can enable a more nuanced comprehension of the events as well as 
a more sophisticated anticipation of their political fallout than is common, 
for example, in the fl ood of media reports.
Th e most important lesson, and one happily receiving at least lip ser-
vice from many prominent political actors, is that the attacks signal no war 
of all Muslims (Islam) against all non-Muslims (France/Europe/the West). 
Muslim Europeans are not a monolithic community. Th eir views are as dif-
ferentiated as those of non-Muslim Europeans. For all those who have ap-
plauded the attacks, for instance via Twitter, there are many more who have 
condemned them. L’union des Organisations Islamique de France (UOIF), 
for example, immediately announced that it was “horrifi ed and shocked by 
. . . this barbaric terrorism” (Anadolu Post 15 November 2015). We should 
keep in mind the observation from chapter six of the president of the Brit-
ish Muslim Council, Iqbal Sacranie: “Th ere is no such thing as an Islamic 
terrorist—that is off ensive.” Th e same sentiment has been expressed by mil-
lions in the wake of the attacks via the Twitter hashtag “#NotInMyName.”
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Readers should resist reductionist arguments that try to attribute a 
greater propensity for violence to “Muslims” in general. Claims such that 
France was struck because it has the largest Muslim minority in Europe 
conveniently ignore the fact that European countries with much smaller 
Muslim populations (most notably Spain and the U.K.) have also been tar-
geted. Th e same criticism holds for assertions or insinuations that, say, refu-
gees from predominantly Muslim countries such as Iraq or Syria present a 
greater security risk. Most of these refugees are themselves fl eeing constant 
terrorizing circumstances and thus presumably are even more sensitized 
and opposed to terrorism. Nor should we lose sight of the fact that Muslims 
were among the victims on November 13.
Even more importantly, this book has shown that especially Muslims 
number among the victims of overzealous counter-terrorism. President 
Hollande immediately declared a state of emergency, requested its exten-
sion for three months, and proposed changes to the constitution to enhance 
police powers. He ordered over 100,000 security offi  cials to stabilize the 
country, including searching and arresting hundreds of suspects. Neigh-
boring lands such as Belgium and Germany joined the hunt. Readers know 
from previous chapters that it would be naïve not to presume that security 
agents will employ racial profi ling that is oft en profoundly informed by the 
essentializing stereotypes generated by both Islamophobic and Europhobic 
hyperbole. Furthermore, these mutually reinforcing discourses that already 
signifi cantly infl uence the politics of diversity are likely to intensify as po-
litical opportunists seek to exploit the attacks for political gain. Th ough 
November 13 dramatically demonstrated that political violence is real, this 
does not change the important insight that what counts as “terrorists” and 
“terrorism” remains ultimately a social construct formed through ongoing 
political contestation typically among unevenly powerful parties.
Ironically, we can expect the surest protection of and compensation for 
those Muslims wrongly accused of involvement with terrorism to come from 
the same French and European governments, especially from their courts of 
law. Such irony and paradox are what this book has sought to stress with 
its central theme of normative and policy messiness. Especially in Europe’s 
courts, but also among its citizens, both Muslim and non-Muslim, the nor-
mative sway of liberalism’s insistence on the sanctity of equal rights for each 
individual human being remains robust. And yet the prevalence of messi-
ness also means that France, despite initially deploying mainly hard power 
inside and outside of its borders, will likely explore soft -power options, in-
cluding community-based counter-terrorism. Such programs, we saw, tend 
to function best in terms of preventing violent radicalization when they re-
lax or suspend the ethical hegemony of liberalism, including the closely as-
sociated presumption of Europe’s moral superiority. Much (understandable 
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and surely consoling) self-adulation about the resilience and greatness of 
French and European civilization ensued in the immediate aft ermath of the 
attacks. Looking to the longer term, however, Europe, if it truly wishes to 
incorporate Muslims into the very essence of its identity, will have to enable 
an open and likely unsettling and uncertain dialog about why so much of its 
foreign policy seems to place lesser value on Muslim lives, whether through 
border controls, economic sanctions, military interventions, or support for 
authoritarian regimes in the Middle East.
Th e attacks of November 13, 2015 were abominable and tragic. However, 
we should not let them obscure the reality of “everyday multiculturalism,” 
namely, that millions of Muslim and non-Muslim Europeans daily man-
age to live peacefully together side by side, and they have been doing so for 
decades. Th e potential for and power of mutually agreeable cooperation far 
outweigh the forces of violence.
Berlin, November 18, 2015
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